

Global Security


THE GROWING CHALLENGES

*Proceedings of the
27th International Workshop on
Global Security*

State Secretary Rüdiger Wolf
German Federal Ministry of Defense
KEYNOTE SPEAKER

Dr. Roger Weissinger-Baylon
Workshop Chairman


Anne D. Baylon
Editor



Global Security

THE GROWING CHALLENGES

Proceedings of the 27th International Workshop on Global Security



State Secretary Rüdiger Wolf
German Federal Ministry of Defense

KEYNOTE SPEAKER

Dr. Roger Weissinger-Baylon
Workshop Chairman

Anne D. Baylon
Editor

FRONT COVER

View of the Charlottenburg Palace dome from the entrance gate.

INSIDE TITLE PAGE

The bust of Nefertiti, circa 1345 BC, attributed to the sculptor Thutmose.

BACK COVER

Night view of Frank O. Gehry's DZ Bank.

© 2010 Center for Strategic Decision Research

International Standard Book Number: 1-890664-16-2

Printed in the United States of America by Almaden Press, Mountain View, California.

Photography by Mika Shiozawa.

Photograph of inside cover (*previous page*) by Kent Rounds.

Center for Strategic Decision Research

&

Strategic Decisions Press

2456 Sharon Oaks Drive, Menlo Park, California 94025 USA

Telephone: 650/854-4751 Fax: 650/854-0761

anne@cldr.org | roger@cldr.org | www.cldr.org

WITH APPRECIATION



State Secretary Rüdiger Wolf
German Federal Ministry of Defense

KEYNOTE SPEAKER

WITH APPRECIATION



Louis Gallois
CEO, EADS

The *27th International Workshop on Global Security* is presented by the
CENTER FOR STRATEGIC DECISION RESEARCH

PRINCIPAL SPONSORS



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (NII)
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
Net Assessment



Bundesministerium
der Verteidigung

EADS

Microsoft

NORTHROP GRUMMAN

MAJOR SPONSORS



URS

THALES

MITRE



THE UNIVERSITY of TENNESSEE **UT**
NATIONAL DEFENSE BUSINESS INSTITUTE

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS OF PAST HOST AND SPONSORING GOVERNMENTS

Czech Republic | Kingdom of Denmark
Federal Republic of Germany | Republic of Hungary
Kingdom of the Netherlands | Kingdom of Norway
Republic of Greece | Republic of Poland
Republic of Portugal | Ministry of Defense of Austria
Ministry of Defense of France | Ministry of Defense of Italy
Ministry of Defense of Turkey | Canadian Armed Forces
Russian Federation's Ministry of Industry, Science & Technology

TOP ROW

Opening session of the 27th International Workshop.

from left to right

Workshop Chairman Dr. Roger Weissinger-Baylon;
General Karl-Heinz Lather, Chief of Staff (SHAPE);
Admiral Mark Fitzgerald, Commander Allied Joint Force Command, Naples;
Admiral Luciano Zappata, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Transformation;
State Secretary Rüdiger Wolf, German Federal Ministry of Defense;
Estonian Minister of Defense Jaak Aaviksoo;
Georgian Vice Prime Minister Giorgi Baramidze.

MIDDLE ROW

left photo

The Prime Minister of Albania, Dr. Sali Berisha, gives the Dinner Keynote Address on opening night.

right photo

General Karl-Heinz Lather, Chief of Staff (SHAPE) (*l*)
and Admiral Mark Fitzgerald, Commander Allied Joint Force Command, Naples (*r*).

BOTTOM ROW

left photo, from left to right

Dr. Ditmar Staffelt, Senior Vice President, EADS;
Mr. Louis Gallois, CEO, EADS, Opening Speaker;
Mr. Thomas Homberg, Corporate VP, Head of EADS Strategic Coordination.

right photo

State Secretary Rüdiger Wolf, German Federal Ministry of Defense.



TOP ROW

left photo

Participants arrive at Charlottenburg Palace for a pre-workshop evening visit and reception.

right photos

Guided tour of Charlottenburg collections.

BOTTOM ROW

Reception for the participants in Charlottenburg Palace's White Gallery.



TOP ROW

left photo

Albanian Prime Minister Dr. Sali Berisha (*l*)
and Turkish Minister of Defense Vecdi Gönül (*r*).

right photo

Admiral Luciano Zappata, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (*l*)
and Brigadier General Enzo Vecciarelli, Italian Embassy in Berlin (*r*).

MIDDLE ROW

from left to right

Workshop Chairman Dr. Roger Weissinger-Baylon;
Finnish Under Secretary of State for Foreign and Security Policy Jaakko Laajava;
Lithuanian Minister of Defense Rasa Juknevičienė;
Latvian Minister of Defense Imants Liegis;
Estonian Minister of Defense Jaak Aaviksoo.

BOTTOM ROW

left photo

Slovenian Minister of Defense Dr. Ljubica Jelušič (*l*)
and Croatian Ambassador to the United Nations Ranko Vilović (*r*).

right photo, from left to right

Workshop Chairman Dr. Roger Weissinger-Baylon;
Georgian Vice Prime Minister Giorgi Baramidze;
Dr. Edgar Buckley, Senior VP for NATO, U.N. and EU, Thales;
Former British Ambassador to NATO Sir Stewart Eldon KCMG OBE.



TOP ROW

from left to right

Ambassador Avi Primor, President of the Israel Council on Foreign Relations (ICFR) and Former Ambassador of Israel to Germany;
Professor Avishai Margalit, George F. Kennan Professor, Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton and Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem;
Mr. Ilan Halevi, Political Counselor, General Delegation of Palestine to Germany; Former Assistant Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs;
Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey.

MIDDLE ROW

left photo

Admiral Luciano Zappata, NATO Deputy Supreme Allied Commander (SACT) (*l*)
and State Secretary Pjer Šimunović, Croatian Ministry of Defense (*r*).

right photo, from left to right

Ambassador Sir Stewart Eldon KCMG OBE, Former British Ambassador to NATO;
Minister of Defense of Bosnia and Herzegovina Dr. Selmo Cikotić;
Professor Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey;
Turkish Minister of Defense Vecdi Gönül.

BOTTOM ROW

Participants arriving at the United States Embassy reception.



TOP ROW

left photo, from left to right

Ambassador Artur Kuko, Albanian Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council;
Ambassador Sorin Ducaru, Romanian Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council;
Ambassador Stefano Stefanini, Italian Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council.

right photo

Mr. Tim Bloechl, Managing Director, Worldwide Public Safety and National Security, Microsoft.

MIDDLE ROW

Participants arrive at the DZ Bank designed by Frank O. Gehry. The atrium's spectacular glass shell covers the main banquet room.

BOTTOM ROW

left photo

Lieutenant General Ulrich Wolf, former Director of NATO CIS Agency (*l*)
and Professor Dr. Holger H. Mey, Advanced Concepts, CASSIDIAN (*r*).

right photo

Mr. Kent Rounds, McAfee Vice President Public Sector (*l*)
and Mr. Robert Lentz, former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (*r*).



TOP ROW

from left to right

Mr. Peter Flory, NATO Assistant Secretary General for Defense Investment;
Professor Dr. Holger H. Mey, Advanced Concepts, CASSIDIAN;
Workshop Chairman Dr. Roger Weissinger-Baylon;
Mr. Robert Lentz, former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense;
Estonian Minister of Defense Jaak Aaviksoo;
Mr. Brad Boston, Senior Vice President, Cisco.

MIDDLE ROW

Turkish Minister of Defense Vecdi Gönül gives a Key Dinner Address in the banquet room of the DZ Bank.


BOTTOM ROW

left photo, from left to right

Lieutenant General David Bill, U.K. Military Representative to NATO and the EU;
General Rainer Schuwirth, former Chief of Staff, Supreme headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE);
Lieutenant General Jürgen Bornemann, German Military Representative to NATO and the EU;
Lieutenant General Patrick de Rousiers, French Military Representative to NATO and the EU;
Lieutenant General Gian Piero Ristori, Italian Military Representative to NATO and the EU.

right photo, from left to right

Ms. Teresa Gera, Executive Director, Global Reach;
Ms. Renée Acosta, President and CEO, Global Impact;
Mr. Rabih Torbay, Senior Vice President for Programs, International Medical Corps.



TOP ROW

Private visit of the newly reopened Neues Museum on Museum Island.

MIDDLE ROW

left photo

Ambassador Klaus Peter Gottwald, German Federal Foreign Office (*l*)
and Ambassador Maged A. Abdelaziz, Egyptian Ambassador to the U.N. (*r*).

right photo

Lieutenant General P K Singh, Director, United Service Institution of India (*l*)
and General Karl-Heinz Lather, Chief of Staff (SHAPE) (*r*).

BOTTOM ROW

from left to right

Mr. William Ennis, Director, International Programs, Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems;
Dr. Scott Harris, President, Continental Europe, Lockheed Martin Global, Inc.;
Mr. Alfred Volkman, Director for International Cooperation, Office of the U.S. Undersecretary of Defense;
Dr. Edgar Buckley, Senior Vice President, Thales;
Mr. Thomas Homberg, Corporate Vice President, Head of EADS Strategic Coordination.



TOP ROW

left photo

Brigadier General Vello Loemaa, Estonian Military Representative to NATO (*l*)
and Major General Cai Bingkui, Vice Chairman, China Institute for International Strategic Studies (Beijing) (*r*).

middle photo

Ambassador Jaromir Novotny, Czech Ambassador to Japan (*l*)
and Ambassador Omar Samad, Afghan Ambassador to France (*r*).

right photo

Professor Linton Wells II, Director, Center for Technology and National Security Policy (TNSP), National Defense University (*l*)
and Ambassador Borys Tarasyuk, Chairman, Ukrainian Parliamentary Committee for European Integration (*r*).

BOTTOM ROW

Buffet reception in the Treppenhalle of the Neues Museum.



TOP ROW

from left to right

Former British Ambassador to NATO Sir Stewart Eldon KCMG OBE;
Ambassador Rogelio Pfirter, Director-General, OPCW;
Workshop Chairman Dr. Roger Weissinger-Baylon;
Ambassador Jorge Argüello, Argentine Ambassador to the United Nations;
Ambassador Dr. Everton Vieira Vargas, Brazilian Ambassador to Germany.

MIDDLE ROW

left and right photos

Tour of the Neues Museum collections.


BOTTOM ROW

left photo, from left to right

Mr. David Swindle, Executive President, URS Federal Services;
Mr. Fred Spivey (*standing*), Defense Consultant;
Lieutenant General Mike McDuffie (Ret.), Vice President, U.S. Public Sector Services, Microsoft;
Mr. James Heath, President, Northrop Grumman ESI, Inc.

right photo, from left to right

Mr. J. David Patterson, University of Tennessee;
Ambassador Linas Linkevičius, Lithuanian Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council;
Ambassador Dr. Jean-Jacques de Dardel, Swiss Ambassador to NATO and to Belgium;
Ambassador István Kovács, Hungarian Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council.



TOP ROW

left photo

Dr. Edward Ifft, Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University (*l*)
and Colonel Robert Dickey, Defense Threat Reduction Agency (*r*).

middle photo

Mr. Kevin Scheid, Deputy Manager, NATO C3 Agency (*l*)
and Lieutenant General Ulrich Wolf, German Federal Ministry of Defense (*r*).

right photo

Professor Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey (*l*)
and Rear Admiral Hakan Eraydın, Head of Plans and Policy Dept, Turkish Defense Ministry (*r*).

MIDDLE ROW

left photo, from left to right

Mr. Terry Morgan, Director, Netcentric Initiatives, Cisco;
Mr. Eyal Bavli, Cisco Systems, Inc., Director, European Public Sector;
Mr. Brad Boston, Senior Vice President, Cisco.

right photo, from left to right

Mr. J. David Patterson, University of Tennessee;
Dr. Scott Harris, President, Continental Europe, Lockheed Martin;
Mrs. Martha Harris;
Mr. Raymond Haller, Senior Vice President and Director, DoD C3I FFRDC, the Mitre Corporation.

BOTTOM ROW

left photo, from left to right

Ambassador Jorge Argüello, Argentinian Ambassador to the United Nations;
Major General Arian Zaimi, Albanian Military Representative to NATO;
Vice Prime Minister of Georgia Giorgi Baramidze.

right photo, from left to right

Mr. Martin Slijkhuis, Public Safety & National Security WE, Microsoft;
Lieutenant General Mike McDuffie (Ret.), Vice President, U.S. Public Sector Services, Microsoft;
Mr. Wayne Phillips, Defense Industry Solutions Director, Public Sector HQ, Microsoft Corporation;
Mr. Tim Bloechl, Managing Director, Worldwide Public Safety and National Security, Microsoft;
Brigadier General (Ret.) Dieter Löchel, Microsoft Corporation.



Table of Contents

Chapter 1. Keynote Address: Global Security—The Growing Challenges **1**

German State Secretary Rüdiger Wolf

CONTEMPORARY THREATS AND RISKS	1
CORNERSTONES OF STABILITY AND SECURITY	1
NATO	2
Planning and Conducting Operations	2
Lessons Learned, Training, Education, and Exercises	3
Enhancing Cooperation with External Actors	3
Public Messaging or Strategic Communications	3
Stabilization and Reconstruction	3
THE EU	3
Dimensions of the Comprehensive Approach	3
Cooperation and Partnership	4
CONCLUDING REMARKS	4

Chapter 2. Opening Address: Global Security—The Growing Challenges **5**

Mr. Louis Gallois, CEO, EADS

THE NEW SECURITY CHALLENGES LINKED TO GLOBALIZATION	5
EADS AND THE INDUSTRY	5
THE NEED FOR STATE AND GOVERNMENT CUSTOMERS	6
CLOSING REMARKS	6

Chapter 3. Security and Development: An Albanian Perspective **7**

His Excellency Dr. Sali Berisha, Prime Minister of Albania

ALBANIA'S PATH TO DEVELOPMENT	7
Overcoming Problems of Crime and Corruption	7
Development Efforts	8
THE CURRENT POLITICAL CLIMATE	8
Future Outlook for Kosovo and Macedonia	9
ALBANIA'S FUTURE IN NATO	9

Chapter 4. Key Dinner Address **11**

His Excellency Vecdi Gönül, Minister of Defense of Turkey

THE GLOBALIZATION OF PROBLEMS	11
REGIONAL INSTABILITIES AS GLOBAL THREATS	12

Chapter 5. Georgia and the Black Sea Region **15**

His Excellency Giorgi Baramidze, Vice Prime Minister of Georgia

OPENING REMARKS.....	15
THE IMPORTANCE AND CONCERNS OF THE BLACK SEA REGION AND GEORGIA.....	15
THE EFFECTS OF NATO AND EU MEMBERSHIP.....	16

Chapter 6. Changes in Ukraine and Their Implications for Security in Europe **17**

Ambassador Borys Tarasyuk, former Foreign Minister of Ukraine

OPENING REMARKS.....	17
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE	17
ILLEGITIMATE ACTIONS OF THE CURRENT AUTHORITIES.....	17
THE BLACK SEA FLEET AND RUSSIA-UKRAINE “RECONCILIATION”	18
NON-BLOCK STATUS	18
CONCLUDING REMARKS	19

Chapter 7. The Situation in the Balkan Region **21**

Her Excellency Dr. Ljubica Jelusič, Minister of Defense of Slovenia

THE SITUATION IN THE BALKANS.....	21
COMMONALITIES BETWEEN THE BALKANS AND THE BALTIC REGION	22

Chapter 8. National, NATO, and EU Security Strategies **23**

His Excellency Anu Anguelov, Minister of Defense of Bulgaria

OPENING REMARKS.....	23
THE NEED FOR SECURITY SYNERGY.....	23
Conceptual Synergy.....	23
Practical Synergy.....	24
STRENGTHENING COOPERATION.....	24
MILITARY COOPERATION AND REGIONAL INITIATIVES.....	24
CONCLUDING REMARKS	25

Chapter 9. Interdependence in International Relations: Views from Bosnia and Herzegovina **27**

Dr. Selmo Cikotić, Defense Minister of Bosnia and Herzegovina

INTERDEPENDENCE IS THE MAJOR FEATURE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS	27
CONCERNS AND CHANGES IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA.....	27
WORKING WITH NATO AND THE EU	28

CONCLUDING REMARKS..... 28

Chapter 10. Southeastern Europe: Successes and Challenges **29**

State Secretary Pjer Šimunović, Croatian Ministry of Defense

SUCCESS IN SOUTHEAST EUROPE..... 29
CHANGES IN THE COOPERATION PROCESS..... 29
FACING REGIONAL THREATS 30
CONCLUDING REMARKS..... 30

Chapter 11. Security in the Baltic Region **31**

His Excellency Jaak Aaviksoo, Minister of Defense of Estonia

SECURITY IN THE BALTIC SEA AREA..... 31
THREAT PERCEPTIONS..... 31
HOW DOES THE BALTIC SEA REGION ADDRESS THE SECURITY SITUATION? 32

Chapter 12. Security in the Baltic Region **33**

His Excellency Imants Liegis, Minister of Defense of Latvia

TWENTY YEARS AGO..... 33
TEN YEARS AGO 33
TODAY: THE NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT 34

Chapter 13. Security in the Baltic Region **35**

Her Excellency Rasa Juknevičienė, Minister of Defense of Lithuania

A UNIQUE MOMENT IN HISTORY FOR PROSPERITY AND STABILITY 35
RUSSIA'S ROLE IN THE NORTHERN REGION 35
A CRUCIAL STRONG TRANSATLANTIC LINK 36
DOING OUR HOMEWORK..... 36

Chapter 14. Achieving Security and Prosperity in the Balkans and the Black Sea Regions **37**

Ambassador Stefano Stefanini, Permanent Representative of Italy on the North Atlantic Council

OPENING REMARKS 37

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE REGIONS.....	37
CONCLUDING REMARKS.....	37

Chapter 15. Achieving Security and Prosperity in the Balkans and the Black Sea Region 39

Ambassador Sorin Ducaru, Permanent Representative of Romania on the North Atlantic Council

THE BALKANS	39
THE BLACK SEA REGION.....	40

Chapter 16. Achieving Security and Prosperity in the Balkans and the Black Sea Region 41

Ambassador Ranko Viločić, Croatian Ambassador to the United Nations

REGIONAL COOPERATION IN SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE	41
GLOBALIZATION AND THREATS.....	41
ACHIEVEMENTS AND STALEMATES IN KOSOVO AND BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA.....	42
CONCLUDING REMARKS.....	42

Chapter 17. Achieving Security and Prosperity in the Balkans and the Black Sea Region 43

Ambassador Artur Kuko, Permanent Representative of Albania on the North Atlantic Council

OPENING REMARKS	43
COOPERATION BETWEEN THE BALKANS AND THE BLACK SEA REGION.....	43
ORIENTATIONS AND MEMBERSHIPS.....	43
BRINGING THE REGION CLOSER TO NATO AND THE EU.....	44
THE POTENTIAL OF KOSOVO.....	44
CONCLUDING REMARKS.....	44

Chapter 18. Security in the Baltic Region 45

Under-Secretary of State Jaakko Laajava, Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Chapter 19. The Future Challenges 47

General Karl-Heinz Lather, Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE)

THE NEED FOR NEW, ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS.....	47
KEY POINTS OF THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH	47
CONCLUDING REMARKS.....	48

Chapter 20. Overview of Future Challenges **49**

Admiral Luciano Zappata, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Transformation

STRATEGIC THINKING.....	49
IMPROVING CAPABILITIES	50
THE MANY ASPECTS OF INTEROPERABILITY	50
THE IMPORTANCE OF DEVELOPING TRUST AND MAINTAINING DIALOGUE.....	50

Chapter 21. Threats and Concerns in Africa: What It Means for NATO **51**

Admiral Mark Fitzgerald, Commander Allied Joint Force Command, Naples

THREATS AND ISSUES OF CONCERN IN AFRICA	51
HOW DOES NATO FIT IN?	52
WHAT CONTRIBUTIONS WILL NATO MAKE?	52
NATO AND THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH	53
CONCLUDING REMARKS.....	53

Chapter 22. Strategies for the New Challenges: Cyber Security and Climate Change **55**

Lieutenant General Jürgen Bornemann, German Military Representative to NATO and the EU

AN OVERVIEW OF THE NEW CHALLENGES	55
THE THREAT TO CYBER SECURITY	56
THE CHALLENGE OF CLIMATE CHANGE	56

Chapter 23. Resources and the Comprehensive/Hybrid Approach **57**

Lieutenant General David Bill, United Kingdom Military Representative to NATO and the EU

THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH.....	57
Key Messages.....	57
Calling for Wider Action and Highlighting Selling Points	57
RESOURCES	58
Achieving More Value for the Money	58
Increasing Interoperability.....	58
Detailing Requirements and Surpluses.....	58
Investing in C4ISR.....	58

Chapter 24. Missile Defense and Strategic Communications **59**

Lieutenant General Patrick de Rousiers, French Military Representative to NATO and the EU

MISSILE DEFENSE.....	59
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION	60

Chapter 25. The Vital EU/NATO Relationship and the Role of Energy in Security **61**

Lieutenant General Gian Piero Ristori, Italian Military Representative to NATO and the EU

THE VITAL NATO/EU RELATIONSHIP	61
THE ENERGY SECURITY PROBLEM.....	62

Chapter 26. Preparing and Working Together to Save Lives **63**

Mr. Rabih Torbay, Senior Vice President for Programs, International Medical Corps

HAITI: AN EMERGENCY IN A PERMISSIVE ENVIRONMENT	64
AFGHANISTAN: A COMPLEX EMERGENCY IN A NON-PERMISSIVE SETTING	65

Chapter 27. Civil-Military Partnerships—Some Guiding Principles for Success **69**

Ms. Teresa Gera, Executive Director, Global Reach

THE NEED FOR CIVIL-MILITARY PARTNERSHIPS.....	69
THE PARTNERSHIPS' ROLE	69
GUIDING PRINCIPLES TO IMPLEMENT SUCCESSFUL PARTNERSHIPS	70
CONCLUDING REMARKS.....	70

Chapter 28. Cyber Security and the Spreading Challenges **71**

Mr. Robert Lentz, Former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense

OPENING REMARKS	71
EARLY ADAPTION TO THE INTERNET	71
THE DUAL-EDGED SWORD OF NEEDING INFORMATION AND NEEDING TO SECURE IT	72
CYBER SECURITY AS A GAME CHANGER	72
CONCLUDING REMARKS.....	72

Chapter 29. Technology Innovation in the Global Security Environment **73**

Mr. Tim Bloechl, Managing Director, Worldwide Public Safety & National Security, Microsoft

Cloud Computing.....	75
Social Networking	75

Unified Communications	75
Changes in User Interfaces	76

Chapter 30. Remarks on the Crucial Importance of Security for Information Technology 77

Lieutenant General Ulrich Wolf, Former Director of NATO CIS Agency

Chapter 31. Cyber Security and the Spreading Challenges 79

His Excellency Jaak Aaviksoo, Minister of Defense of Estonia

CYBER SECURITY IS BOTH A DOMESTIC DANGER AND A NATIONAL SECURITY THREAT	79
HOW TO ORGANIZE NATIONALLY AND INTERNATIONALLY FOR CYBER SECURITY	79
THE NEED FOR PUBLIC AWARENESS OF THE CYBER SECURITY THREAT	80

Chapter 32. Cyber Security and the Spreading Challenges 83

Mr. Brad Boston, Senior Vice President, Cisco

OPENING REMARKS	83
FOCUSING ON THE ENTIRE PROBLEM	83
UNDERSTANDING HOW TO DEPLOY TECHNOLOGY.....	83
LOOKING AT THE BIG PICTURE.....	84
MANAGING THE SUPPLY CHAIN.....	84
THE EFFECTS OF LEGISLATION, CERTIFICATION, AND STANDARDS	84

Chapter 33. Will Computers Convince Us That We Are Superfluous? 87

Professor Dr. Holger H. Mey, Vice President Advanced Concepts, CASSIDIAN

THE EVOLUTION OF DECISION-MAKING SUPPORT SYSTEMS.....	87
THE HUMAN ROLE IN A TECHNOLOGY-BASED SOCIETY	88
STRIKING THE RIGHT BALANCE	88
CONCLUDING REMARKS.....	89

Chapter 34. Cyber Security and the Spreading Challenges 91

Mr. Peter Flory, NATO Assistant Secretary General for Defense Investment

OPENING REMARKS	91
THE GROUP OF EXPERTS REPORT AND THE FUTURE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT	91
CHANGING “HUMAN SOFTWARE”	92

CONCLUDING REMARKS.....	93
Chapter 35. Nuclear Disarmament: Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty	95
<i>Ambassador Maged A. Abdelaziz, Egyptian Ambassador to the United Nations</i>	
GLOBAL ISSUES.....	95
REGIONAL ISSUES.....	96
Chapter 36. Toward a Common Approach to Nuclear Disarmament: the NPT Treaty	97
<i>Ambassador Klaus Peter Gottwald, Federal Commissioner for Disarmament and Arms Control</i>	
Chapter 37. Security in the Middle East: Views from Israel and Palestine	99
<i>Professor Avishai Margalit, George F. Kennan Professor, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton</i>	
THE EVOLVING NATURE OF THE CONFLICT	99
OBSTACLES TO A PEACEFUL SOLUTION	99
THE POLITICAL SITUATION AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR PEACE	100
Chapter 38. Security as the Key to Peace in the Middle East	101
<i>Ambassador Avi Primor, President of the Israel Council on Foreign Relations (ICFR)</i>	
OPENING REMARKS	101
THE ELEMENTS THAT HAVE PREVENTED PEACE.....	101
A NEW OUTLOOK.....	102
THE NEED FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.....	102
Chapter 39. Solving the Palestinian Question: Ending the Blockade of Gaza Is a Priority	103
<i>Mr. Ilan Halevi, Political Counselor, General Delegation of Palestine to Germany</i>	
OPENING REMARKS	103
SOLVING THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION.....	103
MOVING AWAY FROM CONFLICT	104
CONCLUDING REMARKS.....	104

Chapter 40. Dealing with Crises in Afghanistan and Pakistan **105**

General Karl-Heinz Lather, Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE)

OUR MISSION IN AFGHANISTAN	105
PAKISTAN	106
WHERE ARE WE?.....	107

Chapter 41. An ACT Perspective on the Situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan **109**

Admiral Luciano Zappata, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Transformation

THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT IN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN	109
ACHIEVING THE RIGHT BALANCE BETWEEN REACTION AND ANTICIPATION	109
WHAT ARE THE CAPABILITIES THAT NATO MUST DEVELOP?	110
THE COLLABORATION WITH INDUSTRY	110
ACT'S OTHER AREAS OF CONTRIBUTION	110

Chapter 42. Dealing with Crises in Afghanistan and Pakistan: Military Perspectives **113**

Lieutenant General P.K. Singh, PVSM, AVSM (ret), Director, United Service Institution of India

OPENING REMARKS	113
AFGHANISTAN	113
Key Issues for Partners	114
PAKISTAN	115
CONCLUDING REMARKS	116

Chapter 43. Views on Afghanistan **117**

Ambassador Jaromír Novotný, Czech Ambassador to Japan

OPENING REMARKS	117
NATO AND EU PROBLEMS IN AFGHANISTAN	117

Chapter 44. Strategic Fine-Tuning to Assure Mission Success in Afghanistan **119**

Ambassador Omar Samad, Ambassador of Afghanistan to France

THE CURRENT SITUATION	119
THE PRIOR SITUATION	119
LEARNING FROM THE PAST	120

CHANGES IN 2010	120
CONTINUING CHALLENGES	120

Chapter 45. The Process Toward Peace and Economic Reconstruction in Afghanistan **123**

Major General (Ret.) Cai Bingkui, China Institute for International Strategic Studies (Beijing)

FOREIGN MILITARY INVOLVEMENT	123
THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY	123
CHINA-AFGHANISTAN RELATIONS	124

Chapter 46. Dealing with the Challenges in Afghanistan and Pakistan **125**

Mr. Alfred Volkman, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, & Logistics)

OPENING REMARKS	125
COPING WITH LIMITED AND SHRINKING DEFENSE RESOURCES	125
PREPARING FOR PROBABLE THREATS	126

Chapter 47. Convergence Between Defense and Security—How Can Industry Support It? **127**

Mr. Thomas Homberg, Corporate Vice President, Head of EADS Strategic Coordination

THE CHALLENGES WE FACE	127
SUGGESTED APPROACHES	128
THE CONSEQUENCES FOR INDUSTRY AND GOVERNMENTS	128
THE NEED FOR COOPERATION AND DISCUSSION	128
CONCLUDING REMARKS	128

Chapter 48. How Can the International Defense Industry Contribute? **129**

Mr. William Ennis, Director, International Programs, Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems

DEFINING CAPABILITY REQUIREMENTS WITH A BUSINESS-DEVELOPMENT APPROACH	129
USING FIELD TRIALS	129
QUICKLY IDENTIFYING SOLUTIONS	130
CONCLUDING REMARKS	130

Chapter 49. Dealing with Challenges in Afghanistan and Pakistan **131**

Dr. Scott Harris, President, Continental Europe, Lockheed Martin Global, Inc.

OPENING REMARKS	131
RESPONDING TO THE ASYMMETRIC THREAT	131

THE NEED FOR FOCUS AND TEAMWORK.....	132
--------------------------------------	-----

Chapter 50. Industry’s Crucial Role in C4ISR **133**

Dr. Edgar Buckley, Senior Vice President for NATO, U.N., and EU, Thales

THE IMPORTANCE OF C4ISR.....	133
ISAF CIS.....	133
QUESTIONS ON PLANNING AND STRATEGY.....	134
THE NEED FOR A ONE-TEAM, ONE-MISSION APPROACH.....	134

Chapter 51. Resolving the Malvinas Islands Issues **135**

Ambassador Jorge Argüello, Ambassador of Argentine to the United Nations

THE HISTORY OF THE MALVINAS DISPUTE	135
NEGOTIATING A SOLUTION.....	135
THE NEED FOR POLITICAL WILL ON BOTH SIDES	136
CONCLUDING REMARKS.....	136

Chapter 52. Climate Change and Security **137**

Ambassador Dr. Everton Vieira Vargas, Brazilian Ambassador to Germany

OPENING REMARKS	137
INTERNATIONAL ORDER AND ITS EFFECT ON SECURITY	137
THE NEED FOR A NEW WAY OF THINKING	138
CONCLUDING REMARKS.....	138

Chapter 53. Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Personal View **139**

Amb. Rogelio Pfirter, Director General, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

OPENING REMARKS	139
PROGRESS TOWARD NONPROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT.....	139
Nuclear Disarmament	139
Chemical Weapons.....	140
Nonproliferation	140
Biological Weapons	140

Chapter 54. The Way Ahead **141**

Ambassador Dr. Jean-Jacques de Dardel, Ambassador of Switzerland to NATO and to Belgium

HANDLING COMPLEXITY.....	141
THE NEED FOR FLEXIBILITY.....	141
CONCLUDING REMARKS.....	142

Chapter 55. Global Security—the Way Ahead **143**

Ambassador Linas Linkevičius, Permanent Representative of Lithuania to NATO

OPENING REMARKS.....	143
ENSURING NATO MEMBERS' SECURITY.....	143
REACHING OUT TO PARTNERS.....	143
NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONS.....	144
CONCLUDING REMARKS.....	144

Chapter 56. The Way Ahead **145**

Ambassador István Kovács, Permanent Representative of Hungary on the North Atlantic Council

ACT, THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT, AND AFGHANISTAN.....	145
THE NEED FOR REFORM AND TO BE PREPARED.....	145
RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA AND THE UKRAINE.....	146
CONCLUDING REMARKS.....	146

Chapter 57. Global Economic Health and Global Security Are Inseparable **147**

Mr. J. David Patterson, National Defense Business Institute, University of Tennessee

ABSTRACT.....	147
INTRODUCTION.....	147
DISCUSSION.....	147
Economic Health of Alliance Nations.....	148
The Effect of Stressed Economies on Global Security.....	149
CONCLUSIONS.....	151

Contributors

His Excellency Jaak Aaviksoo
Estonian Minister of Defense

Ambassador Maged A. Abdelaziz
Egyptian Ambassador to the U.N.

Ms. Renée S. Acosta
President & CEO, Global Impact

Ambassador Jorge Argüello
Argentinian Ambassador to the U.N.

Colonel Adil Ayaz
Office of the Turkish Minister of Defense

Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı
Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey

His Excellency Giorgi Baramidze
Vice Prime Minister of Georgia

Mr. Hans-Peter Bauer
Vice President, EMEA, McAfee

Mr. Eyal Bavli
Cisco Systems, Inc., Director, European Public Sector

Ms. Anne D. Baylon
Co-Director, Center for Strategic Decision Research

His Excellency Prof. Dr. Sali Berisha
Prime Minister of Albania

Lieutenant General David Bill
U.K. Military Representative to NATO and EU

Mr. Tim Bloechl
Managing Director, Worldwide Public Safety & National Security, Microsoft Corporation

Lieutenant General Jürgen Bornemann
German Military Representative to NATO and EU

Mr. Brad Boston
Senior Vice President, Cisco

Dr. Edgar Buckley
Senior Vice President for NATO, UN, and EU, Thales

Ambassador Mindaugas Butkus
Lithuanian Ambassador to Germany

Major General Cai Bingkui (Ret.)
Vice Chairman, China International Institute for Strategic Studies (CIISS)

Mr. Mike Carpenter
Senior Vice President, Public Sector, McAfee

His Excellency Dr. Selmo Cikotić
Minister of Defense of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Ambassador Jean-Jacques de Dardel
Swiss Ambassador to Belgium and to NATO

Mr. Greg Delawie
Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy Berlin

Colonel Robert Dickey
Defense Threat Reduction Agency

Colonel Erdal Dodurga
Chief of Cabinet, Turkish Minister of Defense

Ambassador Dumitru Sorin Ducaru
Romanian Permanent Representative to NATO

Mr. Richard Ekwall
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), The Hague, Netherlands

Ambassador Sir Stewart Eldon KCMG OBE
Former British Ambassador to NATO

Mr. William Ennis
Director, International Programs, Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems

Rear Admiral Hakan Eraydın
Head of General Plans and Policy Department, Turkish Ministry of Defense

Dr. Werner Fasslabend
President, Austrian Institute for European Security Policy (AIES), former Minister of Defense of Austria

Admiral Mark Fitzgerald
*Commander, Allied Joint Force Command (Naples); Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe; and
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Africa*

Assistant Secretary General Peter Flory
NATO Assistant Secretary General for Defense Investment

Mr. Harald Förg
Manager Sales and Customer Relations, EUROCOPTER

Mr. Louis Gallois
CEO, EADS

Ms. Teresa Gera
Executive Director, Global Reach

Mr. Bernhard Gerwert
CEO, CASSIDIAN Air Systems

Mr. Senahid Godinjak
Chief of Cabinet, Office of the Defense Minister of Bosnia and Herzegovina

His Excellency Vecdi Gönül
Turkish Minister of Defense

Mr. Darko Göttlicher
Head of the Center for Education, Croatian Ministry of the Interior

Ambassador Peter Gottwald
Commissioner of the Federal Government for Arms Control and Disarmament, German Federal Foreign Office

Mr. Ilan Halevi
Political Advisor, Delegation of Palestine to Germany

Mr. Raymond Haller
Senior Vice President and Director, DoD C3I FFRDC, The MITRE Corporation

Dr. Scott Harris
President, Continental Europe, Lockheed Martin

Mr. James Heath
President, Northrop Grumman ESI, Inc.

Mr. Tom Holter
Deputy Director General, Security Policy Department, Norwegian Ministry of Defense

Mr. Thomas Homberg
Corporate Vice President, Head of EADS Strategic Coordination

Mr. Glori Husi
Political Adviser of the Prime Minister of Albania

Ms. Huang Lei
Assistant Research Fellow, China Institute for International Strategic Studies

Dr. Edward Ifft
Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University

Her Excellency Dr. Ljubica Jelušič
Slovenian Minister of Defense

Her Excellency Rasa Juknevičienė
Lithuanian Minister of Defense

Ambassador Kamil Khasiyev
Head of the Mission of Azerbaijan to NATO

Mr. Robert Kosla
Microsoft, Director, National Security and Defense

Ambassador István Kovács
Hungarian Ambassador to NATO

Ambassador Artur Kuko
Albanian Ambassador to NATO

Mr. Jaakko Laajava
Under Secretary of State, Finnish Foreign Ministry

Ambassador Mart Laanemae
Estonian Ambassador to Germany

General Karl-Heinz Lather
Chief of Staff, SHAPE

Mr. Robert Lentz
Former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Cyber, Information, and Identity Assurance)

His Excellency Imants Lieģis
Latvian Minister of Defense

Ambassador Linas Linkevičius
Lithuanian Ambassador to NATO

Brigadier General (Ret.) Dieter Löchel
Microsoft Corporation

Brigadier General Vello Loemaa
Estonian Military Representative to NATO

Ambassador Jüri Luik
Estonian Ambassador to NATO

Professor Avishai Margalit
*George F. Kennan Professor, Institute of Advanced Studies, Princeton University and
Professor Emeritus, Hebrew University of Jerusalem*

Lieutenant General Mike McDuffie (Ret.)
Vice President, U.S. Public Sector Services, Microsoft

Professor Dr. Holger H. Mey
Vice President Advanced Concepts, CASSIDIAN

Mr. Terry Morgan
Director, Netcentric Initiatives, Cisco

Ambassador Philip Murphy
United States Ambassador to Germany

Mr. Rolf H. Neumann
Regional Director—Germany, Rolls-Royce International Ltd.

Ambassador Jaromír Novotný
Czech Ambassador to Japan

Mr. Derek Offer
Cisco Systems, Director, Public Sector

Ambassador Nurlan Onzhanov
Kazakhstani Ambassador to Germany

Brigadier A.K. Pant
Indian Defense Attaché, Berlin

Mr. J. David Patterson
Executive Director, National Defense Business Institute, University of Tennessee

Ambassador Ivo Petrov
Bulgarian Ambassador to Germany

Ambassador Rogelio Pfrter
Director-General, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

Mr. Wayne Phillips
Defense Industry Solutions Director, Public Sector HQ, Microsoft Corporation

Ambassador Avi Primor
Former Ambassador of Israel to Germany and President of the Israel Council on Foreign Relations

Dr. Bernhard Rabert
Vice President Defence and Security Affairs, Head of Corporate Representative Office Berlin, EADS Deutschland GmbH

Lieutenant General Gian Piero Ristori
Italian Military Representative to NATO and EU

Mr. Kent Rounds
McAfee Vice President Public Sector

Lieutenant General Patrick de Rousiers
French Military Representative to NATO and EU

Ambassador Omar Samad
Ambassador of Afghanistan to France

Vice Admiral Ferdinando Sanfelice di Monteforte
Former Italian Military Representative to NATO

Mr. Kevin J. Scheid
Deputy Manager, NATO C3 Agency

Dr. Ulrich Stefan Schlie
Director of the Policy Planning Staff, German Ministry of Defense

Minister Jörg Schönbohm
Former Interior Minister, German Federal State of Brandenburg

General Rainer Schuwirth
Former Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE)

Mr. Aljosa Selan
Head of the Euro-Atlantic Department, Slovenian Defense Ministry

Ambassador Parviz Shahbazov
Azerbaijani Ambassador to Germany

Ms. Salome Shapakidze
Deputy Head of Department, European and Euro-Atlantic Integration

State Secretary Pjer Šimunović
Croatian Ministry of Defense

Lt. General P. K. Singh, PVSM, AVSM (Ret.)
Director, United Service Institution of India

Mr. Martin Slijkhuis
Public Safety & National Security WE, Microsoft

Mr. Fred Spivey
Defense Consultant

Ambassador Stefano Stefanini
Italian Permanent Representative to NATO

Ambassador Veselin Šuković
Head of the Mission of Montenegro to NATO

Mr. David Swindle
Executive Vice President, URS Federal Services

His Excellency Borys Tarasyuk
Chairman, Parliamentary Committee for European Integration and Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine

Mr. Rabih Torbay
Vice President, International Operations, International Medical Corps

Brigadier General Christine Turner
Former Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff Defence Planning ACT, Staff Element Europe

Lieutenant General Ton van Loon
Commander, 1 (German/Netherlands) Corps

Ms. Riina Vandre
Advisor to the Estonian Minister of Defense

Ambassador Everton Vieira Vargas
Brazilian Ambassador to Germany

Brigadier General Enzo Vecciarelli
Italian Embassy, Berlin

Ambassador Ranko Vilović
Croatian Ambassador to the U.N.

Mr. Alfred Volkman
Director for International Cooperation, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense

Ms. Grace Washburn
Office of the Director of International Cooperation, U.S. Department of Defense

Dr. Roger Weissinger-Baylon
Workshop Chairman and Founder; Co-Director, Center for Strategic Decision Research

Dr. Lin Wells II
Director, Center for Technology and Policy Research, National Defense University

Vice Admiral Geoffrey Wieringa
Director, U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency

State Secretary Rüdiger Wolf
German Federal Ministry of Defense

Lieutenant General Ulrich Wolf (Ret.)
Former Director, NATO Communication and Information Systems Services Agency (NCSA)

Major General Arian Zaimi
Albanian Military Representative to NATO

Admiral Luciano Zappata
NATO Deputy Supreme Allied Commander

Principal Supporting Staff

Colonel James A. Brown
Defense Attaché, U.S. Embassy to Germany

Mr. Chris Charveron
Deputy Chief, Office of Defense Cooperation, U.S. Embassy to Germany

Captain Paolo Frare (Italian Navy)
Office of the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Transformation

Colonel Timothy Malinski
Chief, Office of Defense Cooperation, U.S. Embassy to Germany

Mr. William Moeller, III
Political-Military Officer, U.S. Embassy to Germany

Colonel Richard Naughton
Senior Official, U.S. Embassy to Germany

Captain Paolo Pezzutti (Italian Navy)
Office of the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Transformation

Captain Pierluigi Quattrone (Italian Navy)
Navy Attaché, Italian Embassy to Germany

Observers

Lieutenant Colonel Srečko Karba
Defense Attaché, Slovenian Embassy to Germany

Mr. Martynas Lukoševičius
Third Secretary, Lithuanian Embassy to Germany

Ms. Dana Marca
Political Counsellor, Romanian Embassy to Germany

Mr. Kristjan Moora
Defence Attaché, Estonian Embassy to Germany

Ms. Anna-Maria Praks
Defence Policy Counsellor, Estonian Embassy to Germany

Captain (DEU A) Jens Rohmoser
ADC to Chief of Staff SHAPE

Mr. Nurlan Sabyrbayev
Kazakhstani Deputy Defense Attaché

Preface and Acknowledgments

Anne D. Baylon
Co-Director, Center for Strategic Decision Research

WORKSHOP SPECIAL ADDRESSES

The 27th International Workshop on Global Security took place in Berlin, Germany, on 4–7 June 2010, the sixth of our workshop series to be held in Germany. The theme was “Global Security—the Growing Challenges.” We are very grateful to German Minister of Defense Dr. Karl-Theodor Freiherr zu Guttenberg for his support and to State Secretary Rüdiger Wolf, who gave the keynote address on behalf of his minister.

We would also like to thank some of the principal speakers of the workshop, including Mr. Louis Gallois, CEO of EADS, who gave the opening key address; Albanian Prime Minister Dr. Sali Berisha; Turkish Defense Minister Vecdi Gonül; and Georgian Vice Prime Minister Giorgi Baramidze. In addition, we greatly appreciate the presentations on the theme of “Security in the Baltic Region” by Estonian Defense Minister Jaak Aaviksoo, Latvian Defense Minister Imants Liegis, and Lithuanian Defense Minister Rasa Juknevičienė, as well as the presentations on “Security and Prosperity in the Balkans and the Black Sea Region” by Slovenian Defense Minister Dr. Ljubica Jelusič, Bulgarian Defense Minister Anu Angelov, Bosnia and Herzegovina Defense Minister Dr. Selmo Cikotić, and Croatian State Secretary Pjer Simunovic, who spoke on behalf of Croatian Defense Minister Branko Vukelić. We are very grateful as well for the remarkable contributions of the Senior NATO Commanders’ panel that marked the start of the workshop. In turn, General Karl-Heinz Lather, Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe; Admiral Luciano Zappata, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Transformation; and Admiral Mark Fitzgerald, Commander Allied Joint Force Command, Naples, gave their personal assessment of the future challenges.

WORKSHOP VENUES

Charlottenburg Palace. For participants who arrived early, on 4 June, a private visit and reception was held at the Charlottenburg Palace. Built in 1699 for Sophie Charlotte, the wife of the Elector of Brandenburg, the palace was expanded in 1740 by Frederick the Great. Nearly destroyed during World War II, it has been returned to its former glory and beauty.

United States Embassy in Berlin. On Saturday, 5 June, U.S. Ambassador Philip D. Murphy hosted a reception for the workshop participants in the inner courtyard of the United States Embassy. Officially opened on 4 July 2008, the embassy stands on the very location it occupied before World War II, at Pariser Platz 2; it is bordered by the historic Brandenburg Gate and stands near the Reichstag building and the Adlon Hotel.

DZ Bank Building. Following Ambassador Murphy’s reception at the U.S. Embassy, Turkish Defense Minister Vecdi Gonül, who was the patron of the 26th International Workshop in Istanbul, gave a key dinner address. He spoke beneath a distinctive and spectacular glass shell in the banquet room of the adjoining DZ Bank Building, one of Berlin’s architecturally important new buildings designed by American architect Frank O. Gehry.

Neues Museum on Museum Island. On the last day of the workshop, evening events took place at the Neues Museum on Museum Island. Badly damaged during World War II, the museum was restored under the guidance of British architect David Chipperfield and reopened to the public in 2009. Participants took a guided tour of the museum, which hosts one of the most important collections of ancient Egyptian art, including the famous bust of Queen Nefertiti. The tour was followed by a buffet reception in the museum’s Treppenhalle.

Hotel Palace Berlin. All of the workshop sessions were held at the renowned Hotel Palace, and we thank the hotel staff for their excellent support of each of our five workshops in Berlin.

PRINCIPAL SPONSORS

We extend our gratitude to the principal sponsors of the 27th International Workshop who, through their sponsorship and efforts, made this workshop possible.

- The German Ministry of Defense
- The United States Department of Defense (Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; Office of the Director of Net Assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense; Defense Threat Reduction Agency)
- European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS)
- Microsoft Corporation
- Northrop Grumman

German Ministry of Defense. In addition to Defense Minister Dr. Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, we would like to especially thank State Secretary Rüdiger Wolf for presenting his ministry's views at the opening of the workshop as well as General Karl-Heinz Lather and Lieutenant General Jürgen Bornemann for their personal roles and contributions. We also appreciate the participation of Dr. Ulrich Stefan Schlie, Director of the Policy Planning Staff. In addition, for their participation and contributions, we would like to thank Ambassador Klaus Peter Gottwald from the Federal Foreign Office; General Rainer Schuwirth, Former Chief of Staff, SHAPE; Lieutenant General Ulrich Wolf, former Director of the NATO Communication and Information Systems Services Agency; and Minister Jörg Schönbohm, former Interior Minister of the German Federal State of Brandenburg. At SHAPE, Colonel Michael Michael Mensching was especially helpful in post-workshop coordination.

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. Again this year, Alfred Volkman, Director of International Cooperation in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for AT&L, took the lead in developing a session on how industry can contribute to handling the challenges in Afghanistan and Pakistan while coping with shrinking defense resources. From his office, we welcomed for the first time Grace Washburn, whose efforts in coordinating with the U.S. Embassy in Berlin were most helpful.

Office of the Director of Net Assessment. Since the very beginning of this workshop series, Andrew Marshall, Director of Net Assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, has provided sponsorship and guidance. We are extremely grateful for his strong support. For many years now, Rebecca Bash has ably overseen the administration of this project.

Defense Threat Reduction Agency. DTRA has been a very important workshop sponsor for a quarter century, and Colonel Robert Dickey, Senior Strategic Planner-Operations Enterprise and a long-time participant, has worked with great diligence to ensure smooth coordination with the agency.

European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company. As CEO of EADS, Louis Gallois pointed out during his opening key address that EADS has been supporting the International Workshop on Global Security for many years. We truly appreciate EADS's sponsorship and were delighted that Thomas Homberg, Corporate Vice President and Head of EADS Strategic Coordination; Dr. Ditmar Staffelt, Senior Vice President, EADS; Professor Dr. Holger Mey, Advanced Concepts, CASSIDIAN; and Dr. Bernhard Rabert, Vice President of Defence and Security Affairs, EADS, were able to participate. At EADS Headquarters in Paris, Jean-Christophe Henoux, in Strategic Coordination, also provided very useful advice during the planning of the workshop.

Microsoft Corporation. Since he joined Microsoft after serving in the U.S. Department of Defense, Tim Bloechl has been a great workshop advocate as well as a leader in developing the workshop's IT dimension; Microsoft became a principal sponsor of the workshop five years ago. We are pleased that Lieutenant General Mike McDuffie, Vice President, U.S. Sector Services; Wayne Phillips, Defense Industry Solutions Director; Brigadier General Dieter Löchel; Martin Slijkhuis, Public Safety and National Security WE; and Robert Kosla, Director, National Security and Defense, participated.

Northrop Grumman. Our association with Northrop Grumman goes back a long way, and, seven years ago, Northrop Grumman became a principal sponsor. We are delighted that William Ennis, Director, International Programs; and James Heath, President, Northrop Grumman ESI, were able to represent their company at the workshop.

MAJOR SPONSORS

Cisco. We are fortunate that, two years ago, Cisco joined the workshop as a sponsor, and thank Brad Boston, Senior Vice President; Terry Morgan, Director, Netcentric Initiatives; Derek Offer, Cisco Systems, Director, Public Sector; and Eyal Bavli, Cisco Systems, Director, European Public Sector, for their participation this year. We appreciate Brad Boston's agreement to join the workshop advisory board.

Lockheed Martin Corporation. We are very grateful for Lockheed Martin's many years of sponsorship. At the workshop, Dr. Scott Harris, President, Continental Europe, has been the "face" of his company for many years, both as a speaker and a participant.

URS Federal Services. URS Federal Services, formerly URS Corporation, EG&G Division, became a sponsor of the

workshop two years ago. We thank David Swindle, Executive Vice President, for participating again this year.

Thales. It is a pleasure to acknowledge Thales's long-term support of the workshop and the participation and excellent contributions to workshop sessions of its Senior Vice President, Dr. Edgar Buckley.

The MITRE Corporation. MITRE has been a supporter and sponsor of the workshop for over 20 years. Our thanks go to Raymond Haller, Senior Vice President and Director, DoD C3I FFRDC, for his many years of participation.

McAfee. We were delighted to welcome McAfee as a new sponsor this year, and appreciate the support of Mike Carpenter, Senior Vice President, Public Sector; Kent Rounds, Vice President, Public Sector; and Hans-Peter Bauer, Vice President, EMEA.

University of Tennessee, National Defense Business Institute. As a workshop sponsor for the second year, the University of Tennessee was represented by J. David Patterson, Executive Director, National Defense Business Institute.

PATRONS, ADVISORS, AND PARTICIPANTS

Workshop Patrons, Honorary Chairmen, and Keynote Speakers. We gratefully acknowledge the support of our past and present workshop patrons and general chairmen:

State Secretary Rüdiger Wolf, German Federal Ministry of Defense (Keynote Speaker, 2010)
 His Excellency Sali Berisha, Prime Minister of Albania (Keynote Dinner Speaker, 2010)
 Mr. Louis Gallois, CEO, EADS (Opening Key Address, 2010)
 His Excellency Vecdi Gönül, Minister of Defense of Turkey (Patron, 2009; Keynote Speaker 2009, 2008, 2004)
 His Excellency Ignazio La Russa, Minister of Defense of Italy (Workshop Patron, Keynote Speaker, 2008)
 His Excellency Hervé Morin, Minister of Defense of France (Workshop Patron, 2007)
 His Excellency Franz Josef Jung, Minister of Defense of Germany (Workshop Patron, Keynote Speaker, 2006)
 Her Excellency Michèle Alliot-Marie, Minister of Defense of France (Workshop Patron, 2005, 2007; Keynote, 2005)
 His Excellency Peter Struck, Minister of Defense of Germany (Keynote Speaker, 2004)
 His Excellency Rudolf Scharping, Minister of Defense of Germany (Workshop Patron, Keynote Speaker, 2002, 2000)
 His Excellency Jan Trøjborg, Minister of Defense of Denmark (Workshop Patron, 2001)
 His Excellency Árpád Göncz, President of Hungary (Workshop Patron, Keynote Speaker, 1999)
 His Excellency Dr. Werner Fasslabend, Minister of Defense of Austria (Workshop Patron, Keynote Speaker, 1998)
 His Excellency Václav Havel, President of the Czech Republic (Workshop Patron, 1997; Keynote Speaker, 1997, 1996)
 His Excellency Aleksander Kwaniewski, President of Poland (Patron, 1996; Keynote, 2002, 2000, 1998, 1997, 1996)
 His Excellency Volker Rühe, Minister of Defense of Germany (Workshop Patron, 1995)
 Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola, Chairman of NATO Military Committee (Honorary Chairman, Keynote Speaker, 2008)
 General Vincenzo Camporini, Chief of General Staff of Italy (Honorary Chairman, Keynote Speaker, 2008)
 General James Jones, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (Keynote Speaker, 2007, 2006, 2004)
 General Henri Bentégeat, Chair of EU Military Committee, former Chief of General Staff of France (Keynote, 2007)
 General George Joulwan, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (Honorary General Chairman, 1997, 1996, 1995, 1994)
 General John Shalikashvili, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (Keynote Speaker, 1993)

Advisory Board. Our Board of Advisors, which has provided excellent input in developing the workshop agenda over the years, includes:

His Excellency Jaak Aaviksoo, Minister of Defense of Estonia
 His Excellency Valdas Adamkus, former President of Lithuania
 Ing. Giovanni Bertolone, CEO, Alenia Aeronautica S.p.A.
 Admiral Jean Betermier, Senior Advisor to the CEO, EADS
 Mr. Tim Bloechl, Managing Director, Worldwide Public Safety and National Security, Microsoft
 Mr. Brad Boston, Senior Vice President, Cisco
 Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola, Chairman of NATO Military Committee, Former Italian Chief of Staff
 Sir Stewart Eldon KCMG OBE, Former United Kingdom Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council
 His Excellency Dr. Werner Fasslabend, Former Minister of Defense of Austria
 His Excellency Vecdi Gönül, Defense Minister of Turkey

General George A. Joulwan (Ret.), Former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Ambassador Jaromir Novotný, Former Ambassador of the Czech Republic to Japan
Ambassador Marc Perrin de Brichambaut, Secretary General, OSCE
Ing. Général Robert Ranquet, Directeur Adjoint, IHEDN
Vice Admiral Sanfelice di Monteforte, Former Italian Military Representative to NATO
His Excellency Borys Tarasyuk, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine
His Excellency Dr. Alexandr Vondra, Minister of Defense of the Czech Republic
Ing. Dr. Giorgio Zappa, COO of Finmeccanica and Chairman, Alenia Aeronautica

CSDR TEAM

Workshop International Staff. This year, the Center for Strategic Decision Research (CSDR) was fortunate to have a truly international team. Ania Garlitski, M.D., a bi-national American and Polish cardiologist and Assistant Professor at Tufts-New England Medical Center, started working with CSDR when she was a Stanford University student. Pinar Atayol, a Turkish graduate of Galatasaray University in Istanbul, first joined us for the 2009 Istanbul workshop. Calum Docherty, a British national with a Harvard University degree, works as a journalist in Berlin. Julia Brooks, an American graduate of Brown University, focuses her interests and work on human rights. David Jackson, a British graduate of Oxford University, recently completed a master's degree at the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin. It was Calum's, Julia's, and David's first year with the workshop.

Jean Lee became our graphic designer and photographer shortly after graduating from Stanford University; Jean worked from New York on all the workshop graphics. Grace Wong, an American journalist with degrees from the University of Michigan and Stanford University, is based in London and returned to the workshop for the second year. Mika Shiozawa, a French, American, and Japanese national who lives in Paris, also joined us for the second time; Mika was responsible for all the workshop photographs. Caroline Baylon, a bi-national French and American graduate of Stanford University, has been a workshop staff member for over 13 years; she led the team in Berlin as staff director for the sixth time. Caroline is currently working on a Master's degree at Oxford University's Balliol College. Anne D. Baylon, CSDR Co-Director and a University of Paris Law School and Stanford University graduate, handled the coordination of the workshop as a whole.

Workshop Publications. As Head of Publications, Anne D. Baylon was responsible for the editing of these proceedings. She appreciates the contributions of Carol Whiteley and Caroline Baylon, who provided very helpful assistance.

Overview—The Coming Challenges

Dr. Roger Weissinger-Baylon
Workshop Chairman

Dealing with the New Threats

On behalf of German Defense Minister Dr. Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, State Secretary Rüdiger Wolf gave the keynote address of this year's 27th International Workshop on Global Security. State Secretary Wolf argues that dealing with today's challenges involve threats that are "not primarily military." Instead, it is necessary to deal with "threats and risks [that] stem first and foremost from society, the economy, culture, and ecology" and that are complex, evolving, and often asymmetric in nature. In responding to the new risks, four factors are key:

- *Timeliness.* It is vital "to react in a timely manner."
- *Action at the origin.* Threats "must be countered at their origin."
- *Comprehensive approach.* A comprehensive approach requires not only military means, but "includes, above all, political, diplomatic, economic, and development policy instruments."
- *Integrated multinational crisis prevention.* "Crisis prevention measures must increasingly be used within a multinational, integrated network."

General Karl-Heinz Lather. Adding to these four points, General Karl-Heinz Lather, NATO's four-star Chief of Staff at SHAPE, sees a need to reassure NATO members "that Article 5 is the most vital part of our common treaty." He also emphasizes a "new approach to partnering," which includes "the NATO-Russia relationship, the NATO-Ukraine relationship, and the NATO-Georgia relationship...the beginning of NATO-Australia-New Zealand cooperation ...a NATO-China possibility, and certainly a NATO-Pakistan possibility." Since South American countries are active in ISAF, that relationship is also important.

Together with Admiral Luciano Zappata, his colleague at Supreme Allied Command Transformation, General Lather is concerned that even a modest 2% contribution to defense is, for many countries, "astronomical from a national point of view or budget." Given this budget reality, military leaders have to answer tough questions for the future: "Are areas like cyber defense, energy security, the consequences of climate change, and space military tasks?" If so, it thinking is required as to the structures, equipment, and command and control that will be needed for these new roles.

Like State Secretary Wolf and others, General Lather emphasizes "the need to intensify cooperation between organizations like NATO and the EU." He believes that it is vital to "overcome the lack of cooperation." It is also vital to "maintain the nuclear deterrent as long as there is a nuclear threat in the world."

Admiral Luciano Zappata. According to Admiral Zappata, "We are witnessing at least two major changes in our world. The first is a global change—including globalization, the current financial turmoil, and a shift in the relative assets of both the economic and technological powers." The second major change, "more specific to the militaries," is the comprehensive approach, which is needed since we "cannot face the multiple threats and challenges with military means alone." As a result, the very nature of the military role is changing. Since this is leading to considerable "friction between defense and security," as remarked by Admiral Mark Fitzgerald, it will be necessary to find the right balance.

Security in the Black Sea Area

"What is meant by the Baltic Region?" Minister Aaviksoo asks. Is it the three Baltic States, which are about the size of Sweden, or is it the broader and more extensive Baltic Sea area, that is, eight Nordic countries, plus Poland and Germany, which together sum up to a little bit less than Russia? These two different visions show how complex the relations around the Baltic Sea can be.

According to Under Secretary of State Laajava and Minister Juknevičienė, despite a history marked by phases of peace

and cooperation alternating with periods of rivalry, domination, and war, “the Baltic region is currently more stable and secure than it ever was before” and its countries “share many similar values and a common vision concerning the future of a Euro-Atlantic security system.”

Yet, these countries’ different histories and their people’s difficulty in understanding the new global threats (for example, Afghanistan, Somalia) cause them to have different perceptions on security, which makes it hard to agree on a defense policy. Regionally however, Minister Liegis points out that the Baltic States only regained their independence from Russia twenty years ago and that they view Russia as a threat, especially in the context of the 2008 conflict in Georgia and the huge military exercises Russia conducts in their neighborhood. All speakers agree that it is important to have good relations with Russia.

How does the Baltic Sea region address the security situation? “History has shown that none of our countries can *go it alone*” (Aaviksoo) and “traditionally, Nordic countries... have cooperated very closely in all areas and also in terms of security” (Laajava). Hence regional cooperation should be increased. Minister Juknevičienė argues that a “strong transatlantic link remains a crucial element of the regional security structure;” Minister Liegis hopes that NATO’s new Strategic Concept will include “reassurances” against Russia’s actions in Georgia, such as NATO article 5 exercises in the region. He also emphasizes the importance of Article 4, the use of consultations between NATO member-states when issues may have implications for regional security.

The Balkans and Black Sea Regions

In addition to the Security in the Baltic Region panel, other speakers discussed the Balkans and the Black Sea regions. Albanian Prime Minister Sali Berisha detailed his country’s evolution from one of the poorest countries in the world twenty years ago under Communism to a nation that quadrupled its per capita revenue in four years, and one that has become a NATO member and is seeking EU integration. Dr. Berisha emphasizes Albania’s fight against organized crime and corruption and the positive effects of NATO membership in motivating his government to ensure universal suffrage, free speech, and a friendly environment for foreign investment. Despite the tensions that remain in Kosovo and Macedonia, he fully supports Kosovo’s independence and the integrity of Macedonia as factors of peace and stability.

Turkish Defense Minister Vecdi Gönül points out that although the threat of global war is receding in the 21st century, globalization has brought new risks: “terrorism, fundamentalism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, illegal immigration, climate change, water and energy scarcity.” These global problems require “global-scale solutions” and thus “a need for further cooperation.” Regional instabilities also threaten our globalized world, from the fragile equilibrium in the Balkan Peninsula to the grave and persistent problems in the Caucasus and the Middle East. Major tools to bring about peace and stability in these areas are dialogue and cooperation.

Georgian Vice Prime Minister Giorgi Baramidze argues that the Black Sea region is important to Europe because it is a provider of energy resources, but the region’s aspirations for peace and to having good relations with Russia will only be possible after its countries achieve NATO and EU membership. This is because Russia seeks to exert control over its small neighbors but “cannot truly challenge NATO or EU countries.”

Italian Ambassador Stefano Stefanini asks whether the Balkan and the Black Sea regions can help each other. Romanian Ambassador Sorin Ducaru believes that both regions should be viewed “as part of a larger Europe, a family whose particular characteristics have to be taken into consideration.” Albanian Ambassador Artur Kuko and Croatian Ambassador Ranko Vilovic believe that, despite some similarities between the countries, their very different backgrounds create obstacles.

Africa

Admiral Mark Fitzgerald. According to Admiral Fitzgerald, Africa tends to be overlooked, but it is “probably the most dangerous place that threatens the vital interests of the Alliance.” As progress is achieved in such areas as Iraq and Afghanistan, he sees that:

“...the flow of violent extremist organizations is spreading down the Arabian peninsula through Yemen, and across into Somalia. Threats also exist as well in Saharan Africa and Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb; and, these threats are starting to spread south into places like northern Nigeria, Sudan, and Chad.”

Admiral Fitzgerald also warns of a parallel situation developing around the flows of illicit drugs:

“As drugs flow out of South America and meet resistance from the north, we are starting to see new drug channels open up into West Africa and then work their way north into Europe. This has the dual effect of increasing the drug flow into Europe and also destabilizing the countries in Africa.”

In addition, Admiral Fitzgerald sees threats to vital interests in the oil fields of west and central Africa, including the new fields being opened up in Ghana and Angola. Yet, even though piracy in Somalia and other areas are in the headlines, “piracy in Nigeria and Cameroon is much more violent.” There are also serious problems of illegal fishing, and “the illegal migration of 600,000 people a year also adds to the security concerns in the region.”

Israel and Palestine

The conflict between Israel and Palestine, according to Ambassador Avi Primor, is “at the center of all problems in the Middle-East.” It is widely recognized that the conflict exacerbates tensions, conflicts, and wars in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and over a vast area stretching from Africa to Asia. Israel’s tactics are used by the Taliban, Al Qaeda, Muslim fundamentalists, and terrorists for recruiting, fundraising, and to justify their actions. It is undoubtedly one of the factors pushing Iran toward the acquisition of nuclear weapons. The conflict is particularly bitter, according to Professor Avishai Margalit, because:

“The conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians... is about everything. It is about the identity of the two communities; it is about who they are. They dialectically understand each other by the conflict and it is a bitter conflict. The nature of the conflict is currently undergoing a transformation, from a predominantly ethnic national conflict into a more religious conflict; religious conflict is more absolutist. The stakes are higher, the day of payment is postponed. The political scale and the range are very different. While secular national conflicts usually last five or ten years at most, religious conflicts have a very different nature. In the case of the Crusades, for example, it took us 200 years to get rid of the crusaders.”

Right now, the negotiations between Israel and Palestine have suffered a severe setback due to Israel’s unwillingness to block the construction of settlements in the occupied West Bank. Nonetheless, negotiations between Israel and Palestine will undoubtedly continue in various forms. One reason is that many observers, including Ambassador Primor, Professor Margalit, and Ilan Halevi, agree that the ultimate solution is already clear. As Ambassador Primor points out:

“...there is absolutely nothing to negotiate. Everything is known, and all of the details on both sides have been worked out. If you look not only at the negotiations or their results, but all the peace propositions and all the plans that have been published... They have the same principles, the same ideals and the same components.”

Ilan Halevi argues that “everything is known” concerning the solution, which is “an independent Palestinian state in the territories occupied since 1967 and peaceful coexistence between the two states.” Or, in the words of Professor Margalit:

“Put in a nutshell, the solution is 48 for 67. That is, the international community will recognize Israel at its 1948 borders if Israel gives up and renounces what it gained in the 1967 war.”

Both Ambassador Primor and Professor Margalit believe that a majority of Israelis are ready for an agreement and that the key issue is security. In particular, Avi Primor calls for international community support and Avishai Margalit would like Israel to join the EU common market (but not necessarily the EU) and, especially, NATO, so that it could be protected by NATO’s article 5.

In addition to a Palestinian state, Ilan Halevi is especially concerned by the Gaza blockade and Israel’s use of cluster bombs, phosphorus bombs, and spent uranium. He also believes that the settlers’ lobby is a serious obstacle for peace.

In any case, international concern is growing. During this year’s workshop in Berlin, some senior military officials said that they no longer feel the strong personal, emotional bond with Israel that they felt at the time of the 1967 war. More recently, 26 former high EU officials, including former EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana, called for EU sanctions against Israel as a result of Israel’s refusing to stop building settlements. At the same time, Palestine has made some progress with a new strategy of seeking recognition as an independent state from the United Nations.

IT and Cyber Security: Challenges and Opportunities

As Estonian Defense Minister Jaak Aaviksoo has described at recent International Workshops on Global Security, his country suffered from massive, coordinated cyber attacks against government offices, broadcasters, newspapers, and banks

during the April 2007 Estonia-Russia political crisis over Russian war memorials in Estonia. If there was ever any doubt that cyber attacks could inflict serious damage on a country, this incident ended it. Georgia experienced cyber attacks during its August 2008 military conflict with Russia, and Georgia's Vice Prime Minister, Giorgi Baramidze, reported on its consequences at our International Workshop a year later. In Iran, the sophistication of the stuxnet code, which targets the country's nuclear facilities (via frequency converter drives from certain vendors), suggests that Israel and/or other state actors may be the source. If states were directly involved, risks have now moved up a notch, since hackers seem to have played key roles in the attacks against Estonia and Georgia. Now that the stuxnet virus has been released, moreover, its availability to hackers and others probably makes infrastructure attacks more likely across the globe. While such threats are serious, Cisco's Brad Boston points out that the risks are actually much broader, since attackers may do harm in any number of ways including:

- “Interrupt your operation so you cannot operate—that is the traditional denial of service of attack [as experienced by Estonia and Georgia];
- Steal your information...about your infrastructure, your defense plans;
- Destroy your information so you can't use it when you need it;
- As [Cassidian's] Holger Mey said, they may want to change the information in ways that will change...how you interpret the data [so that you might make different decisions than you would have otherwise].”

Although organizations that have been victimized are often reluctant to admit that they have suffered substantial losses of these kinds, Google's operations in China appear to be just one of many large and attractive targets. And the attacks seem to have been effective despite Google's considerable sophistication in such matters.

Much of the greatest damage, however, has been borne by the public at large, which has not always been adequately alerted to the risks. For example, few are likely to be aware that some antivirus products are effective less than 90% of the time. In small companies and among the general public, up to 10% or 20% of internet users have not installed any anti-virus software whatsoever, even though high-quality free software is available (with a very high market share).

Within the U.S. Defense Department, former Deputy Assistant Secretary Bob Lentz points out that the current vulnerabilities developed as a kind of side effect of high-level policy priorities to demonstrate that internet technologies can “completely transform the way military operations are conducted around the world.” In this keen and highly effective race to innovate, security was not “baked-in” early on, so it is harder to add now. Within industry, there was a parallel situation in which companies prospered over the last several decades by developing technologies rapidly in an environment in which the financial benefits of rapid innovation easily outweighed the costs of security vulnerabilities. Partly for these reasons, cyber crime is growing quickly—and it already rivals drug crime in scale. In fact, organized drug and other criminal groups are moving into this area, possibly because profits are higher and there is less risk.

The need for awareness. Defense Minister Aaviksoo says that insufficient awareness of the risks of cyber threats is “one of the biggest problems we have to solve.” He cites recently proposed budget cuts at his defense ministry that were larger for cyber security than for the overall defense budget—despite the severity of the 2007 cyber attacks against his country. Another problem is that many military and government officials focus on threats to defense organizations or governments in general. When governments do address risks to the public, they seem to be concerned largely by threats to the critical infrastructure.

Focus on the basics. Risks cannot be completely eliminated; they can only be reduced. Moreover, there is a necessary trade-off between the benefits of connectivity and the risks. In this context, the best strategy may be to focus on the basics. For example, organizations and individuals should have anti-virus software and firewalls installed as well as the latest software updates (many of which include fixes that are required for security). Individuals might need to begin budgeting for a dedicated computer (which could be a netbook) that would be used exclusively for online purchases. Since most viruses and other malware travel through ISPs, moreover, these organizations should be encouraged to do more about filtering them out. Currently, most ISPs work on a low cost business model, and the increased costs of better filtering might be difficult for them to handle. Therefore, it might be necessary to give them financial incentives (that is, from banks or government). Another approach would be to legislate ISP improvements and, while this would raise the providers' costs, they might find it easier to pass on costs to customers if all ISPs were obliged to improve their handling of malware. In any case, any such efforts need to be speeded up, since the bad guys are often moving faster than the good guys.

The need for a global response. Since a global problem requires a global response, countries need to work together and governments need to work with industry as well. Brad Boston and others have called for a public-private partnership. In this respect, Estonia may be leading the way. The country's “cyber-defense league” is a voluntary group of experts who work without pay; their expenses are covered by the government. Finally, many current attacks are coming from computers

located in the U.S., Russia and China. Therefore, Russia and China should be involved in the search for solutions.

Coping with limited and shrinking defense resources

According to Alfred Volkman of the U.S. Defense Department, international defense equipment funding is already limited and, given the current economic climate, it may fall further:

“Only “6 of 26 European NATO partners spend 2% or more of their gross domestic product on defense, and...less than half of the members of the Alliance allocate 20%...to investment in technology and equipment.”

In fact, General Lather and Admiral Zappata also question whether the 2% goal is even achievable for many countries (as already mentioned above).

In response to the challenge of shrinking budgets, EADS CEO Louis Gallois suggests that the key is “to foster dialogue between industry, political, military, and security forces to find a way to overcome the new challenges.” The task is considerable. In fact, as Alfred Volkman points out, the *only* way it can be achieved is for countries to “prioritize their capabilities” and “eliminate expenditures” that are not vital. As examples of the top priorities, he suggests that the most vital programs might include:

- “Countering improvised explosive devices
- Missile defense [for which Iran is a compelling argument]
- Cyber security
- Lift [even though Europe has made considerable progress since 2001]
- Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance—More nations need to bring UAVs to Afghanistan, and we need to have the capability to share the information they obtain with partners...[hopefully] NATO will award a contract for a ground surveillance system, something which some of us at this workshop have spent a good part of our lives trying to accomplish.”

In order to achieve the cooperation, dialogue, and necessary prioritization by government and industry, EADS Corporate Vice President Thomas Homberg makes four recommendations: (1) “...refrain from over-customization and over-specification; (2) “...a spiral development” approach: Industry should deliver basic product or system configurations that are deployed quickly to theatre and then adapted according to lessons learned;” (3) “the acquisition process should become more flexible and faster. An example is the France-United Kingdom MoU for procurement in cases of urgent operational requirements;” (4) “...industry needs early access to defense and security planners, concepts, and lessons learned.”

At Northrop-Grumman, William Ennis draws on his personal experience developing programs from X-29 to the Global Hawk to suggest ways to respond more quickly and effectively to operational needs:

- “Joint trials with operational users...[as a way to] define requirements quickly and most efficiently. Examples include a joint trial in Japan with the Fifth Air Force, which may lead to the funding of a Global Hawk program in that country.
- Field trials...more expensive, but they do allow you to combine company money with customer money and actually go and fly something and see if it works.
- Field engineering teams...can be extremely helpful in identifying new solutions to problems.”

Dr. Scott Harris at Lockheed Martin points out that, in the last decade, the “United States...has spent roughly \$60 billion on platforms that were never built and on capabilities that never came into existence” which demonstrates the importance of “bringing resources to where they actually produce capability.” He also warned that it would be a mistake to overemphasize the importance of “trading off between the long term and the short term...[since] NATO is always going to want to take care of the long term. We should never find ourselves in a situation in which an emerging power is militarily equal or superior to the combined power of NATO allies.” He also supports Dr. Edgar Buckley in saying that:

“You need the creative energy that industry has, you need the accumulated knowledge and expertise, and you need as little bureaucracy as possible when you try to respond in a rapid way. You also need to be able to bring the entire range of technological capability to bear, whatever the problem is. One example is the response to NATO’s call to deal with IEDs:

...The first response was to try to take away the mechanism by which the IEDs work, to jam them...sophisticated technologies were fielded fairly rapidly that rendered the mobile-phone trigger pretty useless. Then, of course, the enemy adapted. So then we had to tackle them on multiple fronts and protect the vehicles. So...we now have the second and third generations of mine-resistant vehicles. We have to detect IEDs--if you cannot jam them... You use persistent surveillance--maybe you have UAVs, maybe you have balloons, maybe you have other ways... maybe you need sophisticated sensors that you had not thought of before.”

Thales's Dr. Edgar Buckley also emphasizes the importance of C4ISR as a way of getting the most from shrinking budgets, especially when you are dealing with an asymmetric threat as in Afghanistan:

"...the levels of technology required to provide this sort of capability in an operational theater, the backup reference facilities that you need outside the operational theater to make sure that you are not experimenting in the theater and that you can guarantee reliability, the skilled engineers who design, maintain, and service the capability throughout its life—these can only come from industry."

Afghanistan and Pakistan

Afghanistan's ambassador to France, Omar Samad, says that it is important to learn the lessons of the past in order to avoid the same mistakes in the future. Many Afghans believe that the rise of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban takeover of their country "...could not have happened if a political void had not occurred after the Soviet withdrawal." There was a missed opportunity and "...especially since the 1990s, when the Soviets left, we had a chance to dismantle or reform the radicalized infrastructure—madrassas, sanctuaries, training camps, and the financing of networks that still exist within our region." Instead, the attention of the international community was diverted to Iraq.

Describing the current situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Major General Cai Bingkui of the China Institute for International Strategic Studies (Beijing) says that, with the Afghan war in its 10th year, it is clear that "...the Afghan question cannot be settled by foreign military involvement alone." Moreover, he says, "Terrorist attacks, drug trafficking, and organized transnational criminal activities are still unbridled. ...the power of the central government still remains limited," while the rebuilding of the country faces difficulties. He is also concerned that Afghanistan is "... seriously threatening the social stability and economic development of Pakistan...the transport line for military supplies into Afghanistan has been greatly disrupted."

The Comprehensive approach. SHAPE's Chief of Staff General Karl-Heinz Lather emphasizes that NATO is in Afghanistan under a U.N. mandate and at the Afghan government's invitation to assist in "exercising and extending its authority and influence across the country in order to pave the way for reconstruction and a more effective and efficient governance within the country." Currently, a "major change in the strategy and tactics" is underway. It is what NATO calls COIN, a counter-insurgency mission "...centered upon protecting the population...prioritized to high-density population areas where the insurgent groups operate primarily with disaffected Pashtun populations. Special attention is given to reducing civilian casualties."

This strategy falls under the "comprehensive approach, "where there is "...no security without development and there is no development without security." General Lather says that "... we strive to support socio-economic development by creating security situations that can provide the space for community-based development opportunities." By mid-2011, NATO hopes to be able to tie the population centers together, with security that will "...grossly diminish the influence of the insurgents or even fully disturb it." In the principal populations centers, there would be:

"... security that is very much in hand, interconnected security between those centers that could not be broken by insurgents, assured freedom of movement, major infrastructure projects and a sustainable economic corridor, which is the basis for the future development of the country."

As to the Afghan National Security Force, there is a goal of 300,000, which has been agreed to. General Lather says that this level should be reached by the end of 2011. But it is important to remember that General McCrystal called for 400,000—which would probably be needed to be able to control the country. In this respect, General Lather cautions, such a level:

"...would be a heavy burden on us as an Alliance and on non-NATO troops. It would not be easy. It is not easy now, and it would be even more difficult if this level were agreed to in the future. But, apart from the efforts on reconstruction, it is probably one of the strongest arguments as to what the Afghans would have to do in order to control their country by themselves. It is the direction in which the Afghans would need to go."

In order to achieve these and other goals of the comprehensive approach, Ambassador Samad suggests that it is necessary to adapt and fine-tune the concepts on a case-by-case basis with Afghanistan:

"...we discover that counterinsurgency principles, when applied to Afghanistan, differ from those for Iraq, and that, within Afghanistan, we need to keep fine-tuning and adjusting these tactics and measures based on community and local requirements. Marjah is not Kandahar and Kandahar is probably very different from FOB Salerno. From experience, we know that in Afghanistan we need to go deeper at the subnational level to understand

what is happening, since the dynamics are very different from north to south, from west to east, and from rural to urban Afghanistan.”

What is needed for success in Afghanistan. Speaking from an Afghan perspective, Ambassador Samad suggests that there are a large number of issues to be understood and addressed in order to make real progress; for example:

“...What happens across the tribal divide between Afghanistan and Pakistan? Which insurgent leader is arrested in Karachi or in another city? Who provides the latest version of IEDs? Which Hawala system is used out of the Gulf region to fund the radical structures? How do drug mafias intersect with terror networks and how is the Internet playing a recruitment role?”

According to a large number of Afghans, including Ambassador Samad and his government, several areas require special attention for a comprehensive approach to counter-insurgency to be successful:

- “Bringing further democratization through a process of involvement and consultation of indigenous leaders and community representatives, through confidence-building measures...
- Boosting synergy and coordination...between Afghans and international donors, and between the Afghan population and its government ...
- Promoting public-private partnerships. Over the past nine years, this area has done very well to foster entrepreneurship and boost society activities.[In seven years, TV channels have grown from one to 20; radio stations have grown from one to hundreds; women are more involved in economic activities.]
- At the same time, resorting to smart tactics to fight corruption ... and the narcotics business is important.
- Gradual dismantlement of those infrastructures that promote and sustain radicalism and terrorism.
- Focusing on confidence-building measures...[including] regional cooperation on water...and on power, energy, communications, trade, transit, and people-to-people contacts (...Afghanistan is laying down its first railroad, which will eventually connect China through Central Asia to Afghanistan to Iran and Pakistan).”

India’s Lieutenant General P.K. Singh looks ahead to the future arrangements with the Taliban, which would have to meet the following conditions:

- The definite commitment to building an effective, democratic, and secular Afghanistan. You cannot be a partner if you challenge this very basic premise
- Supporting the battle against Al-Qaeda, international terrorism, and global terrorism
- Preventing the return of the Taliban to power by the use of the gun—they cannot come back to power by defeating those who are fighting them and there cannot be a military victory by the Taliban
- Not allowing the spread of Taliban ideology, drugs, and narcotics out of Afghanistan
- Being committed to the fact that sustained economic development and reconstruction in Afghanistan is one of the goals.
- We need to make sure that countries that become our partners in Afghanistan subscribe to all of these common goals.”

Looking ahead

At this year’s 27th International Workshop on Global Security, nearly sixty speakers—whose views are presented in the chapters that follow—discussed key issues affecting the future security, prosperity, and well-being of regions ranging from North and South America, including for the first time Argentina and Brazil; Africa, including Egypt; Europe with the Baltics, the Balkans, the Black Sea region (including Bulgaria, Romania, Georgia, and Ukraine), Turkey, which is a vital bridge between Europe and not only the Black Sea but Asia; Israel and Palestine; Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and Japan. In considering the diverse ways in which diplomats, military officials and other leaders view critical events and how they propose to respond, it is useful to consider the keynote address given at our workshop 25 years ago, in the midst of the Cold War, by SHAPE Chief of Staff General John Chain. He suggested that a key factor influencing political-military decision-making is the reality that “logic doesn’t travel.” In the context of a possible Cold War confrontation with the Warsaw Pact, he worried whether the Alliance would be able to understand and correctly interpret the actions of the other side: “Can we understand their mind set?” and “Are we skilled enough to understand a response from their side?” As we look to the future and challenges that seem ever more complex, we would do well to consider General Chain’s thoughtful remarks in our efforts to understand how our actions will be perceived by others.

Welcome to the 27th International Workshop on Global Security

Ambassador Philip D. Murphy
United States Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany

Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, it is a pleasure to have you here at our new Embassy. In many ways, Berlin tells the story of our times. There are so many places in Berlin—both old and new—that have almost iconic stature because of the history they represent. For the United States, this new Embassy tells the story of how our relationship to Germany has evolved over the past eight decades. Today our relationship is a global partnership of partners. The fact that you—heads of government, defense ministers, foreign ministers, ambassadors, senior U.N., EU and NATO diplomats, military commanders, and experts from more than forty countries—can join us here today on a site that was for almost thirty years part of the no-man's land that ran alongside the Berlin Wall, would have been hard to imagine not so very long ago.

Before World War II, the American Embassy stood right here at Pariser Platz 2. The State Department purchased the Blücher Palais in 1930 as part of a worldwide initiative to emphasize the importance of a broader, more outward-looking concept of American diplomacy. Unfortunately, just after, history got in the way—and slowed down the process considerably. A fire partially destroyed the old villa. Congress was unwilling to fund a major renovation, given the increasing influence and power of the Nazis. It was not until 1938 that the U.S. Embassy finally moved in. The Ambassador had been recalled to Washington. One of the last diplomats to leave the Embassy when the United States entered World War II was George Kennan, the same George Kennan who some years after the war—when the Embassy was a pile of rubble on Pariser Platz—wrote the “long telegram” that defined the U.S. policy of containment during the long years of the Cold War.

When Germany was reunited twenty years ago, the decision to move back to this prime location in the heart of Berlin was made fairly quickly. The attacks on the American Embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam in 1998 did not make the American government re-think that decision. It did, however, force the State Department to start thinking about security in a completely different way.

And now we have come full circle—from the decision of the American government in the 1920s to play a stronger role on the global stage, to the growing threat of Nazi dictatorship in Germany, to the destruction and tragedy of World War II, to the long years of the Cold War, to the fall of the Berlin Wall, to the new concept of global partnership defined by the challenges of a new century that has been the focus of your meetings this weekend. And indeed, we do face epic challenges—in economics, national security, energy and the environment—that closely link both the national and personal security of people everywhere. The wide range of threats—broad dangers of an extraordinary complexity, arising from such highly diverse sources as the international financial system; natural disasters such as the Haiti earthquake; energy security; environmental disasters, scarcity of water, minerals, and other resources; poverty; drug, weapons, and human trafficking—these threats cannot be addressed effectively in national capitals alone.

In the 20th century, the foreign policy of the United States was largely defined in the context of the transatlantic relationship. In the 21st century, the transatlantic partnership stands at the center of our approach to the future security of our world. Now more than half way through the ambitious schedule of the 27th International Workshop on Global Security, I hope that your discussions have been constructive. The need to develop shared approaches and joint solutions to the threats we face is absolutely essential. On behalf of the United States Department of Defense, I would like to thank the German Federal Ministry of Defense, the Center for Strategic Decision Research, and our corporate sponsors for their support of this program.

Thank you and welcome to the Embassy. It is wonderful to have you here.

GLOBAL SECURITY:

The Growing Challenges

Chapter 1

Global Security—the Growing Challenges Keynote Address

German State Secretary Rüdiger Wolf

I am very honored to have been invited to address this distinguished assembly here in our capital of Berlin, on behalf of our Minister of Defense Freiherr Dr. zu Guttenberg. Dr. zu Guttenberg regrets being unable to be present today, but asked me to convey his best regards to you and his wishes for successful discussions and an interesting and, in particular, a forward-looking outcome.

CONTEMPORARY THREATS AND RISKS

Especially in the context of the current development of a new Strategic Concept for NATO, it will be essential to focus on challenges in both the EU and NATO to examine possible enhancements between them. Looking at my expert audience here, I do not need to elaborate on the challenges of the globalized world and the changed security environment we face. In this complex security environment, the international community, with NATO and the EU a part of it, needs suitable concepts and instruments to achieve its security goals.

Analysis of the contemporary threats and risks shows that their cause is not primarily military. Rather, these threats and risks stem first and foremost from society, the economy, culture, and ecology. Their complex, dynamic, and asymmetric nature must therefore be addressed by means of security policy concepts, strategies, institutions, methods, procedures, and instruments.

Above all, there is a requirement to react in a timely manner. Hence, the following assumptions are considered imperative:

- Threats to our security must be countered at their origin.
- A comprehensive approach is called for that, in addition to military means, includes above all political, diplomatic, economic, and development policy instruments.
- Crisis prevention measures must increasingly be used within a multinational, integrated network.

Nowadays, security can no longer be defined purely in terms of geography; it must be defined in terms of function. In that light, let's briefly look at Afghanistan. The instability provides an ideal breeding ground for terrorism, as we witness almost every day. Only an intelligent, network-based combination of civilian and military initiatives that seek to have an impact on the population and that take into account the country's distinctive characteristics and structures will lead to stability in the long term and subsequently reduce the threat posed by terrorists.

Military operations can create and maintain a secure environment. But it is only by means of a forward-looking and comprehensive approach, combining diplomatic tools and dialogue with initiatives in development policy and economic support as well as the tenet of "helping people to help themselves," that self-supporting structures may be created in the long term that provide Afghanistan with the stability it so badly requires. This example demonstrates that a definition of security must go beyond the classical constraints and that security must be understood from a broader perspective.

The second issue contained within the comprehensive concept of security is the realization that tomorrow's hurdles will not be surmounted by nation-states acting alone. Our common interests are safeguarded primarily via international and supranational institutions such as the U.N. and the OSCE. We should seek to ensure that these institutions are strengthened.

CORNERSTONES OF STABILITY AND SECURITY

The U.N. and the OSCE are not the only organizations accomplishing this task. NATO and the EU have provided the cornerstone of political stability, security, and prosperity by spreading values within the European region and beyond.

Therefore, the primary goal of my presentation today is to focus in detail on the enhancement of a comprehensive approach within NATO and the EU and its possible implications for military requirements.

The basis for further considerations is an internationally agreed-to understanding of the comprehensive approach concept. Everyone must understand his or her role and responsibility. The current challenges facing NATO and the EU also should be considered as equal and both organizations should have an answer as to how to meet these challenges.

NATO

I would like to start by taking a look at NATO. Let me emphasize that NATO should not have the lead in comprehensive approach activities on security. That responsibility resides with the international community, represented by the U.N., and should be shared by all relevant multinational, national, and private-sector players. But I would like to emphasize the fact that in 2009 NATO initiated the process for the development of a new Strategic Concept. This will describe our vision to cope with current and upcoming threats and risks in order to promote peace and stability. It is necessary because our 21st century globalized world, with all the previously mentioned security challenges, requires new strategies to achieve security for the Euro-Atlantic area.

Let me also state that in addition to the so-called new threats, interstate conflicts in different regions of the world remain likely. Therefore, Article 5 of the NATO Treaty will continue to be the cornerstone of NATO's old and new Strategic Concept.

Our security in the coming decades will be increasingly tied to the security of other regions. While interstate conflicts may not directly threaten NATO territory and populations, this must be seen as a possibility and we have to be prepared. In order to perform successfully, NATO requires appropriate military capabilities that we must define today in order to assure tomorrow's success.

Therefore, let me highlight the following preconditions:

- In the future, NATO will continue to constitute an important part of our overall national strategic concept with regard to security, consultation, and deterrence.
- The current transformation process within the Alliance is aimed at closing strategic capability gaps, such as reconnaissance and command and control as well as airlift.
- NATO's external profile as an integrated organization will be supported by means of a refined partnership policy, which means that the international community will have to establish and maintain an interconnected web of government agencies, including law enforcement, border protection services, judiciaries, and public health authorities, that can work alongside the Alliance.

NATO needs to have a clear understanding of how it can contribute to a comprehensive approach and which role the Alliance wants to play. This will be the basis from which we can derive military requirements.

At the April 2008 Bucharest Summit, Allied leaders endorsed an Action Plan for the development and implementation of NATO's contribution to a comprehensive approach, which was confirmed again during the 2009 summit. This plan describes in five key areas how the Alliance could improve its ability to work and coordinate more closely with its partners and other international actors in crisis management. I would like to examine these key areas to develop some ideas concerning military requirements.

Planning and Conducting Operations

NATO takes full account of all military and non-military aspects of a NATO engagement. Therefore, we have to improve practical cooperation at all levels with all relevant organizations and actors already in the planning phase and during conducting of operations. This will require adapting our organizational structures, authorities, and decision-making processes in order to "plug in" all relevant players. Interoperability, transparency of information, and decision-making, as well as common standards and definitions, will be crucial in the face of a common threat. The military should concentrate on key military capabilities in order to achieve military objectives. This includes maintaining the classic war-fighting capabilities necessary for Article 5 operations and contributing to conflict prevention and crisis management through non-Article 5 crisis response operations.

Lessons Learned, Training, Education, and Exercises

We have to make greater use of NATO training, education, and exercise opportunities by offering joint training of civilian and military personnel. This promotes the exchange of lessons learned and also helps build trust and confidence between NATO, its partners, and other international and local actors. Therefore, translating a comprehensive approach into practice must become an integral part of our training and exercises.

Enhancing Cooperation with External Actors

Achieving lasting mutual understanding, trust, confidence, and respect among the relevant organizations and actors will make their respective efforts more effective. Therefore, we have to pursue extensive civil-military interaction with other relevant organizations and actors on a regular basis while respecting the autonomy of each organization's decision-making. NATO could also contribute to conflict prevention by strengthening areas of good governance by mentoring and advising other nations. In this regard using the Security Sector Reform and enhanced training and exercise tools to strengthen defense reforms could reduce the need to deploy military forces. Concentrated on security for the Euro-Atlantic area, the tools of partnerships, cooperation, and dialogue are key to the comprehensive approach, and partner-nations should be involved more deeply.

Public Messaging or Strategic Communications

We have to ensure that the information strategies of the main actors complement and do not contradict each other.

Stabilization and Reconstruction

NATO has to improve its military support of stabilization and reconstruction in all phases of a conflict. This will involve exploiting the overall range of existing and planned Alliance capabilities relevant to this broad activity. It will require better coordination of NATO's military efforts in this field with those of its partners and other international and non-governmental organizations, who are the primary providers for the stabilization and reconstruction tasks.

Let me emphasize that Germany is very satisfied with the current report of the Group of Experts to the NAC regarding NATO's new Strategic Concept, because it provides an in-depth analysis of the strategic environment and the challenges ahead for NATO. It is especially good to see the broad coverage given to partnerships and the clear note that NATO is just one of many actors. Even if the sections of the comprehensive approach or the way to handle international terrorism are shorter than it was assumed they would be, the cooperative and dialogue-driven approach by which the report was written is reflected in all its content. This formal aspect is of key value for NATO with regard to the impression the Alliance makes both on the people in the member-states and on partners such as Russia. All in all, the report is an important contribution to the promotion of strategic debate and provides valuable impetus for the new Strategic Concept.

THE EU

Let's turn now to the EU. In the European Security Strategy the EU stated very clearly that none of the new threats we face today can be tackled by purely military means. Rather, it called for a mixture of instruments, tailored to each mission at hand. The EU is the only international organization that has at its disposal instruments covering the whole spectrum of crisis management: Humanitarian aid, economic development, trade, and civilian and military crisis management. In the words of the Security Strategy, "The EU is particularly well equipped to respond to such multi-faceted situations."

Dimensions of the Comprehensive Approach

I believe there are basically two dimensions we have to look at when we talk about a comprehensive approach, no matter what institutional framework we are working in. The first is the conceptual level and the second is the operational implementation, the question of what is really happening on the ground, which sometimes differs from what we write on paper. Twenty-four operations and missions since 2003 show that there is a real need for EU action and I have no doubt that this demand will stay.

It is also fair to say that each and every task we undertake in the framework of the Common Security and Defense Policy

has at its heart a political problem that has to be solved. This realization has led to the concept of civil-military coordination. It is modest in its aspirations, because its primary aim is to enhance cooperation within the EU only. Cross-pillar coordination between the commission, the Common Foreign and Security Policy, as well as the third pillar's police and justice cooperation have to be brought together.

With the Lisbon Treaty we took a major step toward this aim by bringing together the union's foreign policy competence under the new High Representative of the Union for Foreign and Security Policy. The next step will be to create an effective European External Action Service that will serve as a catalyst for bringing together the different foreign and security policy actors at the EU level. We see it as the future powerhouse of the Common Foreign and Security Policy as well as the Common Defense and Security Policy, as it is called in the Lisbon Treaty.

With the EU Council's resolution of December 2008, the EU's level of ambition was further developed along the most likely EU missions and operations toward a more civil-military approach, keeping in mind the adopted elements of the new level of ambition and the fact that, with both Headline Goals approaching their final dates, it will be necessary to formulate a new common civil-military Headline Goal in the coming year. This will further improve civil-military cooperation that creates the added value of the EU in comparison to other organizations such as the U.N. or NATO.

Cooperation and Partnership

Allow me to emphasize at this point that cooperation in the field and at the Brussels level works reasonably well. When we look in the Balkans, for example, the EU has managed to send a clear message through its political, military, and civilian sectors as well as by economic engagement in what we want to achieve. The establishment of a safe and secure environment, which was the main task, was well integrated into the whole EU approach toward the region with the aim of integrating it into the EU in a long-term way. We have diplomatic and economic actors working alongside police advisors and military personnel. It is not only in name but also in effect a truly comprehensive endeavor.

The most important partnership, as well as the one in which progress is most needed, is the partnership between NATO and the EU. This relationship is being held hostage by a rather small number of member-states in both organizations, leading to absurdities in the field, like the problem we have in integrating the members of the EU's police missions in our Afghanistan PRTs. It has become quite obvious that we need a political solution, and we need it as quickly as possible.

The Berlin Plus arrangements that concluded in 2002 give the EU access to NATO planning assets in carrying out military CSDP operations, and they were concluded in order to put to rest the transatlantic differences regarding the relationship between the EU and NATO. In practice only one ongoing ESDP operation—EUFOR ALTHEA, in Bosnia—is a Berlin Plus operation.

Better and more effective EU–NATO cooperation is required. Therefore, the German government welcomed the talks and discussions of NATO's "Group of Experts" with high representatives of NATO and EU in order to discuss the outline of NATO's new Strategic Concept and enhance transparency and visibility. Let me emphasize that, in view of the present financial and budget crisis in almost all the member-states, there will be no alternative to a closer, more in-depth strategic partnership between NATO and the EU.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The key concept needed to establish cooperation mechanisms between different organizations as required by the comprehensive approach is openness—openness in elaborating mandates for missions and operations, in planning and conducting missions and operations, and in the lessons-learned process. Thus the provision of security is not only a military task and can only be a starting point. The combined efforts of the international community are necessary to achieve and secure sustainable peace and stability.

NATO and the EU are committed to taking responsibility and to contributing to a comprehensive approach. In this regard we need to adapt our organizational structures and processes and we have to improve our capabilities in the areas just mentioned. In doing so we have to avoid duplication of capabilities. The organization that is best suited to providing capabilities should take the responsibility. Therefore, we need to not only look at our own organizations but at our partners in the field as well, be they international or government agencies or non-governmental organizations.

We have already taken some steps but more lie ahead of us. I am convinced that we are on the right track, in NATO as well as in the EU. It will be your task to take this matter forward, whether you serve in the Alliance, in the EU, or back home. You need to be successful if we are all to be successful.

Chapter 2

Global Security—The Growing Challenges Opening Address

Mr. Louis Gallois
CEO, EADS

EADS has been supporting the International Workshop on Global Security for many years, and is proud that, this year again, so many leaders in charge of defense and security have gathered here in Berlin to discuss security challenges. This is the fifth time that the workshop has come to Berlin, and I can hardly imagine a city more valid for it. Because of the wall that divided the city into two worlds, Berlin was the focal point of global security for decades. Now, 20 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the end of the Cold War, and disappearing borders, this city and the rest of the world face new, broader security challenges.

THE NEW SECURITY CHALLENGES LINKED TO GLOBALIZATION

I am sure that everyone knows the new security threats that we face in this globalized world after the end of the Cold War. Proliferation, terrorism, climate change, poverty-driven migration, nation building, and so on have made the list of security threats seemingly endless and diverse. One of the most important changes, brought about by globalization, is that the distinction between defense and security is being more and more watered down.

This can be observed in several different areas. Let me briefly address three:

- Political: Overlapping areas of defense and security are on the agendas of NATO, the EU, and national governments.
- Abroad: Today, military operations abroad are no longer limited to military actions, but also include a civil component such as infrastructure development and police work. In particular, the conflict in Afghanistan clearly shows that a new approach is required: Implementing constant reforms to an operation and at the same time taking care of the humanitarian situation in the country are huge tasks.
- Domestic: Due to the many dimensions of threats, homeland security agencies often need to closely cooperate with military forces.

As the example of Afghanistan demonstrates, defense and security cooperation is—more than ever—a matter of alliances and partnerships. As you know, 46 NATO and non-NATO countries with more than 100,000 troops are currently fighting in Afghanistan trying to stabilize the country. It was clear from the beginning that no country alone would have the resources to do it on its own. Financial pressures due to the global economic crisis are weighing on national defense budgets. But the necessity to respond to defense and security challenges has not decreased. Furthermore, the scope of threats and missions is continuously enlarging.

For me there is only one solution: We have to foster dialogue between industry, political, military, and security forces to find a way to overcome the new challenges.

EADS AND THE INDUSTRY

This year, EADS celebrates its 10th anniversary. The roots run deep into 40 years of European aerospace and defense programs. Through cooperation and integration we have developed into a leading global aerospace company with global customers. Just try to imagine: Where would European aerospace and defense be without EADS? There would be:

- No Eurofighter
- No A400M
- No NH90

- No A380
- No Ariane

In short, we are a part of Europe that works! But our achievements would have not been possible without a stable European environment, which a high-tech company like EADS needs in order to operate, especially here in Germany, where we have 29 sites and employ almost 46,000 people.

I know that EADS is not considered fully German in Germany. It is also not considered fully French in France or fully Spanish in Spain.

But our company is a strong German player. We work closely together with the German government to solve discrepancies like we did with the A400M. I am happy that we found a solution and that the program continues. We will also find a solution regarding the Tiger helicopter. Eurocopter is working to solve the wiring problem and the Bundeswehr handed over fixed helicopters for testing in July. These two state-of-the-art aircraft are a good sign of what Europe is capable of when it works together.

That is why it really worries me to see national tendencies on the rise when it comes to awarding contracts in each of our four domestic countries. The current homegrown competition, which is resulting in a fragmentation of force, weakens Europe and its ability to develop innovative systems to tackle the security challenges ahead. Remember that EADS was created 10 years ago to gather European forces in front of the consolidated American industry around the giant companies: Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon.

The rest of the world is not sleeping. Think about China and Russia. Against the background of global competition it is of vital importance for Europe and the European industrial defense base to cooperate and bury unnecessary wars.

THE NEED FOR STATE AND GOVERNMENT CUSTOMERS

To establish Europe as a strong global player, the defense industry needs states and governments as customers. States and governments are essential to provide a reliable environment and necessary resources for innovation and R&D. For example:

- During the last 10 years, EADS created about 15,000 new high-tech jobs in Europe—in a period when the industry was dramatically destroying jobs on our continent.
- We invested €22bn in R&D to develop leading-edge products for the future.

If Europe is busy fighting unnecessary domestic wars, high-tech jobs and innovative products will leave Europe. But they are an important contributor to the European economy. So Europe needs strong defense and aerospace players like EADS to counterbalance strong competitors such as Boeing. And that means, as a counterpart, that we have specific responsibilities and duties toward our domestic nations as customers.

More generally, it is obvious that both the industry and the nations as customers are sitting in one boat. We have to establish a constructive dialogue about common basic problems. We have to establish a dialogue about the way to save money without jeopardizing the future of the defense industry.

Decisions take a long time to make and are very complicated. Overcustomization and overspecification for cooperative programs contribute significantly to time delays and cost overruns. The law of balanced work-share return (juste retour) is leading to industrial inefficiencies. Better performance in procurement and a faster decision-making process have to be implemented to turn the current situation into a win-win situation for both the industry and the nations as customers. We need this particularly in this period of time when defense budgets are under pressure and cooperative programs are the only solution to finance them.

CLOSING REMARKS

Ladies and gentlemen, the industry is ready to adapt. We are ready to meet customer requirements and to develop systems to counter future threats. We are ready to recognize that countries want to save money on defense budgets. I really want to emphasize that we have to engage in constructive dialogue on how to improve the current unsatisfying situation. Once again, we are sitting in one boat!

For me, this workshop serves as a great forum to discuss such important security questions and challenges. Once again let me say that I am very honored that so many of you accepted the invitation. I wish you all fruitful workshop experiences with interesting insights and inspiring discussions.

Chapter 3

Security and Development: An Albanian Perspective

His Excellency Dr. Sali Berisha
Prime Minister of Albania

I would like to thank you for the great honor of being invited to address this very impressive audience with regards to Albania's development efforts and its views on security. I am thrilled and privileged to speak before you in Berlin, a city which played a fundamental role in helping us attain freedom: It was the courage of its citizens, their tearing down of the wall, which made it possible for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to gain independence.

ALBANIA'S PATH TO DEVELOPMENT

Twenty years ago, Albania emerged from the most totalitarian regime that Europe has ever known—a regime which severed the country from the rest of the world in the most brutal manner imaginable; a regime which, in many aspects, left Albania not decades but centuries behind other nations. Coming to this meeting, I met an old friend who was the German ambassador to my country at that time. He told me that after leaving Albania, he was posted in Africa but never encountered rural areas as poor as those in Albania. At that time, my country ranked among the third or fourth poorest countries in the world.

With \$200 USD per capita, I flew all over Europe and elsewhere as President of the country with \$16 USD per month as my salary. Unemployment was at 80%, the economy was in total collapse, and technological development was virtually nonexistent. I was a beginner because my background was a medical one; I was very fond of my profession as a surgeon but one day I told myself that it was time to take an active role in my country's political future. The man who inspired me most was Andrei Sakharov for two major reasons: First, he had a background in technical sciences, something I identified with since I was in medical sciences. Second, he never left his country. In the same way, despite the fact that I traveled a lot, I never considered leaving my country for a second. That is why, once Albania stood up and decided to oppose the Communist system, I entered politics. We did not win the first elections, but were victorious in the second ones. As the newly-elected President at the time, I had to work hard with my team to change the country. We went through very difficult and painful reforms, but they were successful. In four years my country quadrupled its revenue per capita.

In parallel, however, there was a growth in pyramid schemes, which brought about a major crisis similar to today's financial meltdown. This was a very difficult time for Albania because there had been a total legislative vacuum: No laws, no audits, and no supervisory reports. At first, the owners of the pyramid schemes sued in court, and the courts ruled in their favor because civil courts allow the borrowing of money with interest. However, we eventually managed to investigate the owners' activities and succeeded in shutting down the pyramids. But of course, half or more of depositors' money was missing by then. Some people thought that the money was used by the government in the budget, but this was not the case: Not a penny was used. I also stood against bailouts of depositors. As a result, we called elections, and I resigned and went into opposition. I then came back in power as Prime Minister.

Overcoming Problems of Crime and Corruption

There have been two major obstacles in the development of my nation. The first was organized crime. It became a very

damaging factor that blocked our road to development. We then pledged zero tolerance on this issue. In 18 months, our law enforcement agency very professionally managed to dismantle 206 criminal organizations and gangs and to apprehend and put to justice more than 1,000 bosses and members of these organizations: Wherever they were—in Albania, Sweden, Germany, Belgium, or the United States—we tracked them down. Now criminality in my country is lower than the European Union average.

The second obstacle was corruption. It was like a cancer which could not be eradicated, and a permanent fight against it is vital. As part of our war on corruption, we shrank the size of the Albanian government. Within a short amount of time we eliminated 33% of the administration. Now Albania has an administration that amounts to half the cost per capita of that of any of our neighbors, including Macedonia. Since then, we have managed to keep the government small. As another anti-corruption measure, we put strong restrictions on the use of public money. This included reforming the means of transport for government members: In the old nomenklatura, all high officials were provided with a personal car. Now there are only 31 people, who are either heads of ministries or major institutions, with official plates and drivers. This, accompanied by a strong policy of penalization, helped us eliminate these excesses. In four years, we were able to recoup \$5.2 billion USD more than previous governments in revenue. We owe this mostly to the fight against corruption. In addition, we have started to make use of digital procedures. In Albania now, we only use e-procurement and I think this increases the transparency of the process tremendously. My country is currently the only one with 100% e-procurement.

Development Efforts

We are also working to create a friendly environment for foreign investment: We want businesses to have the lowest possible fiscal burden. I believe low taxes are the best stimulus for the economy, and we have now moved to a flat tax rate of 10%. In addition, we have eliminated dozens of tariffs or lowered them to one euro. This has had the additional benefit of simplifying our fiscal system from 26 national taxes to six. With the assistance of the Millennium Challenge Threshold Program which has supported some of our major programs against corruption, we have also streamlined the administration of business registration procedures. Two thirds of previously required licenses have been eliminated, and the remaining one third have been assembled into a greatly simplified “one-stop shop” process. It is much more efficient and the business climate has been much improved as a result.

More than anything else, however, our efforts to achieve NATO membership have been extremely beneficial. The Membership Action Plan became our roadmap and greatly motivated my government to implement a wide variety of reforms in order to meet targets for NATO entry. As I told the Council during the many times I went to Brussels, we understand that the process is a merit-based one. Accordingly, we proceeded with a large number of reforms, including very tough ones in our military. Your nations were very gracious and we are extremely grateful because on April 4, 2009, Albanians gained their greatest achievement since independence: NATO membership. This will bring many benefits to the people of Albania.

This has been possible in part due to the tremendous progress of my nation over the past 20 years. It is true that Albania is now a different nation: The nation which started out with an average monthly salary of \$4 to \$7 USD, now has an average monthly salary of \$460 USD. The nation which started out with an economy in a state of total collapse has kept up a growth rate of 3.5% and has doubled exports this past year. It now has a fully liquid banking system, with a 60% ratio between deposits and credits, despite this having been one of the most difficult years for the world economy in recent history. But it was also your help, your solidarity, as well as your money and the money of your taxpayers that made a vital difference in helping my nation cut with the past, the bitter past.

THE CURRENT POLITICAL CLIMATE

Naturally, I remain committed to my initial ideals in my political life which were very simple: Universal suffrage and free speech. My government therefore did its very best to ensure a free and fair electoral process. We had elections on June 28, 2009 which were unique in the history of my country due to their use of totally new and modern technology. This included digital voter lists as well as digital biometric passports and ID cards. So that the opposition could be certain of the fairness of the elections, I decided to accept all opposition proposals and I was right to do so. My collaborators asked me, “Why are you doing this?” and I explained to them that, “The duty of government is to provide full security and assurances to the opposition. This is a duty.” We therefore went into these elections with many rules, regulations, and instructions for all parties to follow. In addition, every Commissioner and observer had the right of veto in the event that they suspected any electoral improprieties. What results did this electoral process produce? It produced a total unanimity in assessment

because anything which might be construed as questionable was not accepted. After the election, the opposition was disheartened with the results and left for some months. But they came back and are now definitely very determined to do everything needed in order for us to work together. I remain deeply convinced that as a government, we have to give the best assurances possible to the opposition. This is a moral obligation and we will continue to abide by this principle.

Now, we are working hard on another major goal: EU integration. This year some very crucial decisions were taken with respect to Albania. After the elections, the EU ministers voted in favor of opening negotiations with Albania for candidate status. As part of the procedure, my government was asked to answer a series of 2,284 questions. We responded to all of them and sent the responses to the Commission, and currently we are waiting for the Commission's assessment. On another positive note, in May the Council of EU Commissioners decided to recommend Albania for the removal of visa barriers. Many representatives from your countries came and visited Albania, and we sought to meet the highest standards possible. This also had the benefit of greatly motivating our country. We are very committed to pursuing the road to the EU.

Future Outlook for Kosovo and Macedonia

We are situated in a region which faced extraordinary difficulties in the past. However, a new chapter is now open for the Balkans, and we are trying to work together for our common European future. Of course, there are still problems, including in Bosnia. I fully support NATO's decision to offer the Bosnian government the Membership Action Plan. It was very kind and helpful, and I am convinced that it will provide a strong incentive for Bosnian leaders and the Bosnian people to work towards NATO membership.

The independence of Kosovo was also a great contribution to peace and stability. Despite recent incidents in the streets of Mitrovica, I can assure you that relations between the different ethnic groups in Kosovo have never been better. This is largely attributable to the province having gained its freedom, as tensions are more likely to flare under oppressive regimes. After achieving independence, Kosovo held municipal elections in which there was a considerable Serbian turnout and Serbian leaders were elected in six communes south of Ibar, including Gračanica. They have been working well with the other ethnic groups in the Council, which is very promising. In addition, my government has been collaborating with and helping the Gračanica commune, and we currently enjoy excellent relations with them.

However, I do regret that there are three communes in the northern part of Kosovo, including Zubin Potok, where there are no Albanians. In this region, the Serbs have not been able to live with the Albanians—in contrast to the Serbs south of Ibar, where there is much mixing with the Albanians and the two groups live together in peace and harmony. Indeed, in the north of Kosovo it is evident that the dream of a Greater Serbia still persists. If the Serbs really think that they are realizing this dream with these three communes, that is ridiculous: Three communes is an insignificant number. But it is true that these communes could represent a threat to security: There are several cities like Mitrovica in the region, which are divided between the Serbs and the Albanians, and which could therefore become conflict areas if they were roused by the communes. This is why KFOR must play a continuous role in northern Kosovo. In fact, I believe it is the best and most helpful investment that the NATO Alliance and Western nations have made in Europe since World War II.

There were also problems in Macedonia last month. Those trying to incite tensions deserve to be punished under the law. It is undoubtedly their own personal cause that they are serving and has nothing to do with the Albanian national cause. The Albanian national cause in Macedonia is centered on promoting peace, stability, and the development of the country. We very much appreciate the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement, in which the Albanians are treated as equal citizens and their rights are fully respected. My government has excellent relations with its neighbors and we fully support the integrity of Macedonia. Keeping the existing borders is of fundamental importance since any attempt to modify the country's borders could trigger a chain of unforeseen events.

ALBANIA'S FUTURE IN NATO

Albania is trying to do its duty in Afghanistan, in Bosnia, and in Georgia. The war in Afghanistan is of vital importance. We have contributed by sending two companies and will soon be sending another one in a combat mission. I also promised the NATO Secretary General a police unit for training Afghan police, and we are providing scholarships for 100 Afghan students and building eight schools there. Indeed, we are determined to make every possible effort in order to meet NATO's expectations.

There is currently a debate underway about NATO's future. My view is that NATO is in essence a global freedom watch. No other organization, no other institution can provide security better or more effectively than NATO. I am convinced

that the way NATO reached out to its former enemies, the way it extended its role in terms of peacekeeping operations is a blueprint for its future. Clearly, NATO's role will be a more and more global one.

Chapter 4

Key Dinner Address

His Excellency Vecdi Gönül
Minister of Defense of Turkey

Every era, like every person, has its own characteristics. This is what the eminent German philosopher Hegel refers to as the “zeitgeist,” the “spirit of time.” The spirit of our time is characterized by globalization and thus a need for further cooperation.

As the 21st century ends its first decade, the world faces a dynamic and somewhat uncertain security environment. The threat of global war has receded and the core values of the western societies such as representative democracy and market economics are embraced in many parts of the world. Former adversaries now cooperate with the Western world across a range of security issues.

Nevertheless, the world faces a complex and fragile security environment. Conventional threats are now accompanied by new risks such as terrorism, fundamentalism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, illegal immigration, climate change, water and energy scarcity.

Due to her geographical location straddling three continents, three seas and different cultures, Turkey has been closely affected by all these developments.

THE GLOBALIZATION OF PROBLEMS

One of the most important problems of our world is the globalization of terror and its transformation into a threat which has the potential to destroy our economic, political and social order.

Today terrorism constitutes one of the gravest challenges to all nations. It is obvious that the international community cannot defeat terrorism without unwavering determination and close international cooperation. While we take measures to protect our people, societies and states from these threats, respect for international law and human dimension commitments must continue to lie at the heart of our efforts.

In order to tackle terrorism, what needs to be done is to engage in more effective and rapid cooperation on matters such as closing down the frontal organizations of the terrorist organization, curtailing its financial resources and denying it the means of propaganda.

Increasing efforts on nuclear disarmament is the first and foremost step to be taken against the risk of nuclear terrorism. In this respect, the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency should be strengthened and the comprehensive ban on nuclear tests should be put into effect.

Turkey defends the right of all countries to benefit from the peaceful use of nuclear energy. On the other hand, bearing in mind the serious consequences of the proliferation of nuclear weapons for the whole world, we also call upon all countries to act responsibly. We believe that matters concerning nuclear programs still can be solved through dialogue, engagement, and diplomacy.

The process of integration and globalization has placed the migration issue high on our agenda. We need to develop more effective and multi-dimensional migration policies with the active participation of civil society and enhance our cooperation. We must not forget that when we deal with migration, we deal with human beings and with their inherent dignity.

Environmental problems, which may have global impacts, are complex and often interrelated with socio-economic factors. These problems, such as water and air pollution, the generation of solid and hazardous waste, soil degradation, and climate change do not recognize political borders and pose major threats to human safety, health and productivity.

Addressing the global environmental problems requires national efforts as well as international collaboration on both bilateral and multilateral levels. It also needs the active participation of all members of the international community.

Access to alternative sources of energy, diversification of energy supplies, routes and transportation, have become integral components in our efforts to consolidate the security and stability of our countries.

Turkey forms a natural energy bridge between the source countries and consumer markets and stands as a key country in ensuring energy security through diversification of resources and routes.

Major pipeline projects that are already completed and others under construction are enhancing Turkey's role as a transit country on the Eurasia energy axis in the region. These projects will undoubtedly contribute to Europe's energy supply security as well.

REGIONAL INSTABILITIES AS GLOBAL THREATS

Regional instabilities are among the main challenges threatening our globalized world. As a dynamic and responsible member of today's world, Turkey is doing her best to reconcile the West with the East and the North with the South.

In the past, the Balkan Peninsula was identified with turmoil, ethnic unrest and a large-scale civil war. Today, the countries of the region seem to realize the importance of bilateral and multilateral cooperation for peace and stability. Prospects for EU and NATO memberships are the most important incentives for this change in the region.

Nevertheless, the complex political and social structures of the Balkan states lead to a fragile equilibrium in Southeast Europe. We have little choice but to help consolidate stability and prosperity in the region through efficiently functioning defense, law enforcement and governing structures.

In the immediate vicinity of Turkey, grave and persistent problems in the Caucasus and Middle East can erupt at any moment despite all the efforts that are made to attain lasting peace and stability.

Unresolved conflicts in the Caucasus region continue to threaten the security and stability of our continent. The war in Georgia in 2008 was a reminder that the so-called frozen conflicts are not so frozen after all. Since these conflicts have different roots, different historical and political backgrounds, they need to be addressed within their own parameters. On the other hand, the relevant international norms and principles applicable to all of them must be consistent. Respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity must constitute the bedrock of any settlement.

In the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Armenia continues to disregard the U.N. Security Council resolutions by occupying twenty percent of Azerbaijan's territory. Turkey supports direct and indirect bilateral talks between Azerbaijan and Armenia for a peaceful settlement of the conflict and stands ready to support any solution that would be acceptable to both countries.

We have sought not only to normalize relations with Armenia but also to move them to a new level as an indicator of good neighborly relations. We believe that peace and stability cannot be established in the Caucasus if all wheels do not turn at the same time. With this in mind, our aim is to lay the groundwork for improving relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia. We hope that with progress in the Turkish-Armenian relations, Armenians will be relieved to see that Turkey does not have a secret agenda and this may encourage them to adopt a positive stance in the settlement of their issues with Azerbaijan.

The relations between Turkey and Russia, two important states in the Eurasian region and Black Sea basin, are rapidly advancing in all fields. Russia has become the biggest foreign trade partner of Turkey. In many areas, from energy to contracting services, we are in full collaboration with Russia.

The establishment of a lasting and comprehensive peace in the Middle East as well as the evolution of this geographic area into a stable and prosperous region is the shared desire and goal of the international community. Turkey believes that the major tools to this end must be dialogue and cooperation.

Since the Palestinian issue is at the center of all regional problems, we believe that the permanent establishment of peace and stability in the Middle East is not possible without resolving this issue first. Within this context, Turkey has been a strong supporter of the Middle East peace process from the very beginning, viewing it as a golden opportunity.

The current level of relations with Syria, with whom we have the longest border in the Middle Eastern region, is one of the obvious examples of our policy. In the recent past, the two countries were on the verge of war. Today we have started to display a cooperation that will become a precedent for the region. First we abolished the visas between the two countries, and we signed 51 agreements in different sectors.

We have also taken steps forward with Iraq by establishing a Strategic Cooperation Council in 2008 with the goal of bringing our bilateral relations to a higher level. We have signed 48 memoranda in several areas from security to energy and agriculture to trade in order to enhance the cooperation between the two countries.

We closely follow the discussions about the nuclear program of our neighbor, Iran. Last month, Turkey, Brazil and Iran signed an agreement over nuclear fuel swap. This development has increased our optimism that a peaceful solution to this problem can be found. If Iran is to alleviate concerns related to its nuclear program, it should demonstrate the necessary transparency at every stage. Turkey is ready to further contribute to resolve the problem through its diplomatic channels.

In the same way, we closely follow the situation in Afghanistan and the developments in Pakistan. We support the struggle against extremism of the peoples of Afghanistan and Pakistan, with whom we enjoy historical and brotherly ties. We sustain our infrastructure investments in order to help the two countries achieve the prosperity they deserve.

Before concluding, let me tell you a short joke: A man goes to the doctor and says, "Doctor, wherever I touch, it hurts." "What do you mean?" the doctor asks. The man answers, "When I touch my shoulder, it really hurts. If I touch my knee, it also hurts! When I touch my forehead, it really, really hurts." The doctor replies, "I know what is wrong with you—you have broken your finger!"

So in order to tackle a problem or a conflict, you have to define it correctly first.

To sum up, the global problems of our age require global scale solutions. The problems our world faces today are extremely challenging. However, none is insurmountable.

Indeed, we can make the 21st century an era which is ruled by peace instead of wars; trust instead of fear; justice instead of injustice; and prosperity instead of hunger and poverty. It is our common responsibility and historic duty to participate in the construction of such a world, regardless of our language, religion and nationality differences. Our famous Turkish poet, Nazım Hikmet, expressed it in this way: "To live like a tree, alone and free and brotherly like the trees of a forest."

Chapter 5

Georgia and the Black Sea Region

His Excellency Giorgi Baramidze
Vice Prime Minister of Georgia

OPENING REMARKS

Let me share with you my ideas on the role of the EU and NATO in establishing security and prosperity in the Black Sea region. I would now like to speak about the challenges and problems my country faces today. Georgia is located in the Black Sea region, an inherent part of Europe. This fact was underscored when Romania and Bulgaria, other countries of this region, became members of the European Union. It is our hope that Turkey, another regional country that is now undergoing an important transformation and aspires to EU membership, will soon become a member of the European family as well.

THE IMPORTANCE AND CONCERNS OF THE BLACK SEA REGION AND GEORGIA

The Black Sea region is comprised of Eastern European countries including Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia, which are important neighbors and partners of the European Union. This region is indeed full of challenges as well as great opportunities. Currently it delivers energy resources to Europe, bypassing Russia, and also is involved with new energy-related ideas and projects, including the Nabucco project, which, when realized, will further strengthen Europe's energy security and independence. In addition, Romania, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan recently decided to build a liquefied natural gas terminal on the coast of Georgia, which will provide additional natural gas for Europe and diversify the means of delivery.

What is Georgia's interest in all of this? It may sound trivial, but what we want and aspire to is peace, security, development, and prosperity. We have always faced different kinds of security problems and challenges, and we still face them: 20% of our territory has been occupied since Russia's August invasion, endangering our security and future prosperity. The core of the problem is that our neighbor does not respect the universal values of the civilized world, including independence and sovereignty.

Recently, Ambassador Primor said, "What should countries' motivation be when they negotiate different kinds of deals?" If one party thinks that the other party will soon be eliminated, there is no motivation to reach an agreement. This is quite similar to the situation between Georgia and Russia. Russia thinks that, by exerting a bit of pressure on Georgia, the country will no longer exist as an independent and sovereign state. But we do not believe that exerting this pressure is in Russia's best interest. We believe that Russia, as a European nation, could establish good relations with Georgia and start developing as a truly democratic country, respecting its neighbors' independence and sovereignty. Unfortunately, the leadership of Russia, which thinks that the dissolution of the Soviet Union was the biggest tragedy of the 20th century and that NATO is a significant threat, is not willing to act in a civilized way.

Why does Russia believe that NATO is a threat? I do not think Russians lack intelligence, and they should be well aware that NATO does not represent a threat to Russia. Actually, Russia considers NATO an enemy only because of political motivation and their self-perception. Alliance expansion to the east represents a great threat to the imperialistic thoughts of Russian leaders regarding regaining control of the territories they lost after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and reviving the Russian Empire.

Russia's leadership understands very well that they cannot truly challenge NATO or EU countries. Therefore, quite smartly, they are trying to establish good relationships with practically all NATO and EU countries. At the same time, they are acting aggressively and bullying their small neighbors that are not members of NATO or the European Union.

THE EFFECTS OF NATO AND EU MEMBERSHIP

During the years since its establishment, the Alliance has proved that its expansion brings peace, security, stability, and the opportunity to become prosperous to those nations that are members. I believe that history will repeat itself in Georgia's case, and that our membership will bring peace, stability, and prosperity to my country and the entire region.

Unfortunately, even though Georgia and Russia have many common interests, including combating terrorism, fighting against organized crime and drug trafficking, and establishing a WMD nonproliferation policy, we do not believe that Russia's motivation will change within the next 10 to 15 years or that Russia's pressure on Georgia will lessen until Georgia becomes a member of NATO. Furthermore, we do not believe that the U.N. and NATO should wait until countries like Georgia surrender. Based on such countries' merit, achievements, and democratic, economic, security, and defense reforms, they should be allowed to join the Euro-Atlantic family to help solve problems in the region.

The Baltic States have shown that post-Soviet countries can develop positive relationships with Russia and that their region can become more secure, stable, and harmonious. We believe that by achieving NATO and EU membership the Black Sea countries will also bring peace and prosperity not only to their countries but to the whole region and will enhance European security.

Chapter 6

Changes in Ukraine and Their Implications for Security in Europe

Ambassador Borys Tarasyuk
Chairman, Ukrainian Parliamentary Committee for European Integration

OPENING REMARKS

This is my 13th International Workshop. The first time I was invited to this workshop, in 1993, it took place in the first non-NATO country, in Budapest, Hungary. This year's workshop coincides with the time that fundamental, tectonic change took place in Ukraine—the shift in power in Ukraine. Let me say that out of terra incognita, before the restoration of independence, Ukraine became a country that is a well-known contributor to peace and security in the region and in Europe—I dare say a net contributor to security in Europe. So, much now depends on what will happen in Ukraine and how Ukraine will affect international security and stability.

In this regard, I see my major task here as drawing your attention to recent developments that may remind you that Ukraine is one of the biggest countries in Europe: Number one in terms of territory and number five in terms of population. Ukraine plays a significant role in regional and global security. I would also like to draw your attention to the trends that, if continued, can undermine the success of democratization in the region and jeopardize security in Europe as a whole.

A week before the workshop, we summarized the first 100 days of the new president, Mr. Yanukovych, and his team. The result was a failure to launch the highly needed economic reforms so widely advertised to the people and the international community. Since occupying the highest offices, Yanukovych and his team have perpetually breached legislation, including the Constitution of Ukraine, and violated democratic fundamentals, such as freedom of speech and peaceful assembly. Yanukovych and his team's deeds are inconsistent with the declarations made in such critical spheres as foreign policy, European integration, energy, and security.

INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

What was the international response to this situation? Many times I felt bitter listening to comments from some very respected European politicians who labeled the current political situation in Ukraine as long-anticipated stability. I was very disappointed that some of my colleagues welcomed this kind of stability, which basically came at the expense of the rule of law, freedom of speech, and human rights—fundamental values shared by countries of the European Union and NATO. Well, today, nobody is questioning whether there is stability in North Korea, Russia, or Iran. Therefore, I have serious doubts that the international community would welcome the emergence of a new undemocratic, unpredictable, and dependent player in the very center of Europe, even at the cost of illusive stability.

This is not a groundless fear, but a sound possibility acknowledged by the Freedom House on June 3. I was very embarrassed to spot a note regarding my country in the report “Worst of the Worst: The World's Most Repressive Societies 2010.” It concerned Ukraine turning from a free country, which it is now, to a partly free country—and to a place where it was before the Orange Revolution of 2004.

ILLEGITIMATE ACTIONS OF THE CURRENT AUTHORITIES

From the start, the Ukrainian Constitution and legislation did not stop the new authorities from power usurpation and constitutional mutiny. The first red flags were raised when an illegal coalition was established in Ukraine's Parliament in

March 2010 in an unconstitutional manner. Later, the Constitutional Court, while considering this case, made a ruling that demonstrated its lack of impartiality and an absence of checks and balances in the current Ukraine political system. This resulted in the illegitimate appointment of the prime minister and the formation of the government.

We are concerned that Yanukovych and his team will not stop at violating the Constitution, but will continue to break the democratic principles and European values in Ukraine. To this point I vividly recall a line from a recent concept paper called “Reshaping EU–U.S. Relations” that was created by a group of very prominent European politicians and experts, including Romano Prodi, Guy Verhofstadt, Jerzhy Buzek, Jacques Delors, and Joshka Fisher, some of whom I have the honor of regarding as friends. Assessing current global challenges, the authors looked into the foundations of political power and concluded that “the legitimacy of power is now just as important as power projection.” Current Ukrainian authorities and their actions explicitly lack the legitimacy that, in the view of European intellectuals, should be regarded as a security challenge and as damaging power foundations in the biggest European country.

THE BLACK SEA FLEET AND RUSSIA-UKRAINE “RECONCILIATION”

We have been very concerned that, having neglected democratic principles, Yanukovych would carry on, and, unfortunately, we were right. Recently the whole world was astonished by images from the Ukrainian Parliament that showed the appalling ratification procedure of the Russian-Ukrainian Agreement extending a lease for the Russian Black Sea Fleet on our soil until 2042. Those images reflected the ruthlessness of the authorities and the desperation of the patriots of Ukraine to defend national strategic interests, our sovereignty, and independence. Following Russian-Ukrainian documents were prepared without any prior consultations with Parliament, relevant governmental bodies, or the public. They were prepared in an unprecedented shady and discreet manner. By ratifying the Black Sea Fleet Agreement, the authorities once again violated the Constitution and the law by extending the lease; Ukraine prohibits the presence of international military bases in Ukraine.

We are convinced that the Black Sea Fleet of Russia is a serious threat to our sovereignty, a means to contain Ukraine in the zone of Russian interests and to oppose it against the democratic world. Furthermore, it may fuel secessionism inside the country, split Ukrainian society apart, and trigger political confrontation. The presence of the Black Sea Fleet provoked ethnic confrontation in the Crimea. It also poses the threat of our being dragged into armed conflict with third parties, including the Black Sea Fleet, where Russia applies force without the consent of the Ukrainian side, as was the case in August 2008 against Georgia. Moreover, further Russian military escalation with the Black Sea Fleet engagement in Sevastopol may provoke acts of terrorism against Ukraine.

NON-BLOCK STATUS

The undoubted result of the new regime is the rapid reversal of Ukraine’s foreign policy, for the first time in the almost 19 years of our renewed independence. Following the embarrassing Russian-Ukrainian Agreement, the Ukrainian president rushed to drag his draft law, “On Fundamentals of Domestic and Foreign Policies,” through Parliament, reversing foreign policy objectives. Failing to offer a conceptual or an innovative approach to domestic and foreign policies, this document pursues a single goal: To exempt the provisions of Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration, that is, NATO membership, from the legislation. This dangerous step, if accomplished, will finally deprive Ukraine of its chances to ensure its security and to strive for a place among the world’s most mature democracies. Instead, the new regime promotes enshrining “non-block status,” which for Ukraine implies the role of a buffer zone on the European periphery, one exposed to growing global challenges such as arms proliferation, human trafficking, smuggling, terrorism, and human rights abuse. Unfortunately, Ukrainian authorities do not realize that pursuing this non-block status or neutrality is costly.

For instance, non-aligned Austria annually spends on defense about 330 USD per capita, and neutral Switzerland and Sweden spend 500 USD and 600 USD, respectively. Ukraine spends 25 USD per capita. How can Ukraine, in a non-block manner, resist the growing global challenges, located as it is in a vulnerable spot right at the European crossroads? In its rush to secure stability while being deprived of the Euro-Atlantic option, it is expected to gravitate toward Russia, thus realizing the ultimate Russian goal: To regain extensive imperial status.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The scale and pace of Russia's growing grip on strategic Ukrainian sectors, such as its acquisition efforts toward the atomic agency, the Antonov Aircraft giant, shipyards, and railway locomotion plants; its attempts to synchronize Ukrainian education and humanitarian spheres with Russia; and, most importantly, its gaining control of Ukrainian gas transportation and gas distribution systems would symbolize Russia's absorption of Ukraine. This is clearly reflected in the recent Russian-Ukrainian "reconciliation" and paves a clear path for Russia to reinvent its dominance in the former Soviet Union area and in east-central Europe and Eurasia.

Taking into account its size, geopolitical location, military, and industrial and agricultural potential, Ukraine will continue to influence security and stability in its region as well as the whole of Europe. The question is whether this influence will be positive or negative.

A shift in power in Ukraine may result in two scenarios. The first one, which I call negative, is this:

- By becoming subordinate to the Russian quest for domination, Ukraine will transform from being a regional leader to being a Russian proxy in the region.
- An increase of Russian influence in the region and in Europe will result in the consolidation of Russia's monopoly on gas delivery to European consumers.
- Russia will increase its aggressiveness. Regarding this, let me remind you that, according to my good friend Z. Brzezinski, Russia will depend in the future on whether or not it establishes a correct relationship with Ukraine. With Ukraine as part of Russia's policy, Russia stands to become a new imperial state. Without Ukraine as an inseparable part of Russia, Russia stands to become a democratic European country. According to my assessment, we may see the consolidation of Russia's domination over the former Soviet Union countries and a weakening of democratic European values-oriented countries like Guam.

The second scenario, which is more encouraging from my point of view, would lead to combining the efforts of Ukrainian democrats and international democratic institutions, and this would result in the defense of democratic institutions and values in Ukraine. This scenario also enables a change of power as a result of the forthcoming 2012 parliamentary elections. Then we might see the return to an independent foreign policy and its objectives, including EU and NATO membership. For this to happen, however, both Ukrainian democrats and a united Europe must learn lessons from the past. Ukraine must also join NATO and the European Union, and for this we need the political support of our partners in both organizations.

As a result of the changes in the second scenario, Ukraine will again become a participant in achieving security and stability in Europe and the Euro-Atlantic area, and have the chance to return to its role of regional leader and to become a center of democracy building in the region. Currently the EU and the United States, which are largely engaged in a struggle to curb economic turmoil, may be underestimating the magnitude of these shifts in Ukraine. They may also, most dangerously, be missing the devaluation of democratic fundamentals that for decades cemented unions that we all now call the most prosperous and stable societies, and what we young democracies aspire to.

Chapter 7

The Situation in the Balkan Region

Her Excellency Dr. Ljubica Jelusič
Minister of Defense of Slovenia

Our panel will discuss the Balkans and the Black Sea region. It is not easy to find commonalities between these regions. In fact, there are many differences between the regions and even more differences among the countries that lie within them. So what is common to all of us?

THE SITUATION IN THE BALKANS

First of all, the Balkans and the Black Sea areas are seen as sources of challenging problems, if not serious issues or actual threats. Second, a strong Europeanization process is going on within all the countries in both regions. We not only have countries that are already members of NATO and the European Union but we also have applicants for Euro-Atlantic integration. In addition, there is what I call an unfinished process of Europeanization. Whenever we speak about the Balkans and the Black Sea, we think about the area as a kind of “incomplete Europe,” a term that was used earlier in the workshop when we spoke about the Baltic States and the Baltic region.

On the integration side, we have countries that are already members of both NATO and the European Union—Slovenia, Romania, and Bulgaria. And we have countries that are members of NATO but not of the EU—Croatia, Albania, and Turkey. We have a new member of OECD, a very young member, Slovenia. And we have countries that are part of the Membership Action Plan (MAP) process. But even within the MAP process, we have countries that are still at the beginning and taking their first steps in the process.

Macedonia, for example, has been in the MAP process for 10 years, but it is still waiting to become a member of NATO. Then we have Montenegro, which has been in the MAP process for three years, preparing itself with great enthusiasm not only for membership in NATO but also for membership in the European Union. We have Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose representative here, my dear colleague the defense minister, will explain to us the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina during his presentation. We also have Serbia, a country that is a member of the Partnership for Peace program, and which is a candidate for European Union membership, but does not yet seek membership in NATO. And we have Kosovo, which has more than 60 international recognitions but which cannot yet be called a full-fledged state.

If we compare the situation in the Balkans with the situation in the Baltic States, which we heard about earlier in the workshop, we get the feeling that all three Baltic countries—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—are on the same track and somehow in the same situation, approaching their security and prosperity with similar steps. We could not say the same things about the Balkans. In the Balkans we have countries in different phases of prosperity and in different phases of security. We can even say that the Balkan countries are not only taking different approaches and they have had very different experiences as to recent conflicts and war. Some of the countries were fully at war, some were involved in armed conflicts but not truly at war, and some are still war-torn.

One important point is common to all the Balkan countries: They would all like to become reliable partners in security arrangements. Moreover, we can see that all these countries are making the transition from security receivers to security providers. We also see that troops from all of these countries are participating in various international operations and missions all around the world. Many of these countries send their soldiers on United Nations missions under the U.N. flag, but, for the most part, their soldiers serve under the NATO flag, whether or not they are members of NATO or candidates for NATO membership.

COMMONALITIES BETWEEN THE BALKANS AND THE BALTIC REGION

The various Balkan countries are not all participating in international operations and missions in the same way, and are not approaching Euro-Atlantic integration in the same manner. Nonetheless, whenever the Balkan countries have bilateral exchanges or participate in multilateral or regional conferences, the fact that we all have troops in different operations makes it very clear that there is a strong connection between the Balkan region and our colleagues in the Black Sea region. All of us can speak about our troops in Afghanistan, and other activities as well.

Chapter 8

National, NATO, and EU Security Strategies—Synergy in Countering the Growing Security Challenges

His Excellency Anu Anguelov
Minister of Defense of Bulgaria

OPENING REMARKS

It is a great pleasure, honor, and challenge to address the distinguished audience of the 27th International Workshop on Global Security. Let me congratulate the Center for Strategic Decision Research for organizing an impressive number of workshops on topical issues on the security agenda, and conducting the 27th one in Berlin.

The city of Berlin stands in my mind as a symbol of a place that was predestined to be united and will remain united despite the twists and turns of history. The same is valid for Europe, which is irreversibly advancing along the path of unity and freedom. The Euro-Atlantic community of free democratic nations should together face the challenges and shape the strategic environment of the 21st century for the sake of peace, stability, and prosperity for the generations to come. Being on the same side is not enough. We must act as a team in order to attain the highest level of efficiency. It is essential that our efforts be synergistic.

THE NEED FOR SECURITY SYNERGY

The idea of synergy is the core thesis of my talk, in the sense of common action in which the teamwork of different actors delivers an overall greater outcome than would be possible if each of them worked individually. This approach provides added value, especially when tackling the new multifaceted security challenges.

The security environment is complex and increasingly unpredictable. Resources are limited compared to mounting public expectations. The world financial and economic crisis has worsened the situation even more while the defense sector has to adopt the most up-to-date strategic management approaches. In order to attain greater results, and achieve more with fewer resources, it is vital that we take synergistic action.

Security is dynamic; therefore, it should always be sustained. That requires constant effort and, most importantly, a common vision and policies that form the basic of a security strategy. Once we attain the ultimate trinity of strategies—security, the more security we will have.

Conceptual Synergy

Synergy in security strategies can be perceived in two ways. First, there is the conceptual aspect, in which the letter and spirit of texts should be compatible, complementary, and harmonized. Second, there is the practical aspect, which puts into practice the prescribed policy actions. The first aspect is easier to achieve. For example, the three strategic documents—NATO's new Strategic Concept, Bulgarian National Security, and National Defense Strategies—are in the process of development. All three are important for our security, defense, and armed forces. We follow very closely and are participating in NATO's debate process as well as in the EU's strategic rethinking process to harmonize our strategy with the relevant EU and NATO documents.

In order to be synergistic, security strategies should be in harmony with or compatible with the assessment of the security environment, values, interests, objectives, methods, functions, prescribed policies and actions, and structures and

resources. A quick comparison between some of NATO and the EU's strategic documents and those of member-states shows that this is the case in general. The EU and NATO are serving as positive examples to be followed by others.

Practical Synergy

As to the practical aspect, in order to meet the growing expectations of our defense sectors under the permanent pressure of resource shortages, we need to improve the usability of forces, promote solidarity, and increase the synergy of efforts in both NATO and the EU. That includes:

- Seeking common solutions for defense equipment investment. This is especially needed for smaller countries that cannot afford to have all the equipment they need in terms of weapons platforms, such as strategic transport aircraft and multirole fighters for air policing. Such solutions will substantially boost NATO and the EU's ability to undertake operations. Regarding this I can only share the NATO Secretary General's wish that "multinational defense acquisition becomes the norm, rather than the exception." Bulgaria is carefully studying such potential opportunities to realize common acquisition solutions with our NATO-allied neighboring countries. Given the geographical location of south-eastern Europe, we also need to cooperate in the field of investment in defense infrastructure as an example of synergy.
- The second point is burden sharing, which is particularly important and sensitive as far as NATO operations are concerned. Having more common funding and a new reading of the principle "costs lie where they fall" in operations will be important steps toward enhancing our ability to deploy, especially for smaller NATO and EU nations.

A main priority for our armed forces in the coming years will be participation in long-term combined joint expeditionary operations beyond national territory, with little or no host nation support. Despite the difficulties, the Bulgarian Armed Forces keep a high profile of participation in crisis-response operations. Currently about 730 servicemen participate in crisis-response operations abroad. Additionally 170 soldiers are on standby on our national territory as part of NRF-14. The use of improved common funding opportunities could further increase our capabilities and troop contributions.

- The third point is that common solutions and common funding go hand in hand with some degree of role specialization. This will enable us to find out how every nation can make the Alliance stronger through its specific practical contributions, enhancing interoperability and avoiding duplications and wasting of precious taxpayers' money.

STRENGTHENING COOPERATION

I believe that implementing the points I have mentioned would bring us closer to the idea of strengthening cooperation in the European or Euro-Atlantic defense industrial market as a pattern for synergy. A reasonable step in this direction would be the development of a NATO-EU defense capabilities agency, as suggested by the Group of Experts in NATO's new Strategic Concept Report. The real challenge, nevertheless, remains the practical application of policies in the EU, NATO, and national security strategies. Words should now be followed by practical actions. We should ask ourselves how effective the partnership is within the EU and NATO framework and should rely on closer cooperation and synergy. In my opinion, we could perform better in this area. At this critical juncture, the 28 NATO Allies and the 27 EU member-states should prove their capacity to act in concert.

This need is more relevant than ever for security in southeastern Europe and the Black Sea region, which requires synergy at both the visionary level and for real policy actions by NATO and the EU. It will gain even more importance in the future, given the constantly evolving nature of challenges, including interstate conflicts that, despite the growing significance or even prevalence of asymmetric risks and threats, will remain on the security agenda, especially in the wider Black Sea area. Our contribution to security in these two particular regions should be measured by practical achievements, not by declarations of political intent.

We can benefit here not only by enjoying peace and stability, but also by building our own positive image and setting examples of leadership and the ability to shape our own future. Today's challenges should first and foremost be seen as a chance—a chance to become masters of our own destiny.

MILITARY COOPERATION AND REGIONAL INITIATIVES

Before concluding my presentation, let me briefly touch on the role of military cooperation and regional initiatives. Our goal here is to further strengthen military cooperation and bring regional initiatives to a new level.

A key role in regional cooperation is being played by the South Eastern Defense Ministerial (SEDM) process, together

with other important initiatives including BLACKSEAFOR, annual meetings of the Chiefs of Defense from southeastern Europe, and SEEBRIG. In 2009 Bulgaria took over for two years the SEDM chairmanship. We follow ambitious priorities aimed at increasing our efficiency, such as:

- Strengthening regional security
- Accelerating the process of integrating the countries of the region with Euro-Atlantic structures
- Preparing SEEBRIG for missions and operations

The regional initiatives in the security and defense field have received new impetus. Under our chairmanship, Montenegro and Serbia joined the process as full members. And Bosnia and Herzegovina became an observer to SEEBRIG. We attach great importance to the developments in our neighborhood. We are committed to ensuring lasting peace and promoting mutual understanding and cooperation in southeastern Europe. The European perspective is a key factor for prosperity in the region.

In order to be truly able to contribute to stability in the Black Sea region and to the still-fragile western Balkans, we need to possess the necessary capabilities and more. The question is, To what extent can we use them? Or, rather, Do we have the political will and are they fit enough to meet the challenges of today, not those of yesterday? This brings us to the issue of interoperability, but not only of weapons platforms. What is even more important and provides real synergy of effort is the interoperability of thinking and acting, achieved through doctrine development, common training events, exercises, and cooperation initiatives like BLACKSEAFOR, SEEBRIG, SEESIM, and others.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Yet all of this still might not be enough. Taking into account the economic realities and current cuts in staffing and resources, we must be able to make our best efforts and contribute to collective security and defense. That is why our primary mission today is to find intelligent and innovative solutions. The right answer can only be synergy in both strategies and policies.

Chapter 9

Interdependence in International Relations: A View from Bosnia and Herzegovina

Dr. Selmo Cikotić
Defense Minister of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Let me start with some globally relevant remarks. I believe that the progress of civilization and globalization, besides bringing many very positive achievements and the free flow of people, ideas, goods, and values, has brought some globally relevant and present challenges and threats, not only to civilization but even to the nature of threats and challenges, which tend to change due to the changes of the modern world. We live in a time that is characterized by the speed of change, which is unprecedented in history, with a tendency for further acceleration. All of this applies not only to any single country's security system but also to the entire world's security situation.

INTERDEPENDENCE PRESENTS THE MAJOR FEATURE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS

Because of all of these changes, interdependence has become a major feature of international relationships. No country, regardless of its size, strength, and potential, can provide its own security. Countries depend on each other more and more. And with all of these things in mind, we have to recognize the trend of power to migrate outside state structures and also the migration of security threats. It is difficult to predict to what extent security structures per se will be the subject of security environments and guarantees versus the influence of some research laboratories, medical institutions, migration offices, or environmental institutions, and how the leadership and organization of security structures will change. However, I believe that firm, strong, vertically organized hierarchies will be replaced increasingly by more flexible, horizontal organizations that cover a bigger area.

CONCERNS AND CHANGES IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Bosnia and Herzegovina feels all of these changes and concerns and shares them with all of its neighbors. Bosnia and Herzegovina, if I may say, is part of the heartland of the western Balkans. In many aspects, it is representative of the region but also represents a kind of problem and solution for the western Balkans. I will not talk about the entire problem but focus instead on the defense structures of Bosnia and Herzegovina, reminding you that at Dayton it was impossible to organize the defense of the country at the state level, and it was very difficult to include this single sentence within the overall framework agreement: "The presidency of the country will form a standing committee on military matters that will coordinate defense issues between entities", and all defense structures were to be provided at entities' level. Today, fifteen years after Dayton, we have a functioning state-level ministry of defense and a single armed force of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thus we completely abandoned the entity level of defense structures.

Ten years before these reforms, that was completely unthinkable. This illustrates how much progress can be achieved within Bosnia and Herzegovina when there exists an understanding, the will of local politicians and the owners of responsibility, and cooperation with international actors, namely NATO and, particularly, the United States and its government.

Defense reform represents the most significant change of the Dayton Accords, which in a way can be characterized as a constitutional reform of the country. But this reform not only changed the defense system of the country: It changed the mindset of the people. It set the stage and created a role model for many other security reforms and changes as well as many other state-level reforms in many other areas.

WORKING WITH NATO AND THE EU

The most valuable heritage of the defense reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina is that ethnic interests in the country are best protected and promoted by effective and workable state-level institutions capable of taking our country into NATO and the EU, helping everyone to be better off. It is our experience, and this is true not only for Bosnia and Herzegovina but the West and the Balkan region in general, that if you do not create a solution that enables everyone to win, then no one wins. It is also our experience that an imperfect division of revenues and gains that produces success is much better than an ideal division of responsibility that produces failure. In the long run, things balance out, and we are quite sure that in promoting this idea we serve not only internal progress but our external international contribution to the value of international collective security mechanisms and cooperative security concept of the EU. This is the best way, we believe, in which NATO and the EU can work with and assist us.

Unlike some regional states, we do see NATO and the European Union as separate but not separable institutions. We also understand the transition pattern in which a country is taken into NATO first and later considered for EU membership. And we understand that fulfilling the different requirements and prerequisites for membership in both organizations is complementary, and requires the state-building process that brings about positive consequences both internally and externally. We have full national consensus on our European identity and on joining NATO and the EU in the future, and this is not always the case regarding many political issues in the country.

We now have an election campaign ahead of us, and most politicians will care much more about the elections' outcome than the speed of our progress through PfP mechanisms and the resolution of defense immovable property, which is a prerequisite for our enrollment in the first Annual National Plan within MAP. Therefore I do not want to provide any guarantees for the resolution of this issue before the September time, even though the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces is taking an active position, and we have provided and prepared all necessary forms and documents to get this issue fixed in a month or two. If that does not happen, this issue will need to be resolved after the elections are completed, and it will be one of the first and key challenges of the new government that will be formed after the October elections.

I am quite sure, however, that on a daily basis this is an important issue. In the long run, though, it is much more important that we see progress, and I share in the thoughts of my Georgian colleague that any kind of NATO and EU investment in the progress of internal affairs in Bosnia and Herzegovina and its international position is worthwhile.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Our region has a tendency to make very positive changes regarding its future. Some of you know that Croatia, in addition to Turkey, was one of the very active NATO members that opted for MAP for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Just 10 years ago, that would have been impossible. And when Croatia won access to NATO in 2009, it received only positive comments from Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that would have been impossible if it had happened just five or seven years ago. So, all of these changes are very important. Now we focus more and more on practical issues, on future-oriented issues. With all of the global trends, every state in the western Balkans and in the region understands that integration is better than fragmentation, cooperation is better than confrontation, and inclusion is better than exclusion. I dare say today that the western Balkans region will be better integrated in 10 years' time, than it used to be 20 years ago, before the crisis erupted and war broke out.

Chapter 10

Southeastern Europe: Successes and Challenges

State Secretary Pjer Šimunović¹
Croatian Ministry of Defense

When the citizens of southeast Europe consider their future, they face a dilemma: Is the glass half full or half empty? Individuals and institutions outside the region, including such organizations as the European Union and NATO, must surely ponder similar questions.

SUCCESS IN SOUTHEAST EUROPE

Personally, I tend to look at the positive side, not just to be optimistic but also to be objective. What we have heard at this conference, especially in the words of the Georgian Vice Prime Minister, is that, when we discuss southeast Europe, a measure of our success is that we usually discuss the net contributions that the region is providing to global security. We have heard about the area's contributions to Iraq and to Afghanistan, which I would say are the most visible signs of the maturity and stability that have been achieved in this region since the 90s, when the region was a synonym for crisis.

What are the other measures of success in this region? First, it is the fact that the ring of stability, prosperity, and security formed by membership in the EU and NATO is getting stronger and stronger throughout the area. Minister Jelusic's country leads the charge since Slovenia has been in both the EU and NATO for some time. Other countries in the region, such as Bulgaria, Romania, Greece, and Turkey, are members of NATO as well as EU candidates, making this ring even stronger. Croatia recently acceded to NATO together with our Albanian friends, while Montenegro and Bosnia are part of MAP. Macedonia is an issue that has nothing to do with how the country itself is performing; it is an international issue as you know, and the name of the issue is Greece.

What better way is there to demonstrate the region's genuine success than to show how the entire region is being integrated, step by step, into the main Euro-Atlantic scene, into both the European Union and NATO. This is happening quite visibly as the countries become true net contributors to global security, providing tangible forces for the demanding, complex, and much needed peace support and crisis response operations in the world.

In addition to what we can see from the outside—how these countries are gradually acceding to the Euro-Atlantic organizations and providing troops for operations—an entire range of multilateral and bilateral instruments have been established in the region to support good neighborliness, stability, security, and prosperity. There is the USA Adriatic Charter, promoting NATO integration; there is the Southeast European Cooperation Process, with its very effective Regional Cooperation Council; the Southeast and European Defense Ministerial Process; and the Adriatic Union initiatives. These instruments provide a network within which the countries, their ministries, and the people in the region are very tightly intertwined, and almost 90% of the cooperation in the region is dedicated to promoting the full integration of all countries in the region into the EU and NATO.

Surely this is a process that will end with all the countries of the region as members of NATO and the EU. It is a very encouraging and a very positive process. It will generate a lot of good will and a whole range of successes that will affect all the countries in the region as well as their citizens.

CHANGES IN THE COOPERATION PROCESS

We must remember, however, that the process had humble beginnings. After the war, in the 90s, the first instrument with which the countries more or less cooperated with each other was the so-called Annex Four of the Dayton Agreement.

¹ State Secretary Pjer Šimunović presented this paper on behalf of Croatian Defense Minister Branko Vukelić.

This established a scheme based on quotas for certain categories of armaments and on a philosophy of how countries in the region should act. Each country was to possess an established instrument of arms control, which at the beginning was an important confidence-building measure and enabled people to get to know each other gradually and start to become friends. This instrument still exists, but it has spilled over into very friendly discussions on defense planning and strategic documents and has an arms control measure attached to it. In fact, no country in the region regards any other country in the region as a potential security threat.

FACING REGIONAL THREATS

The threats to our security are many. They include broad threats, often asymmetrical, which are faced by all countries in the Alliance. They include soft security threats, which may be the result of organized crime. The countries in our region cooperate particularly nicely in the field of combating organized crime, drug smuggling, human trafficking, WMD, and terrorism. The network of cooperation that has been established is functioning well and, I believe, provides a unique springboard for a happy future. This is not to underestimate the challenges that the region faces. Minister Cikotic told us about the challenges of forging a modern self-sustainable Bosnian state, but indeed everything that is happening puts his country on a good track. One challenge that needs to be resolved as soon as possible is the issue of the name of Macedonia, in order to enable the country to be fully stabilized and to be able to fully contribute to the European and Euro-Atlantic family of nations. So we have to work with our Greek friends to resolve the issue of Macedonia's name.

Another issue that remains to be resolved is finding a way for peaceful, meaningful, coexistence between Serbia and Kosovo. I will not get deeper into that issue; you are fully aware of the extent to which it burdens the region, though in no way can it be compared to what was happening in the 90s, because of the current maturity of the countries in the region and because of the existence of the EU and NATO. The international community has been maturing over the years, starting with the crisis in the 90s, which was very much a test case for the European Union and NATO. The learning curve of those organizations has been very much connected with what is happening in the region. Presently the engagement of the EU and NATO in the region consists of what is happening in the field, but in a very important sense that consists not only of the forces there but of the final engagement that could come at any moment in the future.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

My last comment concerns the uniqueness of this region. In the 90s, the region was a synonym for crisis, but we have now reached a point where other regions can potentially benefit from our experience. As the years go by, the prospect of full membership in the EU and NATO continues to be the single most powerful engine for the development of stability, security and, ultimately, prosperity in this region. Geography does matter, and it is one of the elements that make this region unique.

Chapter 11

Security in the Baltic Region

His Excellency Jaak Aaviksoo
Minister of Defense of Estonia

SECURITY IN THE BALTIC SEA AREA

When “Security in the Baltic Region” was given as a title for this panel, I thought at first, What is meant by the Baltic Region? Is it the three Baltic States and some of the surrounding territory, or a much broader and more extensive Baltic Sea area? It is hard to address the issue of security in the Baltic Region on its smallest scale if we do not see the area in its broader context. If we put together Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania population-wise, we reach more or less the same size as Sweden. If we add to the three Baltic States the populations of Sweden, Finland, Norway, Denmark, and Iceland, all eight countries together are smaller than Poland. If we take Poland and add it to those eight, this sums up to a little bit less than Germany. And if we sum up all the aforementioned countries, this becomes a little bit less than Russia. So I think this hierarchy shows how complicated these relations around the Baltic Sea might be.

THREAT PERCEPTIONS

The second point I would like to make is that, whenever we discuss security, a fundamental concept is threat perception. This is increasingly true in the case of democratic countries where the threat perception of the population directly and indirectly influences the political decision making and the formulation of a security policy, a defense policy, international cooperation and so on and so forth. This means that threat perception in the minds of the millions of people in our countries is a strong consideration, if not the most important one, in devising security strategies. To be straightforward, we have to acknowledge the fact that many people in the three Baltic States are afraid of Russia. Vice versa, it is a somewhat surprising fact that, if asked, many people in the Russian Federation will say that they are afraid of Estonia, Georgia, NATO and the United States. If this is true, we have to address the problem. I think that dealing with the differences in threat perceptions is a very complicated issue and most probably this was the most complicated task that the twelve wise men and women had to tackle when devising recommendations for the NATO Strategic Concept. If some people are afraid of lions and others are afraid of mice, it is very hard to agree on a defensive policy.

So I think that we have to live with the reality of these differences in threat perceptions. Within the Nordic region around the Baltic Sea, these differences are reflected in the very different histories of these countries during the last large scale conflict, namely World War II. Just look at the track records for Denmark, Norway, neutral Sweden, and go alone Finland, who was forced into a friendship with Germany. Then there were the three Baltic States who simply lacked guts or maybe had too much in the way of brains and not enough guts to fight the Russians, after Hitler and Stalin had agreed to divide Eastern Europe into zones of influence. These perceptions still remain, I think, in the minds of people among the different nations around the Baltic Sea area. Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians are perhaps the ones who are the most united in their threat perceptions today.

In addition to this historic experience, our threat perceptions concerning security and defense issues are shaped by the way in which our people understand the modern world. We have particular problems understanding the new threats, especially asymmetric threats, in a modern globalizing world which is getting smaller and smaller security wise. At the same time, we have too many people who still do not understand and do not want to understand what we are doing in Afghanistan. They do not even understand what we are doing off the Somali coast. If they do not understand the dangers coming from these areas and if it is not in their threat perception, we are running into a strategy problem. So a lot has to be done to bring those different national threat perceptions closer together, to build public confidence on threat perceptions. Let's

take for example North Korea. I am sorry to be blunt but I think Estonians do not care about what is happening in North Korea. At the very least, North Korea is not on their list of top security threats as they understand them. And I am afraid that the same thing is true in the case of European vis-à-vis the American threat perception concerning North Korea. This may or may not be true, but I think there is a difference. In any case, I do believe that over the last ten to twenty years, the three Baltic States, now members of both NATO and the EU, have built a threat perception of their own that is increasingly close to the way the Europeans at large and especially European countries in NATO perceive the threats around them. Maybe we could all have a more positive view if it were not for exercises with 40,000 men that were held last year 200 km from the Estonian border or the armed conflict in Georgia two years ago, which shifted back what we had achieved over the last ten to twenty years. Another argument may be important to know: On 9 May of this year, we all celebrated on Red Square the end of World War II that, as formally stated, ended sixty five years ago. Nonetheless, some countries, particularly Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, welcomed the withdrawal of the Soviet Army in 1994. So for us, World War II ended sixteen years ago.

HOW DOES THE BALTIC SEA REGION ADDRESS THE SECURITY SITUATION?

How do we address this security situation around us? How do we decide what is important? What do we have to do (and what must we not do) under those circumstances? I think that the most important thing is to build a rational, open, forward-looking, self-confident understanding of our national interest. It is not an easy thing to do taking into account the fact that all our three countries, with a minor difference in the case of Lithuania, had only twenty years of independence between the two world wars. And even now, as I said before, we have enjoyed our regained independence for less than two decades. This means that we have to solve our internal problems and provide a safe environment for our citizens and all inhabitants in our three countries since we inherited a large proportion of non-nationals on our territories. And we must build our own self-defense in order to be able to solve minor problems. As the old saying goes, "Pray to Allah but tie up your camel yourself." This also means spending a fair amount of our national wealth on defense. We are trying hard to reach that 2% goal. Some countries are more successful than others but I think we have a strategic commitment to meeting that goal. It is just part of our self-confidence, our self-perception. If we are able to deliver that, then we can be sure that this is reciprocal.

Secondly, history has shown that none of our countries can "go alone." Finland did just that and paid a huge price. This is no longer possible, even for Finland, which is the nation that is the most committed to its national defense. Of course, in the case of our three states, who have joined NATO and the EU, NATO is the number one security guarantor and I think it is more or less true all across the area. Equally important is the increased regional cooperation. One may devise a collective defense of three Baltic States uniting their armies. At least technically, that would be a wise thing although practically, it would not be an easy task. But there is no other area of cooperation among the three Baltic States that is as well-developed as the field of national defense. There are also joint educational institutions, joint maritime projects, and joint air surveillance as well as policing together with our NATO partners. Moreover, a number of other projects are on the way.

We also see increased Nordic cooperation in the field of defense. Despite the fact that some countries are EU members, some are NATO members, and some do not belong to either, our cooperation is deepening. The first steps, in the form of a Nordic Baltic Eight, have been taken. They are very promising and I am sure that this cooperation will be deepening in the future. So I will conclude by saying that the Baltic Region, the broader Baltic Region around the Baltic Sea, is probably one of the safest and calmest areas in the world today. However, I will quote the conclusions of the report to the NATO Strategic Concept: "Conventional military aggression against the Alliance or its members is unlikely but the possibility cannot be ignored." With that in mind, we invest in our national defense and in cooperation at all levels because this possibility, however small it may be, can be further minimized through our joint efforts.

Chapter 12

Security in the Baltic Region

His Excellency Imants Liegis
Minister of Defense of Latvia

I will structure my address in three parts: first, twenty years ago, then ten years ago, and finally today, the Strategic Concept. Yesterday, all three of us—defense ministers from Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia—were together in Lithuania where we celebrated the 10th anniversary of the Baltic Joint Air Surveillance project. And of course earlier this week we were all in Riga as part of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly where we spoke on a panel about Afghanistan. Next week, we will be meeting again at the NATO Defense Ministers’ meeting and we will have a separate meeting of our own to discuss ongoing projects. As the frequency of our meetings suggests, our cooperation is very close and very successful.

TWENTY YEARS AGO

In case some of you are wondering about my accent, I want to stress that I am a true Balt, not a true Brit. I am a Latvian from the United Kingdom. Twenty years ago, I was already involved in Baltic cooperation, as a representative of something called the Baltic World Council, an exile group. I was the European representative, which involved lobbying institutions in Strasbourg, Brussels, and the European Union and informing them about events that were taking place at that time in the Baltic region. These were momentous events, because we were striving to regain our independence and our freedom. It was a singing revolution—a way of regaining freedom through singing, and it was a totally passive resistance. Twenty-one years ago, I was in Latvia, and I took part in a human chain which went from Tallinn, and Riga, to Vilnius, with a couple million people standing and holding hands, facing west and with their backs to the east for obvious reasons. Amazingly, this was at a time when we still had Soviet troops on our soil. We were still part of the Soviet Union.

On the 4th of May this year, we marked the twentieth anniversary of the declaration of our independence, even though we were still formally Soviet republics at that date. Lithuania, which led the way—with President Landsbergis very much in the forefront, made a unilateral declaration of independence. Latvia’s declaration was for a transition to full independence, which took place one year later in August 1991. These were really momentous events. In my capacity as the Baltic representative, I remember very well a meeting in the European Parliament in Strasbourg. There had been a meeting of what was then the CSCE in Paris, which our three foreign ministers had attended—Lennart Meri, now deceased, Algirdas Saudargas, and Janis Jurkans, the Latvian Foreign Minister. Two of them came to Strasbourg for a bit of lobbying, the first time that we attended the European Parliament and Lennart Meri, a very inspiring figure, explained to the European Parliamentarians what had happened the day before in Paris. When the three Baltic representatives arrived, they learned from the French of Gorbachev’s demand that the meeting would either have to go ahead without him or the Baltic representatives would have to leave the room. So at that stage, we were shown the door, and we had to sit in a room adjacent to the one where the meeting was taking place. In describing these events, Lennart Merri asked, “Which country is more independent, Estonia or France?” That was a wonderful quote. Since I was unable to persuade the Lithuanian representative to come to Strasbourg for the European Parliament meeting, there were some amusing consequences: At the end of the day, we were up in the gallery when our presence was acknowledged. Since the message that there were only two foreign ministers had not gotten through, it was announced that all three Baltic foreign ministers were present. So I was pushed to stand up so, and for thirty seconds, I had publicly become the Lithuanian Minister of Foreign Affairs! So these are some of my personal views about the situation twenty years ago, four years before the Russian troops finally left our territories.

TEN YEARS AGO

As I already mentioned, we have just celebrated the tenth anniversary of the BALTNET project. Ten years ago, I was Latvia’s Ambassador to NATO in Brussels and we were then aspiring members of the Alliance. There were some “question

marks” as to our prospects and, as Edgar Buckley will recall, there were discussions as to whether the Baltic States were defensible. Some allies felt that we were not, and this argument was advanced for not inviting us to join NATO. At the same time, everyone was waiting to see what the new U.S. Administration would say about further enlargement. When Victoria Nuland, who subsequently became the US Permanent Representative, arrived in Brussels—I think it was the summer of 2000, I had a conversation with her on the grounds of the U.S. Ambassador’s wonderful residence in Brussels. At that stage, Estonia had already been invited to start negotiations for the European Union and Lithuania was making a very strong push vis-à-vis NATO. Latvia was a bit stuck in the middle and Victoria Nuland said to me: “Well, you know, how would you feel if we took one Baltic State for the next round of enlargement?” I said that it would be disastrous. Where would that leave Latvia? We are in the middle. With Estonia in the EU and Lithuania in NATO, we would be left in a situation where we would have to look east. Fortunately, things turned out in a positive way.

In the mid-90s, there were academics, such as Ron Asmus, who had already focused on Baltic regional security and our prospects for joining the Alliance. Another academic, Jim Goldgeier in Washington, had written a book saying that it was not a question of whether the Baltic States would be invited to join but when. A couple of years later, George Bush’s administration came into power and they went for the “big bang.” We were indeed invited in 2002 and we joined in 2004.

TODAY: THE NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT

Because of the Russia factor, we were at the sharp edge of the enlargement question. And as NATO prepares its new Strategic Concept, we are still on the sharp edge and for the same reason. The expert group’s report of the new Strategic Concept not only addressed Russia as a key issue, but, as I think Admiral Fitzgerald said, the focus of the expert group’s report was on the east. Being in the east of the Alliance, we were very sensitive to that. During the process of developing the Strategic Concept over the last year, I was fortunate that I did not need to focus on it a great deal in my role as Minister. Thanks to our excellent Baltic cooperation, we were in the unique position of having one expert on the group of twelve to represent our three countries, Ambassador Aivis Ronis. He took over from me as Ambassador to NATO, and he is now Latvia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs. He was mandated by all three governments to represent Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania on the expert group. So we were very privileged in that respect and also because of the willingness of Madeleine Albright and other members to consider the whole question of reassurances—because the events of the last couple of years clearly demanded them. On the streets of Riga, our people were gravely concerned by the conflict in Georgia in August 2008. (Ron Asmus said that NATO was AWOL at the time.) Our people regarded Russia’s actions as the invasion of a neighboring country, a sovereign country, under the pretext that Russia was defending its nationals in Georgia. This rang heavily on the streets of Riga and no doubt in Tallinn and Vilnius as well. Thus, reassurances were needed and, in many ways, they were provided by the recommendations of the expert group. Of course, let’s not forget that they are only recommendations. We certainly hope that the Secretary General will “take them on board” and that they will be included in the Strategic Concept that will be presented for adoption by all member states at the end of November if I am not mistaken.

Other important elements of reassurance for us are such things as exercises on our territory. We will be having joint Baltic and other country exercises in the next few days where there will be a naval exercise, this one is BALTOPS, where there will be landings from the sea. Russia has been invited, and they will have a ship. I think Sweden will also be present along with a number of our NATO allies. Nonetheless, over the last year, the question has come up as to the importance of Article 5 exercises on the territories of member states and, to my mind, these exercises should become a normal aspect of alliance business because we must have exercises in order to be able to consider the whole validity of collective defense and the implications of Article 5. The other thing that I would mention is the importance of Article 4. Earlier this week when the Secretary General was in Riga for the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, I was impressed to hear him say in a private meeting that he was very inspired by the recommendations that had been made by the expert group vis-à-vis the use of consultations and he linked that to the question of energy security.

From our perspective—and this is perhaps more of a Latvian view that I have already gone on record as saying, the element of consultations should be expanded even wider. It should not just be regarded as a next step to Article 5, consultations would be important for such issues as the transfer of military equipment by NATO member countries to third countries, which could have implications for regional security. Therefore, I think there should be a more liberal interpretation of Article 4 to allow those consultations to take place. This would permit assurances to be given to member states that may feel more vulnerable. Solidarity is vital and this requires consultations. This approach also runs in parallel with the European Union, where the Lisbon Treaty quite clearly talks about the need for solidarity and consultations.

Chapter 13

Security in the Baltic Region

Her Excellency Rasa Juknevičienė
Minister of Defense of Lithuania

A UNIQUE MOMENT IN HISTORY FOR PROSPERITY AND STABILITY

The fact that I meet my Estonian and Latvian colleagues more often than some of my colleague ministers from my own government is evidence of our excellent regional cooperation, and especially defense cooperation. Moreover, I would say that defense cooperation among our three Baltic countries offers an example to our own politicians for dealing with the many other kinds of issues that we must discuss in Latvia.

My main message for this very important conference and panel is that the Baltic Region and Northern Europe as well are now at a unique moment in their history. We are approaching the 70th anniversary of the occupation of the Baltic States in June 1940. This anniversary is a powerful symbol representing the extremely complex and challenging history of our countries. In comparison with the turmoil that we have experienced in the course of our history, the Baltic Region is currently more stable and secure than it ever was before, even when we look back more than a hundred years.

Our six year old membership in NATO and the EU opened a new window of opportunity. It is not the end of history that some people had foreseen at the time; it is only the beginning. These memberships are very important tools, but we now have to do a lot ourselves. And it is the right time to set some new strategic objectives for regional cooperation. Northern Europe—Nordic and Baltic States plus Poland—has the potential to become one of the most prosperous and stable regions in Europe. This is my message and it is what we want to achieve. The Baltic countries, Poland, and Nordic States have many similarities, including geography, as well as similar values and a common vision concerning the future of a Euro-Atlantic security system. I believe that the project of regional security cooperation requires further efforts. We would welcome any further deepening of the partnership of Sweden and Finland with NATO. This is a very pragmatic issue and very important for our interests. For example, the Swedish Parliament expressed a commitment some time ago not to be passive if other EU countries in the region are threatened or attacked—this is an important step in the right direction.

RUSSIA'S ROLE IN THE NORTHERN REGION

Russia is a very big neighbor, with an immense territory. And of course Russia has played, now plays, and will continue to play an important role in our region. I believe that the relations between the West and Russia can be improved on the basis of reciprocity from both sides. It is evident that we cannot ensure complete regional stability and security without Russia's will and determination to support it. The fact that the Russian people consider Estonians to be the main threat to their country is clear propaganda and it is unwise to educate the very young generation in that way. Yet, I do think that Russia will acknowledge this mistake sooner or later on its own. So the ball is in Russia's court now. Our aspirations are worthless unless there are real changes in Russia's thinking and a real desire to improve relations.

First, it is obvious that the countries in our region—and I know very well my own people—want and need good relations with Russia. Every ordinary citizen in Lithuania will agree that good relations with our big neighbor would be beneficial for everyone. The stereotype of the Baltic countries' Russophobia is highly exaggerated. Everyone who knows the Russian language will speak to Russians without hesitation. And Russians visit our countries, too. At the same time, we must be realistic. We cannot completely ignore the huge military exercises in our immediate neighborhood. We cannot ignore the fact that Russia still officially portrays NATO as one of the main dangers to its security and that Russia still sees the world through the lenses of spheres of influence.

A CRUCIAL STRONG TRANSATLANTIC LINK

As a result of this geopolitical environment, a strong transatlantic link remains in our view a crucial element of the regional security structure. The involvement and presence of the United States is fundamental as a strategic glue enabling further regional cooperation. We have recently noticed positive moves from the Russian side. At the same time, we are expecting strategic changes, not just small tactical steps. I strongly believe that one of the crucial reasons for the unification, peace and successful integration of Europe was the fundamental change in Germany's strategic thinking after the war. Germany acknowledged its past problems and chose a course of intensive, open, and transparent integration with its neighbors, which permitted the success of the European Union. Today, practical military cooperation between Germany and Lithuania is among the best in NATO. I believe that a similar Russian openness in assessing its past history would have a fundamental, positive impact on the success of regional cooperation and security.

DOING OUR HOMEWORK

Now that we have arrived at this unique moment for the future of Northern Europe, one more precondition is required for the development of the region: It is the removal of certain stereotypes. The Baltic region is not a special case. Yet despite its membership in NATO and the EU, the Baltic region is still described from time to time as a special case, an exceptional and particularly sensitive region. I believe that this view, which is artificial, has to go. We should be seen as part of a wider geographical area from Norway to Turkey. For example, NATO exercises in the Baltic Region should not be seen as any different from the exercises in Southern Europe. It is not about escalating tension, it is about ensuring an equal sense of security in the whole Alliance.

Despite its tremendous importance, our participation in international organizations cannot and will not be a magic solution to all our problems. We should not forget Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Doing our homework and strengthening our national capacity to address the challenges remains one of the key preconditions of success. I will give a few examples of this homework: The Baltic Defense Cooperation; the Nordic Baltic "5 + 3" foreign ministers' meetings every year; defense ministers' meetings; our CHODs' meetings—we have started to speak about common procurements in the near future; the successful affiliation of our brigade with a Danish division. As I speak, the Baltics are hosting a very important exercise based on Article 5. So we have to do our homework. It might be a paradox but I also believe that the current financial crisis can have a positive impact in terms of strengthening our national capacities. Financial challenges call for the optimization of our structures and the way we spend money. Our aim should be to exit the financial crisis with leaner, cheaper, and a more flexible structure on one hand and smarter spending on the other.

The more "regional door locks" we have, the safer we are. Various measures of hard security, especially NATO's collective defense and reassurance policy, are just one side of the coin. At the same time, we have to keep focusing on soft security measures. I believe that the Lithuanian decision to establish the Center of Energy Security has added value because it increases regional cooperation and also ensures our direct contribution to the security of the whole Euro-Atlantic region.

Only twenty-one years ago, I had a unique moment to visit Berlin. It was in the summer of 1989 in eastern Berlin, of course. It was like a miracle at that time to be here, to be outside the Iron Curtain of the Soviet Union. My family and I were standing in front of the Brandenburg Gate, without any idea that we would be allowed in a near future to be part of the other side. Today I am discussing with you the security in the Baltic Region and in Northern Europe and this time, I have an idea about the future. We really have a unique moment, a unique opportunity, and we have to seize it. This is a unique moment not only because we are no longer being removed from the European map, but also because we have the opportunity to fulfill our duty and our role in contributing to the security of the region and all of Europe despite the fact that we are a very small country.

Chapter 14

Achieving Security and Prosperity in the Balkans and the Black Sea Regions

Ambassador Stefano Stefanini
Permanent Representative of Italy on the North Atlantic Council

OPENING REMARKS

Let me first say before introducing the panel that the Balkans and the Black Sea regions are not a global security issue today. From a Euro-centric perspective and by European standards, both the Balkans and the Black Sea regions are not fully stable—some things are still unsettled, there are frozen conflicts, there is a search for identity—but these things certainly do not present a major security risk today. In 1990, we were confronted with a monumental task, which was the stabilization of what was then known as “Eastern Europe.” Twenty years later, the balance sheet is a good one, and we can say “Mission accomplished” regarding a large area that covers central and eastern Europe. Post-Soviet Russia has stabilized, largely by itself. The western Balkans and the Black Sea region remain a work in progress.

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE REGIONS

After a tragic start in the Balkans, the goal there is at hand. If the western Balkans had a GPS, the GPS would say, “You have arrived, your destination is on your right.” The way ahead is quite clear: It is Euro-Atlantic integration, it is the EU, it is NATO, and it is largely accomplished if you look at the map. The Adriatic is almost a NATO lake now.

Yet we know that in the Black Sea region, the picture is much more frayed. If we took a quick snapshot of the western Balkans, we would see the EU’s and NATO’s dominating influence, with Russia practically marginal. But the Black Sea area is quite different, because the south and west rim are bordering with NATO and with the EU while in the northeast Russia is dominant. Another major difference between the two regions is that the Black Sea region is strategic for energy supplies, but although the western Balkans have an energy problem they are not strategic for the rest of Europe.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

With all of that said, I would like to ask a question of our speakers: Can the two regions, the Balkans and the Black Sea, help each other?

Chapter 15

Achieving Security and Prosperity in the Balkans and Black Sea Region

Ambassador Sorin Ducaru
Permanent Representative of Romania on the North Atlantic Council

I am going to jump directly into our theme from the perspective of a country that is in the neighborhood of both the western Balkans and the Black Sea region. I am hesitant to say on the “frontier” or to use the word “border” because, from my country’s perspective, we should avoid creating new dividing lines and rather embrace a bridge-building perspective. It is true that there is a big difference between the Balkans, which have a NATO-EU integration perspective, and the Black Sea region, where a more coherent and structured approach is needed. But I will start by saying that we should view both regions as part of a larger Europe, a family whose particular characteristics have to be taken into consideration.

I would like to mention something ironic about these characteristics. In the Balkans, the east-west paradigm has been turned upside down, because the eastern Balkans are more integrated into EU and NATO than the Western Balkans, which is in contrast to the old logic which implied that the West is more advanced and is the point of attraction vis-à-vis the east.

Romania faced a dilemma in the 1990s because it is more associated with the Balkans than with central Europe. Andrei Pleșu, our foreign minister at the time and someone I respect a lot, tried to solve our dilemma in terms of geo-political definition with his witty attitude while suggesting that we are “the Scandinavians of the Balkans.” My point, as it was my minister’s point, is that everything is relative in our world, and we need to take into account this relativity when we want to address the big picture. And we also need to stress the unifying concept, the fact that these regions are part of a family and part of Europe.

THE BALKANS

Now I would like to briefly focus on some concrete aspects of the Balkans and subsequently dwell on the Black Sea area. One thing I want to mention is that there are, in my opinion, two main dangers and a dilemma related to the integration process of the western Balkans.

One danger is the risk of excessive delay in the integration process for these countries and losing the momentum of public opinion. The other is a risk that both NATO and EU countries worry about, which is the risk of premature accession. The dilemma is how to bridge the gap between these two risks. Based on the experience we had during the North Atlantic Council’s trips in the Balkan region, I would like to emphasize four important points that could possibly bridge the gap:

- First, it is important that the process of integration set forward by the EU and NATO contain very explicit and clear points regarding benchmarks for preparation and criteria for accession, because our partners in the region have the perception that there is not enough clarity. Sometimes it is not enough for us to lay out what to do but also how to do it. For the Balkans, I believe that this second element—how to do it—should be even more explicit than for other regions, even though this makes the process a little bit more intrusive.
- Second, these “what/how-to-do” benchmarks should have short-term, achievable goals at every step, so that the politicians in these countries can show their citizens that progress is being made and then move on.
- Third, the transparency of the process should be maximized, because countries compare their situations with each other. If they see that other countries are advancing because they fulfilled the necessary conditions, this can act as posi-

tive reinforcement for them.

Fourth and last, let me remind you how NATO made its most recent decision on the Membership Action Plan (MAP) for Bosnia/Herzegovina. The reform benchmarks were contained within MAP rather than conditions to enter the MAP process—a conditionality from within, meant to set benchmarks for the MAP process itself. So NATO and the EU should be as imaginative and flexible as possible in using the instruments designed to support reform and preparation for accession.

Of course, despite all of their differences, the overarching project of all countries in the Balkans is integration, no matter how far along they are on the chart.

THE BLACK SEA REGION

On the EU side, we have a number of instruments like the partnerships instrument and the Black Sea Synergy. On the NATO side, we also have some very clear instruments, like the individual partnerships under PFP, the specific distinct partnership with Ukraine and Georgia, and the NATO-Russia Council. However, I think we need to keep in mind NATO's new thinking, the new Strategic Concept, and the kind of high profile that this new debate has given to partnerships in general. We also need to keep in mind the report of the Group of experts headed by Madeleine Albright which indicates that we can use more of the synergy between these instruments, more of the flexibilities, without necessarily regionalizing NATO's approach towards its partners. Without a regional policy, NATO offers an element of flexibility like the 28+N format of debate and discussions, which can be determined by regional or functional arguments. The report also highlights the importance of keeping the option of enlargement open to countries that are willing and prepared to join NATO. It also encourages as much political debate with partners in the region as possible. These are some of the strong points that are worth following particularly in our approach towards the Black Sea region.

I am now going to make one last point about NATO and the Black Sea. NATO has been talking about the Black Sea region since the Istanbul summit in 2004, and it is prepared to support efforts and actions based on regional initiatives. So regional ownership is the key element and, frankly, it is the important ingredient that countries in the region—Turkey, Romania, and Bulgaria—want. Given this point of view, countries in the Black Sea region must take responsibility to show that regional ownership at work. One example would be to have Turkey's Black Sea Synergy initiative, which is offered for cooperation to all riparian Black Sea countries, as a value added to a NATO initiative, for example to the Maritime situational awareness project developed within the framework of NATO's Active Endeavor Operation in the Mediterranean Sea. This would mean gathering information on maritime traffic in the Black Sea and coupling it with the bigger picture that NATO has on maritime traffic and thus enhance our overall situational awareness from which we all could benefit. It is just an example.

Chapter 16

Follow-up Discussion on Achieving Security and Prosperity in the Balkans and the Black Sea Region

Ambassador Ranko Viločić
Croatian Ambassador to the United Nations

Our presenters have been asked to talk about the Balkans and the Black Sea region, and you have already heard presentations about the Black Sea region. Since my country does not geographically belong to that region, I am going to limit my remarks to those on the Balkans region, more specifically to the western Balkans or, as we prefer to call it, southeastern Europe.

REGIONAL COOPERATION IN SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE

You are all aware of the bloody conflict that took place in the region 15 or 20 years ago following the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia. Now we are witnessing a process through which the countries of southeastern Europe are reaching a level of stability and security that is truly remarkable, and we all feel that military conflicts are a thing of the past and are not likely to happen again either now or in the future. I base this belief on the fact that there is not only rapidly developing cooperation between the countries that is moving along on a really good track, but that this cooperation is more than pure political cooperation. We are seeing military arrangements, cooperation between armies, and cooperation between law-enforcement authorities regarding trafficking, smuggling, and organized crime. We are also seeing cooperation in many other areas, including culture and tourism. So our efforts are truly going in the right direction.

I also base my belief that military conflicts are a thing of the past in the region on the fact that we have an overall security structure there. Some of our countries are now members of NATO, namely, Slovenia, Croatia, and Albania, not to mention other members, including Turkey, Greece, Bulgaria, and Romania, that are not from the western Balkans but are from other parts of the region. We also have one country on the verge of entering NATO, namely, Macedonia, which was mentioned recently in terms of the need to solve the issue of the country's name, which is the only issue that hinders its further development. Another country that has made remarkable progress toward and has expressed a strong will to join NATO is Montenegro, and other countries have taken important steps in that direction as well, including Bosnia Herzegovina. So this security architecture is creating a basis for long-term optimism.

GLOBALIZATION AND THREATS

It was mentioned earlier that countries of the region participate in various peacekeeping operations around the world under the U.N. umbrella. I would particularly like to single out Afghanistan, which is the most comprehensive and the most serious operation so far to which contributions have been made from our region. Of course, we are aware that not all security threats are behind us. We have talked about globalization for at least the past 15 years and are so used to it that we do not even mention it any more. But along with all its excellent aspects, globalization has also globalized threats, and those threats exist in our region as well as the rest of the world. So we are not isolated from them, including:

- Organized crime and corruption—these are big problems that we are fighting in our region and around the world
- Trafficking, not only in arms but in drugs and in people—we are on the trafficking route so it is a threat

- Energy security—this is also a possible security threat
- Proliferation
- The financial and economic crises that have hit all the countries—in more vulnerable countries like those in our region, these crises are a major threat, because, in times of financial crisis, people tend to be more vulnerable to radicalization, not only political but also ideological and religious.

ACHIEVEMENTS AND STALEMATES IN KOSOVO AND BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA

I would now like to single out two spots: Kosovo and Bosnia Herzegovina.

Kosovo has been recognized by a majority of European Union countries and others around the world—62 altogether. We have seen that there is stability there so far, and a significant presence of the international community, EULEX, and UNMIK. But the major threat there is to overall development, by which I mean not only economic development but primarily the development of the rule of law, human rights, and institutions and national capacities.

In Bosnia Herzegovina, stability and security have been achieved, but we now see a stalemate in the political processes, which has lasted a long time. We are waiting for the elections in October 2010, and hope that the processes will then move further ahead. We also are seeing continued nationalistic rhetoric in that country. In addition we see problems with the return of refugees, particularly in Republika Srpska. As well, economic growth is practically nonexistent, and we also see political pressure being applied, including threats to organize a referendum on the secession of Republika Srpska. That could open a Pandora's box, including the rethinking of the Dayton Agreement, and I think this should not be allowed.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

It is clear that we still need international involvement. We have given our support to the work of the Office of the High Representative and to the High Representative's involvement, but I would like to stress the responsibility of and the potentially stabilizing activities of neighboring countries. Here I see the role of my country, Croatia, as a crucial one. Our policy toward Bosnia is based on three pillars: Sovereignty and territorial integrity, equal rights for all three constituent peoples throughout the territory, and support for the Euro-Atlantic integration of the country. Croatia is working toward these goals, and I want to stress that Croatia has absolutely no hidden agenda here. I hope that the other countries in the region will follow our lead.

The question is, "Can the two regions, the Baltics and the Balkans, help each other?" Our histories are very different, but we have the future in common. I tend to answer the question by saying that, yes, there are aspects with which we can help each other, but, in general terms, my answer is no.

Chapter 17

Achieving Security and Prosperity in the Balkans And the Black Sea Region

Ambassador Artur Kuko
Permanent Representative of Albania on the North Atlantic Council

OPENING REMARKS

Eleven years ago, I was an out-of-NATO participant at this event. Today I am a participating representative of a NATO member-country. From where I stand, I see that the room has become much more colorful than it was 11 years ago. I see representatives from countries like Brazil, Argentina, India, and Egypt participating, a definite value-addition to this important event.

I would like to address a few points at the risk of being a bit repetitive following so many distinguished speakers who have addressed the issues of the western Balkans and the Black Sea region. I start with Ambassador Stefanini's question: Can the Balkans and the Black Sea region help each other?

COOPERATION BETWEEN THE BALKANS AND THE BLACK SEA REGION

My answer to Ambassador Stefanini's question is not a firm yes and it is not a firm no. I think the two regions have similarities, in particular the internal order they need to reestablish in order to travel at proper speed toward their desired destination: Being members of both NATO and the European Union. But there is a big difference in their backgrounds. Someone at this conference, our Croatian friend, I believe, referred to the two notions of southeastern Europe and the western Balkans. I personally look at both with a great deal of sympathy: One had Europe and the other had the west inside.

Location has been tremendously important, and things in the western Balkans have taken place within a certain European background, if you will. But that is not necessarily the case with the Black Sea countries. However, I think that there are a lot of things we can learn from each other. As far as Albania is concerned, with the modest experience we have accumulated, we stand ready to do whatever we can to assist the countries of the Black Sea region.

If you look at Albania, you can grasp the speed and length of the journey we have taken to become a member, but I think my prime minister recently addressed this issue in great detail. I will address several points on cooperation in the region regarding European and NATO perspectives, and I will also dwell on a point that most probably was not broadly addressed at this conference, which is the issue of Kosovo.

ORIENTATIONS AND MEMBERSHIPS

If you look at the mosaic of the western Balkans, you see that it is composed of countries with different political and membership affiliations. Romania is a member of the EU and NATO; Bulgaria is a member of the EU and NATO; Croatia is very advanced in its negotiations for full membership; Greece, of course, is a full member of both NATO and the EU; Slovenia is also a member of NATO and the EU. Then you have Albania, a NATO member with a pending application for membership in the EU; Macedonia is also not yet a member-nation but is on the eve of being one with its candidate status. We also have Serbia, a very important factor in the region, but my feeling is that Belgrade is not making full use of its importance in the region.

I think that there are segments out there that have nostalgic feelings rather than pragmatic and realistic feelings. If you

look at all the orientations and memberships of the countries I just mentioned, it is more than obvious that there remains a small group of nations that are not firmly anchored either in NATO or in the European Union, and I think that those countries are well set in their orientations. Montenegro and Bosnia Herzegovina, which I have not yet mentioned, are poised: Montenegro is firmly a MAP country and Bosnia is a MAP country with conditions. I think that these are advantages compared to the Black Sea area. It is a region that is pressed on by all sides—by the EU, by EU and NATO member-countries, and by both.

BRINGING THE BALKANS AND THE BLACK SEA REGION CLOSER TO NATO AND THE EU

What would it take to speed up the process of bringing these countries closer to the EU and NATO? I believe there are three main steps:

- Not the least important is internal developments in the relevant countries—reforms that are needed to bring those countries closer to the European Union and, for those who want it, closer to NATO.
- Regional cooperation is of the utmost importance, and is most probably an element that can be used by the Black Sea countries. We now see countries that were on very bad terms with each other significantly improving their relationships.
- Once regional cooperation is established, it will be easier for the group of countries to knock on the doors of both NATO and the EU, because their voice will be stronger.

However, as we speak, there is a big issue holding back all of those developments, and that is the present world economy—the world's problems do not make regional cooperation or the progress of the region toward NATO and EU membership easy. But that should not be an excuse for the countries concerned to slow down their efforts, and it should not be an excuse, particularly for the EU but also NATO, to close their open-door policies.

THE POTENTIAL OF KOSOVO

Regarding Kosovo, it is a country that has been recognized by a number of other countries. Still, we await the ruling of the International Court of Justice in order to have a significant number of countries recognize it. Such recognition is a crucial element in the Balkans mosaic, and has the potential to unleash an immense peace and progress campaign. However, it also has the potential to unleash phenomena that we thought belonged to the past. It is with extreme concern that we continue to follow Belgrade's efforts to promote a Serb partition of Kosovo, a possibly very dangerous scenario that we would like to try to prevent. My prime minister indicated recently that it is not only Mitrovica that can be separated north and south of Ibar—the region is full of Mitrovicas, and anything that goes wrong in Kosovo can have severe repercussions in Bosnia, in Macedonia, or in the south of Serbia.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

All in all, there is tremendous progress in the region, but tremendous challenges remain there. The main elements of continuing progress should be internal drives for reform in the relevant countries, then regional cooperation, and then a joint regional drive toward the EU and NATO.

Chapter 18

Security in the Baltic Region

Under-Secretary of State Jaakko Laajava
Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Since not everyone is intimately familiar with the North of Europe, I would like to introduce with a couple of brief observations the theme of Baltic Security and the Baltic Sea area as viewed from Helsinki. To the west, we have Norway, Denmark and further on Iceland; in the middle there is Sweden and Finland; in the east, Russia; and to our south there is Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Kaliningrad, a special enclave of Russia, Poland and Germany. Over the centuries, Germany, Sweden and Russia have indeed been the most important and active players in our region. There have been various phases of peace, prosperity and cooperation, but also periods of intense competition, rivalry, domination and indeed war. The region has a multi-faceted history and this legacy is there and still provides some context for thinking about our security situation.

A fundamental change occurred in the early 1990s when after so many years of Soviet totalitarianism, the Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania regained their independence. That was twenty years ago and many important and good things have happened since then. So I can say that in spite of many problems and challenges we certainly still face in the region, the North of Europe is a remarkable success story. Traditionally, the Nordic countries, Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Finland have cooperated very closely in all areas and also in terms of security. So the situation is well established. Norway, a solid member of the Alliance, has not wanted to join the European Union; Denmark joined in the 1970s, Finland and Sweden joined in the 1990s; and then the three Baltic States joined thereafter. At the same time, Sweden and Finland have not joined NATO but work very closely with the Alliance and participate actively in NATO missions. And then there is Russia, a big and resourceful power, and a major exporter of hydrocarbons but a country that still has a long way to go in order to be able to be a full player in the global marketplace with competitive products and services in other areas than energy products.

Those of us who live in the neighborhood of Russia would be the first to welcome Russia's rapid transformation into a normal, stable, and prosperous democracy but we must acknowledge that the development is much slower than we hoped for, say 10, 15, or 20 years ago. At the same time, Russia wants very much to play a big and important role in world affairs, and as President Medvedev has said many times, Russia seeks modernization in partnership with the West. But Russia's rhetoric regarding her privileged sphere of interest in her neighborhood and her right to defend Russians everywhere—by using whatever means necessary—is making many neighbors a bit nervous. At the same time, this forceful rhetoric seems to work well domestically in Russia. We know that Russia has nothing to be afraid of, particularly, from the West. Nonetheless, Russia's perception is still pretty much that NATO represents a threat. So how to engage Russia is a big theme in the preparation of the strategic concept of NATO: How to develop better cooperative security with Russia and at the same time how to reassure the populations, particularly in the new member states, that Article 5 still works.

So these are some of the issues. I see the region as an area of stability, prosperity and growth. There is much potential, but at the same time some problems do remain.

Chapter 19

The Future Challenges

General Karl-Heinz Lather¹

Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE)

The agenda of this year's workshop on global security really addresses most of the issues that we collectively envisage. Apart from the Antarctic and Australia, I think we will cover the world during the workshop, so it is really a globalized effort we are undertaking.

THE NEED FOR NEW, ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS

As you can see from my uniform, I am a European, I am a German, and I am a NATO guy at the same time. Looking back on 43 years of service in the German armed forces and in NATO and the EU, I see that a lot has changed. Because I am currently at the strategic level of NATO within SHAPE, where you face the interface between politics and the military, it is pretty clear to me that the changes ahead of us will be more demanding than those of the past. They will require political, economic, social, and military skills to find proper acceptable solutions—solutions that are acceptable to both the people of this world and our alliances and nations.

We call these solutions the comprehensive approach, and we need to fill out that term. Those of us who have a bit of insight into the process of the new NATO Strategic Concept know about the Multiple Futures Project, which Allied Command Transformation (ACT) mainly led. This project was a kind of introduction to the efforts of Madeleine Albright and her group and was very well discussed both in the Military Committee and the NATO Council. It was very much present when the global experts met over the past year and certainly influenced the report that Madeleine Albright sent to the Secretary General. So it will have an effect; what effect remains to be seen. There are some key questions to ask, and I am going to address just a few on the “shopping list” that are important to me.

KEY POINTS OF THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

Article 4 was mentioned already. Article 5 was also mentioned, and it remains key to NATO. I think all of us, certainly all of us in NATO, would agree that there is a need to reassure all of our Alliance members that Article 5 is the most vital part of our common treaty.

With all of the many politicians and many media sources talking about what is ahead of us, there is also a need for a new approach to partnering, reaching out, on the political side. We come from Partnership for Peace, which is now much wider, with a regional and a global focus. The NATO-Russia relationship, the NATO-Ukraine relationship, and the NATO-Georgia relationship specifically need to be addressed, but there is also the beginning of NATO-Australia-New Zealand cooperation and there is a NATO-China possibility and certainly a NATO-Pakistan possibility. So I think partnering from a political angle needs to be readdressed. I do not know whether this is the first time at this workshop that we have South Americans with us, but South Americans are currently active in ISAF, and we need to address this relationship as well.

Because there is always the question of how to balance home defense and territorial defense, the classic function of NATO and our expeditionary capabilities, we may need to ask the question—certainly we do for my country—What are

¹ At the time of this workshop, General Karl-Heinz Lather was Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE).

our people prepared to invest in their national and multinational security? I think it is a key question, not only for nations but for the Alliance as well. For many of us, even the very moderate 2% annual GNP portion to go into defense is astronomical from a national point of view or budget. The question is what the military should look like in the future. Are areas like cyber defense, energy security, the consequences of climate change, and space military tasks? Do we need structures to counter threats to those things? Do we need new equipment, other equipment, to do that? Do we have the right command and control in place to cope with such tasks if they are given to us? And what is the priority task for the military of the future? Is it fighting terrorism, is it education and training of armies of states that are failing or have failed, or is it the classical home defense, which is dear to everybody? All of that has to do, of course, with affordability, and we all know about the budget and financial crisis we are all in. It also has to do with burden sharing: If you are in the Alliance, you have to share the same burden if you share the same values. So it is about national and multinational solutions.

I think the State Secretary from Germany mentioned the need to intensify cooperation between organizations like NATO and the EU. That is dear to me as well; that is my professional experience. We must overcome the lack of cooperation. We all play with and use the same toolbox, and for political reasons we cannot do it efficiently and effectively. I think we have to maintain the nuclear deterrent as long as there is a nuclear threat in the world. We also have to make decisions collectively on that, but I think there is also the need to renew and readdress the quite successful arms control effort that we have seen over the past decade or so.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Because I was appointed as a member of the German Defense Restructuring Commission, which is ongoing, I could elaborate on the shopping list that is very similar to the one we have at NATO and at the European Union and other places. But I will not go into that detail. After all, I think we are globally interconnected, which creates opportunities as it creates uncertainties and threats. Above all, it requires a mental and a physical flexibility, both for individuals, their nations, their alliances, and, of course, their military.

The times when you entered into an army and left it the same way are over. I think you never fully left it the same way, but nowadays it is even less true. I will give you two examples about that from NATO, where I currently work. At ISAF, over the 12 months before this workshop, we saw the forces there increase by about 60,000. We saw three new headquarters, the ISAF Joint Command, the NTM-A Headquarters, and now the emergence of a new regional headquarters in southwest Afghanistan. And the Afghan Mission Network, which is the CIS network in Afghanistan, will be at an IOC on July 1, 2010. Prior to that, nothing was there on that at all. It is all pretty new and dynamic. We are applying a different military and political strategy there, what we call counterinsurgency, which, in black and white terms, now takes the people into focus and not the killing of Taliban members.

On the side of NATO in Europe, in the Alliance, it took about five years to conclude a peer review. We are now entering into a new NATO command structure but, as we are doing that, we are already in the process of developing a new one. Ministers who are sitting here will make decisions on that, will take note of where we stand in the thinking, and then agree and authorize the Secretary General to go ahead the week after this workshop. It is all taking place in parallel, and is just one example of how quickly things change. I look forward to the very wide range of other changes and topics that we will address during this workshop.

Chapter 20

Overview of Future Challenges

Admiral Luciano Zappata¹
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Transformation

I come from ACT (Allied Command Transformation). Our mission is to lead the military transformation of the armed forces of the NATO nations based on the comprehensive political guidance received from our nations. In this respect, I think it is very important to highlight how we developed our organization on three pillars. The first pillar is strategic thinking; the second pillar is capabilities development; the third pillar is training and education. We also have a fourth pillar, which is an internal one: To be an effective organization. If we are not internally effective and efficient, it is very difficult to sell the idea to our nations that we are capable of proposing new ways of working.

STRATEGIC THINKING

I will start with the first pillar, strategic thinking. Karl-Heinz Lather mentioned that a couple of years ago we started the Multiple Futures Project (MFP), so I would like to share with you the internal reasons within ACT that we decided to start working on this project. Together with my former boss, General Jim Mathis, my goal was to raise a strategic debate inside the Alliance in order to give our nations the “reasons why” for our military forces and for NATO.

From the comments and speeches that we heard earlier, I think it is quite clear that we are witnessing at least two major changes in our world. The first is a global change—including globalization, the current financial turmoil, and a shift in the relative assets of both the economic and technological powers. I very much agree with Louis Gallois’s observation that China is not simply a factory; it can also develop new technologies. That is our experience: I live in the United States, and whenever I buy something it is made in China. It does not matter whether it is a simple drinking glass or a highly technical product. Yet, building things, making them with your own hands and machines, also means that you are learning how to create them, and even how to improve them.

The second change is more specific to the militaries, and when we talk about the comprehensive approach, this change seems very, very clear to me. We all say, and it is true, that we cannot face the multiple threats and challenges with military means alone, which implies that we need complementary means. But, in this respect, I see that the very definition or the very understanding of the military role is changing. I very much agreed with Mark Fitzgerald when he said that the friction between defense and security is considerable, and that in some way we will have to find the proper balance. The example he gave about the supported commander is also consistent with my own experience in NATO. This is a very nice idea, but there are also many problems: Sometimes there are overlaps, sometimes there are gaps, and sometimes there is friction. It is easy to say that we are phasing in this mix of defense and security, but where is the balance? This is the problem. And so the basic idea of the Multiple Futures Project was to raise the debate. It is important to do so in order to understand why we need things and what we need—militaries, defense, and security.

The results for us in ACT were very important, not because of what we achieved but because the strategic debate was very useful. We are also convinced that the work done by the 12 experts in support of the new Strategic Concept, and in support of the Secretary General, was very helpful. I would like to highlight one page of their report, which in my view is very important. It is a page on which the experts say that the nations should spend at least 2% of their future GDP on defense. I am not going to tell you my own ideas about this, but I will just ask a question: I wonder, is it realistic? Is it practical? I leave the question to you. I think, anyway, that it is important to have this debate, to open up the debate to our populations, because, as our populations face very difficult times, we have to be very clear about why we need specific

¹ At the time of this workshop, Admiral Luciano Zappata was Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Transformation.

things, both in defense and in security. This is a very important activity inside our first pillar: Raising the strategic debate and participating by offering different views.

IMPROVING CAPABILITIES

Now I would like to discuss the second pillar: Capabilities. I would like to go back to one of the comments made by Mr. Gallois and the question raised by General Wolf about industry's approach. Of course, we develop capabilities every day. Capabilities are a combination of means—tanks, ships, aircraft, people, and procedures. So it is a very complex issue. In ACT, we work a great deal to improve the relationship with industry; the relationship between the military side and the industry side is through contracts and formal agreements, but we are convinced that there is also a question of culture. The more we work together, the more we understand each other, the better—because we can start at the beginning to develop things in the proper way. It is very bad to discover after many years of development that a piece of equipment is not very well suited for military use. Of course there are some contractual points, but what is important is that we are not getting the proper equipment and the proper capabilities at the proper time. This is particularly important in this evolving environment, because we need to speed up our processes. We need to be able to field the needed capabilities in the shortest possible time.

Karl-Heinz Lather was very clear about Afghanistan: We are changing our strategies. Changing strategies also means changing capabilities, i.e. the way you apply your force. So this means that we need flexibility, we need the ability to react in a very timely way, and we cannot waste time. We also need to think about culture, because the more we work with industry, the better it will be—because working in this way will help both sides develop capabilities in a timely and an efficient way. To do this in ACT, we are developing ways in which we can talk about real problems. We have also developed a legal framework that allows us under the auspices of our nations to work with the companies more effectively.

THE MANY ASPECTS OF INTEROPERABILITY

There is one more point I would like to highlight, and that is interoperability. We are all convinced that interoperability is something that we have in NATO; in the 60 years of its existence, NATO has achieved important results in that area. Interoperability means the ability to work together, to operate together, but it is something that you develop day by day. It is very difficult to build and very easy to lose, and it is also a very important question to discuss when you work with partners, by which I mean the European Union, with whom we are sometimes unable to even exchange documents or papers. Interoperability is the glue of our forces, and without it even decisions made by our political masters to work together and to go together in operations would not be feasible.

Let me give you some specific, very painful, examples. If we are not interoperable in the air, on land, or in air-sea cooperation, there can be some very unfortunate effects: For example, I call for support from an aircraft supporting me but the aircraft drops the bomb in the wrong position. You cannot ask for support from friends close to you if you cannot speak with them because your radios are incompatible, and not interoperable. So interoperability is a very important issue and not just a technical issue. Interoperability is first a question of mindset and a question of decisions made by the political masters, because interoperability is expensive and requires work involving industries, contracts, education, and training.

THE IMPORTANCE OF DEVELOPING TRUST AND MAINTAINING DIALOGUE

We are facing challenges from all over the world, and some of these challenges come from places very far from our borders. In these cases, our approach at ACT has always been to try to build trust, which is absolutely vital in many situations. I am speaking from my experience as a flag officer who spent years in real operations, during which I supported many different flags at various times—the Italian flag, the NATO flag, the WEU flag, the European Union flag under the mandate of the United Nations, but the assets were always the same: Me, my crew, and my ships. In many instances I had to be a kind of ambassador on behalf of these organizations, trying to convince these organizations that we were friendly people. We worked together with them to try to build trust, and, believe me, trust is something that you must develop day by day. It is a continuous effort that you cannot give up on; otherwise, if you make just one mistake, you give up years of development. So I want to conclude by reemphasizing the importance of building trust and keeping alive dialogue with our partners in order to improve the situation.

Chapter 21

Threats and Concerns in Africa: What It Means for NATO

Admiral Mark Fitzgerald¹
Commander Allied Joint Force Command, Naples

Security to me is what is seen with the eye of the beholder. As I sit in Naples, what is seen with the eye of the beholder is not necessarily the same as what is seen from Germany or from the United States. Therefore, I want to focus on some of the concerns in the Southern Region. Though we do have a good number of high-end threats in the reports from the 12 wise men², their primary focus was on the east. The threats, as I look at them, focus primarily on the south. Today I will talk a little bit about that and how this focus should or might impact thinking in relationship to (NATO's) Strategic Concept.

THREATS AND ISSUES OF CONCERN IN AFRICA

One of the most overlooked places, and probably the most dangerous place that threatens the vital interests of the Alliance, is Africa. As you look at what is currently happening in Southwest Asia and you look at what is going on in the United States, a confluence of many things cause me concern as I look south. First, as we make gains in Iraq and Afghanistan, the flow of violent extremist organizations is spreading down the Arabian peninsula through Yemen, and across into Somalia. Threats also exist as well in Saharan Africa and Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb; and, these threats are starting to spread south into places like northern Nigeria, Sudan, and Chad.

It is almost a perfect storm. And the same thing is happening now with illicit drug flows. As drugs flow out of South America, and meeting resistance from the north, we are starting to see new drug channels open up into West Africa and then work their way north into Europe. This has the dual effect of increasing the drug flow into Europe and also destabilizing the countries in Africa.

We also have, in my opinion, some significant vital interests in the energy sector in Africa. We see today that five percent of the world's oil is being supplied by West and Central Africa; and, that number is projected to increase as oil fields in Ghana and additional oil fields in Angola become operational. The world's largest liquid natural gas terminal is opening on the Congo River and also one in northern Angola right on the Congo border.

What is the effect of this destabilization? Piracy in Somalia gets all the headlines, and it certainly challenges the flow of free world goods out of both China and the Persian Gulf. But when you look to West Africa, the piracy in Nigeria and Cameroon is much more violent. The significant numbers of tragic deaths and illegal oil bunkering not only takes three

¹ Admiral Mark Fitzgerald was a four-star admiral in the United States Navy who served as the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe-U.S. Naval Forces Africa and Commander, Allied Joint Force Command Naples, from November 2007 to October 2010. He retired from the Navy shortly after. As Commander, Allied Joint Force Command Naples, he had operational responsibility for NATO missions in the Balkans, Iraq and the Mediterranean. As Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe, he was responsible for providing overall command, operational control, and coordination of U.S. Naval forces in the European Command area of responsibility.

² NATO's new Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, appointed 12 experts to oversee the development of the new Strategic Concept for the Alliance. The special NATO committee, popularly referred to as the group of Wise Men, was led by former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. Her Vice Chair was Jeroen van der Veer, former head of Royal Dutch Shell.

million dollars a day out of countries like Nigeria, but also has a significant environmental impact on the region. Illegal fishing in the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), which is reported by the EU to be about a billion euros a year, drags on the economies and reduces the fishing stocks as well. This, too, destabilizes these countries.

The illegal migration of 600 thousand people a year also adds to the security concerns in the region. This does not take away from the real security concerns coming from the Middle East, but it certainly gives a nod to the future that we will have to start paying attention in that part of the world as well.

HOW DOES NATO FIT IN?

What does this imply for NATO and the Alliance? NATO and the Alliance typically look at the world from the point of view of nuclear and conventional war threats. And, while the severity of such a war in Europe is certainly the most severe threat we have, the probability of such a war is also the lowest. But as you work down the spectrum of threats to those things we have just discussed, such as illicit trafficking and humanitarian disasters, the Washington Treaty cites very clearly that NATO maintains a core role in keeping us secure from these threats. Although NATO's role may not be as a primary provider of security, NATO does have a critical role. So, how do we square the corner between operations and efforts such as Operation Active Endeavor, in which NATO conducts maritime operations in the Mediterranean to help deter, defend, disrupt and protect against terrorism, to stopping the transit of weapons of mass destruction or counterterrorism, with things like FRONTEX, which exists to prevent drug smuggling and human trafficking?

This goes straight to the heart of the question we have been asking: "How does NATO fit in with other organizations and national interests?" Right now, we have dual assets operating in different roles in the same geographic area, both equipped to do the whole mission. We dilute our capability, and not just Mediterranean's maritime sphere, when we do this. I see similar inefficiencies in the Balkans, where NATO has dual missions. We have to find a solution as to how we go about doing this in the future.

Another point I want to make is, as NATO has expanded and as our partnerships have expanded, we have not kept up with how we want to address such an expansion. In the traditional view of the pre-1990's, we had the two big powers aligned against each other: NATO and the Warsaw Pact. When the wall came down, we began Partnership for Peace. And this led to the Mediterranean Dialogue, which opened up the northern part of Africa, which then led to the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, which further opened up the four countries of the Persian Gulf. Then, with Iraq, we have a special cooperation framework, and in Afghanistan we have a cooperation program. As Karl-Heinz Lather pointed out, we have begun to open up the countries of the Eastern Asian area as contact countries.

All of this has implications for NATO. First of all, when the question came up about NATO's Area of Responsibility (AOR), I think it was probably not properly presented or considered. This is because in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, a practical bilateral cooperation between individual Partner countries and NATO, allows Partner countries to build up an individual relationship with NATO, effectively choosing their own priorities for cooperation. Article 8 of the PfP Charter is almost word for word Article 4 of the Atlantic Charter, the Washington Treaty, and provides for consultation for any partnership country that is attacked. So, the AOR has opened up considerably the number of contact countries we have as well as potential partners. There are currently 76 of those, though not all of them are partners with signed charters. We in the military have to design our forces in order to respond to the alliance and partnership treaties we have signed. I think that starts to paint a much larger picture than the traditional Article 5 defense of the Alliance.

WHAT CONTRIBUTIONS WILL NATO MAKE?

What does that mean for NATO's global security contributions? Is NATO going to be a global power projection force or will it be a global enabling force? What exactly is NATO going to be as we move into the new Strategic Concept? There are implications in the Strategic Concept for both defense infrastructure and the forces that we want. It is imperative that we ensure alignment as we move into the future so that we do not take a bigger bite of the apple than we can handle.

Karl-Heinz talked about a new kind of future security, a partnership structure that I fully support. Right now, in my opinion, NATO's partnership program is set up in a way that is very contrary to the Alliance's goals—almost a smorgasbord approach in which a partner aligns with NATO and NATO, in turn, gives that partner a set of 2,000 or 2,500 opportunities for exercise training or other options. The partner nation picks what it wants to participate in, many of which are nice seminars in various Alliance countries, which may or may not contribute to improving the security of that nation. I think we need to turn this approach around and say, "What is in it for the Alliance in these partnerships?" We also need to look

at partnerships both regionally and functionally. Where are the security gaps in the region? Are they in energy security? Are they in counterterrorism? Are they in humanitarian assistance? Or are they in crisis response or anti-piracy operations? We need to focus that region's countries on wherever the security gap exists. NATO must develop these capabilities in partners so that the Alliance does not have to respond or provide its own forces. The goal is to have the region organize and provide the security in that area.

NATO AND THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

The final point I want make, an issue that State Secretary Rüdiger Wolf talked about, is the comprehensive approach. I fully agree that NATO is not the right organization for executing the full spectrum of a comprehensive approach. At the strategic level, however, we need the capability to plug in to whichever organizations are going to execute the strategic approach. That means that NATO needs to be aligned with the comprehensive approach, and right now you cannot find a shingle anywhere in the NATO command structure that reads, "Comprehensive Approach." You also cannot find a place in Brussels to plug in to that coordinates the comprehensive approach. In the future we need to align NATO's command structure and political structure to service the comprehensive approach.

When I think about the comprehensive approach, I believe it requires some degree of trust and transparency with respect to other organizations. That certainly involves intelligence sharing but certainly data sharing, cooperation, and non-traditional partnerships, both with NGOs (Non-Governmental Organizations) and with the legal and the commercial sides. As we look at the comprehensive approach and as we look at NATO's future missions, it is easy to see that we have already taken on what we call the air-policing mission, in which our forces are on daily alert to police the air for renegade aircraft. I think this mission will also soon have to be applied to the Maritime environment. I see the future of the Alliance, in both the air and on the sea, protecting the flanks of NATO and the Alliance's interests. That will drive us into a more comprehensive look at how we share information and data across the spectrum of both defense and security, meaning law enforcement.

Finally, as we look at the comprehensive approach and as we partner for peace and start to build partner capacity, how do we ensure that our partner-nations undertake appropriate security sector reform so that we do not build the forces that ultimately are employed to repress that country? To me that requires a comprehensive approach. We must strive to build not just the military capacity, but also partner capacity in all areas of the security sector.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

To sum up, I think that we need first to sort out and very clearly define NATO's role, not just in defense but in security. And this can be a supported-supporting kind of relationship that we work on the military side; and, second, determine that if NATO does indeed have a global role, what that global role is. For example, is NATO's role as a provider or security enabler? It could be both, but the role or roles that NATO is to play must be defined and understood so that the Alliance can design our future force accordingly. We need to resolve our partnerships, determine NATO's vital interests and shape our partnerships to address those interests.

The comprehensive approach certainly needs to be organized along the lines I have described, so that the entire command structure is organized around a comprehensive approach. I believe that in order to follow a comprehensive approach regarding partnerships, we need to have a full view of security sector reform and understand that information sharing will be critical across organizations taking part in this endeavor.

Chapter 22

Strategies for the New Challenges: Cyber Security And Climate Change

Lieutenant General Jürgen Bornemann¹
German Military Representative to NATO and the EU

AN OVERVIEW OF THE NEW CHALLENGES

Let me start by making some general points about the new challenges from a military point of view. I will then make some brief comments on the issues of cyber security and climate change. The concept of new challenges covers a wide range of topics that were not on the Alliance's agenda back in the days of the Cold War. Issues like terrorism, piracy, cyber security, energy security, climate change, a comprehensive approach, and so on are all issues that are not exactly new—we have had a lot of experience with them over the last decades—but they are now topics on the agenda of the Military Committee and the Council in Brussels. This has led to the development of specific policies, concepts, and doctrines in both NATO and the European Union; the question of how to deal with these new threats and challenges from a security and defense point of view has increasingly become relevant for the two organizations. The NATO Secretary General's speeches always cover new challenges whenever he speaks to the public and, no surprise, we have heard here that it is very likely that several of those new challenges and threats will be addressed specifically in the new Strategic Concept for NATO that is currently under development.

As has already been mentioned, Allied Command Transformation in Norfolk published in 2009 a document called “Multiple Futures,” about a project that aims to strengthen our understanding of the Alliance's future threat environment through a rigorous analysis of emerging security challenges. The top military implications of all the trends and drivers were identified as follows:

- First, protecting against asymmetric threats
- Second, holding military operations against non-state actors
- Third, protecting our C4 systems and networks
- Fourth, preventing the disruption and flow of vital resources
- Fifth and finally, enhancing civil-military cooperation

The 17 May report of the NATO Expert Group that is preparing the new Strategic Concept recommends among the four core tasks for NATO “to contribute to the broader security of the entire Euro-Atlantic region”—the second core task for NATO—and “to serve as a transatlantic means for security consultations and crisis management along the entire continuum of issues facing the Alliance”—the third core task for the Alliance, which includes protection against unconventional threats. Following the current discussion of new threats and challenges, I think there is now broad consensus within the Alliance and the international community that:

- First, conventional military aggression against the Alliance or its members is unlikely but possible, and this possibility cannot be ignored. The most probable threats to Allies in the coming decade are unconventional, and it is unlikely that they will be military in nature. This danger has obvious implications for NATO's preparedness, for the conception of what constitutes an Article 5 attack, its strategy for deterrence, its need for military transformation, its ability to make decisions, and its reliance for help on countries and organizations outside the Alliance.
- Second, it is easy to identify the threat and the challenge but it is difficult to identify the enemy.
- And, finally, the role of the military to address new threats and challenges is most likely support rather than as a first

¹ At the time of this workshop, Lieutenant General Jürgen Bornemann was the German Military Representative to NATO and the EU.

responder or primary provider.

This leads to the conclusion that there is an unquestionable requirement to implement a truly Comprehensive Approach that puts together political, economic, administrative, and, indeed, military means although to a very different extent.

THE THREAT TO CYBER SECURITY

Let me now address two other major new threats, starting with cyber security. I will be very brief, because this topic has already been broadly discussed. Let me simply add to this discussion by answering the question, "What does defense against cyber attacks mean in practice?" Following the cyber attack on Estonia in the spring of 2007, NATO primarily addressed the protection of its own systems. NATO's policy on cyber defense was approved in January 2008 and was endorsed by heads of state and government at the Bucharest summit. In line with this, the Cyber Defense Center of Excellence was set up in Estonia and the NATO Military Committee agreed on a cyber defense concept that adds practical action programs to fit within the overarching policy. These actions include the creation of a Cyber Defense Management Authority, which brings together the key actors in NATO's cyber defense activities. This authority will manage cyber defense across all NATO communication and information systems and could support individual allies in defending against cyber attacks upon request.

Whether NATO in the future should play a more active role in cyber security and whether a cyber attack could or should not constitute an Article 5 scenario is still under discussion in Brussels. In this context, political guidance, and, I underline, a new consensus, is needed if there is a need to develop more offensive concepts including strategies and legal frameworks to deter, respond, or counter attacks. If there is a need, capability enhancement to detect, identify, locate, and engage cyber attacks would also be required. And all of this would require the awareness and sensitivity of our governments to the fact that cyber attacks could develop into real threats to our nations.

THE CHALLENGE OF CLIMATE CHANGE

My second point focuses on the issue of climate change as a challenge for the Alliance. During NATO Expert Group discussions on possible responses to unconventional dangers, climate change was identified as an area in which NATO as an Alliance does not have a formal role in regulating greenhouse gas emissions as a source of global warming. NATO could, however, be called upon to help cope with security challenges that stem from the consequences of climate change, such as a melting polar ice cap or an increase in catastrophic storms or other national disasters. The Expert Group recommends therefore that the Alliance keep this possibility in mind when preparing for future contingencies. The 2004 tsunami in Asia and the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan are examples of disaster situations to which the Alliance reacted at the request of the United Nations.

It is likely that the growing impact of climate change could lead to increased demand on our military forces. One example of this is the possible security aspects of environmental development in the High North, where climate change is not a fanciful idea but a reality that brings with it a certain number of challenges, including challenges for the Alliance. In January 2009, NATO organized, in close cooperation with the Icelandic government in Reykjavik, a seminar on possible security consequences of the melting polar ice cap. In his address, Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer concluded that, although the long-term implications are still unclear, what is clear is that the High North is going to require even more of the Alliance's attention in the coming years. NATO's role as part of a Comprehensive Approach, therefore, needs to include a better understanding of what is already happening and what is likely to happen in the future. In the case of the High North, the seminar has identified areas of possible challenges like navigation, including risks of potential accidents and ecological disasters, resources, and territorial claims. With increased human activity, the potential of search and rescue operation challenges will also rise.

In conclusion, climate change is not primarily an issue for NATO, but NATO should be aware of possible involvement, which means that our forces would to a certain degree also be involved.

Chapter 23

Resources and the Comprehensive/Hybrid Approach

Lieutenant General David Bill
United Kingdom Military Representative to NATO and the EU

I have two topics—the Comprehensive Approach and resources—to discuss in a very short time. Let me start by putting my remarks into context. The context is that we face complex hybrid security challenges in what continues to be an increasingly constrained world as far as security resources are concerned. I want to talk about what we should be doing about this issue now.

THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

As far as the Comprehensive Approach is concerned, we have had a good deal of talk and some action, but certainly that action is insufficient as far as this critical subject is concerned. One of the three areas in which we are currently failing to take appropriate action is in NATO, where there remain legitimate concerns that the organization is in danger of expanding into areas outside its traditional security domain. Second, the EU, which should be in a place to take real action regarding the Comprehensive Approach, with the many levers at its disposal, has been impeded by intra-institutional rivalries. And third, as far as the United Nations and other international organizations are concerned, there is a degree of reluctance to embrace this concept wholeheartedly, perhaps for fear of a military takeover, which we in the military need to be very conscious of.

So what is it that we in NATO and the EU should do about these issues from a military perspective? I think we need to consider what our key messages should be and then start promoting them.

Key Messages

The first key message is that the Comprehensive Approach is not actually that complex. It is a simple philosophy about taking a holistic approach to a crisis and then bringing the levers to bear in an appropriate way. The approach needs to be underpinned by a simple doctrine: Proactive engagement, shared understanding, outcome-based thinking, and collaborative working to provide long-term solutions to crises. The approach is not about the military taking over civil responsibility.

It is inevitably true, however, that where there is insufficient security, the military may well have to take on additional tasks. This, though, must be seen as a temporary arrangement and must always be presented with a clear migration path to the more appropriate civilian leadership and indeed to execution of these tasks.

The second key message is that, as far as NATO is concerned, it needs to be said loudly, clearly, and regularly that NATO's task is to contribute to the Comprehensive Approach; it is not to lead it nor can it be the only player involved. As far as the European Union is concerned, it needs to take advantage of the levers it has at its disposal through better communication and a more effective external service. For the EU, this means communicating more effectively.

The third and final message is that the Comprehensive Approach provides value for money. By bringing the right levers to bear in the right way at the right time, it will ultimately cost us less. Certainly it will ensure that scarce military assets are employed more effectively and for a shorter time.

Calling for Wider Action and Highlighting Selling Points

So what do we need to do about this? First of all, as I have said, we need to promote these key messages rather more actively than we have. And we need to demand wider action. We need to demand that the U.N., the EU, NATO, and oth-

ers actually talk in practicalities as opposed to merely play around with definitions. In particular we need to develop much closer and more focused understanding across the EU–NATO divide as far as the Comprehensive Approach is concerned, both in terms of principles but, more importantly, in terms of practical implications. To an extent here we can learn real lessons in Afghanistan, where slowly but surely we are applying the Comprehensive Approach better and better.

We should also promote education and training in this critical area. And we should emphasize that the Comprehensive Approach provides value for money, which I believe is an important selling point, particularly if resources continue to be as tight as we all think they will be.

RESOURCES

As far as international organizations are concerned, I think we all have to acknowledge that they are institutionally inefficient; they are going to waste money by definition. We all know that nations waste money on security, but international organizations waste money even more. They do, of course, bring about collective political will, a vital ingredient we should not underestimate. This is not about knocking international organizations, but we do need to take action if we are to make better use of our extremely scarce resources.

Achieving More Value for the Money

The first thing I think we should focus on is ensuring that international organizations actually achieve better value for the collective money they have at their disposal; if that does not happen, national treasuries at the very least will not support these organizations. I am talking particularly here about NATO and, to a lesser extent, the EU. We cannot continue to defend outdated and unnecessarily large structures, not just because they waste money but because they do us damage in presentational terms in our countries' capitals.

We also need to deal with the fact that defence spending will never achieve what our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines would like it to. Continually beating the drum for 2% is laudable, but it is not necessarily going to make much difference in the short term. We need to recognize that transformation of forces is expensive, and that we not only need to spend money on that but that we also need to give up military assets we perhaps would rather not. Therefore we need forces in the future that are genuinely adaptable and genuinely agile. As far as NATO is concerned, these forces are going to have to attend both to Article 5 and expeditionary operations, and we need to explain in reassuring terms that we have thought it through and that these forces can do both tasks.

Increasing Interoperability

We also need to work on interoperability. We have been saying this all through my military career, and we must continue to work on it. In some ways, we are doing considerably better than we have in the past. But we must work on multilateral solutions, on sharing capabilities; the C17 model is just the sort of model we should look to, but I do not think we should go for more grandiose multinational projects, because our experience is that they do not seem to provide value for money in a timely way. Often they grow superstructure as opposed to capability.

Detailing Requirements and Surpluses

Another thing we need to do is to highlight not only our requirements but our surpluses. From a NATO perspective, we need to empower Allied Command Transformation to do this for us, because we do not expect nations to own up to what are surpluses as far as NATO is concerned. What do we have that are surpluses? We have submarines, tanks, fast jets, and, most important of all, too high a tail to tooth ratio across our western forces, and somehow we have got to resolve that.

Investing in C4ISR

Finally, the one thing we must invest in in the future is what I call “electric string.” C4ISR, i.e., Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, is the one thing that we as international organizations, whether NATO or the EU, must invest in.

Chapter 24

Missile Defense and Strategic Communications

Lieutenant General Patrick de Rousiers¹
French Military Representative to NATO and the EU

MISSILE DEFENSE

We all know that missile defense is a topic at the top of the agenda in Brussels. There are high expectations for the Lisbon meeting at the end of 2010. But where do we stand in my view? It is 20 years after the first Gulf War, during which SCUDs fell close to Riyadh and the King Khalid military camp, as well as close to Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. Since then, missile capabilities around the world have increased and will continue to do so. So it is hard to say that missile defense is not an issue, that there is no need for it now or in the future.

What are the consequences? The question is, Do we consider that there is a threat or is it just a concern for the future—“un risque ou une menace?” This is a difficult question, but one whose answer will shape the future of our national and multinational organizations and investments. In any case, of course, it is obvious that we need to be able to protect our troops, our staging areas, and other areas. But do we need to protect all of our territory in Europe? Do we need to do it from Diyarbakir to Porto and from Oslo to Palermo? If so, if we need to protect the whole of our territory, what about our allies? What about, for example, Mediterranean Dialogue countries or ICI partners?

My first conclusion is, once we decide—I should say, if we decide—that territorial missile defense is a NATO mission, we will need to say for whom and how this should be done. What are the questions I see? What is the threat? Is the threat Iran, as highlighted in the Group of Experts report, or are there other threats now or will there be others in the future? And do we need to be able to react to an evolution of the threat? Do we need to address ballistic missiles or are we sure that RPVs and cruise missiles or other means of transport of weapons will not be used? The threat for sure is not that of one missile; it is, of course, of a group of missiles heading at different targets, because this will lead to a situation that would challenge our decision process.

What do we need in that situation? We need to know, to detect; we need to analyze, that is, to track what is incoming; we need to decide, and time is very limited—there are 5 minutes if it goes to Istanbul or Bucharest, 20 minutes if it goes to Madrid, Paris, or London. That does not leave time for a military committee meeting or a NAC meeting, for sure. And then we need to destroy. The question then would be, What mixture will we in NATO have? What do we think we need?

If territorial missile defense is for NATO countries exclusively, it would be the first decision. Are we politically ready for that? And the second decision would be, How would we transfer the decision process to military authorities? Since it would not only be one but many missiles that would come, the decision process would be mainly one of not acting with exclusion, with all the impact that would have. The third decision would be, What is the level of ambition, especially in the financial situation we are in now and will be in the future?

My final thought on this issue is a personal view: That the threat is coming, slowly coming but coming, and it is increasing and we need to deter it and, if need be, to be able to respond both through offensive and defensive measures. For this, we need to implement a specific phase-adapted approach for NATO similar to the one that the U.S. is implementing. It

¹ At the time of this workshop, Lieutenant General Patrick de Rousiers was the French Military Representative to NATO and the EU.

has to be operationally and technically realistic and also it has to be financially sustainable. And we will need to explain it to our publics, and this leads me to the next topic, strategic communication.

STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION

Microsoft's presentation at this conference showed that the world has changed in the area of information exchange. Our nations, NATO, and EU have also changed, and we need to put a greater, different focus on strategic communication. The targets are multiple: There is, of course, the media, the population, the blog users, the iPad friends, the teenagers, the voters, and, of course, our adversaries, whether they be in Somalia or in some part of Afghanistan or the vicinity. And the question is, Should that strategic communication be inside looking or should it be outside looking, that is, within NATO or the EU? Or should it be looking toward the nations and between those nations, especially now that we are in a wartime environment? Another question for me is, Do we need to act offensively or defensively? A final political decision is, To what end do we accept that nations leave room for those multinational organizations in the area of strategic communication?

Both of the subjects I just discussed are complex and interesting, and they will take time and keep us busy both in Paris, in Brussels, and in all of our capitals.

Chapter 25

The Vital EU/NATO Relationship and the Role of Energy in Security

Lieutenant General Gian Piero Ristori
Italian Military Representative to NATO and the EU

THE VITAL NATO/EU RELATIONSHIP

Being the last speaker of this panel, I would like to be a little bit provocative and I cannot think of a more provocative subject than the relationship between NATO and the EU. During the last couple of years that I have been representing my country, both in EU and NATO committees, all the speeches and all the documents that have been presented by every major official, political master and high ranking military, have highlighted the importance of the EU/NATO relationship. And recently, the Group of Experts in their Report mentioned that the EU is NATO's most important strategic partner and it is reciprocal.

These are important, wise, and very clever words but they are nothing more than words. The reality is different and the facts are different. In fact, the two institutions, the two organizations, do not talk to each other; they do not solve the problems; they do not save money for the countries that are represented; and they are not able to have a common strategic behavior. That is the reality, that is the fact, and I can assure you that for all the people who are sitting at both tables—there are six of us in this room—it is quite frustrating to belong to two organizations that do not talk to each other. The same thing can be said for the ambassadors that sit at both tables.

Why did that happen and what can be done to solve this problem? I do not have a crystal ball but the reasons for this incommunicability can probably be found in the past. In his opening remarks, Louis Gallois said that the two organizations are hostages of a few nations. Perhaps he was thinking of the dispute between Turkey and Cyprus and this is probably true. But in my opinion, this is only the tip of the iceberg. The real reasons for this situation may go back further and might be traced to how the two organizations did in the last sixty years—first when NATO was born, then with the WEU follow on, up to the Petersberg talks, the Saint Malo talks and then Helsinki, to arrive to today. So it may be that the reason for this incommunicability can be found in a lack of desire for all the nations belonging to the two organizations to find a solution for this relationship.

Unfortunately, the economic situation is very difficult. While it requires urgent decisions, the progress that NATO and the EU are making in their relationship is very slow. This is why I am not very optimistic for the future. Even more than political and economical reasons, I believe that there are some objective reasons that prevent these two organizations from having a better relationship, a better coordination. They have two different bureaucratic cultures. NATO is much more military oriented and favors more aggressive interventions. On the other hand, the EU is more civilian oriented and we should not forget that some EU countries have a neutral tradition, so their approach is different.

There is also a difference in the Comprehensive Approach. Both organizations differ in their relationship with Russia and in their approach to crisis management—Georgia a couple years ago is a good demonstration of that. In summary, NATO and the EU have a different vision of their roles.

There are internal difficulties within the two organizations as well. Both are restructuring. NATO wants to give itself a new structure—the NATO Headquarters reform and new NATO command structure. On the EU side, the new Lisbon Treaty still has to be interpreted and we have to see what the consequences of the application of this treaty will be. Last but not least, there is the attitude of the United States towards the military autonomy of the EU which, at the beginning at least, was not well perceived. The United States may want the two organizations to be complementary instead of considering them as alternative and I want to recall what Madeleine Albright said in 1998 with her famous three Ds, “no decoupling,

no duplicating and no discrimination.” I do not know if these three things are still valid but my fear is that they are not completely over. This is why I do not feel very optimistic. Probably, what we will have to do in the next few years will be just to find a way to better cooperate and nothing more. To think in a more optimistic way would be a dream.

THE ENERGY SECURITY PROBLEM

Linked to this problem is the energy security problem. This is a typical aspect in which, if the two organizations were complementary, they could find a common strategy to face the problems (although I would not say to solve the problems). We all know how much the European countries depend on foreign oil and gas—more than 60% for gas and over 80% for oil—and half of these energy sources come from Russia. So we need to find alternative solutions, we need to find different sources of supply and this also underlines the two different attitudes between NATO and the EU. According to the Albright Report, NATO would consider more coordination policies to share resources, to secure infrastructures and pipelines, to work with the PfP countries to find alternative sources of energy. In contrast, the EU seems primarily to look at the economic and political context and would be much more open to increasing its relationship with Russia. This problem might be solved with better cooperation between NATO and EU and I do hope that it will not be another dream.

Chapter 26

Preparing and Working Together to Save Lives

Mr. Rabih Torbay

Senior Vice President for Programs, International Medical Corps

Over the past two days, we have discussed how to make the world a safer, more secure place. This is an obvious priority from a humanitarian perspective, especially for an organization like mine that all too frequently finds itself delivering assistance in highly unstable environments. International Medical Corps today implements relief programs in some of the most volatile provinces of Afghanistan, in the western governorates of Iraq, in the Darfur region of Sudan and the unsettled eastern provinces of Democratic Republic of Congo.

I believe it is generally understood that defense and diplomacy alone cannot create a safe and stable environment on their own. As essential as these are, they only create optimal conditions for the most important component of a society's long-term security and stability: Development.

It is also obvious that to deliver this package of defense, diplomacy and development, civilian agencies such as mine and military organizations such as those represented by so many of you here today must work together. It is in our common interest to do so.

Consider this data prepared by Tufts University's Feinstein International Center: Driven by factors, including climate change and population growth, the number of natural disasters reported globally has steadily grown over the past half century, from around 50 per year in the early 1960s to the neighborhood of 500 annually in the early years of the 21st Century.

Such prospects demand a new effort to reduce tensions that have long separated two of the most important, yet culturally opposite, actors that respond to major natural disasters—international non-government humanitarian groups like my own, and the military. With more and bigger natural disasters forecast for the future, our only choice is to find ways to ease the allergic reaction each has historically triggered in the other. Like it or not, the hard realities are these: In today's world, we increasingly need each other; in tomorrow's world we will only need each other more.

For the military, natural disasters in today's world pose a new kind of security challenge. In countries where such events can overwhelm weak governments, threaten social and political stability and quickly raise broader regional security concerns, the job of containing their impact has become a military priority as well as a humanitarian one. Even if our reasons may differ, NGOs and the military share a common goal of helping victims and creating a stable environment.

Airlifts of food, medical supplies and emergency international relief personnel into Banda Aceh following the 2004 Asian tsunami by the U.S. Navy and Marines and the armed forces of Australia, Japan, India and others, exemplified this nexus. It is a perfect example of how the military's unique strengths can help ease a major humanitarian crisis.

Non-government humanitarian aid groups also face daunting new challenges, including deteriorating security conditions, tougher access to remote disaster areas and a real-time need for basic information about the disaster itself—all areas where the military has the potential to help.

Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that civil-military relations have been a highly visible, hotly-debated, topic in the past few years. Many scholarly papers have been written about the issue. There have been more interactions between some NGOs and the military, but so far, only a few have gone beyond the "getting to know each other" phase.

Today, to highlight the importance of preparedness, I want to explore two very different kinds of civil-military interaction: Those that occur in more secure, permissive environments and those that unfold in unstable, often tense, non-permissive surroundings. The two examples I have chosen are Haiti and Afghanistan.

HAITI: AN EMERGENCY IN A PERMISSIVE ENVIRONMENT

Haiti is the second oldest independent country in the Western Hemisphere. It was established in 1804. However, after gaining its independence from France, Haiti was badly misruled by a succession of dictators, who seemed to achieve little aside from accumulating vast personal wealth. From one of the richest agricultural lands in the Americas during its colonial era, Haiti became the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, with a per capita income just a fraction of its Latin American neighbors. Today, it is unable to produce enough food to feed itself and malnutrition is visible, especially among children. Life expectancy is short and infant mortality is high. About 12% of children die before their first birthday. One third of all children perish before their 5th birthday. The population of Haiti today is about 8.3 million people. Just under half are illiterate and even before the recent earthquake, about 80% lived below the poverty line.

The seeds of Haiti's poverty and disease lie in a culture of political ineptitude and corruption. As it has in other failed nations around the world, the inability to provide such basic needs as food, medicine and education has bred contempt for the government, cynicism about its motives and a sense of hopelessness about the future. It is a potent recipe for instability.

It was against this backdrop that last January 12th, an earthquake measuring 7.0 on the Richter scale hit the Haitian capital of Port-au-Prince. It was a shallow quake and caused massive destruction in the capital and surrounding areas. It terrified the country and directly affected about 3 million people. More than 230,000 died and an estimated two million others were displaced. These are people that did not have much to begin with.

The local response was non-existent, but the international community responded quickly. Governments, aid organizations, the United Nations and militaries from several countries sent personnel and material to assist. Search and rescue teams poured in from all over the world. The U.S. Southern Command sent troops. The hospital ship, USNS Comfort, was dispatched.

My organization, International Medical Corps, was on the ground treating patients just 22 hours after the quake struck. Among emergency relief groups, we were the first to arrive from the "outside world". Why? Because we had prepared for events like that and we knew what needed to be done.

The needs in those chaotic initial days clearly overwhelmed the response. Haitians went hungry and thirsty. Then they became agitated and upset. Sporadic riots and anti-government demonstrations broke out in the capital. However, the arrival of the U.S. troops brought calm and the arrival of additional aid and the provision of essential services stabilized the situation further.

Before I go into what worked on the ground in Haiti, I would like to talk first about what did not work well in the early days:

- Aid poured in—both people and supplies—but much of it was based more on availability and an understandable desire to do something to help than on precise, targeted needs.
- There was a serious lack of coordination across the board, specifically: Many countries sent search and rescue teams, but there was little coordination and teams failed to communicate with each other once on the ground; little, if any, communication existed between search and rescue teams and medical assistance groups supporting hospitals and other critical emergency services; there was little communications or coordination between the different militaries that came to help.
- A limited number of NGOs—I stress a limited number—decided not to cooperate with the military.
- There were too many VIP trips.

Now, the positives---and there were many.

Overall, civil-military cooperation was good—some described it as excellent—compared to earlier disaster response operations.

Troops on the ground immediately assumed a valuable support role. They secured hospitals, settlements and other essential locations. The very presence of uniformed soldiers from the 82nd Airborne Division patrolling the city center area of the capital, Port-au-Prince, had an immediate calming effect on the hundreds of thousands of frightened victims made homeless by the disaster, who were forced to sleep on the streets or in flimsy shelters erected in local parks or other open areas. These Haitians had lost everything, but they drew comfort that there would at least be order as long as the soldiers remained.

In the confusion and desperation that characterized those early post-quake days, emergency medical teams, including those working with International Medical Corps at the Haitian National University Hospital (HUEH), also breathed a visible sigh of relief when the 82nd Airborne first showed up. With little fanfare, the soldiers established order. They calmed the anxious and unruly crowds of loved ones and passersby that had milled around the hospital's main gate and organized access to the hospital grounds.

When the soldiers of the 82nd handed back the hospital's security responsibilities to local authorities in late February, there was a sense of loss on both sides.

"We could not have achieved what we did without them," summed up Dr. Neil Joyce, International Medical Corps medical director during those initial hectic weeks.

But the soldiers did far more than security. They helped distribute water and food. At the hospital, they transferred patients, set up tents and generators. It was military planes that airlifted in critically-needed supplies and it was soldiers on the ground that brought water and MREs to our doctors and nurses working at the university hospital and at mobile clinics elsewhere in and around the capital. Military doctors and medics treated patients alongside NGO doctors and nurses.

"The soldiers' presence was an altogether positive development for the medical teams," concluded a recent article in the *New England Journal of Medicine* (www.nejm.org) signed by nine medical professionals who were among the first to arrive at the hospital after the quake. "By maintaining order and limiting the crowds of onlookers, they gave us more ready access to our patients."

Most importantly, the military reopened both the airport and the port of Port-au-Prince, which was critical for everyone's success.

The leadership of the U.S. 98th Civil Affairs Battalion (airborne) on the ground in Port-au-Prince clearly understood how to work with NGOs and the United Nations. They immediately dispatched a senior liaison officer to the UN Joint Operations and Tasking Center with the mission to provide support to NGOs and the UN based on needs and requests.

The initial response to the Haiti earthquake had an enormous impact. Countless lives were saved, essential services were restored and a fragile, yet tangible, stability settled over the capital. But the response also achieved something beyond that by proving two points: (1) that humanitarian organizations and the military can work together effectively in permissive environments, and (2) the impact of that cooperation can be far greater than if we each work on our own without coordination or collaboration.

The response also taught us that there is still room for improvement. For example:

- Serious joint civil-military planning needs to take place. We always react well, but we need to be proactive and prepare together for different scenarios.
- Communications and coordination between the NGOs and the military needs to be improved.
- A respected body or institution is needed that can act as a buffer or intermediary between the military and those NGOs that are still hesitant to work or cooperate with the military, even in permissive environments.

What should we take from the Haiti response?

This is a promising experience that should encourage us to do more. At one level, it has proven that a joint civil-military response can be effective and can have a favorable impact on humanitarian conditions following a major natural disaster. It can create or sustain the kind of stability essential to begin the journey to recovery. In short: It affirmed that NGOs and the military can work well together. However, we should not be content to leave it at that. We need to be proactive. Haiti must become a case study from which we draw positive lessons, then use those lessons to plan—together—for such situations so that next time we can be more effective. And as the Tufts University study I mentioned at the beginning of my remarks underscores, it is certain there will be a next time.

AFGHANISTAN: A COMPLEX EMERGENCY IN A NON-PERMISSIVE SETTING

From the feel-good-about-ourselves response in Haiti, I want to focus briefly on a more complex issue half a world away from the Caribbean: Afghanistan, where international aid groups and the military work together—or at least are trying to work together—in a far more challenging, non-permissive environment.

It is a truism that the Sept. 11th attacks changed the world for us all. Before 9/11, Afghanistan was just one more far-off place and NGOs were mostly still seen as "angels of mercy" neutral, impartial, independent and hardly ever targeted. Even when they were thrown together in the same geographical space, the NGO and military worlds tended to remain separate. They rarely interacted with each other, let alone considered cooperation. There were occasional exceptions—Kosovo was one—but the norm was an uneasy co-existence.

Sept. 11th changed all that, nowhere more than in Afghanistan. Foreign militaries arrived to fight the non-Afghans who had planned and launched the Sept. 11th attacks from Afghan soil as well as those Afghans who had welcomed and hosted the attackers. According to the latest available NATO figures, 102,000 troops from 46 countries are currently deployed in Afghanistan. At the same time, diplomatic initiatives to rebuild a country emerging from years of foreign occupation, civil war and oppressive Taliban rule, have brought an influx of NGOs and other international organizations to implement

ambitious relief and development programs. Since 2001, the United States alone has devoted over \$14 billion on humanitarian and development-related work as well as governance and democratization programs. And this does not include counter-narcotics, Afghan military training or other security-related programs.

Initially, the traditional dividing lines remained in Afghanistan and the old rules seemed to still apply. NGOs did what they do best and the military did what it does best. Interaction was limited, but mostly friendly. Yes, there were “trespassing” issues, but, they were generally well-managed.

Insurgent attacks on NGOs were rare. In the months that followed the route of Taliban forces in the fall of 2001 and the retreat of Al-Qaeda’s leadership into the mountainous tribal areas along the Afghan-Pakistan frontier, conditions seemed to improve.

Then they got worse. By 2003-2004, the security situation began to deteriorate and every year since then, it has become more difficult. Steadily, more areas of the country have become active military operation zones between the Government/Coalition forces and a budding insurgency known broadly as Anti-Government Elements (AGE). The fighting has hampered humanitarian operations, complicating our access to affected populations. The Taliban reemerged in many areas stronger than ever and the conflict has steadily escalated. Between 2008 and 2009, incident levels rose between 30 to 35%. As civilian suffering has increased, the humanitarian space in which NGOs operate has become steadily smaller. Currently, less than 40% of the country is officially described as a ‘low-risk/permissive environment.’

The creation of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams with their military-civilian mix, plus the growing involvement of the military in what traditionally was NGO work has added to tensions between the NGOs and the military.

So, where is the civil-military relationship in Afghanistan now?

Today, perspectives and attitudes towards the military differ sharply within the NGOs community working there. Some—as in Haiti—want no interaction at all with the military. Others seem undecided just how to adjust to the military’s involvement in humanitarian affairs. Then there are those who have come to realize that the realities of the post-Sept. 11th era leave us no viable option: We need each other and we must find ways to work together.

I see this mix of reactions on the part of NGOs as part of a broader evolution in thinking about the civilian-military relationship that is now underway, not just in Afghanistan, but in other non-permissive environments, such as Iraq. It is a journey that for many humanitarian groups has gone from complete denial to a gradual—if sometimes grudging—acknowledgement that both they and international organizations such as the U.N. agencies on one side, and the military on the other, need to find a way to co-exist, coordinate and, where possible, collaborate.

All too often, the question we keep asking is this: Should a relationship exist between NGOs and the military and, if so, what is the best way to develop it?

But my question is the following: Can we afford not to have that relationship? Can we afford not to find a way to work with each other? Reality dictates the answer: No, we can’t afford it anymore.

Certainly, an effective relationship between the NGOs and the military is far harder to establish in a non-permissive environment than in a permissive one. The perception by local community leaders that an NGO is working too closely with the military can easily jeopardize the NGO’s mission and place its staff in serious danger. It is sometimes difficult for the military to understand that an NGO’s only real defense in non-permissive environments is community acceptance.

However, I believe there are ways we can build an effective relationship without necessarily having to interact directly in the field or engage in routine contact. Put simply, we do not have to flaunt it. The real foundation of a strong cooperative relationship requires both the NGO and military communities to get to know, understand, appreciate, trust and respect each other. Achieving this in the pressure-cooker of a non-permissive environment I believe is asking too much. This foundation instead needs to be established through frequent interaction, discussion, training and preparing together before deploying to non-permissive environments.

So, if you accept that we can no longer ignore each other and work in isolation, I see two initial challenges. We must:

- Ensure that we focus not just on short-term results, but, on longer term impact;
- Find ways to work together effectively without compromising either’s mission.

While I do not have a magic wand to make these happen, I do offer two recommendations to share with you in the hope we can think about them and begin to move forward with them.

1. We must learn to prepare, plan and communicate and we must learn to do this early and often. We need to listen to each other and learn, first to understand, then to respect each other’s roles. We need to remind ourselves that we share the same goal. In Afghanistan, this goal includes the well-being and safety of the Afghan people, the sustainability of our actions and the long term stability of Afghanistan as a free nation. If we focus on these goals in whatever plans we make, we can have an enduring impact.

2. There are situations in non-permissive environments where open, visible coordination could compromise us. That is the reality. I believe a viable alternative in such situations could be to work through an intermediary. We call this creating a buffer. The intermediary should be a body trusted by both NGOs and the military, whose role is to facilitate dialogue and interventions. Many NGOs have found this to be critical in non-permissive environments, but also occasionally useful in permissive environments.

To summarize my remarks, I believe the military and civilian organizations such as NGOs need each other and we need to be serious about finding ways to cooperate in both permissive and non-permissive environments. Ignoring each other is no longer an option. Cooperation is the only way to maximize the impact of us both, not just on the welfare of the people, but in our efforts to bring stability and ensure the security of a country.

Chapter 27

Civil-Military Partnerships—Some Guiding Principles for Success

Ms. Teresa Gera
Executive Director, Global Reach

The military and NGOs are going to be placed in situations in which they need to work together. Therefore, I would like to quickly highlight the role of civil-military partnerships and discuss some recommended guiding principles for planning the implementation of successful partnerships.

THE NEED FOR CIVIL-MILITARY PARTNERSHIPS

Partnerships address a unique issue: The need to coordinate many disparate organizational efforts to alleviate suffering in order to reduce waste and error, eliminate duplication, and deliver exactly what vulnerable people need when they need it. The mission of Global Reach is to influence change, foster innovative partnerships, and encourage integration between governments and private and public sector communities to increase the resources available to those in need. Our vision is to provide a forum for dialogue between the private and public sectors, identify opportunities for collaboration and sustainable development that keep the recipients of need at the top of our minds, assist those who wish to engage in partnership opportunities, and serve as a trusted intermediary that brings together those responding to humanitarian needs.

THE PARTNERSHIPS' ROLE

There are four key partners in any of these responses:

- Non-governmental organizations, or NGOs. They are on the ground. They know the communities, have the best understanding of the needs that are there, and know what is needed immediately and what can be provided once that immediate need is met. They also have the local resources and contacts that can help humanitarian efforts in times of crisis. More importantly, they can help sustain the benefits achieved from humanitarian efforts.
- The military, which is key to making a society more secure and understands that this relies on meeting the humanitarian needs of a population.
- Corporations. Corporations will ultimately benefit from stable governments and societies through the creation of new and developing markets. They cannot be ignored, and serve as a valuable resource.
- Government agencies such as the U.S. State Department, the Department of Defense, and USAID have constituencies that focus on public-private partnerships.

We have already seen examples of these partnerships in Haiti, Afghanistan, and other places around the world; we have seen how effective these partnerships can be. The Gulf of Guinea, a big oil producer, is one geographic region that can provide an example of how NGOs, government, and the private sector can integrate their capabilities in new ways to maintain stability and enhance the economic viability of a volatile region.

For example, in Nigeria, one single country in the Gulf of Guinea, there is great need as well as the potential for sustainability. With a population of over 150 million people, the literacy rate is 68% and the per capita income is US\$2,400. Life expectancy, however, is only 47 years. The region has the resources to become self-sustaining: It is Africa's largest oil producer and there is extensive foreign investment there. Despite that, Nigeria has real humanitarian needs: 70% of the population lives below the poverty line, and almost 3 million live with HIV/AIDS. The country cannot sustainably establish stability and economic growth while its people lack fundamental health and education services. Among stakeholders who are active in the region, we can see that sources of relief include active and ongoing NGO programs, the private sector, the oil sector, and partner governments along with assistance programs and military programs.

GUIDING PRINCIPLES TO IMPLEMENT SUCCESSFUL PARTNERSHIPS

To aid in the delivery of humanitarian assistance and to maximize the resources made available by NGOs and the military, we recommend establishing civil-military partnerships in advance of emergency situations to help ensure that activities are not replicated, that early and involved planning is in place, and that tools are made available for the implementation and evaluation of the project. In order to do this, Global Reach has identified emerging guiding principles for the delivery of humanitarian aid through civil-military coordination.

- Determine and agree upon the goal and scope of the humanitarian assistance project.
- Define and agree on clear expectations, roles, and responsibilities.
- Agree to financial practices.
- Determine lead partners.
- Assess the relationship and reputation capital of each partner.
- Establish a system for frequent and meaningful communications.
- Discuss openly and agree on how credit and acknowledgment will be given publicly.
- Establish an exit strategy for all partners.
- Evaluate the project.

These guiding principles can be adapted as a basic framework to build successful civil-military collaborations. Of the nine principles, eight are related to the formation of a partnership, underscoring the importance of building a strong foundation from which to proceed. Among these, the pre-assessment of each member's involvement and the definition of roles are fundamental to success. However, when working in conditions as uncertain as those following a disaster, flexibility is also crucial to sustain the partnership.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

We are working now on demonstrating how better communication, collaboration, and preplanning between willing NGO and military sectors can increase the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance delivery. Finally, it is important to note that, through careful and planned partnerships, a holistic approach, and integrated response, we all have the ability to improve the living conditions of those in need.

Chapter 28

Cyber Security and the Spreading Challenges

Mr. Robert Lentz

Former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Cyber, Information, and Identity Assurance)

OPENING REMARKS

This workshop, dating back to Moscow 2004, was the first to really bring together the diplomatic and national security leadership community—defense ministers and so on—at a very senior level to have deep discussions about information technology and its corresponding security implications. We now call this arena cyber security. Other groups are following suit, one of which occurred in Texas recently, called the East-West Conference. The reality is that the United Nations sponsored activity called the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), the World Economic Forum, best known for its annual meeting called Davos, or even the G-20 group of twenty Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors all must step up and make cyber security a top priority. NATO is finally getting on board and even the U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense is making a worldwide tour promoting greater focus on this critical topic. The good news is that IT Security/Cyber Security is no longer just the province of techies or geeks. World leaders finally understand that, with the advent of the Information Age, enabling trusted communications and preventing terrorists or criminals from exploiting the Internet to their advantage is now a core security issue that must be dealt with aggressively.

EARLY ADAPTION TO THE INTERNET

In the early-2000s, even the U.S. Department of Defense was just establishing its strategy for how we were going to adapt to the Internet. We came up with a strategy called Power to the Edge, referring to the power of information, and we began to deploy those capabilities as rapidly as we could. The problem was that, when we had those discussions back in the early-2000s time frame and we were making massive investments in the DOD post 9-11, we unfortunately did not bake in security from the beginning. I know that sounds to some like a fairly minor strategic decision, but the decision of the leadership at that point in time was that we had to get the Internet-based capability out there first in order to show people that the Internet could be the kind of technology that we could rely upon to completely transform the way military operations are conducted around the world. There were a lot of naysayers, but, over the following years, everybody became a believer in that idea, and doctrine and strategy started to change.

This delay in investing in security first goes even back to when the Internet was originally conceived but because technology moved faster and faster consistent with Moore's Law, the threats became much, much more significant. Most security professionals I know will tell you that no one expected the cyber security threat to be as significant as it is today. It is much, much more daunting than we ever imagined, and that is our challenge. We are in a race, and we are behind in that race. So when Roger Weissinger-Baylon and I talked about this panel earlier this year, we decided to modify the purpose of the panel slightly and not just talk about the security dimensions of this information revolution but also about delivering the information that we all need. The question is, Is it benefiting the good guys or is it benefiting the bad guys? And how can we balance things so that we can all achieve the end goals of our strategic plans and each individual nation's objectives?

THE DUAL-EDGED SWORD OF NEEDING INFORMATION AND NEEDING TO SECURE IT

Let's look at what happened in Iran in terms of how the Internet became a key tool. Let's also look at what is happening in Afghanistan with the counter-insurgency efforts. Let's look at how important the Internet is for conducting operations like you heard Microsoft's Tim Bloechl describe with the rich deployment of IT globally or dealing with stability operations in Africa or the Middle East. All of that is part of the fundamental issue that our cyber panel must address: The paradox that we face, the dual-edged sword of making information available while at the same time trying to secure that information so that it cannot be used against us.

Recently Army General Odierno, the outgoing U.S. commander in Iraq, was asked as he was leaving his post, "What is one of the things that frustrated you the most?" His answer was that the Internet was a tool that we needed to conduct information operations, but that Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups were really outflanking us in that area. (These are my words but ostensibly that is what he was saying.) Al-Qaeda was using the Internet for recruitment and propaganda and public relations and so on, and we had very little means to counter that. At the same time we needed the Internet to be successful. So that is our challenge.

CYBER SECURITY AS A GAME CHANGER

Over the years at this workshop, we all agreed that cyber security has become a game changer. I am not going to elaborate on the details, but we have seen it in Estonia; we have seen it in Georgia; we have seen it in Lithuania; and we have seen it in Belarus with the Radio Free Europe denial of service attack. We have also seen it with the cable cuts in the Mediterranean, which were indirectly a cyber space event highlighting the fragility of traditional communications, and we have seen it most recently with the tremendous rise in cyber crime. Once again, experts in this field will tell you that they are shocked at how cyber crime has swept over the world and that there is more money in cyber crime than there is in the drug trade. One statistic that I think is very startling in this area is that one in every five victims in the critical infrastructure area is a victim of cyber extortion—this is the reality of what we face. In China, we recently saw Google and other major companies become victims of very sophisticated, targeted cyber attacks, which is the newest trend that is occurring every day.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Before ending my remarks and turning to our esteemed panel, I would like to throw out a question: What country in the world today has the highest level of cyber security adoption? The answer is China, which also has the highest level of encryption in the world today. Draw any conclusions you want from that, but the reality is that we are all together in this information revolution and we all have a responsibility to deal with it.

Chapter 29

Technology Innovation in the Global Security Environment

Mr. Tim Bloechl

Managing Director, Worldwide Public Safety & National Security, Microsoft

Thank you for taking the time today to hear from Microsoft during your lunch at this great workshop. Most of you think of Microsoft as Office 2010, Windows 7, PowerPoint, Excel, or Xbox360, etc. That is not the Microsoft I know. The Microsoft I know is very focused on solutions for military and public safety customers. In fact, the largest customers in the world for Microsoft are military—11 out of our top 20 customers—and our number one customer in terms of size in our last fiscal year was the U.S. military. Many militaries have architectures based on the Microsoft platform. When our teams support you, they not only focus on architecture, but also try to figure out with our many partners ways to improve battlefield operating systems, to make your logistics operate more efficiently, and to help improve all the systems you depend on for operations. This year Microsoft will spend \$9.5 billion a year on research and development, the largest investment of any information technology company. Although most of this funding is not focused on defense, when we obtain new technology, we look for ways to turn it into defense solutions.

We partner with all the companies here at the workshop. Sometimes they compete with us but for the most part they are our partners because most of our customers want solutions based on Microsoft software. Here are some examples of how we are helping to use commercial-off-the-shelf or COTS technology to support your missions.

- For NATO, the Civil-Military Cooperation Portal links together troop leaders, local officials, non-government organizations and other groups in Afghanistan. This has been a 24/7 operation for years since its creation by a Microsoft architect working at NATO Headquarters.
- Our company created a research and development arrangement with U.S. Joint Forces Command several years ago to build a command center focused on IEDs on the battlefield. It is known as KnIFE, Knowledge Information Fusion Exchange, and today, before units go in harm's way, they check into KnIFE to get the latest information on IEDs, where they have been sighted, and the types of explosives being used. KnIFE is saving lives on the battlefield.
- Logica, a Microsoft partner company is deploying a document handling system for NATO.
- Thales is deploying the new NATO Land Component Command and Control Information System (L2CIS) again based on the Microsoft platform.
- I recently learned that the new NATO Air Command and Control Information System (A2CIS) was awarded to a Turkish partner, Havelsan, and Siemens of Germany, also based on a Microsoft architecture. So we at Microsoft are very focused on doing the right thing to support defense organizations and we are working with a host of partner companies to be able to help.

In their presentations, Admiral Fitzgerald and Louis Gallois mentioned that there is a blurring of defense and security in our operations today. I would agree wholeheartedly and what is nice about the business I lead is that I can see solutions across the whole space. We provide solutions down to local level, to police and fire, up to national level police and justice organizations, homeland security agencies, and to the largest intelligence and defense organizations. Through sharing best practices within Microsoft, we have visibility at the global level on all of these solutions and how they are used.

As another example, when we arrive at a solution in the world of police, we look to see if there are ramifications or transferability into the intelligence or military world. I was recently in New York City the day after a bombing attempt and had meetings with my team there who supports the New York City police department. They have helped build a counter-terrorism center known as the Lower Manhattan Security Initiative (LMSI). Microsoft is the lead company supporting

NYPD as they continue to improve this counter-terrorism operation. Working with other companies, we have helped link together all of the surveillance cameras in Lower Manhattan, plus other electronic means located at bridges, tunnels and other access points into the city. From national level intelligence to local police reports, all possible information comes together under LMSI supporting counter-terrorism operations. We have also developed a similar capability called Fusion Core. Three U.S. states today use Fusion Core to support real time counter-terrorism situational awareness, and we are in the process of deploying this solution to other customers in the United States and beyond.

I am seeing an increasing prevalence of computer-aided dispatch for police and fire on our platform. Companies like Motorola, Intergraph, Unisys, and others are building solutions for police and fire based on the Microsoft product line. Another police solution we are proud of found its genesis several years ago in a letter sent to Bill Gates by a Toronto police detective sergeant. The police in Toronto were very concerned about people preying on children over the internet—child pornographers or sexual predators linking up with children over the Internet, setting up meetings with them, and then sexually exploiting these victims. The police had major difficulties analyzing the computer derived information to try to track these criminals down. Working closely with the Toronto Police and then the Royal Canadian Mounted Police nationally, Microsoft developed the Child Exploitation Tracking System (CETS), an intelligence analysis tool which has been used for years now to fight these horrific criminals. The solution has decreased analysis time by over 90% and has helped police and prosecutors put countless criminals behind bars. Microsoft has since deployed the CETS solution to twelve countries and is now in the process of creating a cloud-based computing variant of CETS so all police worldwide can benefit and take advantage of this technology.

Using what we have learned from these experiences, we have created an Intelligence Framework analysis capability that we are sharing with our partners and Microsoft Services teams so they can build customized applications supporting military intelligence, homeland security organizations, and other police investigatory operations. Additionally, Microsoft R&D efforts led to a new tool called PhotoDNA. One of the basic child pornography problems facing law enforcement comes from the way criminals handle images on the Internet. Efforts to remove these images are thwarted when perpetrators change one pixel on an image making it a totally different image to find in searches. PhotoDNA now allows law enforcement to find not only the original image, but variants of these images across the Internet, thus making it possible to reach out to Internet Service Providers to ask them to remove these pictures from the Worldwide Web.

I wonder how we can use this technology for intelligence operations. Furthermore, how can we use it to support military operations, police criminal cases, or to find terrorists? This is the next hard problem in my opinion. For example, The New York City police commissioner responsible for information technology operations mentioned to me that their biggest challenge today is to search and find an individual when he/she only appears in a moving video. With PhotoDNA as a start, and adding in some of the work we have done on the computer gaming and visual recognition sides of our business, we have the opportunity to converge these technologies into a solution which may solve this tough problem.

Looking at a different challenge I now turn to disaster preparedness, response and recovery operations. My company has supported many disaster response efforts over the years and we came to the point after Hurricane Katrina in the U.S. where we felt we needed to form a more focused effort. We created a full-time disaster response team which now deploys whenever disasters occur. We learn from each operation, do after-action reviews just as we do in the military, and continue to evolve our technology responses to potentially place the right capabilities in the hands of governments and non-government organizations before disaster strikes.

Let me share a few more examples. I was recently in Eindhoven in The Netherlands and had a chance to meet with the police commissioner who is working with industry to solve a difficult problem. A stretch of highway from the Port of Rotterdam toward the German border was hit repeatedly by criminals who targeted trucks sitting by the wayside and hijacked their goods. Working with the police, Microsoft and our partner company Geodan helped build and deploy a surveillance system based on BING Maps, SharePoint, and our new Surface device as a new police command and control system. Once deployed, hijackings at these rest stops decreased to zero! The Dutch are now exploring an expansion of this technology in other parts of Holland to fight crime. And a little warning to those of you attending this workshop— if you go to Hungary you are vulnerable to an automated, Microsoft-based traffic ticketing system. Anyone caught speeding in Hungary quickly gets a ticket and can pay or refute the charge online. This system, which paid for itself in three months, is a money maker for Hungary. Be careful you do not add to Hungarian revenue.

When I think about counter-terrorism, disaster response, and the other operations Microsoft supports, I try to think about how to apply this technology to military missions. This is an ongoing, evolutionary process. We do a lot of work with SharePoint in the command and control space and support to logistics using Microsoft Dynamics software has also become a key focus for us. I was in Iraq recently and had the opportunity to see a military logistics system created on the

Microsoft platform by a small company named Knowlogy. This half American/half Iraqi company has deployed a system now supporting the logistics for the Iraqi army. By extension, the solution is helping Iraqis improve their capability to handle their own security missions.

Cloud Computing

Other current and future technologies are going to have an impact on military operations, such as cloud computing. Most of us are used to using software we operate on our laptop, desktop or hand-held device, and we make sure we store all the data on these devices because we do not necessarily trust storing the data elsewhere. Times and technology are changing the way you and I will store data in the future. The world is now moving to the cloud and more and more solutions are going to be cloud based. As a company, we have made the shift in this direction. We will continue to provide personal computer and handheld software resources, but industry is focused on providing these same capabilities in the cloud so organizations and individuals can reduce storage, network and hardware costs and maintenance. Amazon is a great example of cloud computing and most of you probably have made an order at one time or another at Amazon.com. All kinds of different companies are linked together by Amazon. You as customers are linked in to all of these companies and the services they offer through an Amazon cloud-based capability. You place orders and miraculously, through the Internet and the cloud, you receive your goods.

Another cloud computing example was recently deployed in the U.K. by Microsoft. One of the challenges facing the U.K. Ministry of Defense, and by extension all militaries for that matter, is the high cost, administrative burden and mountain of paperwork facing personnel managers. Until recently military and civilian workers of MODUK had to physically visit personnel offices to file this or that form. To save time, money, and paper, MODUK decided to create a cloud-based solution for their human resources actions for both military and civilian workers. The solution built by Microsoft and partners has been in place now for a couple of years. It saves MODUK millions of pounds a year plus all the travel time normally experienced by their customers. Today, I am seeing a growing number of cloud computing solutions being considered by military organizations around the world and we are at the cusp of a great wave of change based on the benefits these types of solutions offer.

Social Networking

How many of you have a FaceBook page? Quite a few of you I am sure. The current Supreme Allied Commander, Europe has his own FaceBook page. On my last check, he had 4,721 friends. He uses FaceBook as a means to pass information about what NATO is doing and shares it with the world. Twitter, Linked-In, Blogs—these are the technical social networking tools of the present. This evolution in information sharing brings two questions to mind. First, how do you use this technology to support your mission or should you? I suspect your soldiers will anyway, so it is important to think about the ramifications and potential benefits. Secondly, what are the operational security issues involved with using social networking? As a simple example, I recently gave a speech to 1500 students at my high school alma mater in Wisconsin. I warned them that sharing information on FaceBook is great, but one must be careful about the content one puts on the site as some future employer may look at the information out there on the Internet and one's future job may depend on one's discretion.

Unified Communications

When I was a CENTCOM intelligence war planner ten years ago, we used a highly expensive video teleconferencing system for planning operations in the Middle East. Today I can accomplish the same functions from my desk with a small camera linked into Microsoft Office Communications software. Furthermore, I can monitor the status of all the people I work with, whether they are online or not, whether they are in a call or in a meeting, and I can click a button and link them all together by voice or instant message. From my office laptop and camera in Redmond, Washington, I have given defense briefings to military leaders in other parts of the world using a device called Round Table placed in the conference room on their end. The device allows me to see and hear all the people in the room and also a close-up of the person speaking at the time. And they can see and hear me and view my PowerPoint slides as if I was physically there. Such is the nature of the technology we have today and because it is in mass production, it is cheap. So we need to figure out how to secure it properly so we can all take advantage of these capabilities in the defense environment. While I do not think we will ever

hold one of these forums in this new virtual world, the technology to do so is present if we wanted to.

Changes in User Interfaces

As a young officer, I remember using map boards and lots of overlays with acetate and grease pencils. Today this work is all computerized. We now have a device called Surface which is shaped like the top of a desk and is potentially a replacement for the map boards of the past. It was built for home entertainment but today police are using Surface for command and control, moving images around with their fingertips, pulling up data reports, manipulating maps, and even using push-to-talk on the device to contact operators in the field. It is a great technology and some of our big defense system integrator companies are experimenting with the technology to create military operation center versions. Down the road I see the potential for a Surface-like device to be a flexible piece of plastic which can be rolled up like a map and deployed in tactical operations centers for C2. In addition, while you use touch on computer screens and other devices today to do many things, in the near term you will be able to use gestures instead of touch to achieve the same outcomes. My children have this capability today using a Kinect device attached to their Xbox 360. Soon we may have this technology for military exercises, training systems, or even in command centers. We need to think about whether we want to use such technology and how to use it.

Now I think it is important to briefly touch on operational risks associated with these technological advances. Industry is going to continue to innovate and build new capabilities. These solutions will be mass produced and the world's population will use them, so it is important for militaries to think about how to use these new devices and technologies and, if they decide to use them, how to best incorporate the technology. A major risk we face is, if defense organizations do not choose to use these technologies but potential enemies do, what will be the effect on friendly and threat operational capabilities?

Secondly, what are the right security certification standards and practices we need to put in place to ensure these capabilities when put on a network or used for military operations will not cause an opposite effect? Clearly the world today is riddled with stories of cyber espionage and cyber-attacks. We have heard previously from Minister Aaviksoo about the attacks against Estonia in 2007, and when I visited Georgia last October, Vice Prime Minister Baramidze described how the Russians attacked Georgia and how for probably the first time in the history of warfare, cyber-attack was the main initial effort before the start of ground and air operations. We really need to spend more thinking about cyber operations from defensive and offensive perspectives. We must consider the security ramifications involved and this will be the main point of discussion this afternoon. However, if we work together and focus on cyber, we can stay ahead of the criminals and threat forces; we can take advantage of what the world's industries are producing; we can save defense budgets in the process and improve our military capabilities and operations.

This concludes my remarks today and I look forward to the discussions this afternoon on cyber security. I hope you now have a better picture of Microsoft's involvement and potential in the defense and national security arena and why we have been such a stalwart supporter of this workshop over the past five years.

Chapter 30

Remarks on the Crucial Importance of Security For Information Technology

Lieutenant General Ulrich Wolf
Former Director of NATO CIS Agency

Before I introduce our speaker, I would like to thank Roger very much for raising the importance during this conference over the last three to four years of the topic of information technology and its influence and impact on the political and military landscape. When I first participated in this conference, I was part of the cyber defense panel, which was the last panel on the Sunday afternoon. At that time everybody at the conference was looking for his luggage to head off home with as fast as he could, but now this topic is being addressed for the second day, and it is my prediction that in about five years we will have Bill Gates introducing the conference.

I think that it is very appropriate that the topic of IT security, IT support, and living with IT on the business side and on the private side has moved to the center of our interest. We can see that interest here at the conference when we look around the table in the conference room—participation is provided about 50% by the IT industry. That is a clear sign that when we look into the security of our nations and of our Alliance, cyber defense is something that is gaining more and more interest and more and more importance. We are moving it from a technical challenge to a strategic challenge, and I am quite convinced that in the near future we will base the effort in the field of information security on a comprehensive approach. I am also convinced that we will see the Alliance and our different nations approaching this challenge on the basis of some sort of general defense plan, something as comprehensive as we had it during the times of Cold War.

Chapter 31

Cyber Security and the Spreading Challenges

His Excellency Jaak Aaviksoo
Minister of Defense of Estonia

CYBER SECURITY IS BOTH A DOMESTIC DANGER AND A NATIONAL SECURITY THREAT

Addressing the issue of cyber security is always a challenging task in the sense that it is getting more and more complex every day or even every hour. When we deal with cyber security, new and ever newer issues keep emerging. I will try to focus on just two topics that I will describe later. But before doing so, I would like to say that what I have seen over the last three years since I entered office, barely two weeks before the well-known cyber attack on Estonia in April 2007, has convinced me that virtual reality is becoming more real than reality itself. We are increasingly dependent on virtual events in our practical lives and if we speculate in the manner of science fiction, we can think of what would happen to us if someone that we do not know or see were to completely manipulate the information that we get on the internet and then we would make our decisions—investments, buying or selling things etc—based on that information. Of course, this is impossible for practical reasons but, as a mental exercise, it is very useful.

A second point I would like to make—and which has already been mentioned—is that cyber crime is a growing problem that will most probably outrun not only drug trafficking but any other criminal or illegal business in the world in the coming years. My third point, which has also been mentioned previously, is that the notions of defense and security are becoming increasingly mixed up in the case of cyber security and security of the cyber space just as they are in traditional defense and security areas. What is a homeland security issue? What is a national security issue? What constitutes an armed attack? These are very hard to define and they may morph from one form into the other. One good example is that the botnets used in cyber attacks were initially developed for cyber crime. Yet, these tools could be used efficiently for cyber attacks and eventually for cyber wars.

HOW TO ORGANIZE NATIONALLY AND INTERNATIONALLY FOR CYBER SECURITY

As promised, I will focus on two topics. The first one is the organization of cyber security at the national and international levels using Estonia as an example. The second one is awareness. How will the global community, nation states, and international organizations, as well as companies, agencies, and ministries address the issue of cyber security? I think this is very hard to answer. It is increasingly clear that no single group can solve the problem, not 50% or even 5 to 10% of it. Whenever we want to achieve some success, a lot of cooperation is needed at all possible levels—inter-agency, public private sector, third sector, citizens and the government, international organizations. At the same time, this cooperation also goes along vertical lines—within the ministry of defense, the ministry of interior, the ministry of telecommunications, the ministry of economic affairs, or the ministry of justice. And a number of such agencies must work together in a coordinated way. When things become critical, moreover, the coordination must occur in real time. There is no time available for mobilizing defensive assets. They must be in place at practically all times—or at least it should be possible to switch them on very quickly. Everything has to be ready in advance and under such circumstances, we all know that flawless communication is the most critical asset.

How do we build flawless communication? This is not a purely technical issue. Communication is always between individuals, people, which necessarily requires interpretation, translation, and understanding. My conclusion, based on the practical experience of the cyber attacks against our country and for theoretical reasons as well, is that we must train these people to work together. There must be a network in place of people who are able to communicate with each other without problems. They must know and trust each other, whatever the barriers between them—cross administrative, national, legal or other. It is a very complicated task: It is about human interoperability in real time.

Frankly speaking, we have not been too successful at implementing a national cyber security strategy. Nonetheless, one development is worth mentioning here: The establishment of a voluntary, non-governmental cyber defense league organization. Before explaining what I mean by that, let me first explain Estonia's defense organization. We have regular troops, a reserve army and we still have conscription. The regular professional army is between 3,000 and 4,000 strong. In case of need, we can add in a few days 25,000 men—reservists who have to be mobilized—to this professional army. In addition, we have a non-governmental paramilitary organization called the Defense League, which is 20,000 strong. It is organized as a military hierarchy for the purpose of territorial defense. These individuals train regularly, and they are motivated to do so. While they are not paid, costs that are directly related to their activities in defense are covered by a government subsidy even though they remain an independent legal entity. Under that umbrella, we have a special unit, called the Cyber Defense League, which is between 100 and 200 people strong. We have selected its members both for their willingness to join and for their professional characteristics and organized them in a military structure. While several legal problems still need to be resolved, the basic idea is that they are volunteering for that obligation and they come from across the whole society—private sector, government sector, independent individuals, entrepreneurs, all kinds of people. The government offers them training possibilities, equips them with the necessary resources and in case of need, can mobilize them for national defense like the reservists in regular military service. I have to say that the willingness of those voluntary cyber defense league members to serve is a huge asset. Their contribution to the common cause of securing the environment is a strategic asset. I would even go further. I do not believe that we could organize those people to work together if that were not a voluntary effort. Ten or maybe twenty times more resources would be required. So this is a good example of addressing the issue of networked cooperation both horizontally and vertically.

THE NEED FOR PUBLIC AWARENESS OF THE CYBER SECURITY THREAT

My second topic concerns awareness. When we think about cyber security, like with every problem, the most complicated task is to find out where the true bottleneck is. There are billions of problems and we cannot solve them all. Usually, if we can find out where the bottleneck is and broaden it a little bit, things start flowing. Where is the bottleneck in cyber security? Although the need for awareness of cyber security has been mentioned many times, at many gatherings and in many formal or less formal documents, I am increasingly convinced that, if it is not the biggest bottleneck, it is at least one of the most important problems we have to solve. Why do I think that? Last year, we had to cut our national budget by 20% in the middle of the fiscal year, which was a hard exercise, but I found that the resources that were allocated under a national cyber security strategy were cut by 80%. What does that mean? It means that the crucial understanding of the need to defend ourselves in cyber space against different threats is missing. The need for awareness and understanding does not occupy an appropriate place in the priorities, if we look at the exponentially growing cyber crime rate or the magnitude of the security threats. This is a problem not only at the political level but at the public administration level as well. But I will leave that question aside for a moment. I believe that a lot of political decision making in our democratic societies is still done according to what people think is morally right or wrong. And there are several reasons for citizens to underestimate the threats in cyber space. Even when citizens have a somewhat mixed attitude towards what is going on in cyber space, they do not consider cyber crime as a true crime. If some hacker can get his hands on a million dollars from a major bank, he will be viewed by some as a public hero rather than as a criminal. Or if a smart guy, the younger the better, finds a way of taking a dollar from each of our pockets, with 1 billion people, this becomes 1 billion dollars. For most people, he is still a smart guy and not a criminal.

Finally, I tend to believe that what people do if they are one-on-one with their computer is not always something they want to tell their friends or wives to know—going to sites, looking at things, or commenting on articles on internet forums. What people tend to do on the internet, they would not necessarily do in a public place. If that is true, it affects how people feel about others doing things on the internet. When there is a moral problem, they do not think that it is necessarily black or white or straightforward. So I think that one of the main efforts that is needed on the political level, but not only

on the political level, is to raise public awareness about the nature of the threat in order to protect every single individual. People tend to believe that cyber space is anonymous. It is anonymous only on the surface and we really do not know what may happen to us, just like when I presented earlier the idea of a fictional situation where somebody manipulates all the information flows to our computer. We may take another example which is much more probable. We underestimate how vulnerable we actually will become if all the information that flows in and out of our computer is known to someone. In fact, such information is extremely sensitive, especially when it is all taken together and analyzed in a proper way. We must work on those threats in a more systematic way and try to explain more effectively what is good and what is bad. I will not call it a “safe sex campaign.” But a “safe internet campaign” or a “responsible behavior code” is something that we need badly. Otherwise our efforts, whether technological, political, legal or defensive will not bear fruit.

Chapter 32

Cyber Security and the Spreading Challenges

Mr. Brad Boston
Senior Vice President, Cisco

OPENING REMARKS

To answer Bob Lentz's original question of whether the good guys or the bad guys are benefiting from the information revolution, the bad guys do have an advantage because they do not play by any rules. Governments, enterprises, and companies often play by too many rules, and you have to figure out whether they are the right rules, regulations, or standards to adopt in order to be able to deal with the constantly changing threat. In an area that has a constantly changing threat, we spend way too much time deploying static defenses, and as a result those defenses cannot adapt to the attacks as rapidly as the attackers change them. We need to spend much more time thinking about how to deploy proactive technologies, tools, and defenses that can help us learn as the attacks are modified. Some of that technology is being developed today.

FOCUSING ON THE ENTIRE PROBLEM

We also currently focus on a subset of the problem, and that is usually whatever just happened to us. While a lot of the industry focuses on denial-of-service attacks and viruses as Minister Aaviksoo indicated, there are a lot of other potentially more damaging ways of attacking our information infrastructure, especially for defense, government, and private sector organizations. The bad guys want to do one of four things:

- Interrupt your operation so you cannot operate—that is the traditional denial-of-service attack.
- Steal your information, which is a lot of what is going on in the cyber world today—certain players try to steal as much information as they can about your infrastructure, your defense plans, and so on.
- Destroy your information so that you cannot use it when you need it.
- As Holger Mey said, they may want to change the information in ways that will change your reaction to it or change how you interpret the data, causing you to use it unknowingly in ways that make your decisions completely different from decisions you would make if you actually had the right information.

So we have to think much more about the whole problem instead of just about what we dealt with yesterday.

UNDERSTANDING HOW TO DEPLOY TECHNOLOGY

One challenge we see when we talk to government customers around the world is that they do not know how to deploy a lot of the tools and technologies they already own. We need a better public-private partnership so that we can learn how to deploy those technologies in a way that will strengthen our defenses. Once you get those basics deployed, then you can start spending more time on some of the proactive technologies that exist today. So our defenses have to become much more proactive, we need multiple defense-in-depth approaches, and we also need to know how to operate through an attack. At Cisco, we take most of our business through the Internet, and we get attacked at the end of every quarter of every year, which is the last day of business. I dare you to figure out what the last day of our quarter is, because we have a very bizarre fiscal calendar year, yet the bad guys know it, and on the last day of every quarter we get an enormous, vengeful attack on our Web site that we have to learn how to operate through. There are a number of things that we do ourselves or in partnership with our service providers that provide our connections to the Internet, and we need to be able to operate through an attack.

LOOKING AT THE BIG PICTURE

Concerning the four problems that can occur, we need to stop thinking about specific technologies or techniques that have consumed us in the past, such as viruses and denial of service, and step back and take a look at what is common to all the attacks. What is interesting here is that all the attacks exploit some software in your computer, in your router, in your switches, and so on. The bad payload that activates whatever the weakness is can be delivered through a number of different ways. We focus primarily on the Internet, so a bad payload can be delivered via the Internet; by e-mail, which also comes through the Internet; by a Bluetooth connection that is wide open unless we have it secured; through removable disks; from USB devices, which are memory sticks and have major potential exposure. And with the one and a half trillion or whatever the number is mobile devices that will be on the Internet, let me ask how many of you take your cell phone and plug it in with the USB connection into your PC? Payloads get delivered in a number of different ways, and they are going to continue to increase.

We need to start looking at what happens once a payload has been delivered, what it does to compromise your system. It can compromise your system in only a couple of specific ways, and tools have been developed by Microsoft, Symantec, McAfee, and others that look at certain activities that are traditionally used to cause damage to a system. If we can start alerting people that something bad is about to happen, and if we can stop whatever is happening, protect your machine, and become more proactive in your defenses, only then will we be able to get ahead of the curve. There is a lot we could be doing, but I think we are thinking about the problem in the wrong way.

MANAGING THE SUPPLY CHAIN

I would now like to talk about the fact of globalization. We heard about the China issue with the manufacturing of semiconductors, and a lot of discussion has been going on in my country and with NATO and NATO members about the impact of globalization on the supply chain. In my company we do R&D and manufacturing all over the world, and we outsource components all over the world. But there are now a lot of activities bent on anchoring things down—the thought is, Let's build everything in our country and we will be safe, or let's move the supply chain and the factories all back to the U.S. and the problem will go away. The reality is that this does not solve the problem; if we try to put in secure supply chain techniques, our adversaries will still be able to deliver that modified piece of hardware whether I made it in my factory in the U.S. with all U.S. citizens or whether I made it overseas in China.

So we need to think about the problem in a much different way, and we definitely need to work with governments on the threats so that we, the technology providers, can help figure out solutions to those threats. The U.S. government wants to do three things concerning cyber security:

- Buy the best technology available, made anywhere in the world at a commercial price—they don't want to pay a premium anymore if they can avoid it.
- Make sure that, no matter what happens in any part of the world, their access to that technology is still available. So we have to have resilience in the supply chain.
- Make sure that what they bought is actually what they think they bought and that no bad actor tampered with it.

There are a lot of good intentions about how we should manage the supply chain, but until we have a more specific technical conversation with the appropriate authorities who understand the threat, we in the industry cannot do the things we must do to fix the problem. We need to have government partners who will work with us on the specific threats so that we can work on solutions to help mitigate, reduce, and eliminate those threats.

THE EFFECTS OF LEGISLATION, CERTIFICATION, AND STANDARDS

Regarding legislation, regulation, and certification, we understand the intent of certifications and why everyone wants to create legislation, national cyber security strategies, and policies. Here again we need to work very closely with governments in order to develop those. The certification processes we carry out today for security products in particular are often longer than the life cycle of the products we are certifying. That guarantees that you will not use current state-of-the-art defenses in your network.

The serial nature of many certifications makes that problem even worse. In the U.S., a number of people in Congress have become very excited about the issue of cyber security because of the Google incident and other incidents that have

happened. They are well intended, but they are uneducated on the issue, and we are spending a lot of time and energy working with them to help them understand the unintended consequences of the controls and legislation they propose. In our case, if they implement some of the current drafts of legislation in the Senate, we would in effect be developing a Maginot Line for information security. We would be basically guaranteeing that we will be way behind the times, because we will have too many rules that will make it hard to keep up with the pace of technology and we will fall farther and farther behind the bad guys. So, again, we have to work very closely with governments to understand the need for these things, and the need to have things that you can trust, that you can put into your operations. But we have to go about doing that in the right way.

Finally, I would like to talk about standards. Standards are a very interesting concept and there are many standards out there. Open standards are very good because they allow things to interoperate. But I know a number of organizations that have thousands of standards, and if the standards are not enforced or cannot be enforced, they are merely suggestions. Then all of the time and effort, and the energy and dollars, that were put into developing them are all wasted; instead of having thousands of standards to allow the ultimate flexibility, you end up having thousands of standards that limit your flexibility. So you need to step back and take a look at a half dozen to a dozen high-level technical standards or decisions you can make that you can ruthlessly enforce to give you a chance.

Another problem we encounter when we deal both with legislation in Congress and with acquisition authorities in governments all over the world is that too often you tell us how to do things as opposed to what you want to do, which results in our giving you what you asked for instead of what you really want. So, again, we need a much better dialogue between government and industry as to what the problem is and how we can develop a solution for it.

Chapter 33

Will Computers Convince Us That We Are Superfluous?

Balancing Efficiency and Security in a World of Cyber Space,
Virtual Reality, and Artificial Intelligence

Professor Dr. Holger H. Mey
Vice President Advanced Concepts, CASSIDIAN¹

Human legs did not invent land and the ability to walk. Human eyes did not invent light and the ability to see. Nor did the human brain invent intelligence and the ability to think—it was the other way around. There was land and the possibility of moving across it. Hence, nature developed legs because legs provided an advantage in searching for food and escaping danger. There was light and the reflection of electromagnetic waves. Hence, nature developed eyes, a sensor and a computer that was able to generate pictures. This allowed the animal to see food and danger. There was intelligence and the possibility of thought, hence, nature developed an organ that was able to take advantage of intelligence in order to develop smarter hunting methods or better strategies to escape. Evolution suggests that there was a challenge and then there was a response. The fittest survived.

This raises the question of whether the material that composes our brain is necessarily the prerequisite for intelligence. Intelligence could be based on silicon, yet still be capable of doing the same things. Organisms certainly use intelligent methods, though that intelligence is not necessarily inherent. Termites build bridges but they never studied engineering; they do not have the brainpower. Nevertheless, termites do something that we consider very intelligent.

Humans invented machines stronger than human muscles. Humans invented computers—and computers might become smarter than the brains that invented them. This does not necessarily have to disturb us. The evolution of this process is very open. Nevertheless, we should start thinking about it. The implications could be profound. The film “Matrix” is but one example—though one hopes humans will have a more important purpose than simply delivering bio-electrical energy to the matrix.

THE EVOLUTION OF DECISION-MAKING SUPPORT SYSTEMS

At a somewhat smaller scale, one could look at how decision-making support systems evolve. Today’s navigation system is extremely simple and primitive; the navigation system of the future will be much better. Such a system will certainly have a 3-D map, complete virtual reality, a sensor and data fusing capability, and continuous Internet updates. Such a system will be very difficult to “beat.” Today you can beat your navigation system if you know the area and have a feeling for the traffic. Tomorrow, the system will indeed know best. We will tell our navigational assistant to take the fastest route, the nicest route, the most environmentally friendly route. After that, we will not want to interfere unless we want to pay the price—being late, finding no parking lot, running out of gas, having a car accident, or worse.

Something similar will happen with systems for missile defense. If the system tells the commanding general that a ballistic missile is approaching, he will not call a cabinet meeting. He will have only seconds to decide. Slowly but ineluctably, the “system” will take over more and more decisions. People trust their doctor; he knows (or does not know) certain things. A worldwide medical knowledge base will always know. It is only a matter of time before such a database becomes the

¹ EADS Defense & Security has now changed its name to CASSIDIAN.

source and foundation of a doctor's knowledge.

It may be five years or twenty, but eventually humans will not be able to outperform the decision-making of the decision-making system. Humans would simply not be capable of coming up with a better decision. Increasingly dependent on augmented decision-making, humans would probably not even notice or care that they no longer controlled their own destiny.

THE HUMAN ROLE IN A TECHNOLOGY-BASED SOCIETY

Four mega-technology trends are likely to have a particularly profound impact on the future: Nano technology, bio technology, robotics, and artificial intelligence. The way in which these trends complement each other will create even more possibilities. What does this mean for the human condition? Mankind must address this question now.

Geostrategic shifts, on the other hand, will continue in the same pattern as they have for millennia. Just as we understand the changes that came to the Roman Empire, we need to understand the future role of China, India, Brazil, Mexico, Indonesia and a host of other rising—and potentially falling—countries.

The true “wild cards” lie elsewhere. It is in the “unknown unknowns” that the most profound challenges to security will come. What about bio-engineered “designer children” or “designer warriors?” What about “artificial intelligence” deciding which soldiers' lives to risk, and which not? Are we willing to let machines make life-and-death decisions? Can we even prevent this from happening—while still building weapons designed to outsmart the opponent (and his automated weapons systems)?

Our societies have not yet developed the ability to discuss and assess the profound implications of these technological trends. Tomorrow's technologies require careful study today.

The military often defines cyber space as “just” a fifth operational environment. There is land, sea, air, space, and now there is cyber space. (One day the biosphere could also become an operational environment.) Whatever the domain, influencing the decisions of your opponent will remain a strategic challenge—as in the time of Clausewitz. As such, militaries, and societies in general, need to immerse themselves in the implications of cyber space—and the opportunities it offers for both the defense and the offense. Hacker armies are already on the march. Tomorrow's opponent will—despite our standard assumptions—be neither incompetent nor cooperative. As always, the opponent will strategize, seeking to leverage asymmetries to his advantage. Failing to understand the true potential and danger of the cyber domain will leave tomorrow's military fighting yesterday's wars.

STRIKING THE RIGHT BALANCE

A very fashionable trend has come to pervade both the military and the civilian world: Reduce cost, increase efficiency, make everything user-friendly and, of course, interoperable, standardized, and networked—and then outsource the rest. Doing these things may be useful, even necessary, but if there is no security at the core of all this efficiency, then there is a big problem.

We buy electronic parts from China; most of these parts are manipulated in some way. We must acknowledge this. Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) software might be cheap, but it is optimized for a civilian mass market. COTS is not optimized to work under the severe conditions of war—indeed it might have built-in vulnerabilities that only the opponent knows about. With everyone using the same software, everyone is vulnerable. Capturing millions of computers with a botnet to generate an E-mail attack is commonplace today. What will tomorrow bring?

Hundred of millions years ago, Mother Nature developed, among other things, two main strategies to protect increasingly complex—and vulnerable—organisms. One is mutation and the other is biodiversity. Where is biodiversity in today's computer world? We create norms, we standardize, we make everything interoperable—yet all of this could well make us more vulnerable. The complexity of the world we are creating requires a serious consideration of the dilemmas it will pose. Humans must find the right balance. Sometimes we will want systems that draw their strength from their openness, but are commensurately vulnerable to attack. Sometimes we will want systems that are stand-alone and thus protected from external intrusion. At the same time, such isolated systems are vulnerable to threats from inside. In contrast to open systems, they will not have developed the level of immunization to survive such an “infection.”

Everything may be new, but old strategic axioms still have their validity. We often forget about the importance of redundancy and reserve, about hardening and fail-safe procedures. Resilience is required. Tailor-made security solutions help little against dangers we cannot yet fully comprehend. What would a massive Electro-Magnetic Pulse do to the electronic systems upon which not only our military depends, but modern civilization itself? How hacker-resistant are the world's

networks and automated control systems? The threat from within is equally dangerous. Espionage, corruption, and disloyalty all pose a challenge to the hyper-networked world. The sleepers are in our systems—whether human or computer code. Moreover, it is one thing when a system breaks down and you know that it does not work. It is quite another thing when you do not even know that you are basing your decisions on incorrect information that someone else has put into your computer.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The search for efficiency goes on. The questions remain. A final question: Wanting to solve security problems efficiently might imply building super, high-tech, hyper-advanced warrior weapons. But what if we can only afford three of them? Such a system-of-three would lack resilience, to say the least. In conclusion, even in the cyber age, quantity is also a quality. Quality may be better than quantity, but as they say, only when available in big numbers.

Chapter 34

Cyber Security and the Spreading Challenges

Mr. Peter Flory¹

NATO Assistant Secretary General for Defense Investment

OPENING REMARKS

My colleagues on the panel have already said most of the really wise things. Since I am the last one to speak, I will not work from my prepared notes, but will speak more informally and try to fill in the holes that remain in the Swiss cheese. I hope the holes will add up to a coherent whole!

A couple of opening thoughts: First, as Ulrich Wolf pointed out, the cyber security panel used to be on the third day, at the bottom of the lineup. The fact that we have moved up the schedule highlights the emerging importance of this issue.

I also note the growth in the number of IT companies represented here today. This highlights the key role of information, which fuels everything in our society, not only warfare but of course peaceful activities as well. This panel has gone beyond a cyber-defense panel to become more of an information panel, focusing on the end game of information and decision superiority, which Bob Lentz mentioned earlier, not just the business of defending and ensuring the integrity of that information.

And, finally, I sometimes worry about how we are doing in the information domain. To paraphrase Dorothy in the *Wizard of Oz*, will the information revolution end up being a “good witch” or a “bad witch?” Will it work for us or against us? This is an important question, and with our opponents busily engaged in information warfare against us, a lot of what we are talking about here is designed to make sure that this contest comes out the right way.

THE GROUP OF EXPERTS REPORT AND THE FUTURE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

To put the role of information into a NATO context, a useful place to start is to look at the Group of Experts report that was put together by a group of distinguished thinkers led by Madeleine Albright. This report is available on the Internet. It should not be confused with the new NATO Strategic Concept, which has not yet been written. But it is an extremely important document that was put together with great transparency and an enormous amount of input from the private sector and from citizen groups. It does a pretty good job of framing the issues that the Alliance will try to capture in its Strategic Concept, and of identifying some of the considerations that the Alliance will look at when it grapples with these issues.

I would like to give you just a few data points on how the report views the future security environment:

- *Potentially Vulnerable Information Systems.* One of the Group of Experts’ findings (noted as factor no. 4) is the world’s increased reliance on potentially vulnerable information systems. This is not surprising to anyone at this workshop, but it was not something we thought about a lot in NATO until recently, and it is not something that, in the past, would necessarily have been picked as having a role in the Strategic Concept.
- *Implications of the Threats.* The Albright Report identified the following as the most probable threats—cyber attacks, ballistic missile attacks, and international terrorist attacks. In assessing what NATO should do about them in terms of developing capabilities, there is a section on C4ISR, NATO’s operational glue, that makes us interoperable, agile, and a cohesive whole, so again we see the role of information as a key enabler in our operations. The report also talks about what we need to do to defend our information, to defend our networks, to monitor them, and to train people to use

¹ At the time of this workshop, Mr. Peter Flory was NATO Assistant Secretary General for Defense Investment.

them.

- *The Concept of Awareness.* One thing that is missing in the Report, but that I hope gets some more emphasis by the time the final Strategic Concept and its supporting documents are written, is the need for greater awareness from NATO personnel, including senior people, of the cyber threat. With adversaries exploiting modern social engineering, we have learned how easy it is, even for smart and reasonably cyber-aware people to be tricked into making security mistakes that can take many hours and thousands of euros to correct. That is bad enough, but in other circumstances, giving up that kind of control to your network could lead you to much more catastrophic results.
- *Deterrence and Cyber Attack.* One of the key issues that the Alliance will have to discuss is the question of deterrence and cyber attack. Where does cyber attack fit in with respect to NATO's traditional Article 4 and 5 responsibilities? I will read quickly from the Group of Experts report because, although I think there are a number of ways in which you could phrase this, this is probably a pretty useful one:

"The next significant attack from the Alliance may well come down a fiber optic cable. Already cyber attacks against NATO systems occur frequently but most often below the threshold of political concern. However, the risk of a large-scale attack on NATO command and control systems or energy grids could readily warrant consultations under Article 4 and could possibly lead to collective defense measures under Article 5."

This is fairly straightforward, and there is nothing radically new there, but it is an important point that is enshrined in the Group of Experts report, and it is clearly something that the Alliance will think about as we put together the Strategic Concept. The only thing I would add is that when the Report says "an attack on NATO's command and control systems or energy grids" I read that to mean "an attack on nations' or a member-nation's command and control grids"—something along the lines of, or even more intense than, what happened to Estonia a few years ago.

So Article 5 will be an issue that many nations will want to discuss, as it was when we put together our cyber-defense policy a couple of years ago after the original Estonia attacks. Nations stepped somewhat cautiously around it at the time, and I think it is one of the main things that people who follow cyber defense are looking at to see how the Alliance will treat it in the Strategic Concept. A number of nations are extremely interested in this, and in my view, if it isn't addressed in the right way in the Strategic Concept, we will miss a serious opportunity.

CHANGING "HUMAN SOFTWARE"

Another "hole" in the Swiss cheese that didn't get discussed by the panel is the question of information sharing, at least at NATO. We have taken a couple of important steps here, notably, on a policy level, adopting the new NATO Information Management Policy (NIMP), which enshrines the responsibility to share information as a co-equal value along with the responsibility to protect information. This needed to be done and it is currently being implemented through various directives.

Ultimately, though, this is a question of what you might call "human software" as much as anything else: People who have been trained for years to protect information do not necessarily regard sharing information as something that is as important as protecting it, but we did make some important first steps here. In fact, when Allied Command Transformation recently hosted a conference on NATO network-enabled capability, the theme was information sharing. Specifically, it was how to change the human software so that people view information not just as something to be hoarded and taken out and admired in the dark of night, but something that is a resource that has to be shared, managed, and protected, of course, but also is subject to a cost-benefit analysis, as opposed to just being ritually and reflexively protected.

A few years ago, when Major General Ton van Loon (who is a workshop participant this year) came to talk to one of my committees about the difficulties of interoperability and sharing information in the face of myriad security restrictions, he said, "soldiers will always find a way to get things done." The good news today is that not only do soldiers find ways to get things done, but they do it within the rules, not by bending the rules, and they do not have to worry about getting zinged for a security violation.

Some of you may have read about the Afghan Mission Network, which is a revolutionary approach driven by General McChrystal in ISAF for bringing national and NATO networks together. The goal is to have, for the first time, the unity of command and the unity of effort that are the centerpieces of General McChrystal's counter-insurgency strategy. As a subset of this issue, the G2 in ISAF, Major General Mike Flynn, wrote a report on intelligence for counter-insurgency. In his report, he highlights how traditional intelligence, the traditional information that we collect, is a necessary but not a sufficient contribution to counter-insurgency warfare, and he stresses the importance of other kinds of information. But what General McChrystal is doing is going to create for the first time the shared situational awareness that we have not had

in the Alliance recently and not had in Afghanistan. It is going to be a critical enabler in his ability to conduct his mission.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In closing, I apologize again for the somewhat haphazard nature of my remarks, but I thought it was worth trying to hit some targets of opportunity in points that maybe hadn't been fully addressed.

I want to go back now to the philosophical but also practical question I raised earlier: Is the information revolution a good witch or a bad witch? How will it work out for NATO, say in our complex information challenge in Afghanistan? One area in which I think the Group of Experts might have injected more urgency is the broader question of public diplomacy—NATO's image and NATO's role. This is a factor both in terms of operations in Afghanistan, but also with respect to how NATO is viewed in member-countries, for example translating into support for defense budgets, or further afield, support for NATO membership in countries that are potentially interested in joining NATO.

One way to look at this question is a variation on the old economic law, Gresham's Law, which posits that bad money drives out good. Concerning information, I think that the question is, Does good information drive out bad information?

If you look at the question that was posed earlier with respect to Iran, or with respect to extremism generally, or regarding the United States, where various sorts of wild ideas get out on the Internet and obtain credibility for a period of time before ultimately getting debunked, the answer to the question is very important. So I think the first question we must ask is, Does good information drive out bad information? And the second is, If it does, how long does it take? Because before you get to the long term, you have got to get to the short term, and if the short term is going to be a disaster, knowing that theoretically you are ultimately going to win is not very helpful. I tend to be optimistic on this, but I want to throw these questions out there to see what other panelists from the audience think about them.

Chapter 35

Nuclear Disarmament and the 2010 Review Conference Of the Non-Proliferation Treaty

Ambassador Maged A. Abdelaziz
Egyptian Ambassador to the United Nations

When I received the invitation to attend this conference, I knew that this conference should not be missed, not only because of the high profile attendance that I see around the table but also because of the timing, coming just one week after the conclusion of the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference. I wanted to use the opportunity to discuss and explain the review conference's outcomes: If the review conference was a success, then I needed to explain why the conference was successful. If it was a failure, like the failure that occurred in 2005, then I needed to explain why it was a failure. But I am very happy and glad to share the view just expressed by Ambassador Gottwald that it was a very successful conference. However, a successful conference in the eyes of the NPT does not mean that everybody receives everything they want. Instead, a successful conference means that everybody is equally unhappy. So based on this kind of assumption, we had two major issues to deal with: Global issues and regional issues. I would like to touch on those two issues.

GLOBAL ISSUES

In terms of global issues, the NPT had to overcome difficulties stemming from the failure of the 2005 Review Conference as well as the increased lack of trust between the nuclear weapon states and their allies on the one hand and the non-nuclear weapon states on the other hand. In the past year or year and a half, some 62 countries applied to the IAEA to use power generators that are based on nuclear energy, raising concerns that this might constitute a proliferation threat. This situation has also touched on the issue of how strong individual countries' rights are to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The topic came up in certain proposals related to possible restrictions on the ability to withdraw from the NPT and on ways to prevent any country that has withdrawn from the Treaty from continuing to benefit from nuclear material or technology transferred prior to its withdrawal. As a result, the member states who have not yet ratified the Additional Protocol have been under increased pressure to do so, especially given that we do not have universality for the original protocol of the NPT. The 2010 Review Conference also deliberated the idea of establishing an international nuclear fuel bank, which would limit the rights of each participating country to enrich uranium themselves and also ensure that they use the uranium only for peaceful uses.

In terms of proliferation threats, we fully realize where the thin red line is and we understand the concerns. However, these concerns are not necessarily substantiated by facts. When we speak about facts, we have to speak about facts according to the verification system of the IAEA, not facts according to political information or facts according to speculation. Ambassador Gottwald mentioned earlier that President Kennedy predicted that something like 30 countries were going to become nuclear weapon possessors. It included a range of countries from Spain, Sweden, and Japan to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. However, the fact of the matter is that none of these countries became nuclear weapon states. Only North Korea, who withdrew from the NPT and still remains outside of the Treaty, acquired nuclear capabilities. In terms of the suspicions surrounding Iran, this is an issue that we have to deal with based on the verification system of the IAEA, not based on private knowledge or on intelligence reports that are not shared internationally and are not subject to any system of verification.

On the other hand, the Non-Aligned Movement and also the New Agenda Coalition, a diverse group comprised of Egypt, Sweden, Ireland, New Zealand, South Africa, Brazil and Mexico, are also heavily focused on promoting nuclear

disarmament. In particular, they strongly advocate concluding an obligation or treaty banning the possession of nuclear weapons and providing negative security assurances according to legally binding, comprehensive, and global pledges in a treaty-bound time framework for nuclear disarmament. They have proposed specific timelines for this to the 2010 Review Conference starting from 2015 to 2022. The Non-Aligned Movement has also been pushing for changes in military doctrines and particularly for nuclear posture reviews to be undertaken by a number of countries and by NATO. Of course, there are many participants here from NATO, and I am sure this is a subject of much discussion, particularly with the recent meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Tallinn in April. It provoked debate about the philosophy of NATO nuclear sharing issues as well as on issues of transparency, verifiability, reversibility, all of which are topics of concern to the Non-Aligned Movement.

REGIONAL ISSUES

The issue of universality was also an important aspect of the nuclear disarmament discussions. The goal of achieving universality has suffered a severe blow in the minds of the non-aligned countries that are parties to the NPT due to the India-America deal and the subsequent deals that have built upon it. The waiver given to India by the Nuclear Suppliers Group grants privileges to a non-NPT party that supersede the privileges enjoyed by any of the NPT states themselves. This raises a big question mark: Are we really trying to entice the three countries outside of the NPT to join the Treaty so that the Treaty becomes universal, everybody can accept more restrictions on withdrawal and we can better manage the verification system and ensure the establishment of facts etc.? Or do we want to solidify our agreements with the three countries that remain outside of the Treaty (India, Pakistan, and Israel)? These concerns are all the more worrisome given the rumored possibility of concluding another deal between Pakistan and China, There are indeed talks in progress in this direction.

This brings me to the topic of the Middle East. In the minds of the people living in the Middle East—in Cairo or in Amman or somewhere else—if they see that there is an India-America deal and later a Pakistan-China deal, then they will think that they might wake up one morning and find out that there is an Israel-X country deal. There was therefore a strong push at the Review Conference to deal with the issue of the Middle East and the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East calling for the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the region. Egypt has frequently played a significant role in the peace process, starting with President Sadat and followed by President Mubarak. It has also worked hard to help achieve universality of the Arab countries in the Middle East. In 1995 we put pressure on Oman and Djibouti to become parties to the NPT. Subsequently, all of the Arab countries that are members of the League of Arab States became parties to the Treaty.

However, although the Resolution on the Middle East was adopted in 1995, we have not yet seen any sign of implementation. This is why we had to push hard at the Review Conference to get the procedure started. In the process, we found that there was a high level of support for doing so among the NPT states. Working together, we reached an agreement to convene a conference in 2012 to determine how to best implement the Resolution. The choice of 2012 will enable the conference to run in parallel with the review cycle of the 2015 Review Conference: It will report to the 2012 Preparatory Committee of the 2015 Review Conference. We also expect that there will be two more conferences in 2013 and 2014, which will report to the 2013 and 2014 Preparatory Committees respectively.

The Review Conferences and Preparatory Committees are the only opportunities for the parties in the region to sit together and discuss issues related to the establishment of the Middle East nuclear-free zone. The basic assumption in dealing with these issues was based on the approach first adopted at the 2000 NPT Review Conference—that is, that Israel should be mentioned and called upon to join the NPT in the document arising from the Review Conference. We had a long discussion about this issue for about eight months leading up to this year's conference, with many parties involved. There were many different points of view, with one group saying that, "If you want this to be a successful conference, then do not mention Israel because it is going to offend Israelis and they will not come to the negotiating table." We responded, "Okay, fine. If you do not want us to mention Israel in the document, what are the guarantees you can provide that Israel is going to come to the table?" Our partners in these negotiations could not provide any kind of guarantees and even said, "We cannot guarantee anything. The only thing that we can do is work with you to help convene the conference." There was therefore no justification why should we drop the mention of Israel from the document, and we managed at the very last moment to reach this very important agreement.

Chapter 36

Toward a Common Approach to Nuclear Disarmament: Progress on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

Ambassador Klaus Peter Gottwald
Federal Government Commissioner for Disarmament and Arms Control of Germany

Just a few months ago, Ambassador Abdelaziz and I were in New York participating in the Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), a treaty which has been in existence for 40 years and which, according to the Federal Government's assessment, is a key pillar of international security. This treaty has been able to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, a threat which greatly concerned President Kennedy, for instance, in the 1960s when he shared his fear that there would be at the very minimum 20 to 30 nuclear weapon states by the present day, if not more. The New York treaty review conference in May 2010, which lasted for four weeks, was therefore a key event, in particular as the preceding review conference in 2005 had not been able to reach a consensus on the indeed quite difficult and rather diverse issues at hand.

As you know, the NPT is based on three pillars: We have the very central task of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, we have the call for nuclear disarmament vis-à-vis the nuclear weapon states, and we have as an essential component of the overall architecture the rights of all member states to peaceful nuclear technology. Today 189 countries, which represent almost the entirety of the international community, belong to this treaty. We have only very few so-called "outlier" countries that have not signed the treaty: These include India and Pakistan, who have acquired nuclear weapons and remain outside of the treaty. There is also one country in the Middle East, Israel—and I am sure you will be hearing more about it from Ambassador Abdelaziz—which is widely said to also hold nuclear weapons capabilities.

The task of the treaty review conference was to reaffirm the bargain of the NPT. As I mentioned earlier, it was particularly important because the last conference failed. This time it took place under very interesting circumstances, because for the past year and a half, the United States has been led by President Obama, who in a speech in Prague last year put his country's policy behind the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. This conference was therefore the first opportunity to look into ways and means to approach the first place and maybe even to reconfirm and agree on that target. Ambassador Abdelaziz has not only been the ambassador of a particularly important country in this respect [Egypt] but at the same time has faced the very challenging task of presiding over the Non-Aligned Movement, a group of 118 countries.

If the United Nations were working with a pure majority vote system, we might not have had to hold a conference; rather, we could just have held a vote on the first day and then we all could have gone home. But in the United Nations, we aspire to the principle of consensus. As you can imagine, finding consensus between 189 different countries is quite difficult, very challenging, particularly as there are indeed quite different points of view between the nuclear weapon states, between other Western countries with high nuclear technology achievements, and between countries that are extremely varied—I would have said, between countries as varied as Iran and Brazil, but these days, of course, the two have a certain degree of cooperation.

So, the task at hand was very difficult and when we came to the last and final week of the conference, we asked ourselves whether we would be able to achieve consensus in this specific phase. Both Egypt and Ambassador Abdelaziz, as the country's representative, played an important role in helping very decisively to bring us all together, both in terms of the task at hand and also physically, because we enjoyed the hospitality of the Egyptian Mission in New York. From the viewpoint of the Federal Government, the conference definitely has been a success in reaching a consensus over these very difficult issues, particularly because it has paved the way by identifying commitments which we all need to meet for the next review cycle in five years time, and beyond, in terms of a common approach to achieve nuclear disarmament, a common approach to

fulfill the commitments of the treaty. There is no more competent person around to address you on this issue than Ambassador Abdelaziz, to whom I now give the floor.

Chapter 37

Security in the Middle East: Views from Israel and Palestine

Professor Avishai Margalit

George F. Kennan Professor, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton

Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, Hebrew University of Jerusalem

When people in the Anglo-Saxon world start a speech, they start with a joke. When people in the Far East start a speech, they start with an apology. I come from the Middle East, where there are not many jokes and very few apologies, so let me start with something else—namely, with the nature of the conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians.

THE EVOLVING NATURE OF THE CONFLICT

There are two types of conflicts: One is a conflict between states; the other is inter-communal strife. The conflicts between Israel and Jordan, Israel and Syria, and Israel and Egypt are all conflicts between states. They are about territory, water, security, etc. The interests are well defined and they are either solved or dissolved, but the issue is clear and the conflict is clear. The conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians, however, is about everything. It is about the identity of the two communities; it is about who they are.

They dialectically understand each other by the conflict and it is a bitter conflict. The nature of the conflict is currently undergoing a transformation, from a predominantly ethnic national conflict into a more religious conflict; Religious conflict is more absolutist. The stakes are higher, the day of payment is postponed. The political scale and the range are very different. While secular national conflicts usually last five or ten years at most, religious conflicts have a very different nature. In the case of the Crusades, for example, it took us 200 years to get rid of the crusaders.

OBSTACLES TO A PEACEFUL SOLUTION

Both the Israeli and the Palestinian communities are increasingly viewing the conflict as a type of religious warfare, especially with Hamas in Gaza. The conflict is therefore becoming more and more intractable. Ambassador Primor very clearly explained the paradox that we all face: It is a conflict where the solution is clear-cut. Put in a nutshell, the solution is 48 for 67. That is, the international community will recognize Israel at its 1948 borders if Israel gives up and renounces what it gained in the 1967 war. That is basically the formula. It is clear to all, not just to the educated classes and the political classes; it is practically understood by all. There is a majority in both communities including by all indications in Gaza that can live with this solution. They will not advocate it; they are not happy with it, but they can live with it grudgingly. And when it comes to compromises, it is what we can live with that is important. So how come we have not reached a solution?

One reason is, as Ambassador Primor discussed, fear: There is the feeling that the Oslo Accords, which were advocated by the left, failed us and then the evacuation of Gaza, which was advocated by Sharon, failed us again. Therefore there is no solution and we are stuck. This is definitely part of the story. However, it is not the only problem. I believe that about 70% of the people in each community can live with the solution I just described, but 30%, and especially the 30% who are in power, do not always agree. In both communities, there is a much stronger ideological element among the power elite than among the people. So the issue is partly because of the nature of the conflict and the understanding that it is about everything.

THE POLITICAL SITUATION AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR PEACE

Another element is the change in the geopolitical situation. In the past, the other main powers in the region were Egypt, with its population and culture, and Saudi Arabia, with its strong economy. The Americans, with their Pax Americana, always sought to combine all three key attributes—security/military power for Israel, population and culture for Egypt and a strong economy for Saudi Arabia. However, there is currently a shift underway from Egypt and Saudi Arabia to Iran and Turkey as the main power brokers in the region. These are Muslim countries in the outer ring, and this is part of a shift in the balance of political Islam and is a serious issue.

Most people, I think, gave up on the idea of getting rid of Israel, but there is now a new move to try to do so. One way of sidelining Israel is by delegitimizing its friends, making it a pariah state and equating it with outlaws or pirates. This does not help. Now that there is the possibility of a nuclear Iran, the fear should be of a different nature; it is not that the Iranians really want to use a nuclear weapon or hand it over to terrorists. The issue is that if both Israel and Iran face each other with such intense mistrust, there will be no hotline between the two; thus, they can easily misinterpret the other's intentions and war could break out by sheer misunderstanding. This is the most likely scenario and is the real danger.

Can Europe do something about this? Most people, as Ambassador Primor rightly pointed out, do not believe that the Israelis and the Palestinians can extricate themselves from the conflict. There is no outside power to force them to. There were high expectations placed on Obama from both sides, but I am not sure that the Americans are going to take on this role. In terms of what Europe can offer Israel, I think that the possibility of joining NATO, especially with its Article 5 clause, as well as joining the Common Market—I am not talking about the EU but the Common Market—in exchange for withdrawing from the territories is something that could greatly help the inner debate within Israel. In this sense Europeans for the first time could be major Western players in the conflict because they really have something to offer, at least to the Israelis. I am sure that there is something else that could be offered to the Palestinians—It is for the Palestinians to say what this might be.

Chapter 38

Security as the Key to Peace in the Middle East

Ambassador Avi Primor
President of the Israel Council on Foreign Relations (ICFR)

OPENING REMARKS

The problem concerning the boats that wished to break through the blockade of the Gaza Strip is part of the larger problem of the Gaza Strip itself. That problem is part of the Palestinian problem, which is at the center of all problems in the Middle East. Although we must address the boat problem as part of the problems preventing peace between Israel and its neighbors, we also must address the problem of Israel and Syria and indeed that of Israel and the Arab world.

In January 2002, a peace plan was published by Saudi Arabia. This plan was published again in January 2007 and accepted as part of the plan of the Arab League.

Today, however, negotiations are taking place again, but what kind of negotiations are they? They are proximity talks, like the talks between Israel and Syria that were held two years ago under Turkish auspices in Turkey. These talks are supposedly preparatory talks to enable Israel and the Palestinian Authority to negotiate directly, but needing to have preliminary talks between Israelis and Palestinians to prepare for direct negotiations is grotesque and ridiculous. We have been negotiating with the Palestinians directly for more than 15 years; negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians actually took place constantly since the Oslo Agreements of 1993.

If we want to be serious, we have to admit that there is only little to negotiate. Everything is known, and all the details on all sides have been worked out. If you look at not only the negotiations or their results but at all the peace propositions and all the plans that have been published since the so-called Clinton Parameter of December 2000, you can see that all of them, including the American plans, the Israeli plans, the European plans, and the Palestinian plans, are the same. They have the same principles, the same ideas, and the same components.

THE ELEMENTS THAT HAVE PREVENTED PEACE

The issue, then, is not to determine what a peace plan should look like. We know what it should look like. The issue is, why do we not implement a peace plan? Is it because the former Israeli government of Ehud Olmert did not want it, or because the public does not want it? Most people would answer yes to both questions, and conclude that peace is not possible. However, I say that peace is possible, and, furthermore, that the populations of the region have never been as ready for peace as they are now.

The basic elements that have prevented not only peace but peace negotiations, the unwillingness to accept the very existence of the State of Israel and the belief that the elimination of Israel is possible, were once the elementary position of the Arab and the Palestinian side. As long as Arabs and Palestinians believed that they could get Israel out of the region, there was no reason to negotiate peace with it. Temporary arrangements such as cease-fires could be negotiated, but not real peace.

Then, in 1967, the Palestinian territories were conquered by Israel in the Six-Day War. Once this occurred, the majority of the Israeli people believed that Israel should never give these territories up, that they are part of Israeli history and heritage and for some they are even a God-given promise. If Israelis are not willing to give the territories back, how can there be a Palestinian state? The problem has been that there was a no-starter for negotiations, first on the Arab side and later also on the Israeli side.

A NEW OUTLOOK

Now, however, I believe that the basic elements preventing peace, although they have not disappeared, have changed. The majority of the Arab population and the majority of the Palestinian population have concluded that although they would have been very glad to have a Middle East without the State of Israel, the State of Israel is a fact that they have to live with. Just as well, the majority of Israelis today knows that Israel cannot keep the occupied Palestinian territories: Some think that Israel simply is not capable of keeping them, others think that keeping them would be immoral, and yet others say that keeping them would be a demographic danger for the future of the country. Whatever their reasons, the majority of Israelis today are ready or even wish to separate from the Palestinian territories and put an end to the occupation and to the settlements. We must ask again, then, why do we not implement a peace plan?

THE NEED FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

We do not implement a peace plan because the majority of Israelis believe that the one and only issue that truly interests them, which is the issue of security, has not been resolved in any of the peace propositions that have been published. When we negotiated with Egypt and with Jordan, we knew that those partners, if willing, were capable of guaranteeing us security. We do not think that our Palestinian partner, although he is willing, is capable of guaranteeing us security. We fear that if we leave the West Bank under the present conditions, even within the framework of a peace agreement, that the situation in the West Bank will develop as it did in the evacuated Gaza Strip. If we do not find a solution that convinces Israelis that leaving the West Bank will guarantee their security, then there will be no public opinion to support or put pressure on the Israeli government to accept a peace agreement. I think that the solution only can come from the international community.

Chapter 39

Solving the Palestinian Question: Ending the Blockade of Gaza Is a First Priority

Mr. Ilan Halevi
Political Counselor, General Delegation of Palestine to Germany

OPENING REMARKS

It is obvious for us that for global security, which addresses the risks and threats that weigh on international society, (even if taken in the most narrow political military sense without including climate change, HIV, and other sorts of threats), military action or the deployment of military force is like surgery: It is needed when medicine has failed. We think that conflict resolution and conflict prevention should be the focus, because they are the key to real security. This does not mean that we do not have to defend liberties and states and the security of our own citizens, but this cannot be the only strategic thinking because it is defensive and does not try to solve the issue.

What we see is that regional conflicts, when they go unsolved, are a major factor of global insecurity. Look at the nuclear competition between India and Pakistan and the role that the Kashmir issue has played to feed this rivalry throughout the years. We could say the same about Israel's nuclear unknown or the ambiguous potential and ambition on the part of other states in the area, such as Iran, which has a nuclear program. There is great suspicion in many parts of the world, fed by conflict and mutual threats, that there are military back-thoughts behind this nuclear program, even though Iran claims it is a peaceful, civilian program. In our area we are not only threatened with big nuclear threats, but also continually face the devastating effects of small semi-conventional weapons like cluster bombs, phosphorous bombs, and all sorts of unidentified weapons whose use is a source of polemic; for example, when depleted uranium is used, at what level of depletion does it become innocuous? This is a question that we would like to raise.

SOLVING THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION

Contrary to the doctrine that led American policy on this issue under the two Bush tenures, the present U.S. administration has recognized the centrality of the Palestinian question regarding security and stability in the entire area. It is obvious that the non-solution of the Palestinian problem is one of the main factors of the tension and conflict in the area, and that it has served as an alibi and a pretext for all sorts of forces to promote interests that have nothing to do with the security of Israel nor with the freedom and rights of the Palestinian people. There is great awareness that without solving the Palestinian issue, it would be very hard to speak about the greater Middle East or about the stabilization or democratization of the area as a whole. I agree with Ambassador Primor that everything is known in terms of what the solution is. The solution is an independent Palestinian state in the territories occupied since 1967 and peaceful coexistence between the two states.

I do not agree completely with the idea that the root of the non-implementation of this solution is the fear of Israeli public opinion that security for Israel and for Israelis will not result from such a peace agreement. The settlers' lobby and settlement ideology have weight—the settlers are a minority, but they are a very vocal and powerful minority—and we see how they blackmail Israeli political life in general, creating an unfortunate illusion of force and power in Israeli society that is also an obstacle.

MOVING AWAY FROM CONFLICT

From the Palestinian point of view, we are determined to continue fighting for a peaceful solution on the basis of the coexistence of two states. We cannot afford the radical pessimism of those who say peace is no longer possible, it will never happen—we cannot afford it. This would be abdicating our responsibility to our people. We have to try and do whatever we can to diminish the suffering and move away from the conflict. The procedures exist to do so. It is true that it is paradoxical that we go back with regret to indirect talks after 17 years of direct negotiations, but this is due to the deterioration of the situation on all fronts and also the refusal of the present Israeli government to accept the terms of reference of any negotiation contained in the U.S. letter of invitation to the Madrid conference and all the subsequent agreements signed in Annapolis and so on. So I personally tend to agree that, without decisive international interference in the conflict, we will not move toward a solution in the short run.

It is obvious that if we are left to the dynamics so far, to confrontation on the ground, we will not move with any speed. But this has never been a conflict only between Israelis and Palestinians. This has always been a conflict enshrined in a regional context and framed by global considerations—there used to be a Cold War and now there is discourse that has stopped being official state doctrine in the U.S. with the new administration but remains discourse on the war of civilizations, discourse decivilizing the Islamic civilization because of the terrorist groups that claim Islam as a reference. We can see that we not only fight Israelis and Palestinians in our area to move away from conflict into real negotiations but we must also be very aware of the international and ideological context that allows this conflict to continue.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

I would say that the first priority is to end the blockade of Gaza, which feeds hatred and bitterness. It is inefficient and it is politically counter-productive. Most of the EU governments that engaged in this blockade several years ago now acknowledge that it was counter-productive all the way. Of course, the key is the end of occupation and the establishment of a Palestinian state.

I would like to tell Ambassador Primor that if the Palestinian Authority was not constantly humiliated and weakened by Israeli government policies it would have greater authority to ensure security, and that once we have a state we will have instruments to ensure security. I would also like to say that we have constantly been pleading for the stationing of international forces, be they U.N. forces or NATO forces. Recently we reiterated our plea to NATO to play a role in monitoring agreements, keeping the border, and ensuring Israeli security in case there are still some doubts as to our capacity to do so.

Chapter 40

Dealing with Crises in Afghanistan And Pakistan: Military Perspectives

General Karl-Heinz Lather¹

Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE)

I will start with a short outline and a reminder that NATO Operations are a lot more than just Afghanistan. There is KFOR, and there are operations at the Horn of Africa and the counter-piracy effort together with the European Union and Coalition Maritime Force. We are still committed in Bosnia Herzegovina supporting the European Union there and in KFOR, of course. We are with a training mission in Iraq which, from a strategic perspective, is a small investment with a rather huge outcome, so it is very efficient. And inside NATO, we are doing air policing over Iceland, the Balkans—our new member states there, and the Baltic States.

OUR MISSION IN AFGHANISTAN

It is important to reiterate that we are there to assist the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. When you read the media, you sometimes get the impression that we are there to govern Afghanistan, but that is not what we are doing. We are assisting the Afghan government in exercising and extending its authority and influence across the country in order to pave the way for reconstruction and a more effective and efficient governance within the country. We do that predominantly through a United Nations mandate for this International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and we are in Afghanistan at the invitation of the Afghan government.

Since the beginning of our involvement in 2003 almost eight years ago, we have expanded the reach of our mission which was originally limited to Kabul. It now covers the whole territory of Afghanistan and the number of ISAF troops which has grown from an initial 5,000 to more than 100,000. ISAF not only includes all the NATO member nations but, altogether, 46 nations are active there under that framework. The ISAF mission is to conduct military operations in an assigned area of operations, which is the Afghan state, assisting the government of the Islamic Republic there. Its goal is to establish and maintain a safe and secure environment with full engagement with the Afghan national security forces, i.e., the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the various sorts of police in Afghanistan. The purpose then is for the government's authority and influence to be extended in order to facilitate the reconstruction of the country and enable the government to exercise sovereignty throughout the country on the various levels.

I believe that there is one major change in the strategy and tactics that we are applying—mostly since General McCrystal took command there—in the sense that the ISAF mission is now what we call a population-centric mission. We call it COIN, Counterinsurgency, which is not a purely military term but encompasses all fields of what we are doing. What is that? I think that the focus of COMISAF's campaign strategy, which is fully endorsed by both NATO and non-NATO contributing nations, is centered upon protecting the population. The efforts are prioritized to high-density population areas where the insurgent groups operate primarily with disaffected Pashtun populations. Special attention is given to reducing civilian casualties. Although we are not 100% successful, we are really making an effort there and are much better than

¹ At the time of this workshop, General Karl-Heinz Lather was Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE).

we used to be. So COMISAF has improved and adapted its tactical directives with respect to reducing civilian casualties.

We certainly follow the overall concept of a comprehensive approach. There is no security without development and there is no development without security. This balance, which is very challenging to achieve, underlies the campaign. ISAF is making efforts to enable the Afghan National Security Forces and we continue to accelerate and expand indigenous security forces, their capabilities and their capacities. The new NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan (NTM-A), draws together NATO forces and national efforts to train the Afghan police and army in order to increase overall coherence and effectiveness. It is our intent to maintain the present momentum with the ANA while adding focus to the development of the Afghan National Police. Partnering is a buzz word which is regarded as a key to success and it is done at every echelon. So we bring our NATO forces and the police and join them up with the ANA and ANP and in that way achieve a wider presence throughout the country.

In coordination with the international community and the many NGOs there, we strive to support socio-economic development by creating security situations that can provide the space for community-based development opportunities. We believe that these efforts will help us gain the active support of the population and we are focusing our influence and activities in densely-populated areas. Within a year, we hope to have a situation where we can combine those population centers, have them secured, and grossly diminish the influence of the insurgents or even fully disturb it. This would create a secure linkage throughout the country and across the regions. So by early next year we would have national and local governance improved. In key population centers we would have full security or at least security that is very much in hand, interconnected security between those centers that could not be broken by insurgents, assured freedom of movement, major infrastructure projects and a sustainable economic corridor, which is the basis for the future development of the country.

As to ISAF, from a NATO perspective, we have responsibilities across the country. There is one area that requires special mention, though, which is the southwest, close to the Iranian border. We will be standing up a further sub-regional command there, and we call it Southwest. It will mainly cover the province of Nimroz and the province of Helmand whereas the Regional Command South will cover Day Kundi, Uruzgan and Kandahar. Because of the sheer size of the forces (the force flow and the force increase), there is a need for an additional command and that will become effective in the month of July.

Another important point concerns the growth of the ANSF, the Afghan National Security Force. The Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) has agreed to a goal of approximately 300,000 which should be achieved by the end of October 2011. I am happy to report that we are fully on track. The support which we can render through what our nations give us as trainers for the police and the ANA and what the Afghans can generate in terms of recruiting works nicely together. However, one should remember that the McCrystal report from last year talked about 400,000. That level has not been agreed to, neither nationally nor internationally. Nonetheless, it indicates that, according to the assessment of General McCrystal and his studies which were reported to the Secretary General of the Alliance and his President last year, there was an appetite and an aspiration to have the Afghan security forces at the 400,000 level in order to make it possible for them to control the country. Continuing and sustaining such a level would be a heavy burden on us as an Alliance and on non-NATO troops. It would not be easy. It is not easy now, and it would be even more difficult if this level were agreed to in the future. But, apart from the efforts on reconstruction, it is probably one of the strongest arguments as to what the Afghans would have to do in order to control their country by themselves. It is the direction in which the Afghans would need to go.

PAKISTAN

As to Pakistan, since 2008 the Pakistan military and the Pakistan Friendship Corps—the federal paramilitary force, have been conducting multiple and nearly simultaneous operations in the federally administered tribal areas (FATA) and in the Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa in order to curb cross-border infiltration and clear the area of militants. The PakMil and the Friendship Corps operations have clearly affected insurgency dynamics on both sides of the border. Pakistan-based militants were forced to relocate to other areas and districts within the FATA and within the KPK. Some have also fled over the border into Afghanistan. The continued pressure from the PakMil likely contributed to fewer relocation options for militants and disrupted militant logistics networks. However, the possibility for Afghan insurgents to continue to find sanctuary in Afghanistan tribal areas remains. The main challenge for PakMil is the long-term stabilization of cleared areas in terms of both security and infrastructures. So this is very similar to what we are trying to do in Afghanistan.

Operations in Afghanistan are undeniably shaped by PakMil. As a result of operations into Pakistani tribal areas, increased operational coordination and cooperation was recently observed on both sides of the border under the umbrella of what we call the Tripartite Commission framework—i.e., the Chief of Defense of Afghanistan, the Chief of Defense

of Pakistan, and COMISAF, who routinely meet on various levels. This tripartite commission serves as a joint forum on military and security issues between representatives of the ANA, the PakMil and us, ISAF. A joint Afghan/ISAF/Pakistani intelligence center was opened in Kabul in 2007 and we exchanged intelligence there. Border coordination centers have been created on the Afghan/Pakistan border to facilitate the sharing of information and to some extent the coordination of operations between the ANA, ISAF, and the Pakistan Forces active in that area. One needs to know, however, that ISAF as such has no mandate to operate across the internationally recognized border into Pakistan, so whenever something is happening there which seems to be military, ISAF is not involved.

WHERE ARE WE?

I believe that the aim is to regain the initiative. There is a strong political appetite to begin with the transition process inside Afghanistan this year or early next year. Therefore, I would think that the Heads of State and Government meeting, where the NATO Strategic Concept will be discussed, will either make decisions or endorse movements in that direction. Within NATO we are currently discussing this process with the Afghans and other stakeholders. There is an ongoing evaluation process inside Afghanistan as to the conditions for the transition, when they would be given, and what the benchmarks would be for that. That is a coordinated process between the COMISAF, the Secretary General's senior representative in Afghanistan, the government of Afghanistan and certainly UNAMA and the EU. Before we can start on the military side, however, we need the NAC's approval, which has not been given yet. So there is still a political debate and a political decision to be made. We believe that the regional approach is essential for success and here the focus is certainly on Pakistan.

Chapter 41

An Allied Command Transformation Perspective on the Situation In Afghanistan and Pakistan

Admiral Luciano Zappata¹
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Transformation

Let me start by saying that I will talk about the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan from my perspective as Deputy SACT. Allied Command Transformation is responsible for leading military transformation in NATO and it is from this angle that I will try to provide my view of the open issues and what we can do to address them.

THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT IN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN

We all know the situation and the strategic context in which we operate. NATO's mission in Afghanistan is of utmost importance. Allies and partners are contributing not only from the military standpoint, but also in support of economic and political development of the country. The Alliance is committed to the creation of a stable Afghanistan and fostering peaceful reconstruction and development. It is working to achieve this strategic objective. With respect to Pakistan, the military-to-military cooperation is growing and is a key element of our relations, not just for its importance with regards to the situation in Afghanistan. The invitation of Pakistani officers to the NATO Defence College and NATO School activities is also a very positive signal in the right direction. In fact, in the near future, further opportunities for cooperation related to training requirements for the military will be discussed with Pakistan.

ACHIEVING THE RIGHT BALANCE BETWEEN REACTION AND ANTICIPATION

My view is that the new NATO Strategic Concept should include some of the principles and lessons learned that have been derived from the experience gained in the field. From a transformational perspective, we know that the security environment is evolving very quickly. We can face the consequent challenges with two different approaches that are not exclusive, but rather complementary to each other.

The "reaction" process. The first approach is about "reacting" to external inputs. Much of the progress made towards military transformation has been driven by operations conducted over the past years and still ongoing. During this period we have learned a lot from our mistakes, but these crucial lessons learned have not always been properly implemented. It is vital that the lessons learned process helps to deliver the best advice to nations and forces in a flexible and expeditious manner. In addition, training has to be tailored to operational needs and adapted quickly to incorporate emerging requirements coming from the field.

The importance of "anticipation." The second approach is about "anticipation," or, in other words, working to transform ourselves in order to be ready for the next crisis. A lot can be done from the capability perspective through innovation and experimentation. In this regard, Modeling and Simulation (M&S) is a powerful tool, especially from the conceptual standpoint. Studies like the Multiple Futures Project that ACT completed last year can help us develop the strategic assessment needed to derive the security and military implications.

In the current operational environment the process of adaptation and reaction has prevailed, but let me stress that we

¹At the time of this workshop, Admiral Luciano Zappata was Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Transformation.

need to find a proper balance between the ability to react in the field and to anticipate challenges in the long term. This trade-off is fundamental. Focusing exclusively on the short-term can leave the initiative to the enemy, who can exploit our weaknesses and expose us to surprises. At the same time, relying only on a long term focus would not be enough. Anticipation is not an easy task as the future is rather unpredictable. Developing capabilities, establishing policies and doctrines and setting up training and education processes requires a very long time. It may happen that the right instrument is not available when you need it. This is why the two processes of reaction and anticipation, which are both at the heart of transformation, have to coexist and be balanced.

WHAT ARE THE CAPABILITIES THAT NATO MUST DEVELOP?

There are a number of challenges that we need to face in this regard. In particular, there is a requirement for the Alliance to have the ability to:

- deploy forces tailored to specific and sustained operations at a distance
- be effective in our strategic communications
- work under unified chains of command
- create a comprehensive civil-military approach that enables the local authorities to win their populations' hearts
- further develop the relationships with partner and non-partner nations
- improve interoperability among coalition forces that are so different in number, equipment, training, culture and language
- improve the capability development, fielding in a timely way the capabilities needed by warfighters, which is often "now"
- Increase the interaction with the international organizations, such as the UN and others.

At ACT we are working on these aspects in order to contribute to the NATO and partners efforts.

THE COLLABORATION WITH INDUSTRY

Our efforts have privileged the relationship with the nations, who develop the capabilities and provide the forces, and industry, a key player and partner in both aspects of transformation that I discussed earlier.

I will describe with two examples how the relationship and the collaboration with industry is important. In order to contribute to stabilization and reconstruction efforts, a comprehensive approach that allows a coordinated effort between military and civil instruments is important, especially in the planning and conduct of operations. For instance, we can contribute to the process of outsourcing requirements to industry or improving interoperability. In this regard, the initiative of building a network of Battle Labs (from governmental facilities or industry) can help de-risk solutions accelerating the fielding of the right capabilities. This is an excellent model where industry and military actors work together to improve interoperability within an agreed collaborative framework.

Again in this area, another interesting initiative is the Civil-Military Fusion Centre (CFC), mentioned by Tim Bloechl from Microsoft, an organization focused on improving civil-military interaction, facilitating information sharing and enhancing situational awareness through a web portal, the Civil-Military Overview. The products are generated from fused information from governmental organizations, NGOs, international organizations, academic institutions, media sources and military organizations. In the future, we aim at transforming the CFC into a consortium of civil-military organizations open to various potential partners.

ACT's OTHER AREAS OF CONTRIBUTION

Moving now to other areas of work, through our Joint Analysis Lessons Learned Center we are supporting ISAF and Ambassador Sedwill, NATO's Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan, by producing a Lessons Learned report. This will focus on the adequacy of existing planning frameworks, integration of civilian expertise, and modalities of NATO interaction with other actors. We are working on ISAF Command and Control arrangements as well.

ACT also provides support in the areas of pre-deployment training, experimentation, policy, capability development, logistics and lessons learned.

In addition, we contribute to the efforts to establish the Afghan Mission Network aimed at improving the effective communication across Afghanistan and sharing theatre related information and intelligence. This will significantly improve

interoperability and situational awareness.

Following the Defense Ministers' informal meeting in Bratislava of October 2009, ACT has been leading the efforts to develop a counter-IED Action Plan and established a Capability Monitor. We are also leading the Counter-IED (C-IED) Task Force and focusing on policy and training standards.

With regard to the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan (NTM-A), although ACT has no responsibility, we contribute with our personnel and are ready to do more if required.

Finally, in the area of education and training, ACT through the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) and the Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC) provide pre-deployment training to Key Leaders, ISAF HQ and Joint Command, Regional Commands, Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams, PRTs, and Police Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams. We work also within the Counter Insurgency (COIN) Task Force to provide doctrine, training standards and capabilities and training support to the Afghan National Security Forces.

I have concluded my short introduction and I look forward to the upcoming discussions.

Chapter 42

Dealing with Crises in Afghanistan and Pakistan: Military Perspectives

Lieutenant General P.K. Singh, PVSM, AVSM (ret)
Director, United Service Institution of India

OPENING REMARKS

What are my qualifications for talking about Afghanistan and Pakistan? I have been dealing with Afghanistan in the Indian Army since the mid-1990s and with Pakistan since birth, definitely since I joined the army in 1967. So I have been looking at Pakistan closely for the last 43 years. What I am going to talk about now is based more on the seminars, workshops, and conferences that I have attended on Afghanistan internationally and, more importantly, the ones I conducted at the United Service Institution (USI) in Delhi in 2009, to which we invited not just Afghans in large numbers but delegates from Pakistan, Iran, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, China, Russia, the U.S., the EU, ICRC, and, of course, India. This is the regional approach that General Lather was alluding to. You want to hear the views of others too.

In addition to the involvement I just mentioned, I also participate in regular dialogue with India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, track-two regular dialogue that is ongoing. I also attended a three-day workshop between Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India that was hosted by India at Shimla. So the inputs I am going to share with you are based more on what the participants of these discussions and other conferences may want to convey to us rather than just on what I look at from an Indian point of view. Even when I talk about Pakistani military operations, I will do so as a professional and look at them dispassionately, and not make suggestions that are based on Indian views.

AFGHANISTAN

As far as Afghanistan is concerned, we always need to keep some issues in mind, and these were brought up in various seminars and conferences and by Afghan friends and interlocutors who have been asking these questions over and over again.

First, many people believe that the Taliban were never defeated in 2001. They simply made a transition from the seat of power to that of a powerful insurgency. They do not consider themselves as defeated: They did not sign a surrender agreement and they were not decimated. This needs to be remembered.

Second, all of us involved in Afghanistan need to understand the military objectives of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Afghans talk of the U.S. and of NATO, and when you ask them why they talk about them separately, they always feel that even if certain elements of NATO or other contributing nations withdraw, the Americans may stay there longer. The Afghan perception is that, even if others leave, chances are that the U.S. will remain. So they talk of the U.S. a little differently than they talk about ISAF. If what they say is true, we should look at the military objectives of this military force there, because if we do not understand their objectives and we want to be a part of the solution, we may go wrong, since there is also a military campaign going on in Afghanistan. It is not just development, not economics, not anything else; we cannot detach development from security or security from development.

What is the perceived military aim of ISAF? The feeling is that it is to reduce the Taliban's oppression capability to a point at which they are no longer a serious threat or challenge—not to the U.S. or to ISAF, but to the Afghans if they are left on their own. In case of a withdrawal, what will be the Taliban's capacity to challenge the Afghan National Forces? The feeling is that ISAF's aim is to decimate Al-Qaeda. But Al-Qaeda and the Taliban are two different entities requiring two

different operations and two different strategies to address them.

What do the Taliban aspire to? A simple answer is that they aspire to come back to power. The Taliban have never given up that hope. Can they come back to power through a military victory against the forces that are operating in Afghanistan? Definitely not. They can never do it militarily. They cannot get back to power by defeating the U.S. and ISAF militarily. They do not stand a chance.

So how will the Taliban get back to power? The feeling is that they will get back to power through the back door, initially by being part of a governing council or governing system. But even if they are in government or in the ruling coalition, they will not stop hitting militarily at ISAF. So if we believe that because there is a signed agreement or a Peace Jirga that the military part of the Taliban will stop fighting ISAF, the answer is they will not. We will have to be prepared to talk and fight at the same time with this group called the Taliban.

The linkages between those who join the government and those who fight need to be understood. We tend to forget that all of these organizations, even in my country, have a political element and a military element. To think that they are divorced may be a mistake. They are never really going to be divorced. They talk to each other and there is an amount of coordination in their strategy.

What does reconciliation with the Taliban mean? This is an important question that seems to cause a great deal of misunderstanding and differences of opinion. Here I would like to say that a lot of people think that India opposes talking to the Taliban. But how can we oppose? We have talked to all the insurgent groups in India ourselves. But when we talk, we lay down the conditions: Who will be allowed to reconcile? Will it be somebody who agrees to certain frameworks, certain decisions, such as not picking up weapons against the state? There will be certain parameters that the Taliban will have to accept in order to be part of the system now. That needs to be understood. In other words, we will talk from a position of strength.

Will this reconciliation follow a politico-military success or will it be a substitute for defeating the Taliban through counter-insurgency operations (COIN)? The answer is that it will be a mix. In case of a military success, there will be no need to ask the Taliban for talks, because they will come to the table on their own. But if they have some success, there will be resistance, and we will have to get them to the table. This is how insurgencies carry on—I have some experience fighting insurgency in my country. You fight with them and you are sure that there is no talk; then comes a stage when you start having talks and the talks progressively get enlarged but the fighting carries on. Then comes the stage when the agreement is signed and the fighting stops or starts tapering. There will not be a clinical on/off button. So we have to understand this a little better.

Key Issues for Partners

Next, we need to know who has vital interests in Afghanistan, since there are many who do aside from Afghans themselves. It is also important to know who has the means to pressure, bargain, and guarantee an agreement on key issues. It is even more important to know what these key issues are. The need for defining these issues and finding out who is committed to them will lead us to those who can be our partners in Afghanistan. I cannot be a partner if I do not understand the goals or if I oppose the goals that have been commonly laid out. And we are not really laying out what those goals are, who actually subscribes to those goals, and therefore who should be our partners in bringing about peace in Afghanistan.

The key issues are:

- The definite commitment to building an effective, democratic, and secular Afghanistan. You cannot be a partner if you challenge this very basic premise
- Supporting the battle against Al-Qaeda, international terrorism, and global terrorism
- Preventing the return of the Taliban to power by the use of the gun—they cannot come back to power by defeating those who are fighting them and there cannot be a military victory by the Taliban
- Not allowing the spread of Taliban ideology, drugs, and narcotics out of Afghanistan
- Being committed to the fact that sustained economic development and reconstruction in Afghanistan is one of the goals.

We need to make sure that countries that become our partners in Afghanistan subscribe to all of these common goals.

How will we know that the U.S. and NATO or ISAF are going to leave? It will be when you start seeing the increase of other countries' activities to safeguard their own national presence in Afghanistan. And what will happen in Afghanistan if we stabilize the country but do not stabilize the western borders of Pakistan? How safe or secure will Afghanistan be? Afghans feel that they will not be secure inside their country if there is no security on Pakistan's western borders. So we

cannot detach the two.

Finally, I would like to say a word about the military perspective in Afghanistan. One issue that Afghans keep bringing up to us is that we have the best and most developed armies of the world fighting in Afghanistan. They say that the armies fighting in Afghanistan have the best support systems available to them, and that no other army can match them in terms of troops, force multipliers, or military intelligence. They argue that, if we withdraw the best and leave it to the second or third best—the Afghan National Security Forces, which will have a component of the military and a component of the police, without the support system or the force multiplier—what chances will they have? What should their numbers be? Are they capable of standing up and for how long will they need support? No one can put their money, men, or material in Afghanistan *ad infinitum*, but premature withdrawal will be disastrous.

PAKISTAN

The Pakistan Army has been waging a very difficult war against the insurgents on its borders with Afghanistan. I must compliment them for doing a reasonably good job with what they have so far. But since I am talking of the military aspects of this war, I would like to flag some issues that highlight what it means to Pakistan if the country is serious about the war on terror. When you fight terrorism or you fight insurgency in your country, you also have to look at the macro issues, not just the military issue, not just the war on that day or week when you throw out the insurgents from an area. You can be totally wrong if you think you have succeeded.

These are the issues I want to flag:

First, the Taliban-LET-Al-Qaeda combined insurgency in FATA and the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan mixes Pashtun nationalism with religious extremism as a unique sociocultural driver, and it is very different from the self-determination motives of the Baluchis. So when you look at the western border, please remove Baluchistan from FATA/NWFP, because it has a different connotation.

With the killing of a large number—some accounts say 500, 600, or more—of the Maliks or tribal chiefs by the Taliban, there is a power vacuum in this frontier agency of Pakistan that is being filled by the Mullahs who owe allegiance to the Taliban-Al Qaeda combination. Cutting peace deals between the insurgents and the Pakistan Army or the Pakistan state and ignoring these tribal chiefs has further aggravated this problem. The image of the chiefs has been lowered and there are few chiefs left, although today all of us who are outside Afghanistan still think of the tribes as having a tribal chief or a strong chief. I do not think that there are any strong chiefs left. Those who were strong have been eliminated and replaced, and we do not understand yet the effect of these removals or the compromises that these tribal leaders have had to make.

The other aspect that any one of us, whether in the military or not, will understand is that the rugged, underdeveloped terrain, the population distribution pattern, the lack of governance, and the weather conditions are all favorable to the insurgents' operations. The conditions that exist on the frontier help the insurgents against the armed forces and require much more effort to counter. So, when we consider the number of Pakistani troops that are needed to fight against the insurgents, we have to build in these conditions—the weather, terrain, and population—to our framework. I am not even talking about differences in language, about the uncertain effect of troops who have been enrolled from that area—how willing they are to fight an insurgency against their own kith or kin. If you add all this in, the difficulties for the Pakistan Army multiply.

The other point I would like to make is that the strategy of the Al-Qaeda-Taliban is quite sophisticated, and it is a very capable modern insurgency that does not lack men or materials. In fact, you must have read that, quite often when a battle is fought between the frontier corps and the Taliban or the combined Al-Qaeda-LET-Taliban, many analyses lead us to believe that the insurgents were better armed, better trained, and better motivated than the troops fighting them. I cast no aspersions, I just happen to be aware. I am just saying that when we look at the numbers, we need to look at how many of them were troops, how many of them were the constabulary, how many of them were Lashkars, and how many of them were pure policemen. If we add all of that up, it may number 125,000, 200,000, or 400,000. But we need to look at the quality of these troops and understand the composition of the number and the differences in the troops' quality. And we need to keep this information in mind when we talk of the Afghan Security Forces or the Pakistani Security Forces. Security forces has become a very funny term that hides more than it reveals. It does not tell you what the troops' real fighting element is.

Counter-insurgency operations take many years or even decades to be successful. So Pakistan has to understand that it must have the will to fight and that defeating the insurgents in a particular district and moving to the next district is not going to solve the problem. In order to conduct a successful counter-insurgency operation, we need to look at a couple of

ratios and figures. All armies do it. They look at the troops-to-population ratio, the troops-to-space ratio, and the troops-to-insurgent ratio. For example, the number of troops required will be different if the area is large or if the population is different.

As a soldier, I feel that, if Pakistan really wants to be successful, it will have to put no less than 20, or even 25, soldiers to every 1,000 people for the long haul. For a population of 28 or 29 million in that region, what will Pakistan need to deploy? It should be approximately 500,000 troops over the long haul. Today, they only have 150,000 troops deployed. With 150,000 troops, quick victories may be possible, but it may not be possible to sustain them and to sustain them over the entire region. If Pakistani troops win here, the insurgents may go elsewhere; if the troops address them there, the insurgents will come back here the next day in a cat-and-mouse game that can carry on for years.

So approximately 500,000 troops are required, but such a high number is very hard to get. How many troops can Pakistan pull off from the eastern borders? How many more troops can it raise? From its existing strength, the Pakistani Army can easily move another 140,000 to 150,000 troops without jeopardizing security on its eastern border. I can elaborate on this during the discussions that follow.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

To conclude, the jury is out on many of the issues I have highlighted. Illusions of a quick victory are dangerous because they inhibit clear strategic planning. Let us discuss these issues with an open mind and with pragmatism.

Chapter 43

Views on Afghanistan

Ambassador Jaromír Novotný¹
Czech Ambassador to Japan

OPENING REMARKS

This is our third workshop panel about Afghanistan, which shows how important this subject is. And this is my 15th workshop—I started in 1995 in Dresden when the Czech Republic was in the process of negotiating with NATO to become a member. This year, the workshop has been extremely interesting for me because there was a panel on Israel and Palestine, an area of the world that has been a source of trouble for the last 60 years. Now we have Afghanistan, which has been a source of trouble starting in 1979, when a Communist coup d'état changed the regime and the Soviet Union intervened in there. From that time on, Afghanistan has not witnessed any peace.

NATO AND EU PROBLEMS IN AFGHANISTAN

Afghanistan is important for NATO and for the EU because we find ourselves in 2010 with more than 100,000 soldiers on Afghan territory. This is the same number that the Soviet Union had at the peak of the invasion, and the Soviet Union lost. This is also a problematic time for relations between the Allies. Of the 100,000 soldiers who are from 46 countries and 28 member-states, 26 of the 28 member-states are European, and Europeans are delivering 30,000 soldiers, with one-third of them provided by the U.K. So you can see how willing the United States' and Canada's European partners are to be involved in this war.

In addition, all the problems of the relations between NATO and the EU are very visible on the Afghan fields. This is not theory, this is practice. We still hear about the lack of helicopters—I think I first heard about it in 2003—and nothing has changed. We still hear about the problems with the units, too, and now the Dutch units are going out. Who will replace them? Only 6 countries out of 28 give 2% of their GDP to the military budget. And if we fail in Afghanistan, it will be fatal for the future of NATO. I think we are at this crossing point.

I have tried to be a little provocative, and now I will give the floor to the panel representatives.

¹ At the time of this workshop, Ambassador Novotný was the Czech Ambassador to Japan.

Chapter 44

Strategic Fine-Tuning to Assure Mission Success in Afghanistan

Ambassador Omar Samad
Ambassador of Afghanistan to France

Since 2009, the international community, the United States in particular, has been involved in a series of strategic reviews of its engagement in Afghanistan. It is currently in the process of implementing a civil-military strategy announced by President Obama in December 2009 as part and parcel of the Afghanistan Pakistan (AfPak) package.

THE CURRENT SITUATION

What is the situation today? In Afghanistan, the ongoing conflict is unlikely to be resolved without a lot more time, and Afghan institutions and capacities are weak. Around the globe, there are economic constraints and signs of fatigue and apprehension among donor nations, especially in the west, because there is a sense that the return on investment should be quick and Afghanistan does not seem to provide a quick return. Yet Afghans believe strongly that it is imperative to continue to work together and to strengthen this broad partnership until we reach some of our common strategic objectives. It is understandable and advisable to think about an exit strategy once stability is assured in Afghanistan, when regional threats that exist are brought under control and issues such as development and governance activities are sustainable.

THE PRIOR SITUATION

Without going back to why the international community has had such a presence in Afghanistan since the 9/11 tragedy, I want to point out that, for many Afghans, Al-Qaeda's rise and the Taliban takeover of my country in the 1990s could not have happened if a political void had not occurred after the Soviet withdrawal. The noble cause embraced by all of those who helped us defeat the Soviet aggression was unfortunately not followed by post-conflict political and socioeconomic reconstruction. Even though we all know that the Soviet model of intervention in Afghanistan was very different from the current U.S./NATO model of intervention, in Afghan eyes it is clear what that aggression meant then and what this intervention means today.

Neglect of Afghanistan was partly the result of certain strategic blunders and regional realignments that occurred throughout the 1980s, a period that saw the rise of radical Islam as it manifests itself today in various threatening forms. During the 1980s, and especially since the 1990s, when the Soviets left, we had a chance to dismantle or reform the radicalized infrastructure—madrassas, sanctuaries, training camps, and the financing of networks that still exist within our region. All regional actors had a chance to extradite the foreign militants and send them back to their homelands for reeducation.

Unfortunately, none of this was done. The international community walked away, reassured by certain regional powers and actors that the tens of thousands of emboldened Jihadists posed no threat and could be managed locally. I am saying this because these are some of the hard facts and lessons that we must learn from what happened to our region. Between 2002 and 2006, the Taliban were no longer seen as a force to reckon with, and the war on terror (which is no longer a very sexy term to use) was bankrolled with a narrow vision, no strategy to win the peace or rebuild Afghanistan, and little result to show for the billions of dollars that were granted for the dismantlement of the radical infrastructure and sanctuaries in the tribal regions between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Attention was diverted to Iraq, among other things, and we saw the reemergence of the Taliban and other groups affiliated with them.

LEARNING FROM THE PAST

I emphasize this past record because we are talking about some serious issues here, and if we do not apply the “lessons learned” concept we may fall into a trap again or follow the wrong recipe. We are talking about reconciliation and reintegration, and the Kabul peace Jirga that recently took place came up with a program that the Afghan representatives have endorsed. But we are all very much aware of the reality, and the Afghan people know the practical limits of such overtures and the kind of criteria that is required to accommodate those Afghans who are not ready to pursue a path of peace. However, the door is now open for Afghans who renounce violence and accept living in our country as peaceful and law-abiding citizens. Afghans do not want to backtrack to the days of oppressive rule. We do not want our country to once again become a safe haven for radicalism or terrorism. Given the remarkable sacrifices and investments made over the past 10 years by the West and others, I do not believe that western societies would accept such a regression. Who wants to see girls barred from schools again? Who wants to see our cultural heritage blown to pieces, or things such as music or traditions banned for the Afghan people?

CHANGES IN 2010

Two thousand and ten, we believe, is a critical year for this ever-growing multilateral mission. We continue to work to extend the authority and influence of the Afghan government in the less secure areas of the country and enable it by paving the way for better governance and economic development activities, both at the national and subnational levels. During 2010 we also intend to host the Kabul Conference to address the details of funding and aid effectiveness in areas defined in the London Conference earlier in the year. Once again, we are planning to hold elections in Afghanistan, this time legislative elections for the upper and lower houses of Parliament. More than 2,500 Afghan citizens, including almost 400 women, have registered as candidates for these elections. I think that it will be an important milestone, and, if we use the lessons learned from the past election, this process will help us move democracy forward in Afghanistan.

Also in 2010, we will begin to witness the transfer of security duties and responsibilities to Afghan forces under new NATO programs. This transfer will be done on a case-by-case and per-district basis, depending on how the training, mentoring, and other activities relating to the transfer go. This is a key year as the surge moves ahead and we talk about reintegrating certain elements of the armed forces that are in the opposition.

We are very much encouraged by the fact that NATO’s mission under ISAF is more people friendly and “population centric.” As we redefine the counter-insurgency doctrine and tailor it more and more to the conditions and needs of Afghanistan, we discover that counterinsurgency principles, when applied to Afghanistan, differ from those for Iraq, and that, within Afghanistan, we need to keep fine-tuning and adjusting these tactics and measures based on community and local requirements. Marjah is not Kandahar and Kandahar is probably very different from FOB Salerno. From experience, we know that in Afghanistan we need to go deeper at the subnational level to understand what is happening, since the dynamics are very different from north to south, from west to east, and from rural to urban Afghanistan.

Having said that, we are aware that it is too early to evaluate the outcome of the strategy launched with the recent surge. However, there is reason to believe that constant adjustment, recalibration, and fine-tuning will be required to ensure the success of the overarching objectives, which should eventually lay the groundwork for a viable and timely—but not prematurely announced—exit strategy. We have learned that the mission is not military centric. It is not about battles fought in the dirt-poor villages of Afghanistan; it is not about night raids that hurt innocent people. It is now mostly a civil-military process, a comprehensive and nuanced approach using both kinetic and non-kinetic activities to win over the dissatisfied population. On the other hand, it is also about the sanctuaries and other elements that feed an insurgency that, over the past few years, has unfortunately nurtured a two-headed monster that can be seen today on both sides of the tribal divide and that threatens both Pakistan and Afghanistan, its people and its states.

CONTINUING CHALLENGES

Our challenges are not limited to our state alone. What happens across the tribal divide between Afghanistan and Pakistan? Which insurgent leader is arrested in Karachi or in another city? Who provides the latest version of IEDs? Which Hawala system is used out of the Gulf region to fund the radical structures? How do drug mafias intersect with terror net-

works and how is the Internet playing a recruitment role? All of these factors are pertinent questions that shape our lives and should keep us concerned.

I would like to submit seven pillars of activities that, in my view and the view of many Afghans, including my government, will require recalibration:

1. Bringing further democratization through a process of involvement and consultation of indigenous leaders and community representatives, through confidence-building measures, protection from retaliation or intimidation, the buildup of credible institutions and capacities in the domains of justice/governance, and a focus on economic development, especially job creation and productivity areas such as agriculture and mining, a sector that in the future is going to be the backbone of the Afghan economy.

2. Boosting synergy and coordination among donors and stakeholders, between Afghans and international donors, and between the Afghan population and its government in order to integrate activities into a more coherent and implementable framework. Of course, the accelerated buildup of better quality—I am stressing better quality, not just numbers but quality—army, police, and other institutions is a cornerstone of such an effort.

3. Promoting public-private partnerships. Over the past nine years, this area has done very well to foster entrepreneurship and boost society activities. A country that seven years ago had only one television channel has more than 20 private television stations today. A country in which there was only one radio station has now hundreds of radio stations in private hands, and so on and so forth. The fact that women now have much more access to economic activities and political activities—all of this has to be sustained in Afghanistan.

4. At the same time, resorting to smart tactics to fight corruption in Afghanistan in an effective manner and the narcotics business is important.

5. Adopting a strategy for the gradual dismantlement of those infrastructures that promote and sustain radicalism and terrorism.

6. Focusing on confidence-building measures. This is very important for regional cooperation on water, which is a key issue, and on power, energy, communications, trade, transit, and people-to-people contacts (as we speak, Afghanistan is laying down its first railroad, which will eventually connect China through Central Asia to Afghanistan to Iran and Pakistan). All of this is to allay fears and misconceptions that exist and have existed for decades.

7. Finally, we will have to address historic disputes at some level by using new thinking, new paradigms, and new mechanisms in order to shift the existing mental state that has put us in a dilemma. In the region as a whole, we need to foster more cooperation and more dialogue and address some of the disputes that affect us directly or indirectly.

Chapter 45

The Process Toward Peace and Economic Reconstruction in Afghanistan

Major General (Ret.) Cai Bingkui
Vice Chairman, China Institute for International Strategic Studies (Beijing)

Afghanistan is an extremely sensitive place. Dealing with the Afghan situation properly is crucial to the security and stability of the region as well as the success of the international anti-terrorism struggle. Instead of an overall elaboration on the subject, I will focus on the following three points: The foreign military involvement, the role of the international community, and the development of China-Afghanistan relations.

FOREIGN MILITARY INVOLVEMENT

The fact that the Afghan war is now in its 10th year clearly demonstrates that the Afghan question cannot be settled by foreign military involvement alone. Currently, the internal situation in Afghanistan remains quite complicated. The extremist forces have not yet been conclusively put down. Terrorist attacks, drug trafficking, and organized trans-national criminal activities are still unbridled. There has been no obvious change to the complicated relationship between the central government and the local forces, and the power of the central government still remains limited. The process of economic reconstruction, while having achieved some measure of progress, is still beset by difficulties.

The instability in Afghanistan has further affected Pakistan, where extremist forces are wreaking havoc. The chain of terrorist attacks is rapidly spreading further into the country, seriously threatening the social stability and economic development of Pakistan. This also means that the transport line for military supplies into Afghanistan has been greatly disrupted.

THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

The international community should be united and should, in cooperation with the Afghan government, treat both the symptoms and the root causes of the Afghan question in order to reach a permanent solution. It should increase its efforts to crack down on terrorism, drug trafficking, and organized crime in the region in order to help Afghanistan achieve greater stability and economic development. To create the necessary conditions for Afghans to exercise comprehensive control over their own country, it is also essential to enhance Afghanistan's sovereignty, independence and development. We must pay more attention to promoting healthy social and economic development and to raising the living standards of the people. In order to achieve this, it is important to encourage the existing international mechanisms to strengthen their coordination on the Afghan question and to work together under U.N. guidance.

The Obama Administration, which is in a difficult position in Afghanistan, announced its new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan aimed at enhancing the governance capabilities of the Afghan and Pakistani governments. The plan also calls for a short-term increase in military means in the region, in order to effectively squash the insurgency and thus pave the way for U.S. military forces to gradually withdraw from Afghanistan. However, the joint operation conducted not long ago in Marja, in southern Afghanistan, indicates that it is not possible to thoroughly wipe out the Taliban forces in a very short period of time. It has also shown that it is very difficult to persuade Taliban members to return to civil society and establish local governments in the areas originally controlled by the Taliban. Indeed, persistent and unremitting efforts are needed if we are to achieve this.

This being said, the peace process and economic reconstruction efforts have made considerable progress in recent years thanks to the work of the government and the people of Afghanistan as well as the assistance of the international community. At present, the Karzai government is seeking peace talks with the Taliban and maintaining contacts with representatives of other military groups, political organizations, and social strata. Of course, it will be a challenge to finally realize national reconciliation since Afghanistan is a country with a complicated constitution of nationalities and opinions. The process of economic reconstruction is facing considerable difficulties at present due to various factors such as an unfavorable security environment and a capital deficiency. However, the international community is expected to extend further support and assistance.

Being a frontline country in the international anti-terrorism struggle, Pakistan has made important contributions and great sacrifices. According to information officially released not long ago by Pakistani authorities, more than 2,200 military personnel have died and some 6,200 have been injured in anti-terrorism operations. In addition, more than 3,000 people lost their lives in terror attacks in 2009. The social and economic development of Pakistan has been gravely affected by this. It is fully understandable that Pakistan anticipates further support and aid from the international community.

At the same time, Pakistan-Afghanistan relations and Pakistan-India relations are very important to the settlement of the Afghan question and to the maintenance of regional stability. It is thought that Pakistan-Afghanistan relations will become more amicable and that the comprehensive dialogue between Pakistan and India will resume at an early date.

CHINA-AFGHANISTAN RELATIONS

In parallel with the start of the peace and reconstruction process in Afghanistan, the interaction and cooperation between China and Afghanistan has been restored and further developed in a number of fields. Politically, the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Good-neighborly Relations was signed and a partnership for comprehensive cooperation established. China respects the development path which the Afghan people have decided upon based on the specific conditions and situation within their own country. It also firmly supports Afghanistan in its efforts to safeguard its national independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.

Economically, China extends assistance to Afghanistan within its capability. China provides support to Afghanistan in the building of engineering projects that are closely linked to public welfare, such as hospitals and irrigation works. It also assists in training various kinds of professional and technical personnel, so as to improve the livelihood of the local people and strengthen Afghanistan's development capabilities.

During President Karzai's visit to China in March 2010, both countries signed the Agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation and exchanged letters covering technical training and the granting of preferential tariffs for certain Afghan exports. In the security field, China assists Afghanistan in the building up of its national armed forces through military aid and personnel training. The two sides also carry out sound cooperation on anti-terrorism and drug-prohibition issues.

In a nutshell, it is the eager aspiration of the Afghan people as well as the common desire of all people around the world to see Afghanistan on the road to peace, stability, harmony and development. To achieve this will require not only the unremitting efforts of the Afghan government and its people but also close attention and strong support from the whole international community.

Chapter 46

Dealing with the Challenges in Afghanistan and Pakistan: How Can the International Defense Industry Contribute?

Mr. Alfred Volkman

Office of the U.S. Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics)

OPENING REMARKS

This is the panel on the defense industry. The defense industry is an important part of global security. The United States and many of our allies depend mainly on a publicly owned, profit-driven industry to provide the military equipment and technology that is essential to military success, and the close relationship between defense ministries and industry is only likely to grow closer in the future. We talk about the defense industry, but really the industry that supports defense is much broader than what traditionally has been characterized as the defense industry. I think that if you look at the representatives from industry who are here for this panel, you get that point.

The defense industry depends on government to define the military capabilities that are required and to provide the resources necessary to acquire these capabilities. I'll say just a few words about this before I turn the discussion over to representatives of the defense industry to talk about resources and capabilities.

COPING WITH LIMITED AND SHRINKING DEFENSE RESOURCES

The resources available to acquire defense equipment are limited now, and they are very likely to be limited to a greater extent in the future. Today, only 6 of 26 European NATO partners spend 2% or more of their gross domestic product on defense, and very little of this is spent on what would be characterized as defense investment. Less than half of the members of the Alliance allocate 20% of their limited defense spending to investment in technology and equipment. In the past 20 years, European defense spending has been disproportionately consumed by personnel costs and I understand that during the weekend of this workshop the German Parliament is actually looking at whether or not they should continue to have an army that is based on conscripts.

The resources available for defense are likely to shrink greatly in the future as nations strive to reduce national debt. So investments in defense equipment capability are likely to shrink at an even faster rate, which means that nations must prioritize their capabilities and eliminate expenditures on the capabilities that are not necessary or, at any rate, are the least important. My observation is that prioritizing military capabilities and eliminating military capabilities are very difficult things for governments to do. Secretary Gates has made a very significant effort in the United States over the past several years to convince Congress that there are military capabilities and programs that we no longer need. We need to eliminate these programs because we need to spend our scarce resources on things that have a higher priority. He has had a very difficult time convincing the U.S. Congress, as well as the military departments, that this is necessary.

There are many threats that we need to address, and we need to prioritize our capabilities to address them. The U.S. and our NATO allies must fight and prevail in the difficult wars that we are fighting now in Afghanistan and Pakistan. And we still must be prepared to fight against conventional threats against the territory of NATO. We also must be prepared to

defend against the more likely threats from terrorists and nations with nuclear missiles that could emerge within the next 10 years, or that are emerging now.

PREPARING FOR PROBABLE THREATS

The recently published report by the Group of Experts on the new Strategic Concept for NATO, which is on the NATO Web site, identified the most probable threats in the next 10 years to be an attack by ballistic missiles, which could be nuclear armed; strikes by international terrorist groups, and cyber assaults, which we discussed at great lengths earlier in this workshop. So what are the high-priority capabilities that NATO and our industry must be prepared to help us address? Any list would include:

- Countering improvised explosive devices—They are constantly changing, and we must be very agile in how we counter them.
- Missile defense—Any discussion of the threat that is posed by the regime in Iran prompts serious consideration of missile defense for Europe, and the discussion we have had so far indicates that Europe is becoming more and more serious about missile defense.
- Cyber security.
- Lift—Europe has done much to acquire lift since 2001, when quite frankly there was a great deficiency in lift capability in Europe. All of us need more lift.
- Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance—More nations need to bring UAVs to Afghanistan, and we need to have the capability to share the information they obtain with partners. On a positive note, I cannot pass up the opportunity to say that there is a distinct possibility that NATO will award a contract for a ground surveillance system, something which some of us at this workshop have spent a good part of our lives trying to accomplish. I hope it will occur soon.

How can the international defense industry contribute to NATO and allied governments' ability to acquire these capabilities? For the answer to that question, I am going to turn the discussion over to this distinguished panel of industry experts.

Chapter 47

Convergence Between Defense and Security—How Can Industry Adapt to and Support It?

Mr. Thomas Homberg
Corporate Vice President, Head of EADS Strategic Coordination

In my presentation I will first refer to the trend of increasing convergence between defense and security within the current and future threat environment. Second, I will focus on some consequences for industry, government, and our military forces, including options to more efficiently respond to evolving threats.

THE CHALLENGES WE FACE

Today we face particular challenges in light of the pressure on public finances due to the economic crisis. In parallel we must enhance the effectiveness of our forces and also respond to new security requirements.

We face a complex and diverging array of threats. These threats include classic, high-intensity conflict scenarios as well as asymmetric threat scenarios such as those in Afghanistan, which require situational awareness, aggression deterrence, camp/convoy and soldier protection, counter-IED technologies, and precision engagement. Finally, these threats comprise new challenges such as energy security and cyber security, to name two.

This complexity and divergence of threats is driving convergence between defense and security on at least four levels:

1. Convergence is occurring at an operational level, in operations abroad and domestically.

When operating in the same environment, it is critical to ensure interoperability between all actors in theatre, be they defense or police forces or civil agencies, in order to ensure seamless operations. This interaction must also materialize in training and preparation. Regular contact between the U.S. Marine Corps and the International Medical Corps was highlighted in an earlier panel, and this is a good example of ensuring seamless operations in theatre via adapted preparation.

In addition, cooperation between security and armed forces engenders domestic security. The deployment of Eurofighters for air policing missions during the European Football Championship in Austria in 2008 is just one of many examples of such cooperation.

2. As a result of the operational continuum, we see convergence at a conceptual level.

A report by the group of experts led by Madeleine Albright on the new NATO Strategic Concept highlights the importance of a comprehensive approach that combines military and civilian elements to execute operations. Equally, it is part of the priorities of the European Defense Agency's capability strategy to develop interoperability between armed forces, police forces, and civilian actors.

3. Defense and security could be more tightly integrated within budgets.

Substantial defense budget cuts are envisaged in almost all European countries. Nevertheless, the current threat perception requires further investment in our defense forces as well as in domestic security for critical infrastructure protection, transportation, and border security. Consequently, policy-makers should attempt to eliminate budget fragmentation and duplication.

4. The comingling of defense and security within budgets drives convergence on the technological level.

Dual use should be applied across different operational domains, not only because of budget reasons to exploit benefits of scale and scope but because emerging security and defense requirements allow us to do so. One example: UAV or mission aircraft with adaptable mission systems can equally detect targets in theatre, survey green or blue borders in border

protection systems, increase situational awareness during events like the Olympic Games, and identify pollution within open waters by oil-dumping ships in the Baltics.

SUGGESTED APPROACHES

I suggest that we pursue two related paths regarding these points: a) Foster dual-use technology to maximize economic benefits in the fields of research, development, and procurement, which will b) Enable improved interoperability between security and defense forces and, to a lesser extent, with civil agencies.

Such an approach requires increased commonalities in ConOps, standards, and procedures, and would also lead to further benefits and savings in logistics and maintenance.

THE CONSEQUENCES FOR INDUSTRY AND GOVERNMENTS

I would now like to provide some input on the likely consequences of such an approach for industry and government. Our challenge, as described earlier, is threefold:

1. The complexity of future threats,
2. This is paired with budgetary constraints;
3. Both lead to the before-mentioned convergence.

Such a perspective requires new methods for industry and governments to work together, which we recognized quite some time ago. However, implementation is still a challenge. Although governments are currently making important budget decisions and defining future capabilities, there is an opportunity to better define cooperation between industry and governments. What is required to get it right?

THE NEED FOR COOPERATION AND DISCUSSION

We need more international cooperation and further integration at both the policy and the industrial levels, instead of the rather disconnected approach observed today. Such a request has been raised during all panels held at this conference.

In addition to improved international coordination, we need a straightforward, honest, and constructive interface between industry, governments, and operational forces through the phases of design, development, and procurement. Here, I stress four factors:

1. In design and development, we should refrain from overcustomization and overspecification, which often result in program complexity, cost overruns, and delays.
2. Governments should increasingly favor a “spiral development” approach. Industry should deliver basic product or system configurations that are deployed quickly to theatre and then adapted according to lessons learned. This requires industry to improve its capabilities in rapid prototyping and modifications.
3. The acquisition process should become more flexible and faster. An example is the France-United Kingdom MoU for procurement in cases of urgent operational requirements. Something similar, the “Einsatzbedingter Sofortbedarf,” has been successful in Germany.
4. To ensure faster and more efficient development cycles, industry needs early access to defense and security planners, concepts, and lessons learned.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

When tackling the question “How can industry better support?” I think contractors understand the requirements and opportunities, including those driven by the convergence of defense and security. There are several possible ways forward, some of which I have tried to summarize. What we do not do is “walk the talk.” Our forces deserve it.

Chapter 48

Dealing with the Challenges in Afghanistan and Pakistan—How Can the International Defense Industry Contribute?

Mr. William Ennis

Director, International Programs, Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems

DEFINING CAPABILITY REQUIREMENTS WITH A BUSINESS-DEVELOPMENT APPROACH

Let me start by saying that I do believe that industry, working very closely with operational users, can help meet the capability challenges of both Afghanistan and Pakistan in the near term and the far term. In just a moment I will give you some concrete ideas on this, but, to begin, let me say that everybody in the room probably is familiar with the international business development models of American aircraft companies. They start with a focus on a combat commander. What you try to do is get inside his theater engagement plans to the degree that you can to learn as much as you can and find out which allies are participating in the plans and which capability contributions are being embraced by them. Then you run an ops analysis on a whole set of requirements that run the gamut from fuel to weapons to runway lengths to medical team—you name it—and you look for the capability gaps because that is your natural market as a businessman. You then turn your technical wizards loose on those identified gaps and you look to see if your company can come up with something that is better or cheaper—or both—than the next-best alternative. And if you find something, then you have a game; if you don't, you don't. But there are a couple of ways to go about doing this, and I want to talk about two of them.

I have been working on major aircraft development programs for about 24 years, and they run the gamut from the X-29 right up to the Global Hawk. My experience has been that joint trials with operational users are the way you define requirements quickly and most efficiently. I will give you two examples of this: One that addresses near-term requirements and one that addresses far-term requirements. It is a little bit out of theater, but it is somewhat applicable.

In Japan, the Fifth Air Force runs a command post exercise every fall with the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force. A couple of years ago, we were invited to participate in the exercise and bring in a virtual Global Hawk capability that they wanted to insert into the model to see how it ran. It allowed them to run the scenarios, observe the decision-making and the predicted results, and then run the scenarios again with scripted Global Hawk inputs into the model. The results were dramatic, and led to a whole host of Joint Staff studies to look further into it. Now, five years later, we are looking at Japan possibly funding a Global Hawk program in their next five-year plan, which they are putting together. That is a typical gestation period for a normal airplane program; it tends to take about five years.

USING FIELD TRIALS

Another approach to defining requirements that works a lot better is field trials. They are more expensive, but they do allow you to combine company money with customer money and actually go and fly something and see if it works. Two years ago, we ran an exercise in the U.K. with the Royal Air Force in which they put up some airplanes and some air crews, some range time and some fuel, and we brought some networking specialists from the United States with some modified hardware. Then we collectively tried to answer the question “Can a British soldier in the field query his command and ask it what is on the other side of the hill right in front of him?” and be able to get some operable intelligence, or maybe a high-fidelity picture that he could capture and download on a commercial off-the-shelf PDA device like a Palm Pilot.

We ran the drill and came to the conclusion that, yes, you can do this. It did not result in funding an urgent operational requirement. That was not really the drill, but it gives you a sense of how you can address urgent requirements in that way and be very effective. I guess my fear for the future with budgets declining in Europe and in the United States is that we are going to see chief financial officers in all our companies being less inclined to fund these kinds of exercises if they do not show a return in the next quarter's numbers. If that happens, we will have lost something valuable.

QUICKLY IDENTIFYING SOLUTIONS

Both of the approaches I just talked about work for defining requirements. There is also one other idea that I have learned from experience is underused but very valuable. It relates to the field engineering teams that all American aircraft companies have which are staffed with highly experienced guys, all with excellent military backgrounds, who have a good concept of operations (CONOPS) and whose principal job is to monitor the company's aircraft out in the world and to take on problems before an airplane has its nose against the fence for a downing gripe of some sort. These gentlemen can be extremely helpful in identifying new solutions to problems that cut through a lot of the normal requirement-generation drills we usually go through with some of the larger programs. Based on their perspectives you can often take a "USAF Big Safari" approach to solving an urgent problem quickly; it works very well but it is underutilized.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

To sum up, I would like to lift our sights just a bit and say that I make these suggestions from the perceived context that European defense spending is declining and that half or more than half of European defense expenditures goes to manning. The economic logic for cooperation within Europe to rationalize overall defense spending as well as transatlantic cooperation to take advantage of U.S. defense spending makes a lot of sense. That is because, at the end of the day, we need to fund urgent operational requirements while still providing some head room to capitalize on game-changing capability improvements that technical innovation brings us.

Chapter 49

Dealing with Challenges in Afghanistan and Pakistan

Dr. Scott Harris

President, Continental Europe, Lockheed Martin Global, Inc.

OPENING REMARKS

I am going to approach this question in a little bit different way than my colleagues have, although I have not heard anything that I disagree with. We at Lockheed Martin have done a study of recent programs in the United States that were cancelled. Our conclusion is that the United States in the last decade has spent roughly \$60 billion on platforms that were never built and on capabilities that never came into existence. So there is a problem with applying resources to the right thing and to bringing resources to where they actually produce capability. That is a U.S. problem, but I think it is a problem everywhere in NATO if you think about certain programs in Europe that do not seem to be producing capability. I think it is a universal problem.

RESPONDING TO THE ASYMMETRIC THREAT

So the issues that Al Volkman framed at the beginning of the panel concerning how we meet the emerging threats, how we deal with a resource environment in which budgets are declining, and how we make a trade-off between what we need for the long term—these programs that take a long time to develop and produce capability—and what we need in the short term for urgent operational requirements are serious problems and problems that both government and industry need to address.

In the U.S. right now, these issues often are being framed in this Gates “you all will have to get used to a new world” context as trading off between the long term and the short term. I think this is a false dichotomy, and I don’t think we should think about it in that way. NATO is always going to want to take care of the long term. We should never find ourselves in a situation in which an emerging power is militarily equal or superior to the combined power of NATO allies. That would be a very strange thing to do in this world. So there is always going to be a desire to be militarily superior in any kind of major conflict, and that becomes an issue of judgment as to how much is enough. To the extent that we are successful in dealing with the long-term challenge or the potential long-term challenge, any current opponent is going to resort to the asymmetric strategy. Paradoxically, the stronger you get, the weaker you are, and the more vulnerable you become to the asymmetric threat. That is the issue of the short term.

How do we deal with that? Responding to the asymmetric threat is where the partnership between industry and government is absolutely essential. I completely agree with what Edgar Buckley said: You need the creative energy that industry has, you need the accumulated knowledge and expertise, and you need as little bureaucracy as possible when you try to respond in a rapid way. You also need to be able to bring the entire range of technological capability to bear, whatever the problem is. You do not respond to an urgent operational requirement by asking the EDA to conduct a study on how to do Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). You go to the people who do UAVs and you get busy. That is really the essential challenge.

At a very general level, let me give you an example, which is the one that Al Volkman mentioned: the problem of IEDs in Afghanistan. All of a sudden, you have powerful NATO militaries vulnerable to cell-phone technology, and so Peter Flory’s predecessor, when he was in office, demanded that industry “Do more, do more,” and said, “What are you doing about IEDs?” Of course, everybody mobilized to address that problem in a multifaceted way.

Let's look at some of the responses. The first response was to try to take away the mechanism by which the IEDs work, to jam them. A huge number of sophisticated technologies were fielded fairly rapidly that rendered the mobile-phone trigger pretty useless. Then, of course, the enemy adapted. So then we had to tackle them on multiple fronts and protect the vehicles. So a whole new generation of protected vehicles was developed and rapidly fielded, and we now have the second and third generations of mine-resistant vehicles. We have to detect IEDs—if you cannot jam them, you want to detect them, and then the enemy gets clever about how they employ them. So you have to get clever about finding them. You use persistent surveillance—maybe you have UAVs, maybe you have balloons, maybe you have other ways for persistent surveillance. Then maybe you need sophisticated sensors that you had not thought of before to detect where the ground has been moved, to where the ground is warm, or maybe you need systems that can see a picture and say, that picture has been disturbed in a very minute way but we see it. So you do those things and you work on a whole separate line of how to disable or destroy these things if you find them, for example, with robotic technology.

THE NEED FOR FOCUS AND TEAMWORK

Industry responds in all of these ways working with a team, which was mentioned in the last panel, the counter-IED task force, and with all of these other government activities. You work as a team to address this very serious asymmetric threat and you have to do it with a lot of industry involvement in order to meet the urgency of the requirement. I think that is the key lesson about how industry contributes in the short term to a situation like we have in Afghanistan. It is not really a contest for resources; it is a question of figuring out the right way to deploy resources. It is also a question more of recognition than of facts; it is a matter of recognizing the threats, seeing the emerging short-term threats, and moving rapidly against them while maintaining a steady focus on the longer-term investment and modernization we need to do. This gets harder when budgets are being cut, but that is what we have to keep our focus on.

You could argue that failure to keep this focus and failure to get the right balance between the long and the short run could lead to an even worse capability gap between the United States and its NATO allies. I think the thing we all have to worry about the most is that the resource crisis in Europe will fundamentally weaken European industry to the point where it cannot respond to the urgent requirement and cannot partner with U.S. industry. We and our European industry colleagues work very hard to keep the capability gap from widening, but we need to be constantly aware of this issue or it will widen.

Chapter 50

Industry's Crucial Role in C4ISR

Dr. Edgar Buckley
Senior Vice President for NATO, U.N., and EU, Thales

I want to start with something that David Bill said about the importance of C4ISR: Command, Control, Communications, Consultation, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance. He called it “electric string,” which is easier to understand.

THE IMPORTANCE OF C4ISR

C4ISR is increasingly important in today's military operations, where you face an asymmetric threat and you do not know where the other guy is or when he is going to attack you. The only way you can even up the odds is to have good C4ISR capabilities, so you know where he is likely to be very early and you can protect yourself and counterattack. It is the key element in General McCrystal's strategy, and this mission-critical data has to be transported to the edge of operations in a highly reliable and dependable, efficient way, with a secure and protected infrastructure.

In my opinion, only industry can now provide that. I do not think that everybody agrees with that, but it is very much my opinion. I think that the levels of technology required to provide this sort of capability in an operational theater, the backup reference facilities that you need outside the operational theater to make sure that you are not experimenting in the theater and that you can guarantee reliability, the skilled engineers who design, maintain, and service the capability throughout its life—these can only come from industry. The days when Signals Regiments, as we used to see in Bosnia, would cycle in, bring their equipment with them, operate the equipment, and then cycle out when a new one comes in are gone. The requirements of the commanders are just too demanding now for that sort of approach, and that is what has happened in Afghanistan.

ISAF CIS

The ISAF secret backbone communications that transport all the critical information in the theater and back to Europe are provided by my company under a service contract to NC3A and under the operational coordination of NCSA. It works very well. We have 87 points of presence in the theater, which is 95% of ISAF's total. It is a mixture of satellite, fiber optic, radio, and landline connections. We designed it to NC3A specifications. We installed it, we transported it, we transferred all the legacy applications to run on it, and we maintain it, enlarge it, or amend it as needed by the commanders and as instructed by the agency. It has 2,800 workstations and 8,300 user accounts. It is all under the ISAF chain of command and responds to the coordination authority of NCSA.

We have 150 people in theater, all engineers and ex-military signalers for the most part. They provide an excellent service, and we have been told that our quality of service is better than anything ever seen before in an operational theater. We are required to have the system running at 99.98% availability, which means that we can have it down six minutes per month. We have to have 98% of problem tickets resolved within four hours, and the average at the moment is 34 minutes. We monitor it through 12 processes on 34 key performance indicators. If we do not meet those indicators, we do not get paid.

So it is a very good system, and it not only gives you that capability but it gives you a surge capability. During the summer of 2009, when ISAF wanted to put a new headquarters into theater, we got the request to do that in July, but they

had asked for this headquarters to be up and running by the middle of October. One thousand workstations needed to be provided for this theater and be up and running. We did that, and here I come to General Wolf's point of view, we did it without a contract; we did it at financial risk to ourselves because the contract through the NATO processes could not come through. We did it because we are part of the team in Afghanistan.

Another example of the surge capability is the contract to link all these different national systems to the ISAF backbone to provide the Afghan Mission Network, which is the center of General McCrystal's strategy. We got the instruction to proceed to provide the links at the end of April, and the first spiral deadline is at the end of the month of June. We are comfortable that we are going to meet that deadline.

So industry supports ISAF right up at the front line, not just in communications. It is also the food, the air traffic control, the UAV provisions, and the in-theater support in many ways. This is all part of a pattern of outsourcing; outsourcing increases in operations the longer operations are maintained. We saw that in Iraq, and we are seeing it again in Afghanistan. But now the depth and the nature of industry's involvement, which are linked to technology shifts, are changing. Industry is conducting operations in direct support of the front line in non-traditional areas such as tactical and strategic C4ISR.

QUESTIONS ON PLANNING AND STRATEGY

The question for me is: Should we plan for this in the future? The traditional NATO approach is that you buy deployable equipment, you put it in a warehouse, and then, when you have an operation, you open up the warehouse, take out the equipment, and take it into theater and see if it will work. That more or less guarantees that you are going to have non-state-of-the-art equipment when you use it. I think there is a real issue as to whether we should now be thinking of contracting industry to be ready to deploy at short notice rather than stockpiling equipment in the military, which is the traditional approach. Based on experience of how quickly NATO operations actually do begin, I think that industry could be inside the decision loop.

Another fundamental question is: What is our overall strategy for industry's involvement in the support of operations? How does that strategy fit with our long-term policy of disengagement and empowering the local Afghan authorities? I am not sure that NATO is thinking about these questions, but I think it should. I would like to suggest a new concept document for operations support, taking into account how technology has changed, how our national approach has changed, how NATO's operational missions have changed, and the lessons we learned from Afghanistan.

THE NEED FOR A ONE-TEAM, ONE-MISSION APPROACH

My final point on this is that there are other implications for the way NATO deals with industry. We would not have had this success at all if it had not been for Rainer Schuwirth, who brought us all together around his table when he was Chief of Staff in SHAPE, and said, We have to carve a one-team, one-mission approach, and that was taken on by Karl-Heinz Lather. I think they would both agree that without that, we could not have done it. That lesson applies more widely across the board. We have got to get away from this whole business of arms-length relationships between a fractured NATO customer and industry. We have got to bring all the customer interests together on the NATO side and have a one-team, one-mission approach.

Chapter 51

Resolving the Malvinas Islands Issues

Ambassador Jorge Argüello
Ambassador of Argentine to the United Nations

THE HISTORY OF THE MALVINAS DISPUTE

I have been asked to prepare an introductory presentation on the Malvinas sovereignty dispute question with the idea of showing from our experience and point of view what the current situation is and the alternatives we have ahead. During the last 177 years, there has been a dispute between Argentina and the United Kingdom over the sovereignty of a territory called the Malvinas, which the British call the Falkland Islands and the United Nations calls the Malvinas-Falkland Islands. This is one of the oldest territorial disputes in the modern era. As you know, the Malvinas are located in the South Atlantic, but you may not know that they are 400 km away from Argentina and 14,000 km away from the U.K.

During the 177 years of the dispute, we have had many different situations. There were periods during which there was important bilateral cooperation between Argentina and the U.K. under sovereignty formula improvements and agreements that existed in fields such as communications, cultural and trade exchanges, oil, airline flights, and fishing. The sovereignty formula, which was an interesting mechanism adopted by the U.K. and Argentina, enabled the two countries to protect each party's position on sovereignty while bilateral negotiations on the issue were taking place in compliance with U.N. resolutions on this matter.

There was also a time, in 1982, when, as a last resort, a weak Argentine military dictatorship decided to recover the islands by force, doing exactly what the British had done a century and a half before, in 1833, when they took the islands and expelled the Argentine people and authorities. Regrettably, our longstanding tradition to seek a solution to the Malvinas question by peaceful means was interrupted. The dictatorship used force even though they were mindful of the fact that the sovereignty claim over the Malvinas unites Argentines over and above any political difference they may have; they made use of this deep conviction of the Argentine people to try to perpetuate themselves in power.

Less than one year after the war, democracy was back in Argentina. It is very important to stress that the 1982 conflict, in all its significance, introduced no changes to the legal or political nature of the controversy. So here is the first question: Is a renewed armed conflict in the South Atlantic possible because of the Malvinas question? The answer is definitely no, even though recently, because of British oil exploration in the disputed waters surrounding the islands, it was said that the U.K. was afraid of an armed attack from Argentina. Let me say that this is impossible. Our national decision is to pursue through diplomatic negotiations a solution to the sovereignty dispute—exactly what the United Nations has been requesting from both parties since 1965, when Resolution 2065 was adopted. Furthermore, Argentina is one of the Latin American countries that has exhibited one of the lowest expenditures in armaments since 1983. Although the regional average is 1.32% of the regional GDP, my country's military expenditures are only .82% of the national GDP.

NEGOTIATING A SOLUTION

U.N. Resolution 2065 calls for an end to colonialism, recognizing the sovereignty dispute over the Malvinas Islands and mandating cooperation from both sides. The U.N. has also taken the view that the population transplanted by the colonial power is not a people with a right to free determination. Argentina and the U.K. formally accepted Resolution 2065 to negotiate a solution. Both parties recognized the existence of the sovereignty dispute and held conversations on sovereignty after 1965.

During all of these years of bilateral negotiations, many solutions were designed and some agreements were drafted. However, they failed to yield the results that were expected. Since 1965, year after year, even in the year of the war, the

U.N. General Assembly and a special committee on decolonization have been expressing themselves in a similar fashion, urging both parties to resume bilateral negotiations to find a just, fair, and lasting solution to the sovereignty dispute over the Malvinas Islands.

Ruling out the military option and burying the ax, we have only one alternative: Diplomatic negotiation. But reality points out that the main obstacle to a solution to this sovereignty dispute is the lack of political will on one side. Recently, when Mr. Ilan Halevi talked about the Middle East conflict, he said that you cannot marry alone; you need a partner. In Argentina, we express the same idea by saying that it takes two to tango. We need political will on both sides. We need to go step by step to generate political conditions that are appropriate to gain momentum toward a new consensus.

Instead of being afraid of wars that are not going to take place, we should all be trying to get answers to some new questions being raised in our region and in other regions: When is it possible in the current world to ignore the U.N.'s definitions? What is the trend? Are we facing the exhaustion of the world's multilateral possibility or are we on the eve of its reemergence? In the South Atlantic, facts point to an answer: Neither the U.N. General Assembly resolutions nor the good-offices mission entrusted to the Secretary General have been successful in solving the Malvinas question. We have not gained a simple centimeter in all of these decades.

THE NEED FOR POLITICAL WILL ON BOTH SIDES

The title of this panel is "Global Security from a Latin American Perspective." So from a Latin American perspective, I remind you that not long ago the heads of state and government of the 32 Latin American and Caribbean countries jointly demanded full compliance with the U.N. resolutions on the Malvinas question. I recall what was established by Resolution 31/49 of the United Nations General Assembly, which says, and I quote: "Calls upon the two parties to refrain from making decisions that will imply introducing unilateral modifications in the situations while the islands are going through the process recommended by the General Assembly." At that meeting, in the city of Cancun, Mexico, President Lula of Brazil posed an interesting question, and again I quote: "What is the geographic, political, or economic explanation for the U.K. to be in the Malvinas? Could it only be because it is a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, where they can do everything and others nothing?"

From our point of view, in some issues there is a clear double standard for those few U.N. member-states that have a permanent seat on the Security Council. Some of those who have more power continue to use this power, this place of privilege, to shield their interest, violating the U.N. resolutions. I am convinced that the lack of political will to negotiate responds to power and is founded on the existing relationship of power between the U.K. and its supporters on the one hand and between Argentina and its supporters, including the Latin American countries, on the other hand.

We should question ourselves: Are some of the most powerful countries turning a deaf ear to the demands of the international community? Is the very existence of the multilateral system that has ruled the world since the Second World War being undermined? Is the intransigent attitude of some of the most powerful countries responsible for the lack of progress? Facing or trying to face this situation, the Argentine Congress created the Parliamentary Observatory of the Malvinas question. It is an attempt to open a path of dialogue that could be traveled when necessary; it is a tool to be ready for use when political conditions embrace it.

The Parliamentary Congress became a permanent body sanctioned by law, with members from both the government and the opposition parties. Three years ago, our Congress invited the British Parliamentarians from both houses to hold meetings with our Observatory in Buenos Aires. In response, we accepted a similar invitation from the British Parliament. These meetings appear to have been proposed in the light of cooperation and trust-building measures.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Since you may have all read about the situation we are going through in the South Atlantic, I am not going to talk a lot more about it. We hope that the situation will be resolved soon, but I would like to raise a question here: Could the discovery of oil reserves in the South Atlantic and problems surrounding the British exploration exacerbate cooperation and trust-building issues even more? We currently are working fervently toward a solution to the problem, and it is our understanding that, when political conditions are appropriate, reciprocal ties of knowledge and trust will be bound even closer. Argentina's desire is to honor U.N. Resolution 2065. However, over the years we have realized that we cannot do it alone. It takes two to tango.

Chapter 52

Climate Change and Security

Ambassador Dr. Everton Vieira Vargas
Brazilian Ambassador to Germany

OPENING REMARKS

The issue of climate change and security is not discussed very much in international fora. It is an issue that is very complex because of two very complex elements: On one side there is climate change, one of the most challenging and complex issues on the international agenda, and on the other side there is the issue of security, which everyone here knows much more about than I do. Both issues are becoming more and more interlinked these days, but the challenge is how to address their relationship. We have seen the possible consequences of an increase in the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere in terms of rain patterns, the desertification process, and agricultural effects on ecosystems. And we all know how difficult it has been for the international community to address this issue. Perhaps the biggest example of this was the conference in Copenhagen in December 2009, where there was no progress in reaching a legally binding agreement involving all countries to address climate change.

The ecological schedule of climate change is one that holds major implications for social and political instability. These will be particularly felt in developing countries where the capability to respond to climate change is very limited. They have also been felt in industrial countries as a result of the cost that must be borne in switching from the current economic path to a more sustainable one.

INTERNATIONAL ORDER AND ITS EFFECT ON SECURITY

The international order is changing not only because of the new role of countries or blocs that until a short time ago were at the margins of world decision-making, but also because of the rise of essentially transnational problems such as climate change. These transformations have a significant impact on the way we think about security. Historically, security has been understood in terms of threats to the territory and population of a state. Science has asserted with reasonable certainty that climate change affects the physical survival of societies, which is the most basic premise of security. Yet climate change is not controlled through military power; rather, addressing it requires radical rethinking of the structure of international order.

As I said before, climate change and security are intimately related to the role of sovereign states as primary actors in the international order. The comprehensiveness of the policies required to face climate change reinforces the centrality of the state as the sole entity with the legitimacy required to enforce political action. Three main consequences for security may be associated with climate change:

- First, exacerbation of environmental problems such as droughts, water scarcity, and land degradation related to land-use conflicts
- Second, social and economic disruption provoked by the rise of sea level
- Third, radical environmental changes like the savannahization of tropical forests such as the Amazon or the disappearance of the Asian monsoon

Political decisions to promote national development while disregarding the effects of intensive use of fossil fuels or the consequences of deforestation may increase the probability of droughts, floods, sea-level rise, disease propagation, and so on. We have seen through the studies of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change that if there is an increase of 2.5

to 3 degrees Celsius in surface temperature this can lead by the middle of this century to a gradual replacement of tropical forest by savannah in the eastern Amazon. For Brazil, this would be a disastrous consequence: The Amazon is not only important for its biodiversity and water resources, but its rainfall regime is crucial for the agriculture in the center-west of the country, one of the major export areas of soy and meat to the world markets.

THE NEED FOR A NEW WAY OF THINKING

There is a need to address and to think about this issue, not only from my local perspective but taking into account how the current order serves political decisions, international law, and domestic order in all of our countries, because it is a source of insecurity. Addressing climate change requires not only new ways of thinking and acting, but also of re-focusing the power structures implicit in the provision of security. Security, therefore, should not be seen only in terms of anarchy. Justice and equity are key elements to promote security and order. The different periods of development in rich and developing countries led to acknowledging at the Climate Convention that different countries hold different historic responsibilities for causing the problem. This has established a hierarchy in the parties' obligations under the convention.

There is consensus that prevention, mitigation, and adaptation to climate change demand decisions that have domestic and international implications. At the domestic level, efforts to adapt will require robust institutions. These institutions should be capable not only of taking urgent action to counter the negative effects of climate change, but also of planning future measures. They will also have to coordinate with other sectors of government at the national and local levels as well as with civil society.

At the international level, the U.N. will have to be adequately prepared to support the governments of the most vulnerable countries. A good example here is how the international community had to respond to the devastating earthquake that rocked Haiti in January 2010, even though that earthquake cannot be attributed to climate change. We will need to have adequate instances, institutions, and early warnings to respond to such situations.

The search for answers to how to deal with this issue will require that the international community as a whole look for ways to arrive at commitments and to fulfill the obligations they have under the Climate Convention. In 2007, at the initiative of the British president, the U.N. Security Council held the first debate ever on the impact of climate change on peace and security. Many developing countries saw this debate as an encroachment of the Security Council on the roles and responsibilities of the other main organs of the United Nations. This is a major issue, because climate change and security should not be focused on from a military perspective but from a cooperative perspective, and in this regard we will need to combine historical responsibility and sensitivity with the internal demands particularly of developing countries. The developing countries made clear in Copenhagen that they do not intend to accept uncritically the roles and procedures set by traditional powers to deal with the world's problems. Both the new rules and institutions must be developed taking into account their needs and perceptions.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

To conclude, I would like to say that there is a need for anaggiornamento of global governance mechanisms as well as a need to rethink international cooperation. This will have to be achieved through an equilibrium in which all countries have the possibility to quest for prosperity and be enhanced by an international regime that serves as the foundation for cooperation to minimize the consequences of climate change.

Chapter 53

Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Personal View

Ambassador Rogelio Pfirter¹
Director General, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

OPENING REMARKS

The OPCW organization, which I have had the honor to lead for the last eight years, has proven that multilateralism and consensus—when supported by countries' strong desire to work for peace and security—offer a workable means for advancing precisely those objectives, which are in fact those of the Charter of the United Nations. Indeed, the Chemical Weapons Convention, which entered into force in 1997, has made enormous progress over the last 13 years toward ridding the world of a whole category of weapons of mass destruction.

Of course, progress toward the elimination of chemical weapons is not fully indicative of what is going on in the broader areas of disarmament or nonproliferation around the world. Despite the excellent progress that has been made on the chemical front, we must recognize that there is still cause for serious concern, most notably in the nuclear area but also in the biological one. We have all recognized that the possible proliferation of weapons of mass destruction constitutes the gravest danger for the very survival of humanity in the long term. Moreover, I think we also recognize that progress on nonproliferation is, to a considerable degree, linked to progress in the area of arms control and disarmament.

PROGRESS TOWARD NONPROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT

I would like to pay tribute to President Obama and his administration for the strong contributions that he has made in this area during the last year. Since his speech in Prague, a series of concrete steps by the American administration has contributed to the creation of an improved atmosphere in a field in which, quite clearly, distrust and enormous concerns still prevail. The steps taken with regard to Russia, the review of the strategic and nuclear posture of the United States, the personal efforts by President Obama at the security summit in Washington, the high-level meeting of the Security Council in September of 2009, and the transparency that was provided to the NPT Review Conference in New York as to the quantities of nuclear warheads deployed and stockpiled are all very, very positive. We have to pay tribute to them, because I believe they have had an enormous impact.

Nuclear Disarmament

Of course, much still needs to be done with respect to nuclear disarmament; there is no question about that. Nonetheless, the step-by-step approach agreed to in the final document of the NPT Review Conference is a good way of moving forward. It is also very positive that we will take stock in 2012 and 2014. Nonetheless, we must clearly do much more in certain specific areas in order to achieve the vital goal of eventually eliminating nuclear weapons from our world.

¹ At the time of the workshop, Ambassador Rogelio Pfirter was Director-General, OPCW.

Chemical Weapons

In the area of chemical weapons, progress on disarmament is much more satisfactory. Over 60% of all chemical weapons have been destroyed—verifiably. Although we still have much to do, there is no question that Russia and the United States, which still have large stockpiles, will complete destruction sooner rather than later.

Nonproliferation

The concerns basically regard nonproliferation, and I think that goes for all categories of weapons of mass destruction. On the nuclear front, we clearly face countries with opaque polices as well as countries that are cheating. In the case of the NPT, we face difficulties based on the fact that the additional protocol of the NPT has not yet entered into force for many countries. Basically, we face challenges involving countries that are still inside the NPT, while there is one country, North Korea, that has left.

With chemicals, the nonproliferation front is much better. We have instrumented a credible regime of verification of industry for nonproliferation purposes. Although much still needs to be done, the OPCW has been able to carry out almost 2,000 inspections, and, as a result, the international community is well on the road to doing what it is supposed to do.

Biological Weapons

I think that the big remaining question marks are for biological weapons. We have a treaty, but we do not have a truly independent, multilateral, nondiscriminatory verification regime. Arguably, we have enormous doubts, and those doubts don't just emanate from the policies of governments; they also emanate from the fact that terrorists could very well—as you know—have access to either nuclear, chemical, or biological materials for the pursuit of evil goals. Resolution 1540 of the Security Council tried to address that, but much more needs to be done.

In the case of biology, we saw in the United States not long ago a case in which just one individual using anthrax was able to cause enormous concern. That is an indication of how not only governments but also small groups of terrorists, or even individuals, can do serious damage. Therefore, it is vital for all of us to remain united.

Chapter 54

The Way Ahead

Ambassador Dr. Jean-Jacques de Dardel
Ambassador of Switzerland to NATO and to Belgium

This is the “way-ahead” panel, which is thus also the “wrap-up” panel. At this stage of our work I will tell you that a lot has been said during the workshop, and some of it will no doubt take time to sink in. During the whole of the workshop we have listened, we have thought, and we have understood, and we will try to organize our many considerations about all of that in the coming time.

HANDLING COMPLEXITY

For my own part, I have gathered my thoughts around a few words. The first word I would like to highlight is complexity, the complexity of many matters that we have approached from different angles. Throughout our sessions, we have acknowledged the mounting complexity of security issues. In doing so we have done well, because it is important that we ascertain both the interlinkage and the complexity of all security issues: There is complexity in defining the threats, there is great variety in the mounting new threats, there are many challenges in the comprehensive approach if it is to be truly comprehensive and effective, and in the networks that are needed to enable government and industry to work together.

The answer to complexity, I would say, is one that the human mind usually applies, and that is to try to synthesize, to simplify matters, to prioritize, to go to the essential elements in order to draw conclusions. That, too, has been well done, and should be done in all circumstances.

There are many ways to synthesize. For instance, in the extremely complex Middle-Eastern situation, one avenue of thought is to boil it down to security needs for Israel. Another avenue of thought for the Afghan situation, which we all perceive to be not only complicated but intensely complex, is a population-centric strategy; that is a simplified strategy, but a worthy one. As we proceed from one beautiful conference to another we continue to try to grasp the whole picture and make sense out of it.

THE NEED FOR FLEXIBILITY

I will end by saying that the main lesson I draw from all of our work here is that, although we acknowledge the complexity and want to understand it, we must be wary to not go back to oversimplifying. The world has become more complex, we know that, and in order to organize our thoughts about it we must always remain open to novel ideas. In that sense what is called for is another word that contains an x—flexibility. I trust that this word is well understood across the board, and I have had no complaints in my own mind as to a lack of openness of thought; quite to the contrary. I believe that flexibility needs to flow into the new Strategic Concept, for instance, and I am encouraged by what I see and hear. Recently I visited ACT in Norfolk and I was very encouraged to see the kind of open thought that is being given to such issues. I am also encouraged as a representative of a partner nation that more thought is being given to how to draw in capabilities, minds, resources, and partners.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

This in a sense will be the way in which I will think ahead about what we have experienced here—which, you can see, is in itself oversimplifying, even though I complain about oversimplification. But now we will get the larger picture through our three distinguished panelists.

Chapter 55

Global Security—the Way Ahead

Ambassador Linas Linkevičius
Permanent Representative of Lithuania on the North Atlantic Council

OPENING REMARKS

Many challenges of today can be characterized as shockwaves that remain from the much larger conflicts of the past. The tendencies of global terrorism; narcotics, weapons, and dangerous materials proliferation; and persisting frozen conflicts and the attempts to solve them by force remain issues of great concern. NATO today is adapting itself to deal better with these and other challenges: Its adapted tools, formats, and policies should be defined in the new Strategic Concept that will be issued by the Alliance in November 2010 in Lisbon. In the new Strategic Concept the Alliance will reconfirm its core task of defending its members, define partnerships, and outline its view on the role of dealing with ever-more-global insecurities.

As a representative of a country whose name has been in use for 1,000 years, yet has constantly flickered on the political map and recently experienced the dramatic shift of joining structures that my own generation deemed out of imaginable reach, I would argue that lessons of history should be taken into account as we make our decisions.

ENSURING NATO MEMBERS' SECURITY

The first and foremost conclusion NATO should draw is that ensuring its members' security remains a paramount task. Both Cold War and post-9/11 experiences have shown that the security and defense of Allied nations allow broad political, economic, and social recovery, and provide assurance of stability and insurance against irreversible destruction. More importantly, the resolve to defend each other underpins our values of human rights, social justice, liberty, and democracy.

REACHING OUT TO PARTNERS

A second important consideration is to reach out to other partners, nations, and organizations that are willing and able to engage with Allies in the pursuit of common interests and objectives. Even during the Cold War years, it was well understood that security cannot be created in a vacuum. Today we are still engaged in building a Europe whole and free that does not begin or end with NATO membership. To be secure, NATO needs partners. Undoubtedly, partners bring enormous added value to NATO's business by contributing to NATO-led international missions, supporting them through logistical and political means, and providing useful ideas and technologies. At the same time, partnerships are mutually beneficial. Political dialogue and practical cooperation with partners enhance security and stability in the entire Euro-Atlantic area and beyond.

While some partners have chosen to become NATO members, others have not. This must be respected, and should not by itself imply any disadvantage in security terms or in limitations to their political reach. From the very beginning of the Alliance, it was clear that NATO is to pursue mutually beneficial practical cooperation with other non-member Europeans, such as Sweden, as far as there are mutual interests. Now the partnership network has expanded to the benefit of NATO as well as partners. Internal NATO decision-making is and will always remain a matter for the Allies. However, our partners should maintain the improved tools of consultation on all issues that involve them, their interests, and their cooperative relationship with the Alliance.

NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONS

To better illustrate this point, allow me to address NATO-Russia cooperation for a moment. This is one of the most advanced, yet also one of the most problematic, engagements among NATO outreach engagements. Building on the positive momentum that has characterized European security for the last 20 years, the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) was established to ensure what today is a 29 equal-member format of cooperation on multiple issues across the full spectrum of security concerns and challenges. However, it soon became apparent that while the cooperation structures under the NRC roof kept on multiplying (today there are more than 10 different NATO-Russia working groups and formats), the substance of discussion was low. The Russia-Georgia conflict brushed away all the principles embedded in the NRC founding documents, particularly the agreement that sides will not resort to force while solving territorial issues and will not interfere in other countries' internal problems or their choice for integration into wider security structures. It is not surprising that Russia's action in Georgia led to a break in NRC relations, and today we still need to work hard to rebuild confidence and to persuade Russia to implement its commitments to withdrawing from separatist Georgian regions. Although on track for being repaired, NATO-Russia relations today still lack confidence, and encompass a lack of progress on CFE, missile defense, and other issues.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Looking to the future, we must see a wider picture, that of global influences on our security, and deal with them accordingly. Not only NATO, but also wider European and other regional mechanisms, will have limited capacity to deal with challenges that are of a global nature. We need to find strength to put aside our differences and limitations and to work together against threats of a global nature—terrorism, proliferation, natural and man-made disasters. But we never should put aside our values and principles—to lose them while seeking short-term gains or practical advantages would be a gross miscalculation that would undermine all that we have achieved. NATO is and must remain a beacon of freedom and liberty, looking for and finding solutions but not taking shortcuts, so that those values can be shared by many more in the world.

Chapter 56

The Way Ahead

Ambassador István Kovács
Permanent Representative of Hungary on the North Atlantic Council

ACT, THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT, AND AFGHANISTAN

What is the way ahead? My answer is that NATO has a bright future. Why? Because we have so many security challenges ahead of us, even unknown ones, that we obviously have a bright future.

On ACT, I want to say that it is an essential think tank for NATO, and during lean times, when we have financial economic crises and budget cuts, we have to use more of our brainpower, our gray matter, and we have to be more creative. I really believe that we can solve the way ahead by thinking a little bit more than we have in the past years.

I would also like to reflect on NATO's way ahead with the Strategic Concept by touching on a few subjects. For one, I believe that NATO's core function—one for all and all for one—will remain in the next Strategic Concept, and that collective defense will be foremost. Remember that NATO is foremost a political-military regional organization, but one that is faced with global challenges to its security. That is why you have seen NATO's role in the past, especially during the past 10 years, going out of area, and it will remain this way even though we want to stay a political-military regional organization.

The Open Door policy will also be emphasized in the Strategic Concept, but it has to be in line, as it has been up to this day, with Article 10 and with the Preamble of the treaty. This means that Alliance security cannot be weakened by any new additional member, so any new member has to bring stability, security, or even enhanced value to the alliance.

On Afghanistan, I would say that, yes, it is one of the most important NATO operations and one of the most important for many others in ISAF. But at the same time, I do not believe that Afghanistan is the future of NATO. We want to be successful, to stabilize the situation, and to hand over to the Afghans the security for and the running of their own country, with an economy that can be reliable and not depend on opium. We will help them and even stay there after military operations are no longer needed, but I do not think that it is the future of NATO, and not even the future of the Strategic Concept, to be approved in Lisbon in November 2010, because the life span of the Strategic Concept is usually about 10 years—the last one was enacted in 1999. So we believe that, within the next 10 years, Afghanistan and the other KFOR operation in the western Balkans and Kosovo will be successfully finished.

The new Strategic Concept will focus, in addition to the coalition, on the organization and its reform. Why do we need reform within NATO? There are many reasons, but two reasons are for sure: one, to be more efficient, to have a command and control structure that can successfully deliver and is geared to the traditional challenges that we still have to take care of as well as to the new challenges; and two, for financial reform, because even though some countries are luckily coming out of the current financial crisis, defense budgets were hit this year and this will have a ripple effect in 2011 and even 2012.

THE NEED FOR REFORM AND TO BE PREPARED

Cuts are needed but to achieve real efficiency first and foremost we must use our brain and our creativity better. Reforms are also needed because of the new challenges that lie ahead of us. We also need to take care of the asymmetric challenges that we face in Afghanistan and the future challenges that we will deal with in the Strategic Concept: Cyber defense, energy security, climate change, and many other things. It is very difficult to identify the future challenges because who would have said just a couple of months ago that there would be the earthquake in Haiti, the volcanic eruption in Iceland, and

an oil spill—these of course are not NATO's tasks to take care of, but they did affect almost all of us, for example, because we could not fly normally. So there are challenges that we may not be able to identify now, and that is why we need a clear mind and the ability to be mobile and to be ready for even those things that we cannot write down in the security concept. My main message is that we should be ready, prepared, flexible, mobile, and take on the new security challenges from any source and anywhere in the world that they come from.

RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA AND THE UKRAINE

On partnerships, I believe that Russia will remain a special partner, and I predict that within this next Strategic Concept, that is, within 10 years, despite the stagnation we see today in NATO-Russia relations, Russia will become much closer and will be much closer when we have to deal with the next Strategic Concept in 2020. This is due to NATO and Russia's rising common security challenges, such as terrorism, drug trafficking from Afghanistan, and a few others that we identified.

On Ukraine, I am certain that the country should remain a strategic partner of NATO despite the present turmoil, because we need Ukraine. Without becoming a NATO member, Ukraine should keep on track at least on the security side and we should continue our projects together. Of course, in the security concept, arms control and nonproliferation, both traditional and nuclear, will be issues, and I can tell you that the principle of consensus will be kept all across the board.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

To conclude, all of us need to have a much better communication strategy as of yesterday, not as of tomorrow, because we often lose public support because we are not coherent in our communication message, not only in the field but also with the media. I think our publics are sometimes not told the whole story, for example, why we are in an operation in which our sons and daughters are doing the duty to keep us safe. I would say that NATO has a bright future because of the many security challenges that are ahead of us. I am cautious about how many future challenges we will face, but we will be ready.

Chapter 57

Global Economic Health and Global Security Are Inseparable

J. David Patterson

Executive Director, National Defense Business Institute, University of Tennessee

ABSTRACT

Economic instability is moving through Europe. The European Union is scrambling to shore up the finances of the countries most affected. Greece has received a temporary reprieve, with Germany agreeing to lead the way as the European Union provides €750 billion (\$953 billion) in financial aid. But this assistance comes at a price back home for Germany. The German people are not universally in favor of providing Greece with financial assistance and many in Germany see this assistance as an assumption of a wider European Union economic responsibility. The specter of other countries with the same economic woes as Greece is not comforting. In the United States, Standard & Poor (S&P) lowered the debt rating on Spain's debt by a full step in April 2010. This downgrade comes on the heels of the December 2009 assessment by S&P that Spain's debt could reach 90% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Meanwhile, U.S. lawmakers are concerned that U.S. debt has reached historic levels and many believe the answer is to cut defense spending in order to meet the needs of the domestic agenda. We therefore expect to see a fall in defense spending in the immediate future. Does a reduction in defense spending mean a reduction in global security? This address explores the impact of defense spending and what actions should be taken to help promote global security.

INTRODUCTION

There has historically been a linkage between the global economic environment and the willingness of Alliance nations, including the United States, to invest in defense. When economic times are good, nations are inclined to invest more heavily in their own national security as well as in Transatlantic and Western European Alliance-based defense programs. The reverse is equally true: When economic times are challenging, individual national domestic agendas take considerably more prominence—often displacing security interests.

We are in the latter situation at present: The prospect of a decline in defense spending in the United States is real and the U.S. Defense Department leadership is laying the foundation for a reduction in funding for defense programs, despite some rhetoric to the contrary. In fact, there is a lack of enthusiasm for defense spending throughout the western defense alliances as all member countries face overwhelming domestic economic pressure. In order to better understand the nexus between nations' inclination to spend more of their national treasure on defense—thereby fortifying their contribution to global security—and the general global economic climate at the time, we must first look at the economic health of individual nations and how these nations have reacted in hard times.

DISCUSSION

The following is a short analysis that uses timely sources and commentary to assess events happening now. Of course, with time what is reviewed here will be dated. However, for the purpose of the International Workshop on Global Security, it should be current.

Economic Health of Alliance Nations

The discussion at the 26th International Workshop on Global Security on “The Business of Global Security in a Stressed Global Economy” was foundational in discussing this subject. Though the immediate effect on defense spending was a secondary consideration at that time, the subsequent loss of the equivalent of a full year of the world’s GDP, or over \$50 trillion (Patterson, 2009), has had a major impact that is clearly apparent now.

It is no secret that Europe is facing what may be its most daunting economic crisis in modern history. Debt is overwhelming NATO and EU countries whose staunch and dependable support of “collective defense” has been historic and effective. Again, to provide perspective, though Greece has been the focus of attention in the economic crisis, all European countries as well as the United States have experienced deep economic woes. The key indicator of economic health is how well a nation can sustain and service its debt.

Using currency as an indicator, the European debt crisis has done significant damage to the value of the euro. The euro has fallen to its lowest level since 2006. Within the EU community, Greece has been the barometer for the direction of the currency. Greece’s budget deficit in 2009 was nearly 14%, with a total debt of 120% of GDP. According to Bloomberg’s financial assessment, the fall in the value of the euro is a clear indication that the fiscal crisis is “spreading from Greece” and undermining confidence in the euro. (Czuczka and Worracate, 2010)

On May 10, 2010, European nations agreed to prop up Greece with loan packages of more than €750 billion (\$953 billion), but there is no guarantee that the euro’s decline will be halted. The International Monetary Fund’s contribution will be €250 billion (\$315 billion), the largest loan arrangement in the history of the fund. (The Economist, 2010) Investors, particularly in the U.S., have demonstrated their concerns with recent sell offs of stocks on the U.S. Stock Market. The week of May 17, 2010, the Dow Jones dropped over 300 points and posted the worst close since February, due principally to worries over debt in the U.S. and Europe. Those who frequently comment on European and U.S. debt issues expressed alarm regarding the debt in both the U.S. and Europe. William Stone, Chief Investment Strategist for PNC Wealth Management, described the recent market weakness specifically as “concern that the European sovereign debt problems will morph into another global economic downturn.” (TheStreet, 2010)

The U.S. Stock Market is not the only financial indicator to react to European economic conditions. Great Britain’s FTSE 100 index has fallen 14% since worries over the eurozone’s debt crisis came to the forefront, and it has declined nearly 8% over the course of the year. (Frearson, 2010)

Furthermore, it is not clear that providing financial assistance to Greece will indeed stem the economic problems that all of Europe is facing. In reaction to the Greek bailout, many countries in the euro region have begun the fiscal tightening of the availability of loans. This will slow any momentum toward a swift and substantial economic recovery. (Czuczka and Worracate, 2010)

Though Greece is the focus at the moment, other European countries face similar debt problems. As Raphael Minder explained in *The New York Times*, Spain is rapidly becoming a member of the staggering debt club. S&P’s recent de-rating of Spain’s debt rating from AA+ to AA is not on par with Portugal’s rating of A-, but nevertheless indicates the impact of Spain’s private sector indebtedness of 178% of GDP and an unemployment rate of 21%. (Minder, 2010)

The crux of the problem for Western European allies is the investment required in domestic welfare programs. A recent European Commission report stated that the percentage of Europeans older than 65 will have nearly doubled by 2050, making the financial burden on those still working a cause for real concern. Whereas in the 1950s, there were seven workers contributing to retirement accounts for every retiree, by 2050 there will be only 1.3 workers supporting every retiree. (Erlanger, 2010)

What was unthinkable just ten years ago is now becoming a reality: European countries are looking at reducing spending on domestic social programs. Michael Weissenstein, a journalist for the Associated Press, recently wrote that “Deep budget cuts are underway across Europe. Although the first round of cuts are mostly focused on government payrolls—the least politically explosive target—welfare benefits are looking increasingly vulnerable.” The German government, for example, is planning to cut €3 billion (\$3.78 billion) from its domestic budget and is looking at reducing unemployment benefits in order to do so. The proposal would involve lowering the amount paid to out of work Germans from 60% to less than 50% of their last recorded salary before taxes, a reduction of almost 17% in annual unemployment benefits. (Weissenstein, 2010)

According to Weissenstein, other nations are making the same hard choices. The week of May 24, 2010, the United Kingdom revealed a plan that cuts government payrolls and expenses by £6 billion (\$8.6 billion) and also requires the unemployed to make a real effort to find jobs in order to be eligible for unemployment benefits. (Weissenstein, 2010)


The economic conditions in Europe have not been lost on U.S. industry, particularly those in the defense business. CEOs of major defense companies like Honeywell and United Technologies Corporation have expressed their concerns. These fears center on the amount of sovereign debt in Europe as well as on the precarious position of the euro. (Malone, 2010)

As all European countries increasingly focus on domestic agendas and priorities, cutting defense spending will be a more and more attractive option. The irony of the economic circumstances in which Europe, and by association the United States, find themselves is all too clear: The European welfare state built after World War II as “the keystone of a shared prosperity meant to prevent future conflict” may be the very thing contributing to instability. (Weissenstein, 2010)

The Effect of Stressed Economies on Global Security

Defense Secretary Robert Gates recently made a speech at the Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kansas on the occasion of the 65th Anniversary of the Victory of World War II in Europe. His remarks portend how the United States is reacting to economic pressures. He stated that:

“The attacks of September 11, 2001, opened a gusher of defense spending that nearly doubled the base budget over the last decade, not counting supplemental appropriations for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Which brings us to the situation we face and the choices we have today—as a defense department and as a country. Given America’s difficult economic circumstances and parlous fiscal condition, military spending on things large and small can and should expect closer, harsher scrutiny. The gusher has been turned off, and will stay off for a good period of time.” (Gates, 2010)



On the graph above, the dashed line depicts the variation in the procurement account for the U.S. Department of Defense. It shows the willingness of the U.S. to buy military weapons and equipment over the years from Fiscal Year (FY) 1960 to FY 2010. The amounts are in then year dollars to show the appetite for defense spending historically in any one year. The dotted line is the expenditure on research and development and shows less variation over that same period. The solid line shows the percent change in GDP from one fiscal year to the next. We can see that when the highest spikes in the percent change in GDP are followed by significant negative changes in percent change, these variations correspond to high spikes in the procurement account followed by significant reductions in defense spending on weapons and equipment. The significance of this rough comparison is that where the highest spikes occur in the percent change in GDP, the reductions

in defense spending were the greatest in U.S. history. The situation we see today may therefore foretell an equally drastic reduction in U.S. spending on weapon systems.

Another indication that there will be pressure on defense spending due to the general economic conditions is the unwillingness of other countries to share the current burden of global security or step up to new defense funding challenges. Again, David Ignatius describes this issue:

“NATO members in Europe were mostly failing to meet their defense spending commitments even before the financial crisis that hit Greece, Spain, Portugal, and other nations. They will be even less likely to share burdens now that they have to fund a trillion-dollar financial bailout for the eurozone...”

The debt crisis, both in Europe and the U.S., has significant U.S. national security implications and Pentagon analysts have made the issue the subject of a senior leadership study. An analysis this year inside the U.S. Defense Department pointed out that of the top 25 nations with the most debt, the United States ranked number 19. (Ignatius, 2010)

Though seemingly paradoxical or at least ill timed, the financial woes of the United States are driving the U.S. to put pressure on European nations to meet their fiscal obligations to NATO. This comes at a time when European countries are least capable of doing so. Admiral James Stavridis, NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe, is holding firm for NATO members to honor their obligations to devote 2% of their GDP to NATO. In comments made to the Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C., Stavridis emphasized that the 2% goal was not “unreasonable” considering the wealth of NATO member nations. (Bennett, 2010) However, in 2008 only five of the 26 NATO countries had met the target of 2% of GDP spending on defense. One of those countries, oddly enough, was Greece, who continues to meet that commitment. (Neuger, 2010)

Admiral Stavridis’ request for NATO nations to hold to the 2% goal notwithstanding, the realities of Europe’s economic straits have prompted defense spending to be put under a microscope throughout Europe. Stavridis also has called for finding ways to reduce NATO spending. One area he is focusing on is the rank structure. At a breakfast for defense writers in Washington, DC on May 17 of this year, Stavridis suggested there could be “significant cuts of both flag officers—generals and admirals—as well as staff for the U.S. and NATO allies.” (Lubold, 2010)

Other NATO countries are also looking at cost saving measures. The Dutch are reviewing a number of options to cut costs by as much as €2.1 billion (\$2.67 billion). (Kerres, 2010) Greece is evidently inclined to make whatever adjustments in defense spending it must. Greek Defense Minister Panos Beglitis has made it very clear that he is going to cut his country’s defense budget by 12%, from €6.8 billion (\$8.6 billion) to €6 billion (\$7.6 billion), which will be roughly 2.8% of Greece’s GDP. (Defense News, 2010) The Italian government recently announced that it is planning a 10% reduction in its defense budget. In an effort to cope with its debt, Italy’s “emergency debt reduction package” will hit the Italian defense budget hard in 2011, leaving the military in serious funding difficulties since this new defense budget reduction will come on top of a 20% cut in the military operations and maintenance account. (Kingston, 2010)

Additionally, the U.S. is trying to get the NATO allies in Europe to assume responsibility for the missile defense mission. This would levy an additional burden on European members but result in significant savings for the U.S. (Malone, 2010). However, getting Europe to shoulder the missile defense burden—or at least share it—is not the only initiative on the table. In May 2010, the NATO Strategic Concept Expert Group issued its recommendations as to how NATO should focus its strategic efforts in the coming decade. It was the first strategic review since 1999. What made this project unique was that the members spent considerable time assessing how to make NATO more economical, efficient, and effective. One of the key recommendations was to have NATO countries better pool their resources to achieve economies of scale, making “more efficient use of our money.” (NATO Strategic Concept Expert Group, 2010) James Neuger, who followed the deliberations of the Strategic Concept Expert Group on behalf of Bloomberg, quotes NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen as saying that, “This is about much more than just money: It’s also about security. Too deep cuts at the expense of future security may also have damaging economic implications.” This makes it clear, however, that there will certainly be cuts to defense budgets in reaction to national economic pressures. (Neuger, 2010)

It was clear that the state of the European and U. S. economies played a significant role in the recommendations of the NATO Strategic Concept Expert Group. Ambassador Madeleine Albright, the chairman of the NATO Panel, summed it up for the other delegates by explaining, “We take note of the fact that taxpayers are the same for most of the countries [in NATO and the EU]. It’s important to be efficient and try to figure out ways where the two organizations can co-operate so there is not a duplication.” (Pop, 2010)

CONCLUSIONS

As the allied nations in Europe and the transatlantic partners feel the financial pressures of the global economic conditions, concerns for security in each individual country as well as collective defense objectives may be forced to the bottom in terms of national priorities. There is clearly great economic stress on both Europe and the United States, and the debt they carry is an ever-present reminder of that stress. Our imperative is global security, in both good and bad economic times.

While global economic conditions demand timely and difficult decisions, we all stand to benefit from good government decisions that reinforce the need for fielding existing, adequate capabilities in order to drive down costs. None of us can afford to invest large sums of our nations' resources in striving for an exquisite capability solution at the expense of a good capability solution with growth potential. The best approach is always to adopt low cost, high value alternative solutions that are the result of thoughtful deliberation. Otherwise, we risk waiting until budget realities drive us to make poor decisions—ones that all too often end up being expedient, precipitous program cancellations.

To conclude, the lesson of the times is that there is never a good rationale for waste in a nation's budget. In his speech at the Eisenhower Library, Secretary Gates also reminded the audience of the words of his predecessor on September 10, 2001: "Every dollar squandered on waste is one denied to the warfighter." Global security and global economic health are indeed inseparable topics, causing us all to pay increasing attention to the cost of defense.



international workshop series on global security

SPONSORED BY

U.S. Department of Defense | German Federal Ministry of Defense | EADS

Microsoft | Northrop Grumman

Cisco | Lockheed Martin | URS | Thales | MITRE | McAfee

The University of Tennessee (NDBI)

CENTER FOR STRATEGIC DECISION RESEARCH & STRATEGIC DECISIONS PRESS

2456 Sharon Oaks Drive | Menlo Park, California 94025 USA | www.csdr.org