Many Workshop participants were instrumental in creating "the new NATO," and many continue to be intimately involved in its current work. For this reason, I will not go over the well-trod ground of how NATO has refocused its efforts from defense and deterrence in the Cold War era to the current promotion of stability. Instead, I will try to look ahead and describe in concrete terms the tasks that I believe we must accomplish as we approach the next century.
In January 1994, the Brussels Summit reconfirmed NATO's core functions and firmly put the accent on using NATO's experience and influence to reach out to our East and enhance our crisis management role. NATO's policy and direction were clearly set out. The problems we must now address are practical--the kind that NATO is good at solving. Let me review them and talk about the tasks NATO is and will be facing.
NATO's support of United Nations activities in the former Yugoslavia is a continuing urgent operational requirement. I believe that everyone who knows what NATO has undertaken in this regard has been impressed by the Alliance's effectiveness. Without NATO's strong participation in maritime embargo enforcement, the U.N. would not have been able to impose sanctions as effectively as it has. Without NATO air power, the enforcement of a No-Fly Zone over Bosnia's air space would have been impossible. Without the decisions taken by NATO in February and April 1994, Sarajevo and Gorazde would still be under attack.
NATO's role in the former Yugoslavia has not been limited solely to operations. We have stated on a number of occasions that the Alliance supports the international effort to reach a durable, negotiated peace settlement and that, once it is achieved, we are prepared to contribute to its implementation. We have also developed a contingency plan to assist the U.N. in evaluating the military requirements of a peace plan for Bosnia.
NATO's supportive role in the former Yugoslavia has also helped forge a close and effective working relationship with the U.N. We had to construct this relationship in the heat of the developing crisis. Now, however, the "getting to know one another" period is over. We are in close touch with the U.N. Secretary General, his office, and his Special Representative. I believe that these close working relationships between NATO and the U.N. form a pattern that will be very useful in the future. Conflict prevention and the management of crises will likely require our organizations to continue to work together to provide mutual support in common endeavors.
This brings me to NATO's second task: realizing the full potential of Partnership for Peace. It is no exaggeration to say that Partnership for Peace has the potential to fundamentally transform the relationship between NATO and Partner countries. Partnership activities will be tailored to the specific needs of each Partner country. Moreover, much of Partnership for Peace will involve practical cooperation programs between NATO and Partner military forces. It will allow Partner states to develop cooperative military relations with NATO and engage in joint planning, training, and exercises. These activities will strengthen our Partners' ability to operate with NATO forces in fields such as peacekeeping, search and rescue, and humanitarian operations.
The Partnership also has a wider political aim: to sustain the new democracies in their commitment to the principles and objectives of the U.N. and CSCE and to achieve a full democratic accountability of military forces. For this purpose, the Partnership will facilitate transparency in national defense planning and budgeting processes, and democratic control of defense forces. Active Partner countries will also have the opportunity to consult with NATO if they perceive a direct threat to their territorial integrity, political independence, or security. Thus, NATO is responding to Partners' concerns about the possibility of rising tensions and the need for a mechanism to consult with NATO in cases of emergency.
I can report to you that Partnership for Peace is well on track and has become one of the top priorities on the Alliance's political agenda. As of June 1994, twenty countries have signed up; we have received ten Presentation Documents and are currently establishing the first Individual Partnership Programs. The first peacekeeping field exercises are in the offing this fall--one in the Netherlands and one in Poland. A maritime exercise is also being planned by the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) for later in 1994. Our Partnership Coordination Cell near Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) is already up and running, and I recently had the pleasure of cutting the ribbon opening the Partner building at NATO Headquarters. For the first time in our history, non-members will be permanently represented at NATO, working alongside NATO's diplomats and military officers and sharing their varied and accumulated experience. Our Partners have come to stay, not to visit.
Clearly, Partnership for Peace is having an effect in transforming the European security landscape. Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev reassured us in June 1994 in Istanbul that Russia will sign the Framework Document as it stands. In our North Atlantic Council (NAC) Communique, we have also offered the Russians a broad dialogue in pursuit of common goals in areas where Russia has a unique or particularly important contribution to make, both inside and outside the Partnership for Peace.
Partnership for Peace offers considerable potential for expanded cooperation with Russia. For example, the principle of self-differentiation underlying the Partnership offers much leeway for the development of a pragmatic NATO/Russia relationship that reflects Russia's special weight in European security. Such pragmatic cooperation would serve the interests of Russia, NATO, and Central and Eastern Europe alike. Let me be very clear, however: on issues such as NATO's expansion, there will be no Russian veto. Nor do we agree with ideas to subordinate the Alliance under the CSCE. NATO will reach decisions by a consensus of 16, not 16 plus 1.
Another task that is currently underway and will require further development concerns how to deal with the proliferation threat. At the Istanbul Ministerial in early June 1994, NATO foreign ministers endorsed an "Alliance Policy Framework on Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction." This document is now in the public realm. In short, NATO's approach to proliferation will have a dual political and defense dimension. In the political field, the Alliance will seek to support, without duplication, work being done in other international fora and institutions. We will also use the fora provided under the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) to consult with our Cooperation Partners on this subject, with the aim of fostering common understandings and approaches.
In the defense field, we will examine in detail the current and potential threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. If necessary, we will seek to improve our defense capabilities and to consider how NATO's defense posture can support diplomatic efforts to prevent or reverse proliferation.
As we approach the conference for the renewal of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, our first aim will be to reinforce the existing diplomatic means for the prevention of proliferation. Beyond that, our summit leaders have endorsed the development of a policy for defense in case prevention fails.
Let me turn now to the need to adapt NATO's structures further. Initial work has started on this task. Yet, because of its complexity, completion should be seen in the longer term. This task should be placed in its proper context. At the Rome Summit in November 1991, Alliance leaders adopted a new Strategic Concept. This concept recognized that, in the future, Alliance security would likely be affected more by conflicts and instabilities arising in neighboring regions than by direct threats to the territories of Allied states.
Today, NATO has a broader, more cooperative approach to security. It has also developed a new structure, in which flexible multinational rapid reaction forces figure prominently. In the political sphere, NATO has given its strong support to the strengthening of the European pillar of the Alliance. At the Brussels Summit, Allied leaders gave their full support to the development of a European security and defense identity. Regarding the Western European Union (WEU), and on the basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Council, Allied leaders stated that they were ready to make collective assets of the Alliance available for WEU operations undertaken by the European Allies in pursuit of their Common Foreign and Security Policy.
The second area of additional flexibility concerns the military sphere. In line with the Brussels Summit decisions, we are also examining how to enhance the effectiveness of our military capabilities for collective defense operations and, at the same time, provide for the use of these capabilities under European Union/WEU auspices. The increased military flexibility we now need will be realized through the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF). This concept envisages using the Alliance's existing headquarters structures as a basis for establishing deployable multi-service headquarters. These latter would be mobilized when required for peacekeeping operations, and for training and exercises. NATO attaches great importance to this work, which will enhance the Alliance's ability to respond to crises and provide separable but not separate military capabilities that could be employed by NATO or the WEU. The CJTF concept could also provide a means for involving Cooperation Partners in contingency operations. We are keeping the WEU informed of progress made so far, and arrangements are being developed to ensure cooperation between NATO and the WEU in implementing relevant aspects of the CJTF concept.
The agenda I have set out is ambitious. Supporting the U.N. in the former Yugoslavia, developing Partnership for Peace, addressing the proliferation threat, and further adapting NATO's political and military structures will take up most of NATO's time and activities over the next few years. But a remarkable feature of each of the tasks I have mentioned is that they are not exclusive to, or narrowly focused on, NATO. They represent instead a major contribution by the Alliance to the wider European security agenda. They will require an unprecedented degree of cooperation, consultation, and coordination with Partners and other organizations.
In drawing to a close, I would like to emphasize that the Alliance is an essential--I would say the essential--element in the development of a new European security order. Through change and adaptation, it has developed into a state-of-the-art model for building security; the Alliance is indispensable not only to its members but also (and increasingly) to its Partners and others. By keeping our Alliance strong, we are keeping bright our hope for a secure future. This contribution is possibly the most significant and important one that the Alliance can make in expanding peace and stability in an unsettled world.