Deputy Secretary General Sergio Balanzino opened this year's NATO Workshop by describing several new initiatives: the Partnership for Peace, Combined Joint Task Force, and Counter Proliferation programs. Belgian Foreign Minister Willy Claes, Swedish Foreign Minister af Ugglas, former Congressman and Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, and Finnish Ambassador Jaakko Blomberg discussed the political and security implications of these initiatives and provided views from both the Northern and Central parts of NATO. For my part, I would like to give my assessment of where Allied Command Europe is today, and where it is going. Although I have few answers, I do have some questions and some ideas.
My remarks will focus on the implementation of a new NATO. Much attention has already been devoted to the different initiatives resulting from the January 1994 Summit, and we have already heard many perspectives on the roles of our new Partners as well as the uncertainty and instability that still exist in Europe. I would like to make three additional points concerning our changing Alliance:
Let me be more specific about the first point. Over the past 40 years, we built and maintained a robust NATO sustained at a high state of readiness, although quite unlikely to be committed. Today, we have drastically reduced the size of the force. In some cases, we have cut readiness at the very same time that NATO is committed and operating out of area. This situation can be somewhat problematic. From a force structure standpoint, peacekeeping operations can be more demanding than Cold War operations. Every battalion committed to peacekeeping requires two or three battalions to support it.
We are also working in an environment of constrained resources and budgets. In the next two years, many nations within the Alliance will reduce their force structures anywhere from 20 to 60 percent. Equally troublesome is the cutback in both modernization and R&D funds. After years of sacrifice, the people of our member nations expect some sort of peace dividend--and rightly so. Reductions have been and, I believe, will continue to be severe. Yet our requirements continue to grow. I am not hand-wringing, just pointing out the facts that we must live with as the mission of the operational arm of NATO continues.
From Norway, at the northern boundary of Allied Command Europe, to Turkey, on the southern boundary, we are committed in many different ways. In the south, we are in the former Yugoslavia doing a non-Article 5 mission. To be more specific, we are conducting Operation Deny Flight, in which NATO is enforcing U.N. Security Council resolutions with over 200 combat aircraft. In Operation Sharp Guard, the enforcement of the U.N.'s maritime embargo, NATO provides support with about 25 combat warships. We are also involved in a "be-prepared" mission for an operation called Discipline Guard in the event of a negotiated settlement. Elsewhere in the Balkans, forces from NATO states are supporting Able Sentry in the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia. We have a multinational operation airlifting and airdropping humanitarian aid in the former Yugoslavia; it is called Provide Promise. Moreover, we have Provide Comfort, a multinational operation in support of the U.N. in Turkey. Those are real commitments that draw assets from one single pot--Allied Command Europe.
But there are still more requirements and commitments. Let me cite just a few. Part of our mission remains to prepare for an Article 5 situation, and that requires considerable training. We have now been asked to prepare for a Combined Joint Task Force headquarters. Although we are still waiting for clear instructions on this, it is, nonetheless, a requirement. We also have the Partnership for Peace program, for which 20 Partners had signed up as of mid-June 1994. Its impact on the Alliance will be very extensive. And the states of the former Soviet Union still have more than 20,000 nuclear weapons. Lieutenant General O'Neill and Secretary Aspin have described the implications of that fact in terms of theater missile defense.
All these challenges and commitments demonstrate that Allied Command Europe has a much more diverse set of missions than ever before. Today, we must determine how to create a framework for our various missions--a framework that makes sense both to the operating command and to our member nations. We must also determine the overall implications of these missions in terms of command, control, and resources for the entire integrated military structure.
Let me sum up my first point: This is the new NATO, a vastly different Alliance than the one whose primary mission was to face an attack from Soviet forces. We must adjust to that challenge in terms of missions and resources--requirements and contributions. In doing so, we must make good on a unique opportunity to create, in our lifetime, a new Europe--one whole and free, from the Atlantic to the Urals.
We have to be realistic about what we are facing. We must make some tough assessments and provide clear military advice to the political and military leaders of the Alliance. Then, we can take clear, timely, comprehensive political guidance from Brussels and use the Partnership for Peace and Combined Joint Task Force efforts to prepare to work with our Partners in peacekeeping and humanitarian relief activities. If our Partners are going to stand up forces to work with NATO in out of area or peacekeeping commitments, it also makes sense for those Partners to train to common standards, use common procedures, and follow a common doctrine in order to create the best conditions for success. Perhaps the Partnership Coordination Cell can help provide such doctrine, training, and exercises for interested Partners who could later work under a Combined Joint Task Force controlled by either NATO or non-NATO. Linking and leveraging the Combined Joint Task Force and Partnership for Peace in this way makes excellent sense operationally. If we can succeed in attaining such synergy, we will have a new NATO, one in which we work with our Partners in a truly proactive and productive manner.
Now, I would like to turn to my third point: how we can work with other organizations, including the U.N. or the WEU. Operating with another organization may involve making Combined Joint headquarters and other assets available. But, before we hand over such resources, we must make sure that we understand that there is only one pot--one set of assets from which to draw. The required assets for both non-Article 5 and Article 5 missions include combat forces, combat support forces, and combat service support forces. When we make those resources available in a non-Article 5 area, they may involve only 10 to 20 percent of our available combat forces but employ 75 to 80 percent of our available logistics, communications, and intelligence forces. This makes things very difficult because there are only a limited number of resources from which to draw, and I am responsible to our political and military masters for the apportionment of those assets. As we look more closely at peace-support operations, we must take into consideration the impact they will have on the rest of our missions and our strategy.
I want to underscore the fact that many of our most critical assets are in very short supply. It will be quite important in the future for us and for all NATO member nations to be very much aware of how those shortages affect operational capability. For example, every satellite communication (SATCOM) system in Allied Command Europe is currently supporting operations in the former Yugoslavia. So, as we look at new NATO initiatives and proposals and as we contemplate committing more of our forces, we must keep in mind such shortages and the continuing needs of commanders across the Alliance. In doing so, we will be able to provide both the Military Committee and the North Atlantic Council with clear military advice, especially on the apportionment of forces, before forces are committed.
Let me add a few more thoughts before concluding. First, we need to find ways to do better leader development training. The changing world environment makes it imperative to prepare our nations' senior leaders for the full spectrum of possible challenges. This is a tough assignment; and we need seminars, study sessions, and computer-assisted exercises to help in this effort. In May, we conducted the first high-level exercise within Allied Command Europe. It was well-attended by flag officers from throughout the Alliance; we will continue to emphasize this sort of training. We welcome assistance and suggestions on how to proceed in the leader development of Allied Command Europe.
My second thought concerns interoperability, which has been a NATO issue for decades. Today, as we begin to operate with new Partners, we need to consider what that concept means to PFP in terms of communications, command and control, logistics, and other common areas. In the former Yugoslavia, for example, 35 nations are involved--many of them trained to different standards, with different doctrines, different forms of communications, and different logistics. If we have the opportunity, and if our Partners are willing, I believe we should try to determine how to create the best conditions for success in working together with air, land, and sea forces. So, interoperability will become a major PFP issue. I will try to use the SHAPE Technical Center to assist me with it, but I would also welcome any suggestions as we move ahead in this very important field.
Regarding peace-support operations, one might ask a number of questions. Should we integrate them into the total spectrum of our training? Should we include both Article 5 and non-Article 5 missions in our training plan? Should we consider different methods depending on the presence of conscripts and volunteers in the force? Peace-support operations are very difficult and complex missions, and we need to understand how to train both NATO and Partner forces to conduct them.
My final point concerns liaison, particularly with the U.N. Clearly, as we continue to support U.N. forces, we must establish some sort of liaison mechanism between our organizations, both at the political and military levels. On the military level, it is certainly important to discuss procedures and rules of engagement, as well as command and control, with the United Nations before commitment.
Today, we are witnessing the emergence of a new NATO. Even as we build this new organization, we must continue to nurture the solidarity, mutual trust, and confidence that have made the Alliance great. At the same time, we must conduct the whole new spectrum of missions ranging from Article 5 to peace-support operations. To do so efficiently and effectively will require the understanding and support of our member nations. We must stabilize our existing forces, have clarity in both our missions and purpose, and continue to promote modernization and technological development. To do all this will require unprecedented innovation and imagination by the leadership of Allied Command Europe and the member nations. It will require the insights of clear-thinking leaders.
The Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) appreciated the opportunity to participate in the Eleventh NATO Workshop, which is also the eighth that our agency has supported. This year, Norway's beautiful land was an ideal setting for what proved to be one of the truly valuable conferences of this type. Such workshops are an extremely important part of DNA's vision of how we should modify our research and development program from year to year to ensure that we meet the war fighters' requirements. One of DNA's primary operational missions is to provide technical support assessments and advice to the operational commanders. By participating in such workshops, we are better able to understand those requirements. Furthermore, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which is a primary concern of the United States, is increasingly becoming a concern of the Alliance and the world at large. This concern includes deterrence, arms control, treaty support, deep underground targets, collateral effects and damage, preemptive strikes, mission planning, Nunn-Lugar support, lethality, and defensive forces. All these issues are part of DNA's research and development program.
Because of the importance of DNA's relationship with Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), it was a great pleasure for me to introduce General George Joulwan, who has been the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) since October 1993 and is the eleventh SACEUR in succession since General Eisenhower. General Joulwan has spent over half of his career in Europe, serving in a variety of positions throughout the Berlin Wall era, from its construction to its fall. Born in Pottsville, Pennsylvania, he graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, and went on to serve two combat tours in Vietnam. During his fourteen years in Germany, he went from platoon leader to division commander. General Joulwan came to SHAPE last year after serving as Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Southern Command. In his short time on the job, he has been faced with numerous challenges, one of which is NATO's involvement in military actions for the first time since its inception. General Joulwan's responsibilities are awesome, and NATO's military command is very fortunate to have him at the helm.
The distinguished group of commanders whose remarks appear below are General Joulwan's brain trust. Admiral Leighton Smith, the Commander of Allied Forces Southern Europe, is principally involved with the situation in the former Yugoslavia; General Helge Hansen is Commander of Allied Forces Central Europe, and the officer in charge of the two Partnership exercises that have been scheduled in the Netherlands and Poland; General Sir Garry Johnson is the Commander of Allied Forces Northern Europe; finally, General Danielsen is the head of the ACE Reaction Force Planning staff at SHAPE. Their contributions will help us understand how to look at events and issues from the perspective of their applications to the military and to the allied operating command.
In the former Yugoslavia, we have four distinct ongoing operations: Deny Flight, Sharp Guard, Provide Promise, and the development of plans in the event that the U.N. should ask NATO to execute a peacekeeping operation. Each of these programs have different chains of command. Some go through national channels; others go through NATO channels or in parallel with the U.N. and NATO. Generally, in "Lessons Learned," we try to discover what is wrong and spend little time on what is right. But a good mission statement derived from clear political guidance is the common element that led to success on all operations in which I have been personally involved. Such guidance is vital and must come up front. With it, you can develop a military concept of operations and a plan to follow that concept. Unfortunately, political guidance is at times received infrequently and may not be clearly or completely understood.
A second element of success comes from clear rules of engagement, together with an understanding of how each nation will follow them. For example, Germans can or cannot do certain things because of interpretations of their constitution; a Greek ship can or cannot do other things for political reasons. But we can accommodate these differences as long as we know them in advance.
Trained individuals--people who have a level of expertise that allows them to be certified for a given operation--are a third element. When pilots and crews come to Deny Flight, for instance, they go through a certification process that includes familiarization flights. They are also tested on Rules of Engagement before being certified individually by Commander AFSOUTH. In the same way, ships' commanding officers and crews go through a training and certification process before being put in their positions. As a result, when Sharp Guard or Deny Flight crews are asked to act within their mission statement, there is no doubt that they can do it.
Our Intelligence is very good. Although no Intelligence is perfect, ours is as good as it can be for a given situation. The great deal of effort that has gone into this area is providing good situational awareness and a good tactical picture.
Most people do not think much about trust, but it comes as a result of meeting people and working together. In Deny Flight, for example, the situation is not ideal from a unity of command viewpoint. Yet there is clear unity of effort and purpose because of the personal relationships Bertrand de Lapresle, Michael Rose, and myself have established, and because we communicate frequently. Of course, we do not agree on everything, but we can work together effectively.
Finally, when trying to develop an operational order for peacekeeping, it is important that these orders be dynamic, because operations that were envisioned six months ago may have changed a great deal in the meantime.
I would like to comment on the SHAPE Technical Center (STC) using my personal experience at SHAPE as Deputy Chief of Staff Operations. If any organization has really earned the name Rapid Reaction, it is the STC. The deployment of forces from the center to the southern flanks could not have been handled as it was--under tight political control and reacting to daily demands--without the SHAPE Technical Center's help in creating an inter-regional command and control system and its rapid development of the software and hardware interfaces. The SHAPE Technical Center is also developing a software and hardware technology that will be valuable over the mid and long term. When rapid reaction is needed in times of crisis, this center is most responsive and, in my view, one of our most precious assets at the disposal of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe.
During the Workshop discussion, General Hjalmar Sunde asked whether resource constraints, as well as the concentration on peacekeeping, were beginning to draw down the funds available for Article 5-type training. As a subordinate commander to SACEUR, I believe that there is such a danger. Peacekeeping, which is the thing of the moment, uses SACEUR's resources; peacekeeping takes people from my headquarters and General Hansen's (CINC Central Europe) in order to give them to Admiral Smith (CINC Southern Europe). Moreover, some governments and politicians find this process so absorbing that they happily divert resources from Article 5 situations, because they think that the risks of an Article 5 situation are improbably low. Surely, Admiral Smith would say that the AWACS used in his peacekeeping operation are effective because they are trained for Article 5 at the higher end of the war-fighting spectrum.
Therefore, I occasionally get worried when people angle in on peacekeeping, saying, for example, "Let's teach peacekeeping. That is the thing of the future." I then remember the head of the armed forces of an English-speaking nation on the other side of the world who was concerned about isolation; he wanted to send forces over to join in a peacekeeping operation but feared that, in doing so, his forces would forget war-fighting--which is what they were really trained for. I sometimes look at the exercise program and wonder whether we are in danger of losing sight of the real purpose of the Alliance's armed forces--and not just Article 5. After all, as SACEUR said, you may begin a peacekeeping intervention at one end of the war-fighting spectrum and who knows to what level it will grow before you are finished. Therefore, we need to maintain our war-fighting capability.
General Joulwan asked me to collect the lessons learned from the former Yugoslavia as a way to help NATO's planning and execution of operations. One aim was to establish a "Center for Lessons Learned" that would permit us to systematically benefit from our experience. In order to improve future interoperability, we must keep track of the lessons we learned. I am not ready yet to give details about the lessons from the former Yugoslavia, but our work should be completed soon.
Perhaps, a group of experts could define the problem areas for interoperability, but I do not believe it is that easy. Only exercises will show us where difficulties lie and how to take corrective action. Since exercises will cost money, I hope that the politicians will follow through on their decisions to allocate sufficient resources for that purpose.
We will be able to develop a common doctrine, common standards, and common procedures for peacekeeping or peace-support operations, but it will take time. Although this kind of work initially began during the Second World War, some areas still call for improvement. The interoperability problem may be easier to define, however, when it is restricted to peace-support operations. Of course, as General Joulwan pointed out, interoperability is a two-way street. We cannot merely place huge stacks of NATO documents on the table and ask our Partners to read them. We also need to draw on their own expertise, since many of the Partner countries have substantial experience with peacekeeping operations that could benefit NATO.
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