Bergen is an excellent place for reflecting on the relations between Northern Europe and the continent as a whole. This is due in part to its beauty, but also to its history. Eight hundred years ago, Bergen was the site of a famous Cistercian monastery with close links to monasteries in England, France, and several others in Sweden. This network of monasteries was an important part of the medieval European architecture, one might say, although the monks themselves employed that word more literally. At about the same time, Bergen became, in the commercial sphere, an important member of the Hanseatic League, which linked together German and other cities as far apart as Bruges in Belgium, Novgorod in Russia, and, of course, Visby in between. I am using these two examples to illustrate the basic fact that the North has always been an integral part of Europe. We were Europeans long before there was a European Union. And now, the North is as deeply affected by the dramatic transformations of our continent as any other part of it--perhaps more than many others, as I shall try to explain.
If I claim that there are five pillars of Swedish security policy, it may sound as if I am overburdening the architectural imagery. But, for brevity's sake, I would like to base my points on five themes, which may be described as pillars of security.
The first pillar represents continuity in the form of continued non-participation in military alliances, supported by a strong national defense. Since Napoleonic times, Sweden has stayed out of military alliances and also out of war. Abroad, this policy of neutrality was not always viewed as glorious, but it was acknowledged by most as realistic and constructive. And we have paid for it in terms of a substantial national defense effort. During the Cold War, there was no military vacuum in the North; despite the strategic importance of the region, the peacetime military presence of the two blocs could be kept to a minimum, and tensions maintained at a low level. A strong Swedish defense contributed to regional stability, and still does.
From the 1950s to the 1980s, the policy of neutrality was strongly emphasized as the unchangeable bedrock of Swedish foreign policy. This was done to such an extent that people sometimes lost sight of the fact that neutrality was never an end in itself, but always an instrument. Departures from this policy and attempts to find other solutions were certainly made. Joining the League of Nations in the 1920s was one example--with its sanctions policy and without Germany and the Soviet Union; trying to establish a Scandinavian defense alliance in the late 1940s was another. In the Cold War atmosphere, however, the instrumental nature of the policy of neutrality was sometimes lost. As a result of self-imposed restrictions, we also refrained from political cooperation that might have been regarded as potentially compromising the credibility of the policy we had chosen. Twenty-three years ago, the Swedish government of the day concluded that membership in the European Community would not be compatible with our security policy.
This reflection on the past is intended to clarify what has changed for Sweden and what has not. Sweden continues to stay outside military alliances. We shall continue to have a strong national defense. As in other countries, our defense will undoubtedly remain under the same pressures to be "leaner but meaner." But defense spending is being maintained and has actually increased in real terms recently. It will continue to be a stabilizing factor in the North. While these are factors of continuity, a fundamental change is taking place: the self-imposed restrictions of the past concerning foreign and security policy cooperation have been replaced by our interest in becoming active participants in European affairs again. This brings me to the other pillars of Swedish security.
I would point to the European Union (EU) as the second pillar. Sweden's application for membership in the EU is probably the single most important Swedish foreign policy decision since World War II and, possibly, of this century. It is getting to be viewed in this light in Sweden. There is an awareness of the historical dimension: after 180 years, we are joining continental affairs in a programmatic way.
In security terms, EU membership is seen in Sweden as a bonus or a plus. Even if most of the Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) still remains to be developed, we believe the continuing integration process per se and the community created by daily cooperation adds to our security. But the importance of the EU in security terms goes beyond this, of course. First, the European Union is the natural center of gravity and source of attraction for Central and Eastern Europe. It is the key factor for extending West European stability eastward. The membership prospect is indeed a stabilizing force in the political affairs of Central and Eastern European countries that still need to come in from the cold.
Second, the European Union can only handle the many new security challenges facing it today by developing coherent common policies. Although this paper was presented at a workshop on political-military decision making, it is worth underlining that the immediate threats to European stability, the former Yugoslavia notwithstanding, are not primarily military in nature. I am thinking of the many new so-called low-level threats emanating from the "debris of disintegration" in the East, or from the economic pressures and social unrest in regions to the South of our continent. The consequences of organized crime, illegal migration, and trafficking in drugs and weapons; refugees; and environmental hazards are being felt more widely. They require common responses, including common European Union policies.
As a member of the European Union, Sweden will work toward strengthening the CFSP. Whatever lessons are drawn from the tragedies in the former Yugoslavia, an obvious one is that we need more, not fewer, instruments for responding jointly to crises, and we also need more, not fewer, common foreign policies. The only restriction, of course, is that joint action can be developed only when members of the Union have important interests in common, to quote the Maastricht Treaty. We hope that this commonality will be strengthened. The C in CFSP stands for "common" and not for "convenience." As you may know, the Swedish Parliament has determined that our relationship to the Western European Union (WEU) will be defined only once we become members of the EU. Yet, it is already easy to see that we would have an obvious interest in becoming observers in the Western European Union.
As a European Union member, we expect to cooperate loyally in meeting the challenges facing the Union from various directions, including the South. Correspondingly, we hope that, together with the other Nordic countries, we shall bring to the Union a distinct Northern dimension.
Here I come to the third pillar of Swedish security. Russia directly meets the West only in the North of Europe, and I would submit that changes since the Cold War have been almost as dramatic in Northern as in Eastern Europe. The three Baltic States have recovered their independence. The Baltic Sea has ceased to be a maritime equivalent of the Berlin Wall. Northwestern Russia is starting to regain its natural place as an integrated participant in a regional cooperation that dates back to Viking trade, Novgorod as part of the Hanseatic League, and, later, St. Petersburg as a dynamic growth factor for the whole region in the 19th century.
Following the logic of the Cold War, maps of Northern Europe were, until recently, vertical, tall and narrow. The new ones are less tall and much broader. The new North has become horizontal, not vertical. Of course, it is still far from being a region in any political or economic sense of the word. The bitter heritage of the Soviet era can still be felt, not only in the Baltic States but all over Russia as well. In that sense, Northern Europe has become a sort of frontier or pilot area for dealing with the remains of Soviet disintegration. The Nordic countries have more of a direct stake in what happens in this process than most West European countries: perhaps we stand to gain more from positive developments in Russia, just as we have more to lose from bad developments.
The logical response to this situation is a policy of consistently involving and engaging Russia in European cooperation, and of promoting its integration in as many ways as Russia's size and its own development will permit. Successful democratic and economic reforms in Russia are probably the single most important factor for long-term European stability and security. Only Russia itself can carry out these reforms. But regional cooperation could help build a new Russia from below, as a result of practical daily contacts. The Nordic countries can make a contribution here, the importance of which extends beyond merely regional implications.
Regarding Russia as a normal partner also means expecting it to follow standard European rules and norms in its external dealings. Geopolitical weight does not confer any special rights or prerogatives. We expect the last Russian soldiers to leave the Baltic States by August 1994, when the final withdrawal from Germany will be celebrated, thus removing the last vestiges of the Second World War. Like other countries, Russia has legitimate interests to look after, and we are convinced that common European institutions will help provide a satisfactory framework for doing so. In this framework, there is also room for building a Russian-Baltic relationship that is not only free from acrimony and rhetoric, but genuinely constructive and mutually beneficial. We are trying to do everything we can to promote such a development.
In military terms, and for reasons well-known to this audience, Northern Europe is not just an area of regional importance--it is also strategically important. This brings me to the fourth pillar of Swedish security, the transatlantic one.
Even if Sweden is a country that neither is nor aspires to become a NATO member, I think we have good reason to testify to the value of NATO, both for its role in providing a strategic balance and as a stabilizing force in Europe. NATO's continued commitment to the North and, through NATO, the commitment of the United States, are obviously of particular interest to Sweden. NATO continues to be one of the cornerstones of European security. We therefore have reason to welcome the new functions that NATO successfully took on after the end of the Cold War. NATO's resources and structures have proved to be indispensable in carrying out the U.N. mandate in the former Yugoslavia. About 1,300 Swedish soldiers are serving under UNPROFOR, gaining experience in cooperating with NATO in peacekeeping activities. When placed at the disposal of U.N. peacekeeping missions, the efficiency of integrated NATO structures represents a valuable asset for all European countries.
The Partnership for Peace (PFP) initiative is, in our view, a very constructive response to a number of demands made on the organization at the present juncture. Sweden submitted its Presentation Document in spring 1994 and looks forward to concluding the Individual Partnership Program very shortly. Quite naturally, this program will focus on peacekeeping activities and contributions to transparency and democratic control. We look forward to participating in the first peacekeeping exercise in the Netherlands in October 1994. We also look forward to helping set up a Baltic peacekeeping battalion, together with other countries. We expect to be an active Partner in the Partnership for Peace program. And like other countries participating in the PFP, we look forward to Russia's participation in this cooperation in the near future.
Sweden also has good reason to welcome other important decisions made at the NATO summit in January regarding the Combined Joint Task Forces, which will strengthen a European security and defense identity. In this case, as with the PFP, the flexibility of the new approach will allow countries that are not members of the Alliance to cooperate with NATO. It will also allow them to contribute more effectively to meeting new challenges to European security in possible operations under a U.N. or a CSCE mandate.
This mandating function remains essential. The CSCE and the U.N. can be seen as the fifth pillar.
The United Nations remains the ultimate source of legitimacy for the use of force and for decisions binding the whole international community. It is striking how, since the end of the Cold War, the U.N. has become involved in solving conflicts on our own continent. Therefore, strengthening the U.N. is not only a global interest, as we seem to be moving toward a more fragmented international system facing increasingly varied challenges; it is also a directly European interest. U.N. peacekeeping must become more efficient, based on the strengths and weaknesses that have been amply demonstrated since U.N. commitments have grown dramatically.
The role of the CSCE has been developing rapidly over the last few years. During the year when I was chairman of the CSCE, we emphasized conflict prevention and crisis management, reinforcing the community of values, developing cooperation with other organizations, and strengthening the internal structures of the CSCE. Important work is continuing in these directions. At the Budapest Summit, it will be particularly essential to arrive at a common view on the role of third-party forces in local conflicts.
Since many of these local conflicts concern countries that were part of the former Soviet Union, I think one key to further development of CSCE capabilities lies in achieving a close coordination between Russian diplomatic efforts and the joint efforts undertaken by the CSCE. That is certainly one conclusion that can be drawn from our current experience as chairman of the Minsk group on the Nagorno-Karabach conflict. The political importance that Russia attaches to the CSCE, as recently underlined by Defense Minister Grachev, should be reflected in the role that Russia is prepared to give to the CSCE in conflicts close to Russia's borders. The future of the CSCE is, to a large extent, a function of the role that Russia itself is prepared to let it play. Likewise, without a consistent substantive commitment from NATO countries, the CSCE can achieve little in any of the conflicts on its agenda.
The CSCE is indispensable as a forum for political consultation and cooperation, including both the transatlantic and the Russian presence. Its source of strength is its great flexibility and its ability to adapt to new circumstances. Sometimes, however, the CSCE lacks internal cohesion--a reminder that it needs to be supplemented by deeper forms of integration.
Our new attitude toward Europe reflects our new attitude toward security. To build and secure democracy, to facilitate the rule of law, to promote human and minority rights, and to create market economies to the east and southeast of Sweden are now some of our major foreign policy objectives. The pillars of Swedish security, old and new, will reinforce each other. We are facing changes in Europe with an open mind. While we remain outside military alliances, we still share the vision that conflict is best prevented through increased integration. Our security goal for the rest of this century can be most accurately described as European integration with a North European dimension.