Center for Strategic Decision Research



Workshop Patron's Opening Address

His Excellency Dr. Franz Josef Jung
Minister of Defense of the Federal Republic of Germany

It is a pleasure for me to welcome you to the 23rd International Workshop on Global Security in Berlin. The fact that such an event is being held for the 23rd time shows me the continuing interest the international strategic community has in the workshop started by Dr. Weissinger-Baylon.

The subject of this year’s workshop is “Toward Peace and Security in the 21st Century—Decision-Making in the Global Era.” The subject needs no further justification, because the importance of security for our world is growing, even in the minds of the general public. We only have to glance in the newspapers each morning to see that we are confronted with security problems all over the globe, with CNN transmitting pictures of these problems—Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine, Iran, Africa, Kosovo—directly into our living rooms. We are living in a world whose regions are growing closer together all the time.

This situation increases the significance and the necessity of a security policy that addresses global security, not just regional security. It also requires us to talk about NATO, the EU, and the United Nations when we discuss our subject and to base our ideas on a comprehensive concept of security.


The year 2006 is a key year—at both the national and international levels—for setting the right course for security in the 21st century and for developing a comprehensive concept of security.

At the national level, we Germans have been prompted by the World Cup being held in our country to think very carefully about the security threats and risks of today and tomorrow because of the terrorist attacks in New York, Washington, Madrid, and London. We are in the process of taking all conceivable measures to avert such attacks and have realized that providing protection against terrorist attacks and other asymmetrical threats is a challenge for every national government and one that can only be mastered on an international basis. That requires that new approaches be adopted and new state procedures be found for ensuring security.

The year 2006 is also a key year for the major international institutions responsible for our collective security, namely, the Alliance, the European Union, and the United Nations. At the NATO summit in November 2006, heads of state and government will approve the key documents that update the Strategic Concept of 1999 and adapt the organization to the security environment of tomorrow. The Comprehensive Political Guidance will set extremely far-reaching standards.


During the preparation of these documents, a broad consensus was achieved that stated that tomorrow’s threats and risks lie in:

  • International terrorism, with the threat becoming even greater as terrorists acquire chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear capabilities
  • The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, in association with the availability of long-range delivery means
  • Collapsing or failing states that offer refuge to terrorist organizations or provide bases from which they can operate
  • The centuries-old potential for national and international conflicts along ethnic and religious boundaries in Europe and its periphery
  • Corrupt and inefficient governments, massive population growth, economic hardship, and starvation in parts of Africa and Asia, a result of state collapse that brings on uncontrolled migration, which can contribute to destabilization of an entire region
  • A wide range of other cross-border risks that are being increased by growing migration, worldwide mobility, global trade, and the availability of new technologies and means of communication
The most important feature of the Comprehensive Political Guidance is that it indicates the road that must be taken to counter these threats and risks, a view shared by the 26 NATO allies, 19 of which are also members of the EU. These nations agree that cooperation must be greatly intensified between the international organizations, notably NATO, the EU, and the U.N. All available political, diplomatic, civil, and military instruments must be organized to effectively counter tomorrow’s challenges, from prevention to combat to stabilization to reconstruction support and humanitarian relief. With this consensus I believe we are all on track to master the challenges facing us.


I also believe that 2006 is a very important year for the EU because we are preparing for Germany to assume the EU presidency for the first half of 2007. The crucial task will be to implement the European Security Strategy, which covers anti-terrorism, nonproliferation, disarmament, arms control, conflict prevention, and crisis management, in a host of pragmatic steps and projects and to continue to put life into it. We must expand civil-military cooperation with the EU and the EU must shoulder more responsibility in Kosovo. It is also important to me that the EU work to enhance the transatlantic relationship as well as expand the ESDP. It is of the utmost importance that it also moves ahead in its strategic cooperation with NATO and the U.N. While security may not be the most prominent part of the extensive programs Germany will undertake during its EU presidency, it will certainly be a key one.


It is obvious to me that the U.N. must regularly submit more requests for military support during prevention and crisis-management operations. We see this now in the Congo, where the EU has been asked to assist the MONUC by providing military forces to facilitate elections. There has been a fundamental change in the number and character of U.N. missions since the end of the East-West conflict and the number of deployed service personnel and police officers has risen dramatically. U.N. missions already involve the use of armed forces and the settlement of intra-state conflicts. Experts on international law increasingly acknowledge that averting humanitarian disasters, combating terrorists, and defending human rights may demand the use of coercive measures. Acting legitimately under international law is particularly crucial whenever military force is used and the United Nations is of unique importance in that regard.


What must we prepare for over the next decade in light of this situation?

The first is that the security situation in the global Information Age poses new and increasingly complex challenges to those responsible for security policy. It will be necessary to confront crises and conflicts at the source to keep their negative impacts as far away as possible from the countries and people in Europe. But single states and single security institutions, such as the army, police, or judiciary, cannot master these challenges in isolation. Effective security can only be provided through efficient and coherent collaboration at the national and international levels.

Second, we must be prepared, either in coalitions in NATO or the EU, to deal with a broadened task spectrum and to conduct a large number of operations that vary in both nature and intensity. At the same time we must be able to cover greater distances and sustain operations for long periods. The operations envisioned will probably increase in numbers but decrease in size. They will also be more multinational. Highly developed forces will probably be called upon to provide expensive and scarce critical assets and enabling capability in areas such as strategic lift, reconnaissance, command, control, communication, engineering support, and medical support. The large number of small operations that will need to be sustained for lengthy periods will stretch us to our collective limits much more than the medium-sized operations that the EU has conducted so far in ISAF, KFOR, and IFOR/SFOR/EUFOR.

Virtually all defense ministers may see themselves facing greater problems in the future. For most of us, having to ensure that our forces can do two things at once—namely, mount and sustain a host of operations increasingly distant from their bases and transform their structures to meet entirely different demands in the future—has been enough of a challenge and effort over the last few years.


As Germany’s defense minister I know exactly what I am talking about. Only a few other nations have had to come as long a way as Germany, from maintaining a deterrence and defense posture in its own country to participating in operations in far-off lands as well as turning its forces so radically into expeditionary forces and then providing them with the capabilities they need. But if our projections are correct and we have to contend in the future with more complex civil-military–style operations that are smaller in size but greater in number and that cannot be carried out one after another by quickly sending in forces and just as quickly pulling them out, then two fundamental conclusions must be drawn:

Our nations’ forces must adapt to the new challenges and, through transformation, work hard to develop or enhance the capabilities needed across the broad spectrum. In doing so they must bear in mind the increase in multinationality and preserve and improve the required military interoperability particularly with U.S. forces because of their unique strategic capabilities but also with European armies and with new countries around the globe with whom we intend to engage in strategic partnerships. Above and beyond this our complex civil-military commitments demand civil-military interoperability, especially in information sharing and communication, between military staffs and forces and civil authorities. This will ensure closer and more effective cooperation during operation planning, preparation, and execution.

In future military crisis prevention, conflict management, and humanitarian relief operations, a decade-long military presence, such as has been the case unfortunately with IFOR, SFOR, EUFOR, and KFOR in the Balkans and ISAF in Afghanistan, must not be required to establish and maintain stability. Military goals are accomplished in a few weeks or months but large military forces are then committed for years, because civil stabilization and reconstruction, which the military helps to enable by guaranteeing a safe and secure environment, progress too slowly because of insufficient planning and coordination. We will not be able to afford such states of affairs in the future and will need to be much quicker establishing self-supporting civil stability that allows forces to be downsized earlier than they have been in the past. In the future I assume we will require our forces and their critical assets and capabilities to be quickly available after military goals have been reached for other urgent operations in crisis areas. If they are not, on no account will we commit additional forces that are needed to support the U.N. or other organizations in stabilizing failing states.

Therefore the key to success lies in mastering the challenges of the early 21st century by ensuring substantially closer cooperation between key international organizations and non-governmental organizations that are willing to join in not only strategic planning of operations but tactical execution in the field. Defense ministers who must be careful in how they handle their forces and economical in using scarce resources will be especially eager to see this type of concerted civil and military planning and action come about.

I am pleased to see that the comprehensive approach to security that Germany has adopted is growing in fertile ground in the Alliance as well as reflected in the concepts of transformation: the Effects-Based Approach to Operations (EBAO), the Concepts for Alliance Future Joint Operations (CAFJO), and Denmark’s commendable Concerted Planning and Action (CPA) initiative. I am also pleased that the approach puts the work we are doing in our PRT in Afghanistan into a conceptual framework within NATO.

I am convinced that we are realizing at an international level that international inter-agency cooperation—well-orchestrated cooperation between international organizations, governmental organizations, and non-governmental organizations—is the way to move forward. The strategic commanders have realized this as well and have begun to draw the right military conclusions. We must now adapt and further develop our capabilities across the spectrum with this approach, without duplication and in a complementary manner. The civil capabilities we can provide in the EU are not needed and should not be provided in NATO, and the military capabilities we can provide in NATO are not needed and should not be built up in the EU.

Well-planned and pragmatic cooperation facilitates effective commitment without demanding too great a share of scarce resources, even if the challenges continue to increase. If we do not cooperate in this way, we will not be in a position to collectively shoulder more operations and will lose popular support. So there is no alternative.


Much closer cooperation, especially between NATO and the EU, is extremely important for success. We must overcome deadlocks and encourage practical cooperation wherever possible. Just as NATO will be crucial for the military component of complex commitments, in most cases, particularly the difficult ones that demand robust strategic capabilities, the EU will be vital for the civil components. This is why I would like to emphasize that NATO and the EU are equally essential for the security of Europe and its member-states. The two organizations have different profiles and areas of expertise and both have strengths and weaknesses. They must therefore not compete with each other but complement one another.

For us, NATO remains the foundation for the collective defense of Europe and for our joint security. No other organization will be able to perform this core task in the foreseeable future. NATO is the transatlantic forum for consultation and offers the instruments needed for all military operations involving European and American allies.

Complex military crisis-prevention operations demand robust and proven political and military structures, procedures, forces, and capabilities for combat and stabilization roles to be assumed. It is in this area that NATO has singular political and military assets, especially given the strategic capabilities and force potentials of the United States. The EU will therefore remain unable to take military action at the same level for some time to come, even after full implementation of the Headline Goal. On the other hand, the EU has a much broader range of non-military instruments, assets, and capabilities than NATO. It can draw on steadily increasing experience, particularly in the areas of prevention, long-term stabilization, reconstruction aid, and humanitarian operations. It should also become capable of autonomously planning and commanding ESDP operations. However, because resources are extremely scarce in all member-states, we must be careful not to be tempted to duplicate structures instead of closing Europe’s already long-standing capability gaps.

It is therefore important to use the different forms of expertise and the different strengths of NATO and the EU as efficiently as possible. This requires that the two organizations reach agreement on the roles they will play within the transatlantic security architecture. Germany will do what it can to improve the organizations’ relationship in order to achieve closer cooperation and greater efficiency as well as strengthen European and transatlantic security as a whole. We will work to intensify cooperation in:

  • Early political consultation on crisis management
  • International terrorism
  • Civil defense
  • Prevention of proliferation
  • Civil-military cooperation
  • Extending the Berlin Plus instrument package
  • Capability development and force planning
  • Training exercises and certification
  • Identical military standards
We believe that the dialogue between the EU and NATO must be improved at all levels. This will involve working to render cooperation between the established joint bodies more effective, giving them the necessary restricted decision-making authority, and eliminating existing deadlocks in practical cooperation. Attendance of the respective council meetings by both the High Representative of the EU and the NATO Secretary General should also be institutionalized, as should corresponding possibilities for the two military committees or representatives.

Nineteen states are already members of both organizations, a number that is set to increase over the years to come. But increasing that number also involves close coordination and pragmatic cooperation in the interest of both sides. The idea of a Strategic Partnership between the EU and NATO, formed at the Istanbul Summit in 2004, also needs to be developed further.


It is a fundamental fact that a strong EU is good for the Alliance and a strong NATO guarantees Europe’s security and best serves European unification. So what firm action do the two organizations need to take?

When I look at NATO, I see that its military transformation has greatly advanced: there is a new command structure, a new force structure that includes the NRF, and systematic capabilities development to match a broad spectrum of tasks. The goal and conceptual thinking are leading us in the right direction—toward faster decision-making processes, information superiority through network-enabled capabilities, coherent effects, reorganized logistical capabilities, and the fastest possible application of lessons learned and new concepts to ongoing operations. I greatly appreciate the good pioneering work that has been done in this regard by the attending strategic and operational commanders at ACO, ACT, and NATO headquarters over the last few years.

The necessary political transformation is also progressing well, with continued openness regarding enlargement and global partnerships. Still, three things remain to be done:

  • The strategic dialogue within the Alliance must be improved. All important issues relating to transatlantic security should be discussed more frequently within the Alliance bodies, including such thorny issues as Iran. There must be no taboos. The Alliance can retain its relevance in the long term only if its members have the political will to analyze security problems jointly, make decisions by consensus after joint analysis and consultation, and then take joint action.
  • NATO must integrate all the political, diplomatic, military, and civil instruments at its disposal to coordinate their use.
  • NATO must enhance its willingness and ability to work more closely and complementarily with other international organizations, particularly the U.N. and the EU.
The EU must then assimilate the progress that NATO achieves in developing conceptual capabilities to eliminate existing gaps and to closely correlate defense planning processes. The ILA Air Show in Berlin highlights the fact that the European defense industry has been striving for years, with growing success, to pool Europe’s capabilities to become better and more efficient on its side of the Atlantic. Cooperation in the field of armaments can both further strengthen NATO as an institution of transatlantic security as well as further develop the EU’s capability to take military action. The European Defense Agency has a highly important role in bringing about more joint projects.

Regarding the United Nations, it is important for that organization to adapt its structures to current challenges, in particular to the drastic increase in the number of U.N. missions. These include the recent establishment of a permanent Human Rights Committee, the adoption of an after-terror convention, and the implementation of comprehensive reform.


What can Germany do to help? We would prefer to continue working within international organizations to contribute to collective security. We are making great efforts to keep these institutions politically relevant and effective. We are also contributing force contingents, capabilities, and financial resources, mostly as part of NATO and the EU on the basis of U.N. mandates. At present Germany has over 7,000 military personnel taking part in international operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Africa and is making considerable financial contributions—Germany is the largest contributor in the EU, the second largest in NATO, and the third largest in the United Nations. This will continue.


I would like to conclude by summarizing my key points:

  • All those who bear political or military responsibility must be increasingly aware that security policy has become a general responsibility that cuts across every ministry and agency.
  • Both at home and abroad we must improve cooperation between the various players and instruments and make more efficient use of them. Distinguishing between external and internal security is no longer justified.
In other words, we need a networked security policy. This requires reviewing and adapting existing structures, processes, and instruments in keeping with a comprehensive national and global security concept. That is the real challenge facing those responsible for security policy, both nationally and internationally, at the present time.


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