Center for Strategic Decision Research




Dr. Roger Weissinger-Baylon
Workshop Chairman
Director, Center for Strategic Decision Research

Abstract. With the expansion of serious crises from the Balkan Peninsula to Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon and North Korea and many other regions, it is vital that international organizations including the NATO Alliance, the EU, and the U.N. continue to transform themselves and cooperate more effectively. Since the U.S., U.K., and other militaries are overstretched, budgets are under pressure, and public support is falling (at least for the Iraq War). There is a widely-felt need to explore new strategies, and we may already be on the cusp of fundamental changes. Moreover, the U.S. mid-term elections represent a powerful call for new approaches in the Middle-East and globally. Following policy reviews by the Iraq Study Group, the U.S. military, and the incoming 110th Congress, there will most likely be a push for troop reductions in Iraq, for possibly talking in some manner with Syria and Iran, and, hopefully, for addressing the Israel-Palestine problem which is at the heart of the multiple crises in the Middle East. While the debate is sure to be intense, White House Chief of Staff Josh Bolton has recently said, “We clearly need a fresh approach.”


In his opening address to this year’s 23rd International Workshop on Global Security, German Defense Minister Franz-Josef Jung calls 2006 “a key year…for setting the right course for security in the 21st century.” According to Supreme Allied Commander, Europe General James Jones, it is now time for NATO’s transformation to enter a new phase that will “enable the new NATO as it accepts…operations in Africa, in Afghanistan, in Iraq.” General Jones sees NATO’s Riga Summit on 28-29 November 2006 as the occasion for the Alliance’s political leaders to agree on the key issues. Italian Chief of Defense Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola views the current international security situation as a “revolution” that calls for a broad international dialogue of experts and leaders, with an “open and frank debate and exchange of ideas which is necessary to arrive at “decisions for a safer, more stable and more peaceful global future.” We would like the series of annual International Workshops on Global Security to encourage a useful exchange of views that will help our political and military leaders find the right course. As General Jones suggests, we also hope that the Workshops will help explain to our publics what NATO does and why it is important.


With the expansion of serious crises from the Balkan Peninsula to Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon and North Korea, capabilities and resources of the international community (including the NATO Alliance, the EU, and the U.N.) are stressed, and militaries are overextended. In this difficult context, it is vital for the key international actors to put aside past differences and cooperate far more effectively. Fortunately, there seems to be a new willingness to do so. There is also a pressing need to find new strategies for dealing with insurgencies, for successful reconstruction, and to recover public support. There are no other options.

In addition to the continuing tensions in the Balkans, the Black Sea region, and elsewhere, several crises have taken on particularly grave dimensions since the Berlin Workshop:

  • Lebanon. Following Israel’s July invasion, the French-led U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) is seeking to maintain calm while the country struggles to recover. (Israel has since begun a military offensive in the Gaza Strip. A Qatar-sponsored U.N. Security Council resolution, which would have condemned Israel’s Gaza attacks, was vetoed by the United States.)
  • Iraq. With the continuing deterioration of the situation in Iraq, public support for the war has fallen. As a result, the Republican Party has lost control of both houses of Congress, and there is now broad-based pressure to find new strategies.
  • Afghanistan. While NATO has now assumed responsibility for all of Afghanistan, its troops are facing intensified Taliban attacks.
  • Iran and North Korea. Both Iran and North Korea continue to provoke the international community with their nuclear ambitions, while North Korea has now exploded a nuclear device.


In Lebanon, the UNIFIL (U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon) is restoring calm but the price may prove to be heavy. France now leads UNIFIL, and Italy will assume command in January. These countries and their U.N. partners are committing scarce military and other resources to Lebanon. As long as these assets remain in that country, they will be unavailable to deal with Afghanistan, the Darfur situation, or other crises that may arise. Moreover, there is a risk that the French, Italian, and other U.N. troops in Lebanon will at some point become hostages of Hezbollah—and that could make it difficult for their countries to take firm political stances against countries such as Syria, or Iran, or to easily face other difficult international challenges.

Lessons from the July War. The lessons from Israel’s invasion of Lebanon should be a “wake-up call.” The fighting was characterized by extreme violence—more than one million on each side were displaced or forced to take shelter. Yet, despite the mutual suffering, both countries seemed to relish the damage done to the other. Many Israelis believe that their country suffered a defeat. Consequently, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s popularity has dropped to just 20%, and his government has been forced further to the right by taking Avigdor Lieberman into the cabinet as Deputy Prime Minister.

Among Arabs, there was an international feeling that was close to glee. Hezbollah’s strong military capability was only one of several unexpected developments. Other surprises were Hezbollah’s ability to maintain secrecy and successfully resist Israel’s efforts to penetrate the organization; the determination of Hezbollah fighters willing to die to defend their villages and to maintain the fight against Israel for 34 days (the first-time for an Arab army), and Hezbollah’s ability to attack Israel with increased sophistication. Hezbollah is now the third group to have used rockets against Israel.

Consequences for Israel and the U.S. The international effects of the July War are serious. Millions of Arabs and their governments will long remember the U.S. insistence on delaying the negotiation of a cease-fire until Israel had time to destroy Hezbollah. Among the consequences are the following:

  • Damages to Lebanon. Israel will be blamed for the damage to Lebanon and its infrastructure, and for the strategy of deliberately harming Lebanese civilians in order to turn them against Hezbollah. (Actually, it turned the Lebanese population even more against Israel, while many believe that harming civilian populations in this way is a war crime).
  • Israel’s unexpected military weakness. Israel (and the U.S. as well) are now perceived as being militarily weaker than expected; Israel’s aura of invincibility has been shattered, and Israelis have lost much confidence in their government’s ability to protect their security.
  • Threats to the U.S.-Israeli sense of partnership. The sense of partnership shared between the U.S. and Israel may have been weakened somewhat by U.S. perceptions that Israel did not deliver on its promises to deal a quick and decisive blow to Hezbollah. Israelis are concerned that the U.S. policies “have empowered Iranian-backed militias in Iraq”(NYT, 13 Nov 06), which would not be in Israel’s interest. Moreover, there may be concerns in Israel that the U.S. interests in encouraging democracies in Arab countries are not in Israel’s interest—since opposition groups in Arab countries are inevitably linked to Islamic militants.
  • Influence of U.S. evangelical Christians. In considering Israel’s invasion of Lebanon, and other Middle East issues as well, it is important to consider the influences of evangelical Christians who represent part of the power base of the U.S. Administration. According to the New York Times, U.S. evangelical Christians met with the White House during the July War to “voice support for allowing the air attacks on Hezbollah to continue unabated.”
While there can be no doubt that the U.S. remains enormously powerful and influential in the Middle East, it has nonetheless lost considerable credibility with respect to any future efforts to:
  • promote democracy in the region, since it supported the invasion of Lebanon, or
  • offer to mediate potential future conflicts involving Israel.
The significance of Hezbollah. Considering Hezbollah as merely a terrorist organization misses the point that it has political, social, and economic roles in addition to its military dimension. Moreover, Hezbollah represents a deeply-felt striving by Arabs to fight back against a broad range of humiliating experiences that they are suffering throughout the Middle East:
  • mistrust and mistreatment by their own Arab or Muslim governments.
  • defeats and repression by Israel (including Israel’s record as an occupying power, with unrelenting political, social, and economic discrimination against Palestinians).
  • a centuries-long tradition of European powers successively imposing their will on the region.


Falling public support for the Iraq War. In his recent assessments of the Iraq War, President George Bush remains confident and continues to predict victory, but acknowledges that there will be “tough fighting ahead.” Following gains by the Democratic Party in the November mid-term elections, however, former CIA Director Robert Gates has been nominated to replace Secretary Rumsfeld, and White House Chief of Staff Josh Bolton has said that “We clearly need a fresh approach” in Iraq.

The Iraq Study Group, headed by James Baker and Lee Hamilton, will soon present their recommendations, and U.S. political and military leaders are expected to approach the Iraq situation in a more bi-partisan manner (at least that is the hope). Some Republican leaders, including Senators John Warner, John McCain, Lindsey Graham, Chuck Hagel, and Susan Collins, have expressed varying degrees of frustration and concern over the war’s direction. A few leading neo-conservatives have even joined the critics.

As the U.S. elections have demonstrated, public support for the war has dropped significantly—partly due to heavy casualties among U.S. forces, its coalition partners, and the Iraqis themselves (estimates of civilian casualties range from 50,000 to over a hundred thousand). The falling support probably also reflects distress over the large numbers of seriously wounded soldiers, Abu Ghraib prison, U.S. policies on torture, secret CIA flights, and the lack of a clear and convincing strategy for either winning or leaving. The costs of the war, for which estimates range up to $2 trillion, is undoubtedly an important factor, too.

How to achieve progress. Hopes for progress in Iraq rest on efforts to pass responsibilities to the Iraqis, which would relieve the pressures on the U.S. and coalition troops. The Iraqi government may be encouraged to disband the militias, which are at the heart of much violence. According to recent media speculation, there may be proposals for the creation of semi-autonomous Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish regions, with central control limited to a few areas such as oil revenues and foreign policy. In order to achieve such goals, it could be necessary to talk with Iran and Syria. This, of course, would represent a fundamental policy shift, but the U.K. has already taken this step as has James Baker in the context of the Iraq Study group efforts. Another challenge will be to move forward on the reconstruction of the country, but the withdrawal from Iraq by Bechtel, one of the largest construction contractors, certainly presents a challenge. If Bechtel could not be successful despite its huge size, vast international experience, and close political ties to the Administration, what are the chances that other companies will be able to succeed ?

Pressures on U.K. forces. Since it will be vital to keep the coalition together in Iraq, consideration must be given to the growing domestic pressures on British Prime Minister Tony Blair. Public support is low and he has been challenged by several of the nation’s most prestigious military leaders: General Sir Richard Dannatt, Chief of the British General Staff, has said that the presence of British troops in Iraq “exacerbates” the difficulties the British Army is facing in Afghanistan. Field Marshal Lord Inge, Britain’s former Chief of Defense, believes that the U.K. does not have a “clear strategy in either Afghanistan or Iraq.” Britain’s former ambassador to the U.N. and advisor on Iraq, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, has called the Iraq War “a failure” with “only bad options for the coalition from now on.” (Sir Jeremy suggests a “massive new effort of regional diplomacy” involving Syria and Iran.) More recently, General the Lord Guthrie, another former Chief of Defense, has added his voice to the debate in saying that “to launch the British army in [Afghanistan] with the numbers there are, while we’re still going on in Iraq is cuckoo.” There is concern in the U.K. that British forces are so over-stretched in Iraq that the mission in Afghanistan could be at risk and both the Iraq and Afghanistan wars might be lost.


NATO’s most dangerous operation. SACEUR General Jones describes Afghanistan as “the most dangerous operation NATO has taken on.” NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has now assumed responsibility for the entire country. Its mission is to establish a “secure, self-sufficient, democratic and stable Afghanistan” (Amb. Juneau)—which is the only way to assure that the country will not become a base for Al-Qaeda or continue to supply the majority of heroin now arriving in Europe. As Allied Joint Force Commander General Gerhard Back notes, there have been many successes there: “Governance is improving, free elections have been achieved, and reconstruction and security sector reforms are showing progress.” However, ISAF is now facing growing difficulties. According to recent reports, insurgent activity has increased by a factor of four over last year, as the Taliban import techniques that they have found to be effective in Iraq:

“…improvised explosive devices against Coalition and ISAF forces, and more recently, a rise in suicide bombers. The older tactics of intimidation and violence against government officials, NGOs and other soft targets have, if anything, increased. In addition, the insurgents are proving adept at capitalizing on links with criminal and narcotics elements to garner support and generate funds.” (General Back)

These links between insurgents and criminality, according to General Back, lead to a “difficult paradox.” Security and stability cannot be achieved without tackling “…the wider problems of factionalism, power brokers, illegally armed groups, narcotics, and criminality.” This means that the test of success is not purely military but “whether the Afghan people feel safe in their homes and villages, whether they are free of corruption or bribery, and whether they can exercise the rights guaranteed to them in the new constitution.”

The need to develop a bond of trust with local populations. In order to truly succeed in Afghanistan, we must “win the hearts and minds” of the people, and “…if we take a military approach…in which the main issue is to use the full power of our military forces, we may end up creating more problems than solutions” (Admiral Di Paola). In dealing with poppy production, for example, this means that:

“It is of little use to target the farmers who are merely scratching out a living to support their families and who have few if any options. It is the bigger players we need to target. A comprehensive approach is needed that encourages farmers to turn to alternatives. Until they have choices, eradication alone will not solve the problem.” (General Back)

Traditionally, Afghanistan was organized around clans, not a central government. So the challenge is to “build something from scratch that never existed there…and that will take a long, long time” (Admiral Di Paola). NATO forces will need to develop a bond of trust with the local populations, avoid the perception of being an occupying force, and maintain public support in home countries once NATO troops begin to incur casualties.


Iran. Over the longer term, Iran’s continued efforts to develop nuclear technology (a second chain of centrifuges is now ready for operation) present a serious threat to regional stability. Ambassador Munir Akram, Pakistan’s long-serving representative to the U.N., describes the nuclear issue as the “fulcrum of the struggle between the U.S. and its allies and Iran” over a range of issues that is broader than narrowly-focused concern for Iran’s eventual acquisition of a nuclear weapon. Major General Zhan Maohai, former head of International Affairs for the Chinese Ministry of Defense, suggests how his country may view the thorny issues at the root of the tensions:

“In reality, the crisis is a result of problems left over from history, namely, the existence of geostrategic and structure issues between America and Iran. Since the end of the Cold War, the Middle East’s geostrategic significance has greatly increased, and the collapse of the Saddam regime elevated Iran’s strategic status to a major regional power. But as U.S. armed forces have entered Central Asia, Afghanistan, and Iraq, Iran has been the only barrier to America’s building a Central Asia/Middle East/South Asia link.”

The following points, while by no means exhaustive, may suggest the complexity of the issues:

  • Iran’s domestic policy failures. Since Iranian President Ahmadinejad has been unable to deliver on his electoral promises to improve the lives of Iranian citizens, strong popular support for Iran’s nuclear programs provides a vital diversion that helps to prop up his government. (While ordinary Iranians do support their country’s nuclear ambitions, they may not be prepared to go to war over it.) Similarly, threats against Iran from the U.S., Israel, or other Western countries may also help President Ahmadinejad deal with opposition politicians as well as those critics who have charged him with personal corruption.
  • Iranian perceptions concerning nuclear deterrence. Iran may feel it needs nuclear weapons as a essential element of deterrence. Moreover, President Ahmadinejad may also believe that a nuclear program will “…help Iran win prestige in the Islamic world and build its regional power status.”(Zhan)
  • Iranian support for Hezbollah, Syria, and Hamas. Iran is seen as supporting Hezbollah, Syria, Hamas, Islamic Jihad groups, and maintains a “defiant Iranian rhetoric against the U.S. and Israel.” (Amb. Akram)
  • Is the West seeking regime change in Iran? In addition to international pressures over the country’s nuclear activities, the Iranian government is concerned that the West wants not only a change in behavior but also “regime change.” (In the case of Libya, Khadafi agreed to meet Western demands to give up his WMD programs in exchange for assurances that he would remain in power.)
  • Western desires to control the region’s oil and energy resources. According to Ambassador Akram, the U.S. and its Western allies feel a need for “effective control over the oil and energy resources of the Gulf Region.” Consequently, the difficulties experienced by the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq make it “more necessary to address Iranian power in the Gulf.” There is also concern that Iran might assume a dominant position in the Shia Crescent (which comprises Iran, much of Iraq, and the oil-rich areas of eastern Saudi Arabia).
  • Russian and Chinese influences. Since Russia and China have important trade and other relations with Iran, the two countries can be expected to oppose any harsh sanctions that would be counter to their own economic or political interests. On the positive side, Russia and China may be motivated to help resolve the tensions.
North Korea and India. North Korea has now exploded a nuclear device; and India has been able to enter the exclusive club of nuclear powers with what amounts to a “free pass.” The Czech Republic’s Ambassador to India, Jaromir Novotny, has described the treatment of India relative to other countries with an ironic reference to a famous proclamation by the pigs who have taken control of the government in George Orwell’s Animal Farm: “All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others.”

As more countries seek to acquire nuclear weapons or avoid IAEA controls, other countries may come to believe that nuclear weapons are essential to their security.

Concerns for the future. In the face of these trends, United Nations Under-Secretary General Nobuaki Tanaka understandably points out that the “international non-proliferation regime is in crisis,” but, at the same time, “moments of deep crisis in international relations are also moments of opportunity.” Many experts are calling for more dialogue, including IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei who wants the international community to move beyond the idea that dialogue rewards bad behavior.


Completing NATO’s transformation. NATO’s transformation continues to go well, with recent progress in such areas as the establishment of the Intelligence Fusion Center in Molesworth in the United Kingdom, the announced intention of building a special operations capability, and, especially, the creation of the NATO Response Force (NRF). SACEUR General James Jones calls the NATO Response Force the “single most visible example of operational transformation.” Nonetheless, NATO’s progress is still needed in certain areas:

  • Strategic lift. Although strategic lift is a shortfall, several options are under consideration.
  • Helicopters. According to General Jones, helicopters are the “hardest thing to generate in the Alliance” and “…in Afghanistan, the most critical problem is a lack of helicopters.”
  • Caveats. Although there has been progress on eliminating caveats in Kosovo, caveats place restrictions on the use of certain forces in Afghanistan and thereby reduce the flexibility of commanders.
  • Funding mechanisms. With the Alliance’s current “costs fall where they lie” funding mechanisms, there is a reluctance by some countries to provide forces for the NATO Response Force: If NATO were to decide to use the NRF, the countries offering forces would have to bear the costs. Thus, the funding mechanism gives countries an economic incentive not to offer forces to the NRF, even though they have the necessary capacity.
  • Political transformation. Since nearly all of NATO’s transformational efforts have been directed at the military level, transformation now needs to continue at the political level.

NATO-EU complementarity. While NATO and the EU are seeking ways to work together more effectively, real progress cannot be achieved without concerted efforts at the top of these organizations, especially at the level of the Secretary General. One of the challenges is that NATO’s search for new missions tends to bring it into geographic areas and missions, such as disaster relief, that formerly might have been considered as the EU’s province.

International defense industry cooperation. Since the resources of many countries are overstretched, it is vital to lower acquisition costs through more effective international defense industry cooperation. From the standpoint of SACEUR General Jones, a serious acquisition problem arises when urgently needed systems (such as blue force tracking technology) are subjected to lengthy multi-year international acquisition processes. From the standpoint of companies, there is also frustration when acquisitions are delayed because of the need for technology transfer approvals that often take years. Alfred Volkman points out that there are now several cycles that are necessary for technology transfer approval, but he hopes it may be possible to handle them in parallel.

Fortunately, the transatlantic defense industry, which Northrop Grumman’s Carl O. Johnson calls “better linked and stronger than ever,” is finally moving ahead. He summarizes some of the progress that has been achieved:

“Witness the growth of BAE in the U.S.….an AgustaWestland helicopter as the replacement for the U.S. Presidential helicopter…partnership between Northrop Grumman and EADS for EuroHawk…the strides EADS North America has taken….there is the AGS [Allied Ground Surveillance] industry team working together to provide critically needed transformational capabilities.”


Lieutenant General Ulrich Wolf, who is responsible for Alliance communications systems, describes NATO “procurement circles, which produce communications equipment designed up to ten years before introduction into service.” As a result, NATO’s “standard communications software is on the average two generations behind the actual versions.” SACEUR General Jones, has expressed concern as to NATO’s financial systems in particular:

“Are we going to tiptoe into the 21st century in this way or are we going to swing into it full speed ahead with a full wind behind our sails? I find our NATO financial system to be opaque, incomprehensible and certainly not agile enough to support NATO operations of the 21st century. I believe a complete overhaul of our financial system, with renewed transparency, is appropriate and I think it should be done before we ask any country to increase its fair share of financial support to the Alliance. The members of the Alliance must be able to see what we are doing, how we are doing it, and where the money is being spent.”

With only 10% of NATO funding going to operations, General Jones feels that more agile and transparent systems are needed to answer the question, “Are we really spending our money wisely?”

Another area that requires attention is non-traditional missions. According to the Pentagon’s Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Dr. Lin Wells:

“…our forces need increasingly to emphasize non-traditional missions such as: stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations; humanitarian assistance; disaster relief; and, increasingly, something called building partner capacity, which is trying to set conditions so that war does not happen…this implies that we will be dealing with non-traditional partners, for example, aid organizations, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, indigenous security services, commercial partners, people who will never get inside the firewalls of our network but with whom we need to share information.”

Working with such non-traditional organizations may be increasingly important in future years—and this may impose special information requirements in order to share information with them. NATO (and other international organizations) need to work with the information technology industry in order to achieve the benefits of the information age systems of the 21st century.


Since these challenges are testing the military capacity and other resources of the U.S. and key allies, a major shift in diplomatic and military strategy is vitally needed. We are already on the cusp of that change. While it is too early to know what new policies are in store for Iraq or other regions of crisis, there are signs that the winds of change are beginning to blow:

  • Increased international cooperation. The U.S. and its European allies are showing a willingness to work together far more closely and effectively than ever before. They understand that there is no other option.
  • Openness to new strategic options. Policy makers are beginning to discuss openly options that were unthinkable until quite recently, such as reducing troop levels in Iraq; talking with Syria, Iran, or North Korea; or even abandoning the goal of democracy in Iraq in favor of a strongman who could reduce violence in the country.
  • Public pressures for change. There is a strong push by the U.S. and European publics to find more effective means of dealing with the global security challenges and especially to reduce military and civilian casualties in Iraq.

In the U.S., President Bush has already met with the Iraq Study Group, headed by James Baker and Lee Hamilton. The new Democrat-led 110th Congress is also expected to push for the review of Iraq strategy and to seek reductions of troop levels in Iraq. Among U.S. allies, Prime Minister Tony Blair appears to be advocating talks with Syria and Iran as well as a resolution of the Israel-Palestine problem, which is at the heart of the conflict in the Middle East. As mentioned above, White House Chief of Staff Josh Bolton has said, “We clearly need a fresh approach.”

Much depends on the willingness of the new Congressional leaders and President Bush to work effectively together—and with their global allies. In any case, President Bush and his administration now have an extraordinary chance to develop broader public support by promoting more bi-partisan domestic and international policies. This is also a favorable time for the Bush administration to begin a new chapter in U.S. relations with other nations—and to further strengthen ties with NATO, the EU, the U.N., and other key international organizations.


According to a key recommendation in the report on last year’s International Workshop on Global Security:

“There is probably no way out of the current dilemmas that does not involve enhanced international cooperation and, especially, a major effort to address poverty and misery in the world—for the security and prosperity of wealthy countries depend on that of the poor and underdeveloped ones.”

This observation is as important as ever: it is vital to remember that feelings of poverty, inequality of incomes and opportunity, and injustice are at the heart of the violence that is spreading on every continent—and which is one of the great challenges of global security in this new century.

In his major address to last year’s Workshop at the Chateau de Chantilly in France, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk described the success of his country’s non-violent Orange Revolution: “By protesting persistently in a non-violent manner for 17 days, despite snow and cold weather, Ukrainians proved to be Europeans, in the heart of Europe.” In his address to this year’s Workshop at Berlin’s Bode Museum, Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli reminded us once again that extraordinary political change can occur without violence. Three years ago, his country joined Ukraine by providing another non-violent example of revolutionary change that others might emulate: In the words of Prime Minister Nogaideli, “The Rose Revolution—during which not a single life was lost, not a single building burned, swept away a deeply corrupt regime.” Of course, it will be far from easy to apply the lessons of Ukraine and Georgia to Iraq, Afghanistan, or other regions where radical Islam is fueling insurgencies. In regions were Islam is dominant, the profound cultural differences are a great challenge. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the pressures for change are not arising from the local populations as in Ukraine or Georgia. Instead, Western countries may be motivated by a desire to gain access to or influence over regional energy resources, to promote the spread of Christianity, to prevent countries from being used as bases for Al-Qaeda or other terrorist groups, or to block the production or distribution of the heroin arriving in Europe and North America. Nonetheless, it is important to put aside selfish motivations and seek progress toward peace and stability in these strategically vital regions.

The above overview addresses some of the key issues discussed at the 23rd International Workshop on Global Security, which was held in Berlin, Germany in May 2006—with somewhat more attention to crises and other developments that have emerged or intensified in more recent months. For a more detailed examination of the current global security issues, including discussions of progress and suggested future approaches, we would like to refer you to the forty-eight chapters that follow in this report. You will find well-informed views by international political figures including German Defense Minister Franz Josef Jung, Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander, Europe General James Jones, other defense ministers, state secretaries, and government leaders, as well as leading military figures, senior diplomats, and representatives of many of the largest technology, aerospace, and defense companies.


Top of page | Home | ©2007 Center for Strategic Decision Research